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Abstract
-This thesis explores the apparent paradox of mutuality in Britain at the turn of the
millennium. It contrasts the relative decline of building societies via demutualisation,
against the continual governmental support for and growth of credit unions. It begins
by constructing a cultural conceptualisation of mutuality, which comprises of four
interrelated elements: trust, reciprocity/habit, longevity, and caution. These are
formalised in an organisational model of cooperation, which seeks to explain how
mutuals function in reality. Both these models are employed to assess the validity of
competing explanations of contemporary mutuality. First, a functionalist interpretation,
which assumes that demutualisation is an inevitable result of growth, is examined.
Second, a neo-Marxist analysis, which believes resource appropriation by building
society management, was the motivation for change. However, neither theory was
substantiated by the evidence because they could not fully explain why demutualisation
did not occur earlier or why new mutuals, namely credit unions, were being established.
Consequently a third interpretation synthesising the Neo-Marxist thesis with a cultural
post-modern glocal turn was developed. Accordingly, demutualisation occurred
because building societies became disembedded from society. First, the culmination of
paternalism produced a transformation in the trust relationship between members and
management. Second, in the political and economic spheres, Thatcherism and
globalisation marginalised any alternative perspectives to the neo-liberal narrative,
through the commodification of the personal; discrediting and abasement of the mutual;
and the imposition of a crypto-Utopian discourse. Alongside this assault on mutuality a
counter-culture of opposition to globalisation, glocalism, created spaces for new
mutuals, such as credit unions. Many of these entities deliberately prioritised social over
economic objectives and based their attachment on a small locality. By examining
mutuals holistically it is hoped that this thesis contributes to a sociological




The high volume of demutualisations (the conversion from mutual to joint-stock
company status) between 1989-99 resulted in mutual organisations such as building
societies becoming a rarity at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Unlike joint
stock companies, mutual members are customers, and/or workers and own the mutuals.
Membership is equally distributed on a one-member one-vote basis and not premised on
pecuniary investment. The earliest known building society began in Birmingham in
1775 and formed part of a mutual tradition including friendly societies, insurance and
burial companies, and ultimately co-operatives. Collectively these organisations were
practical manifestations of early socialist thought that emerged alongside the Industrial
Revolution. Building societies originally provided collective finance for house
purchase and construction for and by members. Over time they evolved into the
repositories of members' savings, which were then used to on-lend to other members in
the form of mortgages. Until the 1970s building societies were the only' mutuals
providing savings and loans facilities, thereafter credit unions were established which
offered much smaller personal loans.
The ownership structure was ignored until building societies started to demutualise,
when members were compensated in order to facilitate a transfer of control. Once
individuals realised the potential for a windfall of £800-2500 on the basis of a £100
investment made prior to a predetermined date, many thousands of people joined
societies. This activity became known as carpetbagging and participants called
carpetbaggers. Companies were even formed to takeover building societies and force
their conversion, although attempts to appropriate building societies have failed, most
notably Leek United in 1999.
'The exception being the Co-operative Bank
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1.1	 Aims
This thesis is a journey from eighteenth century Birmingham to late twentieth century
-
Leek and beyond. It is the tale of two mutual forms: the growth of credit unions, in
receipt of political and public support; and the decline of building societies, the other
indigenous and longstanding form, virtually ignored by the political establishment until
very recently when they were considered legitimate targets by a minority of members.
Specifically, it seeks to understand this apparent paradox by examining how these
mutual forms and mutuality itself are defined, embedded and effected within
contemporary culture. It does this through a review of the historical development of
building societies and credit unions, followed by a theoretically informed empirical
analysis of the attitudes of senior management of mutuals, the ordinary members, and
the active members, who are predominately the anti-mutual carpetbaggers. More
generally, the purpose of the thesis is to account for the rise, recent decline, and even
more recent stabilisation of mutual organisations in contemporary Britain.
1.2	 The Evolution of the Research Project
This thesis was the product of three conflating influences that emerged independently in
1997. The first was the process of demutualisation (mentioned earlier), the second was
my own research into community based financial institutions, and the third was the new
socio-political literature grappling for alternatives to neo-liberalism.
In 1997 a total £35 billion in the UK was distributed through demutualisations,
dwarfing the £22 billion raised by privatisation throughout Thatcher's 11 years as Prime
Minister. This phenomenon which started within the Savings and Loans sector in the
USA, before being transplanted into the UK with the conversion of the Abbey National
in 1989, has now intensified and globalised, transforming the ownership of the personal
finance industry. ACME (2001) estimated that £100 billion of insurance premium
cover and 10% of the global life assurance business was demutualised between 1996-
2001. Two-thirds of the UK capitalisation of building societies has been converted, and
over 80% of those in Australia and Ireland, while within Australia even two credit
unions have demutualised. In 1998 it was estimated that global conversions would
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create $200 billion of new stock (Grannis 1998), yet this was before the demutualisation
announcement by America's largest insurer, Prudential, with its capitalisation of $198
billion. Based on these figures $400-500 billion of new shareholdei stock has been
issued globally in less than a decade, spreading from the Anglo-Saxon financial world
to include Scandinavia and latterly Japan.
A third of the UK population gained at least a £1000 each (Marsh 1997), and the
number of private shareholders rose from 9 million to 12 million (Eaglesham 1998)
even excluding those who sold their shares within a year. Yet there is a paucity of
literature on the greatest redistribution of wealth in British history. There are no
histories of demutualisation, or philosophical monographs, political tracts, or
assessments of its implications on the wider society. Even within the field of economics
it is seen as part of the move towards a global economy and not an event in itself
(Fliegelman & Maloney 1998, Pugh 1998). By the end of 1997 the FT estimated a third
of the windfall had been spent on consumer goods (Marsh 1997), with the remainder
saved as cash or shares. For these reasons I was drawn to the subject which was given
added piquancy by the project I was then working on.
As the research assistant on a Leverhulme Trust project on financial exclusion I
examined the intervention of differing financial intermediaries, including mutuals.
According to the incoming Labour government this could best resolved through the
promotion of credit unions (H.M. Treasury 1999b). However, interviews with residents
in deprived communities implied that credit unions were unlikely to be an appropriate
solution. Interviewees argued that credit unions were designed for those who were in a
position to save before they needed to borrow, which effectively excluded those unable
to save. Instead we found that this group would continue to use moneylenders (Dayson
et al. 1999).
Interestingly the government's promotion of credit unions, premised on them being a
community based and responsive body, was occurring simultaneously with the
demutualisation of building societies. This incongruity between policy objectives and a
policy of non-intervention aroused my curiosity, especially as our interviewees were
suspicious of credit unions whilst holding building societies in esteem. Additionally I
suspected a link between the globalising forces allegedly causing the consolidation of
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the financial sector, one of the outcomes of which was demutualisation, and the problem
of financial exclusion. The bankers we interviewed conceded that a 'flight to quality'
was occurring within their industry, in which institutions targeted the most profitable
customers while closing branches and reducing services in deprived communities (Pratt
et al. 1996). This caused a dilemma for the building societies as they risked losing their
most profitable clients in order to provide universal services, or offer unequal provision
based on income and geography. Combined with this was a fear of competitors
merging and using economies of scale to undercut other providers. Arising out of this
analysis is whether the mutual form, with its reliance on organic growth by membership
deposits, had a future in a globalised financial marketplace? Or whether it would be
reduced to a marginal supplier of services to deprived communities?
The third influence on the thesis was the emerging academic and political interest in
collectivist approaches to policy implementation. Following the collapse of state
socialism and hegemony of neo-Liberal economics and politics, there was a renewal of
interest at the end of the 1990s in community, trust and mutuality. In the USA the
Communitarian movement from a social authoritarian stance argued that a 'rights based
culture' was weakening society (Etzioni 1993) and undermining the republican spirit
(Bellah et al 1985). Similarly social capitalists (Coleman 1988, 1990, Putnam 1993)
believed the intricate networks that held civil society together were collapsing as
citizen's lives became more privatised. This DurIcheimian argument found echoes in
Giddens work on high modernity (1990), and latterly the 'Third Way — Beyond Left and
Right' (1998). Giddens argued that purely market or state based solutions would be
inappropriate in a risk society, where people required 'weak induction relationships' to
engender ontological security.
Politically in the USA and Britain, Clinton and Blair exploited the sense of anxiety in
their respective societies, calling for a more integrated and participative (but not
necessarily equal) capitalist societies. The continuing debate about the congruence
between the Third Way and the politics of New Labour (Dahrendorf 1999, Etzioni
2000, Giddens 2000,) enabled Kellner (1998) to argue that the concept of mutuality
offered a commonality between the philosophy and politics of the centre left:
The Co-operative movement provides one important and enduring example of
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mutualism in practice; however, it is the contention of this pamphlet that it can, and
should, exist in every public private and commercial institution: in the boardrooms of
-
our banks and in the classrooms of our schools; in shops and in factories; in trade
unions and in government offices.' (Kellner 1998:2)
Kellner's 'New Mutualism' drew on a relativist approach to Darwin and echoed
growing sociological enquiry regarding the concept of trust (Luhmann 1979, Coleman
1990, Misztal 1996), considered an essential component of a functioning society.
However, there appeared minimal theoretical exchange between New Mutualism and
sociology, and no discussion regarding the effect of demutualisation. Instead, much of
the New Mutualism writing came from a defensive perspective of 'proving' the value of
mutuality and its viability (Leadbeater & Christie 1999), not explaining its apparent
marginalisation in the financial sector. This analytically inductive (Denzin 1989
[1970]) and empirically grounded (Glaser & Strauss 1967) thesis aims to bridge the gap
between the theoretical, policy, and economic debates. My intention is to demonstrate
that mutuality has become an 'essentially contested concept', predominantly defined
and shaped by capitalism affecting its structure and informing relationships between
managers and members.
Unfortunately with a topic as broad as mutuality it has been necessary to focus attention
on certain pertinent areas, resulting in the omission of the mutual insurance sector.
Building societies and credit unions were selected as the mutuals of study as both were
engaged in similar activities, but at very different stages of their life cycles.
Additionally the concept of mutuality was much weaker among insurance mutuals with
minimal participation in elections or encouragement by management (Grannis 1998).
Furthermore their practices closely resembled that of their joint-stock company
counterparts, as the Equitable Life debacle ably demonstrates, and the products they
supplied had little cultural connection with the working class (Kempson et al. 2000).
Sociologically the two most obvious omissions are debates around the roles of
professionals and the concept of community. Though both are discussed briefly the
latter was minimised because I wanted to consider mutuality from an alternative
perspective. Although community is often used in conjunction with mutuality I
considered it told us little of how mutuality functioned between social actors.
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Professionalism was mainly reduced because of a desire to concentrate on the concept
of mutuality within society and its relevance to members, rather than within
organisations. Equally, organisational literature has only rarely addressed the role of
paid employees and managers within mutuals (Blau and Scott 1963). I accept that much
of the thesis directly relates to these areas of study and I look forward to considering
these in subsequent work.
1.3	 Thesis Structure
Following this introductory chapter the thesis has a further ten chapters. Two
theoretical chapters sandwich another two outlining the history of British financial
mutuals. A chapter discussing methodology precedes three dealing with the results and
another triangulating the findings. The final chapter details the conclusions of the
research.
Chapter 2 attempts to define mutuality and locate it within sociological literature. It
begins by drawing on its philosophical origins in utopian thought before examining
New Mutualism. Using these discourses I propose a sociological understanding of
mutuality based on the inter-locking components of trust, reciprocity/habit, longevity
and caution. Collectively these four principles ensure the prime function of mutuality,
stability, is attainable. The remainder of the chapter discusses how mutuality has been
converted from theory into practice, in particular through cooperation. Out of this
literature a theoretical model of co-operation is developed based on education, non-
transferable ownership, solidarity, community economics, democracy, and at its
pinnacle stability. These concepts are the practical manifestations of the components of
mutuality and it is these that have become associated with mutuality. However, this has
been a selective process with emphasis placed on democracy and less attention on non-
transferable ownership. This particularist cooperation has enabled the demutualisation
process to occur and be justified because it is the 'will' of the members.
Chapter 3 reviews the early history of mutuals tracking building societies from their
inception by non-conformist groups as a response to their exclusion from housing
finance. Later in the chapter this is paralleled in the development of the first credit
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unions which came from Catholic and Caribbean communities in the 1960s. The
chapter also demonstrates that mismanagement and anti-democratic practices, so reviled
by critics of contemporary building societies, were more extensive in the nineteenth
century.
Chapter four follows the history from 1979 through to 2001. During this period there
was a divergence between the evolution of building societies and credit unions, with the
former being liberalised under the eponymous 1986 act which enabled demutualisation,
while the latter's regulator strictly interpreted an already restrictive legislative frame.
To my knowledge, the chapter gives the first full historical account of the
demutualisation period, suggesting that two conflicting narratives were employed as
explanations. A functionalist approach was used by the converting building societies,
believing the process was an outcome of becoming too large for their organisational
form and the attached requirement to compete in a global economy. Others took a neo-
Marxist interpretation stating that the avarice of directors, who sought to appropriate the
means of production, was responsible (Hird 1996). Meanwhile credit unions were said
to have divided between instrumentalists, who sought a more business-centred
approach, and idealists keener on community development. Again this suggests a
parallel with the development of building societies.
In the fifth chapter I seek to locate contemporary mutuality within broader culture and
society and assessing other possible explanations. The chapter begins by analysing the
validity of the functionalist analysis of mutuals by examining the relative merits of
ownership and organisational structures. The role of the middle classes within mutuals
and how they usurped and redefined the concepts of community and mutuality are
discussed to inform the neo-Marxist perspective. Moreover, I hold that the role of the
state has been crucial in the development of mutuals often subverting mutuality in
favour of capitalist interests. However, the neo-Marxist argument used thus far has
omitted this aspect and the importance of embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) within a
culture to mutuals, which are analysed in the remainder of the chapter. Initially, I
examine the literature on Thatcherism and whether privatisation established an
intellectual justification for demutualisation. Thereafter a review of writings around
globalisation and `glocalisation' is undertaken, as these may have been additional forces
of disembedding for some mutuals and the re-embedding of others. Finally the chapter
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debates the New Social Movement (NSM) literature to assess whether mutuals could be
defined as a NSM or whether collectively the members of mutuals who promote
demutualisation are a NSM.
Chapter six begins with an overview of the three methodologies employed in the
fieldwork: semi-structured interviews of mutual managers, surveys of members of both
credit unions and building societies, and cyber-ethnography of active building society
members' websites. The latter is a relatively new form of research and there is detailed
discussion of its merits and the justification of its use.
Chapter seven outlines the results of the interviews with the mutual managers. These
findings provide support for the neo-Marxist embeddedness perspective developed in
chapter five, suggesting that mutual managers have to operate within an environment in
which joint stock companies are viewed as the 'natural' economic form. This forces
managers to negotiate the existence of mutuals through accommodating capitalism in
terms of both economic objectives and socially defined purposes. However, the
managers remain optimistic for the future believing that globalisation has encouraged a
counter-trend of glocalisation, through which mutuals embedded within their local
cultures can prosper.
The results of the surveys are discussed in chapter eight, and indicate that the middle
class members are more inclined to support demutualisation, while the working class
express a desire to retain the reciprocity element of mutuality. Moreover, there was also
a positive correlation between attitudes towards privatisation and demutualisation.
The views of more active members, particularly those most opposed to mutuality are
discussed in chapter 9. The language, and to a lesser extent the attitudes adopted by
many of these campaigners essentially replicates the discourse of anti-capitalist NSMs,
yet these individuals wish to remove a possible counter element to capitalism. Further
contradictions are exposed when some carpetbaggers argue that they are motivated by a
desire to financially protect their kinship groups against the vicissitudes of globalisation,
which they also believe is the justification for demutualisation.
The findings of the previous three chapters are triangulated in chapter ten to show how
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the differing social actors within the mutuals understand the components and elements
of mutuality, and the respective importance of other influences on its changing nature.
-
These cumulative results are then discussed in the conclusion in chapter eleven, which
returns to the theory of mutuality developed in chapter two and the explanations of
change in chapter five, to argue that mutuality has been widely misrepresented resulting
in an adulterated mutuality partially defined and prescribed by the capitalist sector it has
worked within. The recent disruption to its status was an outcome of accelerated
capitalism in the late twentieth century, which challenged and ultimately disembedded
the previously negotiated accommodation with state and capitalism. However, this has
enabled mutuality to survive due to the scope of globalisation leaving a cultural vacuum
within many localities, which mutuals may partially fulfil.
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2	 Mutuality In Theory
-
2.1	 Introduction
Until the emergence of the New Mutualism literature, mutuality was a forgotten and
neglected term, more of interest to management and economic academics than
sociologists. Its limited use has invariably been restricted to being an alternative verb to
cooperation, while I could locate no sociological attempt to distinguish these terms or
define mutuality.
As outlined in the introduction, the rediscovery of mutuality after a prolonged hiatus in
theoretical understanding (Birchall 2001) arose because it resonated with the discourses
on the Third Way and the search for a pragmatic ideology (Leadbetter and Christie
1999, Giddens 1998). Furthermore it benefited from being untainted by mistakes of the
past:
`...unlike liberalism, socialism, social democracy or conservatism, mutualism has not
figured in mainstream twentieth century debate. Thus it has not left a trail of change
and contradiction, or dispute about its meaning.' (Kellner 1998:5)
In extracting mutuality from a narrow economic deterministic definition, Kellner
obfuscated the imprecision of its origins, resulting in a conceptually weak and under
theorised philosophy. The consequence of this is the contemporary usage whereby it
can be universally embraced without any substantive ontological knowledge. Thus
mutuality is attractive because it draws on the individualism and freewill of liberalism,
and the social justice and solidarity of socialism, yet the issue of power relations is often
obscured by appeals to natural justice (Owen 1927 [1816], Fourier 1966 [1829],) or in
the case of the New Mutualists — socio-biology (Kellner 1998, Rodgers 1999).
Arguments regarding the distribution of power have polarised opinion within existing
mutuals and are present throughout the thesis. I deliberately avoid offering a definitive
resolution, arguing that the tension is a function of its unique structure, which can be




Unlike capitalism or Marxism, mutuality does not have a seminal text from which a
body of literature can evolve, develop and contradict. Instead mutuality's lineage draws
from utopian communistic writers. In 'Utopia' More (1989 [1516]) creates a world
where money and private property are abolished, sentiments echoed in Winstanley's
polemics and pamphlets (Winstanley 1983 [1652]). Owen, considered by many (Beer
1957, Cole 1965,) as the father of mutuality and the Cooperative movement, offers the
first comprehensive critique of industrial capitalism, and suggests the establishment of
small interlocking mutual communities. Similar views were being expressed in France
by Fourier (1966 [1829]), whose more conservative perspective envisaged the
continuation of patriarchy alongside a limited role for mutuality. It could be argued that
Fourier's vision has accurately reflected the history of the cooperative movement.
Elsewhere Proudhon argued mutualism was based on the reciprocity of services (Hall
1971). In the twentieth century Kropotkin (1904) emphasises the importance of habit in
mutual behaviour, while Tawney (1964) equates mutuality with fraternity.
2.2.1 Thomas More and Gerard Winstanley: Pre-industrial
Utopianism
Though mutuality is considered to be intertwined with socialism (Beer 1957, Kellner
1998), its English heritage was in the sixteenth and seventeenth century utopian
communist thought of More (1989 [1516]) and Winstanley (1983 [1652]). Both
believed that mutuality (which prior to the 19 th century was used interchangeably with
cooperation) was the a priori state of human society and had only been supplanted by
competition and individualism after the introduction of property. This idealist or
utopian epistemology was the philosophical equivalent of the "forbidden fruit", with
both More and Winstanley seeking divine justification for their argument from the Acts
of the Apostles.
More's concept of mutualism is constructed through virtuosity, with the reward being
received in heaven (Kautsky 1927). Significantly he argued that the accumulation of
private property resulted in anxiety and unless abolished would result in continuous
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unhappiness. For More happiness can only be attained if the individual is subservient
and immersed by the collective, because the collectivist approach of the utopia brings
stability and thus removes anxiety and the pursuit of inequality. Subsequent
interpretations of mutuality assume that it brings stability and therefore ensures
happiness. More does not state how the equality and social justice of his utopia will be
upheld. In contrast Winstanley's utopia is sustained mutuality through an appeal to self-
interest and reason:
'knits every creature together into a oneness, making every creature to be an upholder
of his fellow, and so everyone is an assistant to preserve the whole.' (Winstanley 1983
[165489)
Thus Winstanley replaces the theocratic teleology of More with one based on individual
self-determination. Winstanley believed that individuals would always seek to
maximise personal happiness, which could only be achieved through submission to
collective will. Winstanley's theory draws inspiration from John Lilbume's concept of
mutual consent, which held that all men were created equal and that power could only
be granted freely and limited only to producing the collective good (Sharp 1998). By
merging the outlook of More and Lilbume, Winstanley realised the importance of the
link between economic and political freedom. Whilst acknowledging the possibility of
dissent, unlike Hobbes he felt that cooperation, not conflict, was the natural condition of
man but this still needed to be enforced through rigid laws. Though coercion would be
required to maintain solidarity, the transition to a communistic society would occur in a
theoretically problematic 'day of judgment of all men's hearts' (Hill 1972:393).
What emerged from More and Winstanley was a conflict between the presumption that
mutuality is based on a priori knowledge and the requirement of force for its
maintenance. If coercion is necessary then mutuality is formulated not inherent.
Winstanley's position was contradictory as he shared Owen's (1927 [1816]) later belief
that humans were primarily conditioned by the environment; that we had to the ability
to learn from our experiences and the environment that most shaped us was property
(Petegorsky 1972). This critique should not diminish the contribution of More and
especially Winstanley to our understanding of mutuality. By incorporating the concept
of consent and free-will into More's utopia, Winstanley outlined the parameters of
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contemporary mutuality: individuals voluntarily entering into an interdependent
community, which has a form of accountability, and where the maximum benefit to the
individual occurs through collective provision. This interdependence is based on
reciprocal relations between the participants, in which all contribute to the collective.
2.2.2 Owen and Fourier: Industrial Utopianism
In the early nineteenth century Owen came to his understanding of mutuality through a
critique of industrial capitalist society (Cole 1965). He stated that industrialisation was
causing high levels of differentiation in the workplace and that labour was the source,
but not the recipient of wealth. Profit was accumulated through the creation of surplus
value in the labourers' output and this excess was redistributed to shareholders.
Additionally demand is controlled to ensure scarcity, which maintains prices and
reinforces inequality (Owen 1927 [1816]). In Owen's opinion this was both
economically inefficient and morally wrong (Yeo 1971).
Owen's alternative 'New View of Society' envisaged the establishment of a network of
interlocking and integrated communities, built on collaboration not competition. In
accepting industrialisation and differentiation, he believed that only a cooperative
society could maximise the benefits for all and create a good life. Thus, Owen did not
perceive mutuality as natural but 'superior' to individualism. Unlike More, Owen
foresaw that the transformation to a mutual society would require re-education. By
basing his philosophy on a critique of the existing order, Owen developed the first
empirical understanding of mutuality.
Though Owen moves beyond the a priori philosophy of More and Winstanley, his
explanation of how mutuality is to be secured and maintained is intellectually naive and
regressive when compared to Winstanley's. Owen's attachment to reason causes him to
over emphasise the power of education and omit the necessity of coercive power.
Similarly, he perceives democracy as unnecessary and divisive in a society where
individualism is logically inferior to cooperation. Instead responsibility for governance
is to be rotated and distributed evenly across the community. This reciprocal
participative government limits the power of any individual, implies a moral imperative
to conform to mutual principles, and places emphasis on the trust between participants.
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Owen was aware of the risk of alternative mutual power centres developing, which
could disrupt the priorities of the community, as was demonstrated in his condemnation
of the family unit. This pre-dates Sennett (1974) in perceiving the family as a centre of
privatised and introspective behaviour, which would have a detrimental impact on the
society. From this it can be assumed that Owen's ideal mutuality would have open
membership, as closed membership would pursue their own narrow objectives, possibly
at the expense of the collective. To overcome this Owen proposed redesigning social
norms and habitual behaviour through the separation of parents and their children. Thus
Owen suggested that power within mutuality was connected to control and management
of social norms.
Among the utopians only Charles Fourier foresaw the necessary accommodation and
compromises mutuality would require to be allowed to continue under capitalism. Like
the aforementioned authors Fourier wished to create an alternative society, however he
wished to engender support from the ruling elite and consequently he was opposed to
the abolition of private property and equality of distribution ([1829] 1966).
Additionally, he felt humans were ruled by their 'passions' and the purpose of any
society was to reconcile these to serve a general good. To Fourier these 'passions' were
most obviously apparent in patterns of consumption. In his analysis the unequal
distribution of resources was predominantly the responsibility of those people who
traded goods rather than the producers. In effect the problem was one of consumption
rather than ownership of production:
'Is there anything sensible or rational about an order in which fifty thousand
inhabitants of a city are reduced to idleness and beggary as a result of a change in
fashion that takes place two thousand leagues away in the United States' (Oeuvres
complete de Charles Fourier IX, 1966-68 [1829] cited in Beecher 1986:198-9)
Passions could be managed if goods encompassing collective security such as assurance
schemes, banking, and agriculture were provided from a single source, while
profiteering would be curtailed, as goods would be supplied only through cooperative
shops. At the heart of Fourier's concept of mutuality is social harmony (Goodwin
1972), rather than the communistic economic equality of More, Winstanley and Owen.
To Fourier social harmony could only occur if "passions" were harnessed (Mellor et al.
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1988) and for him equality was a corrupter of an individual's "passions". This pursuit
of psychological emancipation and collective unity meant that it was acceptable to
-
accrue wealth and possessions providing it had been achieved through individual
production. Fourier's meritocracy is reinforced by his insistence on elective democracy,
but partially vitiated by his approval of inherited wealth and the receipt of interest on
investment capital. Of all the progenitors of mutuality, Fourier's legacy is the most
intellectually problematic and historically accurate. He prioritises an individual's
'passions' and considers conflicts can be resolved by collective approaches, but he
offers no explanation why individuals should accept the outcomes of this scenario. He
desires social harmony but cannot grasp the inequities caused by inherited wealth.
Finally he attacks the adverse effects of consumption but fails to account how this will
be curtailed if people have free use, beyond that being paid for mutual services, of any
earnings. Yet he perceived the need for collective provision to alleviate the impact of
risk, describing a mutuality which would be democratic, have voluntary membership,
appeal to an individual's needs, and be interlocked with a capitalist economy.
Additionally he implies that mutuality must adopt a cautious and long-term perspective
if it is to ultimately replace capitalism without detrimentally affecting social peace.
2.2.3 Kropotkin: Early Twentieth Century Utopia
Kropotkin wrote his Mutual Aid (1904) in an attempt to recapture Darwin's theory of
evolution from Spencer and supporters of the maxim "the survival of the fittest". He
examined the sociability of animals and early human history through to the medieval
guilds, and found widespread evidence of mutual relations. Animals mostly lived in
societies, to counteract "all natural conditions unfavourable to the species" (1904:293)
and similarly humans had lived in clans and tribes because mutual dependence was
necessary for each other's happiness. Practising sociable habits ensured better personal
security and easier access to food, thereby enabling longer lives and greater opportunity
for the development of intellectual faculties. Society and mutual aid thrived in
environments of loose structures where individuals had the greatest freedom, for
example the medieval guilds. Unfortunately this creativity and network of mutual
relationships within the guilds was subjugated by the "crushing weight of the
centralized State" (1904:263) as the "continual interference of its officials paralysed
the trades, bringing most of them to a complete decay." (1904:264). Mutuality was an
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exchange between equals, and attempts to supplant mutuality with charity were destined
to failure, as charity "implies a certain superiority of the giver upon the receiver."
(1904:283). Kropotkin's critique of state intervention reflects the opinions of New
Mutualists which are discussed in 2.3.
To Kropotkin mutuality, being an evolutionary imperative, could not be destroyed by
the state. Its initial supporters were invariably drawn from excluded groups who
employed it as a means of everyday survival. From here mutuality widened and
prospered among those with common occupations and daily contact, indicating the
relevance of openness and habit to its development (see 2.4). However, this is
accompanied by an erosion of commonality when mutuals extend into cities where
indifference and privatisation of the self are nurtured. Kropotkin saw individualism
having two strands: personal gain, which was unfortunately prevalent in cities; and the
breaking of existing mutual chains to achieve freedom, which was sometimes necessary
and desirable. Kropotkin holds the latter arises when mutual institutions and relations
lose their "primitive character" and are invaded by "parasitic growth and thus become
hindrances to progress" (1904:xvii). The ensuing revolt within mutuals has three
protagonists: purifiers who seek to resurrect a higher and purer mutual aid; a second
group who seek to "breakdown the protective institutions of mutual support, with no
other intention but to increase their own wealth and their powers" (xvii); and finally
defenders of the status quo. Kropotkin's analysis of the decline of mutuals has an
attractive resonance to contemporary demutualisations of building societies as is
reflected in chapters 7 and 9.
The philosophical origins of mutuality clearly reside within what was once called
communistic thought, which prioritises equality and solidarity over liberty. However,
while this is a central tenet of the socialist and utopian thought of More, Winstanley and
Owen, it is an anathema to Fourier and Kropotkin's concept of mutuality. For them
liberty is a prerequisite of mutuality, through the freedom of association, while
mutuality's resistance to the use of centralised power heightens this separateness.
Tawney (1964) progresses this debate by suggesting that mutuality represents fraternity,
whose role it is to balance the demands of equality and liberty. What remains unclear is
how this pivotal role should be maintained and what happens to the distribution of
power. However, trust, whether in a higher faith (More), humankind (Winstanley and
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Owen), or evolution (Kropotkin) appears central to mutuality, as does normative
reciprocal behaviour which develops cautiously over a prolonged timeframe. These
early theorists continue to inform contemporary understandings of mutuality, with the
rationality of Winstanley, Owen's emphasis on education, Fourier's gradualism, and
Kropotkin's evolutionary approach all present in the writings of the New Mutualists.
2.2.4 Beveridge, Marshall and Titmuss
For much of the twentieth century mutuality has been subsumed by debates around the
creation and maintenance of the welfare state. The main agent of this transition was
Beveridge who in a series of reports set the theoretical template for the welfare state
(1942, 1944, 1948). However, despite Beveridge's protestations to the contrary (1948),
the welfare state created by Liberal and Labour governments minimised and eventually
curtailed the role of non-state mutual organisations in the delivery of welfare services.
During the nineteenth century the skilled working-class had established friendly
societies, co-operatives and other mutuals to provide insurance for burial fees,
unemployment protection, and rudimentary pensions (Thane 1996). It is estimated that
by 1904 over 6 million men were members of these schemes (Green 1982, Thane 1996).
However, these services were criticised for being gender specific, as women were
largely excluded because they were perceived as being more prone to sickness (Thane
1996). Moreover the low-paid, which included most women, could not afford the
regular repayments and tended to join informal savings schemes. As mutuals grew they
also became more detached from their members with a concomitant decline in
conviviality, and a growing belief that they were less financially secure than
commercial providers (Taylor 1995, Thane 1996). These criticisms were supplemented
by the view of Bevan that mutuals were a 'patchwork of local paternalisms' (cited in
Taylor 1995:219). Furthermore he and other socialists highlighted the uneven provision
of services across the country, the resource and skills shortages among many mutuals,
and the absence of any strategic foresight (Thane 1996). This perspective overlooked
the organic nature of mutuals development, which tended to follow routes of least
resistance and centres of population, in order to secure sustainability (Birchall 2001).
In response to these complaints Beveridge sought to combine 'the old spirit of social
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advance by brotherly cooperation' (Beveridge 1948:117), with universality and
comprehensiveness of state social welfare (Birchall 1988a). In practice Bevan and the
Labour Party found reconciling these impossible (Birchall 1988a) because the mutuals
and voluntary sectors were paternalistic organisations and consequently were
incompatible with the new vision of centralised planning (Gladstone 1995). Recently
Yeo (2001) criticised the revisionism of the Labour Party's antecedents by Bevan and
other state socialists, believing that they ignored 'old, old Labour' (2001: 232) which
engaged in co-operative and mutual behaviour. Furthermore when they came to create
the welfare state they did not utilise their own 'great tradition to undertake the work in
hand' (2001:231). Similar sentiments were expressed from the Right by Green (1982),
who, in a historical review of the 1911 Social Insurance Act, noted Beveridge's dismay
at the undermining of mutual aid by the vested interests of doctors and commercial
health care providers.
Although these historical interpretations help us understand the failure to create a
Beveridge style welfare state, they overlook the opaqueness of Beveridge's concept of
mutuality. In 'Voluntary Action' (1948) Beveridge argued that the welfare state should
be based on minimal state provision supplemented by voluntary action (Williams and
Williams 1987). To Beveridge a 'voluntaly organisation properly speaking is an
organisation which, whether its workers are paid or unpaid, is initiated and governed
by its own members without external control' (1948:8), this included traditional
mutuals, such as friendly societies, and charitable entities. Although he segments them
for definitional purposes he still maintains that both have an equally important role.
Consequently it is unsurprising that Bevan and others were dismissive of the
appropriateness of this model, mainly because of the negative image among many
working class communities of philanthropic bodies, often engaged in selective service
to the 'deserving poor'. Thus mutuals suffered from guilt by association.
Philosophically Beveridge built on the tradition of Owen, Fourier, and Kropotkin to
argue that mutuals had their origins 'in a sense of one's own need for security against
misfortune, and realisation that, since one fellows have the same need, by undertaking
to help one another all may help themselves' (Beveridge 1948:8-9). Moreover this
collective security extended beyond kinship groups and was a fraternal self-help based
on mutual reciprocity (Green 1982, Thane 1996). The reciprocity was to be based on
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'men who know one another pay money regularly into a common fund in order to be
able to draw on that fund when they are in need' (Beveridge 1948:21), this resulted in a
-
fellowship' of men who trusted each other. However, Beveridge acknowledged that
personal reciprocity diminished as the mutual grew and was replaces by individual
accumulative motivation (Beveridge 1948, Williams and Williams 1987). To partially
offset this Beveridge argued that mutuals based on personal thrift, for example building
societies, were legitimate forms of mutuality provided they operate outside the state, as
the freedom to create and maintain a public space was an important function of a
mutual. Disputing this Williams and Williams stated that the remaining mutuals had
'an afterlife as adjuncts to middle class individualism' (1987:151), as commitment to
personal thrift and 'preserving the freedoms of capitalism undermined the possibility of
effective action' (p172). The difficulty with this analysis is that the authors do not
contextualise Beveridge's writing. As Green suggested Beveridge realised that mutual
aid was 'incompatible with compulsory state provision of services' (1982:36) and that it
requires freedom of choice to avoid becoming 'incomprehensible' (p36). Although
unlike Green Beveridge wrote from the centre-left but he did perceive the state as a
threat (1948). Moreover as a liberal he believed that collective action through
individual free-will, not coercion, was the only means to establish his cherished
'friendly society' (1948), in which 'each with its own life in freedom, each linked to all
the rest by common purpose and by bonds to serve that purpose. So the night's insane
dream of power over other men, without limit and without mercy, shall fade. So
mankind in brotherhood shall bring back the day' (1948:324). Through this Beveridge
connects to the tradition of the utopians in ultimately linking mutuality to libertarian
socialism.
Beveridge's liberalism incorporating mutual aid was also evident in the work of
Marshall (1965, 1981) and Titmuss (1970). Marshall argued that modern citizenship
had three interlocking elements: democratic-welfare-capitalist, which formed the
'Hyphenated Society' (1981:102). He believed that the contradiction of political
equality of the franchise and the social and economic inequality caused by capitalism
was best resolved through the introduction of welfare (Turner 1990). The purpose of
the Hyphenated Society was to maintain equilibrium between these axes, as the
extension of one at the expense of the others would ultimately diminish freedom and
security (Marshall 1981).
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Marshall indicated two roles for mutuality in the Hyphenated Society: first, the
collective welfare of the friendly societies was already informed by the democratic
principle; second, mutual aid 'when applied to a comprehensive scheme of national
social insurance, is nothing else than the concept of common citizenship' (1981:71).
Thus the pursuit of universal state provided welfare service is for the community as a
whole a mutual benefit society of the kind with which the working class were familiar
among themselves' (p131). More explicitly he stated that the NHS is a 'system of
mutual aid operated by the citizens through parliament, local government, and a host of
boards and committees on which doctors and layman (unpaid) sit and work together'
(p79). However, Marshall did recognise a risk with his nationalisation of mutuality;
fearing that an over-paternalistic state monopoly of welfare would detrimentally effect
collective social action by communities. From the mutualist perspective it is Marshall's
failure to resolve this conundrum of the coexistence of mutuality and state monopoly,
rather than the criticism of evolutionarism and anglo-centricism highlighted by Turner
(1990), which remain his most problematic legacy.
Perhaps an explanation for the role of mutuality within the welfare state was provided
by Titmuss (1970). He stated that the Second World War had created an environment
for more solidaristic and statist welfare policies (Titmuss 1950), thus its completion was
the fulfilment offraternity, the creation of community' (Gladstone 1995:6). However,
by the late 1960s social cohesion was rupturing and Titmuss indicated that the welfare
state should be based on the principle of the 'Gift Relationship' (1970). The objective
of this was to serve social concern, achieved through being independent of the selfish
motivation of capitalism and the coercive and sometimes unreliable power of the state
(Barry 1990). Tittmus argued that the perfect example of the gift relationship was
giving blood. As giving it freely signified a belief in the future altruism by others in
returning the compliment.
'By expressing confidence in the behaviour offuture unknown strangers they were thus
denying the Hobbesian thesis that men are devoid of any instinctive moral sense.'
(Titmus 1970:175).
Thus the welfare imperative was dependent on the spread of altruism and this mutual
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society could only remain cohesive through complex networks of reciprocal obligations.
In contrast state monopoly of welfare became bureaucratic and impersonal, or
commodified, the latter of which undermined moral bonds.
Despite attempts by the New Right (Green 1982, Barry 1990) to use Titmuss, Marshall,
and Beveridge to argue for the minimisation of the state, the authors genuinely desired
state involvement in welfare provision but they wanted this based on universal
mutuality and not bureaucratic command management. This indicates the difficulty of
locating libertarian socialist perspectives within contemporary debates about the future
of the welfare state. However, with regards to mutuality it is apparent that the authors
agree that it requires at least solidarity and reciprocity if collective security is to be
fulfilled.
2.3	 New Mutualism: Late Twentieth Century Pragmatic
Utopianism?
The intellectual reawakening in solidarity and mutuality was foreshadowed by
economic Post-Fordism and cultural Post-Modernism. A consequence of Post-Fordism
was the decline in mass work based communities and a shift to more individualised
environments, sometimes located in the home. In tandem with this change Post
Modernism challenged the universality of 'grand narratives', such as socialism and
capitalism. In disrupting certainty, increasing risk was placed on individuals who
adjusted by reformulating their identities (Giddens 1991). This process of
differentiation ruptured existing social structures and resulted in parallel contradictory
processes such as anomie (Putnam 1993, 1996) and new social movements.
Traditionally in times of crises the nation state would provide a shared sense of identity
but its legitimacy and hegemony was now being challenged. This was exacerbated by
the electoral success of neo-liberals in the USA and Britain and the consequent
reduction in universal welfare provision (Edgell and Duke 1991, Flynn 1997).
Following his election as Labour leader Blair, 'tested', `solidaristic' theoretical stances,
earning a reputation for 'ideological promiscuity' (Hargreaves 1999). Meanwhile the
conversion of the building societies to banks forced those remaining to re-evaluate the
objectives and delivery of mutuality (Llewellyn 1997). An unexpected outcome of this
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process was revealing flourishing mutual activity within society (Leadbeater and
Christie 1999, Mayo & Moore 2001). Partially this was an example of new social
relations being formulated in a postmodern era, and reaction to the rieo-liberal
displacement and withdrawal of the welfare state. Nevertheless by mid-1990s a new
critique of society drawing on both neo-liberal and Marxist traditions was emerging,
originally described as associationalism (Hirst 1994) before becoming known as New
Mutualism (Kellner 1998): The New Mutualists believed that the state had become over
bureaucratised, disempowering the citizenry and failing to deliver the illusory objective
of universal services (Hirst 1994). Private sector supply was also discredited due to a
deficit of public trust because it prioritised shareholders over users (Leadbeater 1999,
Michie 1999). Additionally, drawing from Hutton (1997), both Kellner (1998) and
Hargreaves (1999) highlight the chronic short-termism of British companies, being
driven by conflict rather than cooperation between stakeholders. The aforementioned
authors' solution (Birchall 2001) was mutualism and a greater use of cooperative
organisational forms. Thus Kellner (1998), and particularly Leadbeater and Christie
(1999) extended Hirst's (1994) associationalism beyond the public sector, converting it
into an ethic; mutualism. Furthermore Kellner reconnected mutualism with its English
libertarian socialist origins, holding that Marx was the 'villain' as he converted the ethic
into an ideology, in which ownership and the control of the state became synonymous.
This Yeo (2001) later described as a conflict between old, old Labour and old Labour.
Kellner (1998) accepted that environmental changes would be required if New
Mutualism was to prosper, which he classified as the seven pillars of mutuality:
1. For the free exercise of liberty an acceptance of mutual responsibility is required
2. These should be rooted in culture and choice rather than rules and coercion
3. The source of legitimate political power is less important than how it is used,
how it is checked, and how far it is dispensed
4. Markets are social institutions and therefore should offer rights and impose
obligations for those seeking financial gain
5. Government should act as umpire, promoter of good practice and avoid
becoming a competitor
6. Mutualism requires an inclusive society with equal access and participation
7. Government should guarantee basic equality of access but leave delivery to
independent institutions exercising their mutual responsibility
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Writing later Kellner (1999) acknowledged that the transition to mutualism, which
should apply to all organisations, would be more challenging for go -vernmental bodies.
This was because business practice among some investor owned companies was
increasingly mutualistic, though he did not overemphasise this, accepting that "the
application of mutual principles to private enterprise is reasonably easy to set out, if not
easy to implement" (1999:xxii). For the public sector its role should be to set the
framework and "then get right out of the way" (New Statesman 1999:iii). Justifying
this, Kellner believes that bureaucratic regulation is invariably too excessive and
ineffective; it wraps companies in red tape but fails to catch wrong-doers who use the
multiplicity of rules to identify loopholes. Where Kellner and the other New Mutuaiists
differ from Hirst's (1994) associationalism is their perspective that mutualist entities as
opposed to mutual organisations should deliver services. However for those supporting
continual universality of provision (Offe 1994, Taylor-Gooby 1994, Flynn 1997) this
differentiation is probably insufficient. Flynn (1997) saw inherent risks in
associationalism and by implication mutualism, as heterogeneity of supply would result
in a fractured service, though Hirst believes this merely codifies existing inequalities.
Another risk foreseen by Flynn was that multiple providers, which may include
religious groups, could result in factionalism. Birchall (2001) counters that provision
should only be provided by 'open' organisations and unfettered supply is the province
of liberals. Mutualists hold that the regulations have to impose a 'licence to operate'.
Flynn argues that the basis of membership effectively excludes certain individuals and
groups; thereby any attempt to broaden the accessibility through the entry criteria would
effectively undermine the cohesiveness of the association. Finally Flynn doubts the
likelihood of the member participation envisaged by Hirst, instead the organisation will
conform to Michels (1949) iron law of oligarchies. This view was echoed by Wallace
(1999), who thought that mutualism was too silent about the location of power, while
Leadbeater and Christie (1999) acknowledged that mutuals could become either
introverted or ineffectual due to their size and the weakness of their membership bonds.
Much of this criticism was articulated by Kropotkin and was subsequently borne out in
the history of building societies (chapters 3 and 4).
Missing from this debate is a discussion of what motivates individuals to cooperate.
Though Flynn queries participation, absent but implied from his critique is a
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questioning of members' motivation. Unless Hirst can demonstrate that members will
participate, the prime benefit of associationalism, direct user accountability, is lost. In
addressing this matter Kellner (1998) and Rodgers (1999) employed two interwoven
discourses, which I have entitled socio-biological and Durkheimian. As previously
discussed Kropotkin questioned the validity of competition as the natural condition.
This genetically deterministic perspective reached its epoch with socio-biologists such
as Wilson (1975, 1978) who argued that society and culture was constrained by our
genes.
Wilson's reductionism was challenged by mathematicians who were designing game
theory scenarios to explain behaviour, the most famous of these being the prisoners
dilemma (Poundstone 1992). In this game two prisoners awaiting interrogation must
decide whether to confess or remain silent, knowing the response of their colleague will
affect their own sentence. If both prisoners 'hang tough' and remain silent both will get
a short sentence, if one confesses and implicates the other, the confessor is released and
the other gets life, and if both confess they both receive medium term sentences. The
most successful option would be for both to 'hang tough' or cooperate.
Game theorists have designed numerous programmes to resolve the dilemma and
Axelrod's (1984) model demonstrated that trust between the participants was the only
means of unlocking the puzzle. Subsequently Frean's (Ridley 1996) programme of
'Firm but Fair' was found to be the most effective; co-operates with cooperators,
punishes defectors but forgives them by returning to cooperation thereafter. The model
eliminates 'hedonists' who pursue their own interests and 'suckers' who always co-
operate and do not punish. Evolutionists use game theory to demonstrate that social
agents make a fundamental difference to the complexity of the world, as individual
moves are shaped by the moves of other individuals rather than following a
predetermined code (Dennett 1995). Thus game theorists have undermined Wilson's
more extreme theories and evolutionists went on to connect the outcomes with genetic
development and the contradiction of why multi-celled organisms existed if the sole
imperative of a gene is its survival (Dawkins 1989, Dennett 1995, Ridley 1996,).
Dawkins (1989) suggested that genes enter into cooperative cartels, a process which
continues until the organism becomes extinct. Once acquainted the genes recognise
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each other and automatically adopt a symbiotic relationship. He describes this
arrangement as 'nice guys finish first' and draws on Trivers (1971) concept of
reciprocal altruism to show how in nature different creatures co-operate. To Kellner
(1998) this confirms that mutualism is ingrained in human nature and he uses Dawkins
to offer the rallying call 'be selfish: trust each other' (1998:6). An objection to this
analysis is that reciprocal altruism is enlightened self-interest and not mutualism,
however Dennett (1995) rejects this as it misses the point that small steps are necessary
to reach the 'real McCoy'. Dawkins (1989) dismisses both hypotheses that humans are
cooperators or competitors; instead he stresses our adaptive nature, influenced by
genetics and culture. A perspective endorsed by Ridley (1996) who held that
cooperation must be learnt and that language and the ability to communicate is
fundamental to the ability to co-operate. Finally Dennett (1995) revisits Neumann, who
believed that while competition in nature was inevitable it did not necessarily mean the
survival of the fittest, organisms could design cooperative strategies, combining with
chance to unleash the evolutionary eukaryotic revolution (Margulis 1981). In early
history solitary prokaryotes cells were invaded by parasites who were actually
symbionts and these cells became mutualists who joined forces to become the first
multi-celled organisms, eukaryotics. In accepting this genetic transformation Dennett
(1995) shows that external factors, whether they be chance or culture do affect our
development. Dismissing Wilson he cogently states that genes interact to create
policies of cooperation, but that was and is different from genes being the beneficiary of
this cooperation. Anything can and does happen. Unfortunately Kellner assumed
cooperation was genetically probable as opposed to possible, which the literature
indicates.
For Rodgers (1999) cooperation is mutually beneficial and necessary for sustainability,
which is only attainable if there is a balance between liberalism and authoritarianism,
the outcome of which is solidarity. Sociologically this position was first articulated by
Durkheim (1964 [1893]) when he suggested that intermediate groups should stand
between the state and the individual, through which reciprocal interdependence would
be practised. Unknowingly unacknowledged Durkheim is arguably the intellectual
antecedent of the New Mutualists. Kellner's (1998) emphasis on mutual rights and
responsibilities and reciprocal obligations between state and citizen reflect this
Durkheimian tradition. Even when calling this an 'ethical' imperative — it's good to
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cooperate — he employs evolutionist and sociological rather than philosophical or
theological principles. Other new mutualists (Rodgers 1999, Hargreaves 1999b, and
-
Birchall 2001) strengthen their Durkheimain stance to compensate for a reduced
reliance on socio-biology. Rodgers seeks a greater role for education, as innate abilities
require stimulation. Part of these stimuli arise from exchange, which is the raw material
for trust, and institutions that pervert this training are acting against cooperation.
Clearly Rodgers intertwines genetics and Durkheimian perspectives on the importance
of social relationships for society. Birchall and Hargreaves were more explicitly
Durkheimian in arguing for a need for intermediaries between the public and private
sectors to revitalise civil liberalism. Morally mutualism is seen as 'good' but Rodgers
warns that collaboration may be negative, hence the need for democracy to control
abuses of power.
For New Mutualists mutuality is natural but requires stimulation to be fulfilled, usually
through education and exchange whereby trust can be developed.
2.4	 Mutuality and the sociology of trust
Operating independently of New Mutualism, sociology has rediscovered an interest in
social cohesion, whether through social capital (Putnam 1993), identity and risk
aversion (Giddens 1984), or trust (Misztal 1996, Fukuyama 1995). It is the latter which
most closely reflects the implied discourse within New Mutualism, being a necessary
component of mutuality.
2.4.1	 Theorising a sociology of trust
Trust is often explained by its social benefits and the properties they encompass
(Misztal 1996). At an individual level it is a prerequisite for self identity (Habermas
1987), whilst interpersonally it is necessary to foster democratic values and civic
community (Putnam 1993); its absence would result in a society where all relations
were fleeting and risky (Luhmann 1979). Definitions are hindered by its linguistic
interchange with faith, cooperation, confidence, exchange and reciprocity (Misztal
1996). An alternative narrow interpretation follows Simmel (1950 [1908]) to argue that
it has an 'irreducible core' which involves a leap of faith (Giddens 1990, M011ering
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2001). Often confused with trust is confidence, which is more habitual and less
evaluative (Misztal 1996). Habit itself forms an important feature of reciprocity being
reliant on mutual exchanges over a non-immediate timeframe (Mau-ss 1970, Camic
1986). Reciprocity may not be present in interpersonal relations in modern society,
resulting in a different form of trust than found in previous eras (Giddens 1991).
Giddens' erstwhile historicism, lacking any empirical evidence, confuses trust with
reciprocity, perceiving changes in the latter as the evolution of the former. In
economics, trust is a specific feature of exchange relationships necessary for efficiency
(Fukuyama 1995), while 'cooperation is seen as a by-product of trust rather than a
source of trust and, moreover, a lack of cooperation can be a result of other
factors ...rather than an absence of trust ' (Misztal 1986:17). These myriad of
interpretations and uses of trust have both broadened its applicability and lessened any
understanding. To help inform our knowledge of mutuality and its intimacy with trust
the remainder of this section will attempt to discern the major themes in the trust
literature and how these have been applied.
The connection between trust and social harmony, previously alluded to, originated
from the utilitarians. They believed social order was the result of mutual dependence
with obligations resolved by bargaining. Therefore trust was a rational choice made by
social actors to minimise social disharmony. In this context trust is an extension of
egoism, being merely a means to achieve one's own objectives (Coleman 1990) and as
the benefits of trusting exceed those of breaching or not trusting, trustworthiness is a
valuable attribute (Blau 1989, Gambetta 1988). A societal interpretation sees trust as a
vital lubricant for exchange (Arrow 1974) as it promises credibility, operates as a code
of honour (Elster 1989), and overcomes the unobservable in many transactions
(Dasgupta 1988). Apart from its tendency to tautology, rational choice theory excludes
anything but opportunistic behaviour rendering honesty and altruism as untrustworthy
(Misztal 1996).
Doubting its rationality, M011ering (2001) argued trust was based upon weak objectivity
(Williamson 1993) and contained a 'leap of faith' originally identified by Simmel (1950
[1908]). Simmel believed 'suspension' would be more extensive due to the lack of
knowledge inherent in impersonal trust (Frankel 1977, M011ering (2001). M011ering
stated that trust resides between knowledge and ignorance, as it is unnecessary for the
27
former and the latter is reliant on confidence. For impersonal trust to be effective it
requires 'suspension' alongside the efficacy of normative sanctions, thus detaching
egoistic motives from successful relations (Gambetta 1988).
M011ering's analysis drew upon the functionalist and Simmelian influenced perspective
of Luhmann (1979), who argued that trust reduced complexity by increasing tolerance
of uncertainty while resting on confidence to operate. To Luhmann trust resides in an
actor's ability to read meaning and a rational perception that our ability to function rests
on 'trust in trust', which is the cognitive basis of trust. Confidence is required to
confront societal risks whilst trust enables risks to be taken, thereby increasing
confidence, and creating a virtuous circle. However, trust being partially reliant on
experience cannot be artificially created. Luhmann's epistemological and ontological
transdentialism (M011ering 2001) enriches our understanding of trust by distinguishing
it from confidence. This enabled M011ering to further develop his concept of suspension
although Misztal (1996) criticised Luhmann's separation of trust from its objectives,
arguing these informed how we trust. Unfortunately Misztal confuses objective with
definition and refuses to accept that both trust and its purposes are socially constructed.
Luhmann implies that trust requires a degree of predictability to be effective, a point
endorsed by Weber, Gambetta, and Giddens. From a rationalist perspective Weber
(1968 [1922]) stated that it was in individual's self interest to trust as this contributed to
the predictability of behaviour and by implication the efficiency of economic actors.
Lewis and Weigert (1985) held that trust 'allows social interaction to proceed in a
simple and confident basis, where, in the absence of trust, the monstrous complexity
faced by contingent futures would again return to paralyse action' (1985:969).
Partially endorsing this, Misztal considered trust played a 'significant role in any
exchange where each partner has clear expectations of the other, and where there is a
time lapse between the exchange of goods or services' (1986:17).
As Simmel (1978 [1908]) demonstrated, predictability was important for inanimate
objects, as money relied on trust for its continued legitimacy. Historically this was
predicated on reciprocity between actors, beginning with barter before more
sophisticated means of exchange were gradually introduced. This normative basis for
trust echoes Durkheim's (1964 [1893]) dualism of self-interest and altruistic-idealistic
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action, the latter of which was the reciprocal bonds and relationships within society.
Durkheim's argument that in a well integrated society we can trust each other because
we have common morality and norms is questioned by Misztal, who ponders the
purpose of trust if behaviour can be predicted. Furthermore Abercrombie et al. (1990)
expressed concern that Durlcheim's reliance on normative values would reinforce the
existing conservative consensus.
Misztal returns to the objective of social harmony and perceives trust as a coping
strategy to overcome the arbitrary nature of social reality, implying the necessity of
limited predictability. Misztal's criticism of norms influencing trust counterpoises her
endorsement of Bourdieu's (1977) dialectic between objective structure and subjective
perception, in which the past survives and is perpetuated by the present. This inherited
experience is a system of 'durable transposable dispositions' (1977:72) which shape and
are shaped by the present. Thus trust is a social action which helps maintain the fiction
of order because it functions (Elster 1989) and this fictive stability assists the rationality
of risk taking (Luhmann 1988), and ontological security (Giddens 1984). Without
predictability of daily encounters deep-seated anxiety will prevail, which undermines
trust (Giddens 1990).
What unite most analyses of trust are the acceptance that trust is future oriented and a
'state offavourable expectations regarding other people's actions and intentions'
(M011ering 2001:404). Hence trust is perceived functionally as the outcome of
expectation. M011ering cogently suggests that trust is more than interpretation based on
imperfect knowledge, but emphasises 'suspension' which enables the transfer from
interpretation to expectation. This mental leap distinguishes trust from rational choice
or blind hope, representing the 'unknown, unknowable and unresolved' (2001:414).
However, though distinctive suspension and interpretation operate in tandem as a leap
'cannot be made from nowhere, nor from anywhere' (p414). Once a leap is made the
land of expectation becomes interpretation and a new leap is required, reflecting trust's
dynamic and reflexive nature. M011ering's hermeneutic approach renders models of
trust based on objective irrelevant, and assumes there are no automatic links between
good reasons and a favourable outcome. Trust is based on a combination of rational
assessment, cultural norms, predictability, and experience both genuine and perceived.
These interact differently depending on the nature of the 'trust transaction'. Although,
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this definition assumes trust is not reciprocity, habit, cooperation or blind faith, it is
likely to be intimately involved in the first two and necessary for the third. Therefore
trust is not mutuality but a component of it.
2.4.2	 Trust in practice
Sociologists have also been concerned with how trust has been transformed during
modernisation. For example Giddens believes that the complexity of modern society
has directly affected the nature of trust, which has been reformulated in response to the
loosening of societal bonds. This narrative originated with TOnnies (1955 [1887]) who
thought that rational and instrumental social relations, resulting in the imposition of
rules and the loss of freedom, would replace the shared experiences and familiarity of
gemeinschaft. The impersonalised gesellschaft of exchange relations will become
reliant on 'trust' in professional experts. Ultimately this divorce of the personal and
professional will erode standards and social cohesion, as superficial politeness would
mask manipulation and deception. Pinnies faced criticism for romanticising
gemeinschaft (Fletcher 1971) and for not understanding that social order required
impersonal trust founded on moral standards (Durkheim 1964 [1893]). Despite these
criticisms TOnnies' discourse remains intuitively potent, with the credit union
movement fearful of losing a sense of community as organisations grow (see chapter 4).
In contemporary sociology Misztal (1996) links the depth of gemeinschaft to friendship
and passion, and shares with Zucker (1986) and Giddens (1991) a belief that this is the
purest trust, but its pursuit leads to a withdrawal from public life, undermining
interpersonal trust (Sennett 1974). Paradoxically despite the compression of time and
distance, the attainment of pure trust remains elusive as self-absorption was leading to
narcissism rather than an awareness of others (Etzioni 1993). Ironically the reliance on
gesellschaft enhanced the desirability of the emotional skills immanent in gemeinschaft.
In discussing the changing nature of society Durlcheim, Weber and Giddens all
suggested that increasing rationality has fundamentally altered relationships and forcing
trust to be reconstituted. Lockwood (1992) suggested that DurIcheim's view that trust
could be assessed through the motivations was too simplistic, as values are often
obscure or disputed. By contrast Weber (1968 [1922]) held that all meanings were
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socially constructed, but that individualisation and rationalisation were creating new
solidarities in which pre-modern shared beliefs were systematically replaced by mutual
interest and functional interdependence; essential for the success of capitalism. To
Weber there were only four types of action and from these in only two cases were trust
and confidence self-reinforcing: `affectual' action comes from faith and emotions and
was therefore uncontrollable; 'value-rational' action was based on trust in virtue, which
is learned and motivated by honour. For Weber this was irrational because it was
unreflective. Thirdly, 'traditional' actions which he considered automatic enshrining
stability and uniformity, were based upon conformity and were therefore self-
reinforcing. Finally, 'rational' action predicated on mutual self-interest was the most
reliable approach in modern societies. Though its sustainability in an individualistic
society would require agreed rules for legitimacy (Albrow 1990), Weber feared
instrumentalism and bureaucratisation would result in disenchantment and 'legitimacy
without trust' (Pakulski 1992:24). By weakening TOnnies' distinction between
associative and communal relationships, Weber allows for a complex differentiation
between interpersonal and abstract trust (Misztal 1996). Thus Weber reconciles the
detachment of institutional trust by incorporating predictability, which minimises
conflict and prevents the instrumentalism of rationality.
Giddens (1990) perceives the trust environment as determined by the dialectic of
modernity. Despite arguing that the norms promoted by Weber were under attack from
distanciation, disembedding and reflexivity caused by an increase in low probability
high consequence risk, Giddens remained optimistic that individuals would not be
reduced to passivism and anomie. He suggests modern trust in persons has to be
'worked out' as individuals 'open out to each other' and attempt to 'win trust'
(1990:121). Running counter to Sennett (1974), this intimacy creates reflexivity and a
new social action. This is more urgent in late modern society where trust in expert
systems has declined as risks are external of established control mechanisms and have
become intertwined with personal life (for example the effects of genetically modified
crops) thereby undermining ontological security.
Ostram (1990) acknowledged asymmetries in information inherent in modern societies
create uncertainty, thus collective organisations such as building societies need
contingent strategies to ensure long term commitments. At their most effective
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participants internalise and adopt norms of behaviour that reduce the costs of
monitoring. Prior to adaptive behaviour, individuals overcome asymmetries of
knowledge by assessing an organisation's reputation. Mutuals have long understood
this, promoting themselves as more trustworthy and reliable than investor owned
companies. However, as Giddens highlights, trust in experts is diminishing as
knowledge becomes more specialised; in excluded communities where individuals have
no external reputation credit unions function on the basis of accumulation of internal
reputation (Ward and Jenkins 1984). Thus reputation is moral; being based on opinion,
connected to reciprocity and is maintained by shared values, social conformity, and
formal control. Reputation can at one extreme be based on Veblen's (1959) analysis
that wealth should be displayed via conspicuous consumption, or possibly the standards
of 'beyond reproach' prevalent in many professions. Increasingly reputation is justified
in rational economic terms, either as a means to reduce transaction costs (Newbery and
Stiglitz 1971) or the use of brand names to counteract product homogeneity (Akelof
1984). Alternatively reputation may be transformed and have a transformative effect on
the market place through changes in technology (Misztal 1996).
In the context of mutuality, trust within this thesis has been employed in Simmelian
terms, assuming it is a process of actual behaviour (Mdllering 2001) not an outcome of
that process (Luhmann 1988, Misztal 1996). Though perspectives enable us to
understand how trust is altered in differing circumstances, they confuse the production
of trust with the activity of trust. Rather trust has become more complex to practice in
modern societies, while with the shift to abstract trust there has been an increasing
reliance on 'suspension'. To alleviative the uncertainty associated with abstract trust it
relies on reputation alongside cultural norms and education. The alleged erosion of
trustworthiness during this generation has paralleled the decline of these aspects of trust.
Moreover, the alienation attached to this development has resulted in a pursuit of a re-
conceptualised purer form of trust, found in pre-modern society and intimate
friendships.
2.5	 Conceptualising Mutuality
Much of the reviewed literature concentrates on the justification for mutuality, which is
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usually solidarity and/or social cohesion. This ranges from the utopian perspective of
More, who believed mutuality would bring stability, to Kropotkin and Owen's beliefs in
a better society, through to the New Mutualists' search for a cohesion aimed at
superseding the individualism of Thatcherism. Despite the absence of a prime source
within the literature a series of discourses frequently reappear which indicate that
mutuality is constructed from interrelated component factors: trust, reciprocity or habit,
longevity, and caution.
Kropotkin stressed trust as central to mutuality, a view endorsed by Leadbeater and
Christie (1999) who argued it enabled mutualism to function by securing commitment.
Similar views were expressed by Hargreaves (1999) and Rodgers (1999), who stated
that once established trust was a social commodity that could be traded. Within this
framework trust is conceptualised as fictive stability' (Elster 1989), possessing an
irreducible core (Giddens 1990) of 'suspension' (M011ering 2001). Though narrowly
drawn this releases trust from excessive association, resulting in an ill-defined and
elusive concept.
Related to trust, but distinctive (Mistzal 1996) is habit, which Mauss (11925] 1970) saw
as part of reciprocity (Camic 1986). Winstanley, and latterly Durkheim through his
'reciprocal interdependence', and Weber's 'traditional trust', all held that habit enabled
trust to function, a view more recently endorsed by Luhmann (1979). New Mutualists
(Birchall 2001) believed that everyday repetitive habitual behaviour secured mutuality.
Similarly, game theorists and evolutionists (Dawkins 1989), thought cells continued to
cooperate once they knew how each other would operate. However, Giddens (1984)
argues that this personal reciprocity has been supplanted in modern societies by
impersonal trust, based on reflective knowledge and reputation. Additionally, Trivers
(1971) linked reciprocal trust with self-interest, therefore reciprocity and trust alone is
insufficient for mutuality.
Though it may be impossible to eliminate self-interest, Kitchner (1993) argued that the
more casual the relationship, the less likely people were to co-operate, indicating that
long-term relationships may offset egotism. The importance of longevity was
highlighted by Fourier, and Mauss (1970 [1925]) noted that mutuality required an
'indefinite timeframe'. These views were reaffirmed by New Mutualists as developing
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understanding requires longevity (Kellner 1998, Hargreaves 1999, Michie 1999,
Rodgers 1999), which stands in contrast to anomie outlined by Durkheim and Giddens.
Ostram (1990) went further, arguing that longevity was required to -overcome
uncertainty, reducing the costs of trust through participants gradually internalising
norms. Hence longevity is an essential component of mutuality.
The final component is 'caution'. Building on Fourier's belief in stepped transition and
Kropotkin's evolutionary progress, both assume that mutuality is most effective when it
proceeds steadily. Further, it assumes that trust is not blind hope but a combination of
anticipation and expectation bridged by small acts of 'suspension' (M011ering 2001).
This transition can be aided if there is a sense of predictability (Luhmann 1979) about
the process, if not the outcome. Therefore predictability is described as the lubricant for
cooperation (Gambetta 1988, Lewis and Weigert 1985). By implication predictability
entails a degree of caution, for it proceeds on the basis of limited knowledge. For
mutuality, a cautious approach can reduce complex and high-risk strategies with
uncertain outcomes to small manageable steps towards trust. Caution should not be
mistaken for risk avoidance, rather it seeks an accommodation. Kellner (1999)
describes mutuality as a 'philosophy for a fallible world. It accepts that people,
enterprises and public institutions are all liable to make mistakes.' (1999:xxiii).
Kellner does not seek the elimination of errors nor does he advocate unlimited risk,
instead he calls for the space for humans to make mistakes. Based on choice, mutuality
does not seek the security of universalism endorsed by a state socialist approach, nor
does it desire the unfettered excesses of private risk taking. Instead it desires a limited
dynamism avoiding the ossification prevalent in universal security, while anticipating
and mitigating the most identifiable risks. Thus caution embodies the patient and
expected action exemplified in mutual relations. With competing risks and
opportunities, caution enables social actors to make the leap in trust by offering a lower
threshold for commitment without the loss of ontological security caused by anxiety and
inaction. Although this may suggest that mutuality is more relevant in modern society,




Cooperation is invariably used when discussing the cooperative movement, which is
generally perceived as originating with the Rochdale Pioneers (Carr Saunders et al.
1938, Fay 1939, Cole 1944). The movement involves the undertaking of shared action
to achieve a desired goal (Jary and Jary 1991). In contrast mutuality originates from the
French `mittualitó and the activity in insurance through which collective action benefits
the individual. Thus cooperatives may act mutually but mutuality is not the exclusive
domain of cooperatives' (Fay 1939:36-37). Consequently the Cooperative movement
contains the strength and weakness of a specific implemented form of mutuality.
One feature of cooperative writing is the continual debate between idealism and
pragmatism (King 1947, Fauquet 1951, Gurney 1996), becoming increasingly prevalent
from the 1960s onwards when competition from the private sector eroded profits and
resulted in a consolidation of the decision making process (Brazada & Schediwy 1989).
Debates regarding the 'soul' of cooperatives ranged from the conservatism of Schulze-
Delitzch (Lambert 1963) and the pragmatism of Fauquet and Birchall (1997b) who
argued that only the acceptance of cooperatives as part of the capitalist system had any
contact with the 'real world'. Meanwhile idealists despaired at the instrumentalism
(Cole 1944) of cooperators:
'..the term cooperation was used in the sense of communism. From implying concert of
life in community it came to mean concert in shopkeeping. It was a great descent from
the imperial attitude of world making to selling long-sixteen candles and treacle.'
(Holyoake 1879:41)
Holyoake's frustration at the intellectual decline of cooperation since the Owenite
'enthusiastic period' (Holyoake 1879:29) was shared by Gide, Fay (1939), and Carr-
Saunders et al. (1938) who believed the Rochdale Pioneers were not a revolution, but a
reconciliation of private interest with public good, as the market advance of
cooperatives resulted in detachment from profit elimination and profit sharing, and a
more business-like approach was adopted. In critiquing the sterility of this debate,
Mellor et al. (1988) identified three narratives to explain the role of cooperatives:
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'N as agents of social stability, (it) as one method of working within a plurality of
organizational structures, and (iii) as the traditional 'shining lights" for a new society.'
(Mellor et al. 1988: 178-9)
They proceeded to argue that (i) reduced cooperatives to a conventional business, (ii)
was superficially attractive because it was the middle ground, but again sacrificed
cooperative principles for business, and finally unlike the claims of idealists (iii) most
producer cooperatives were interested in job creation or survival, not social change.
2.6.1	 Philosophy of Cooperation
Birchall (1997b) thought that cooperation originated in the relationship of the 'first
order values', of liberty, equality, and solidarity, and that these were sometimes
`antinomic' resulting in different types of cooperatives. Being a practical philosophy,
cooperation is constrained by ethical considerations of honesty, openness, social
responsibility, and caring for others. These political and ethical values are supported by
the second order values of democracy, equity, self-help and self-reliance.
Birchall describes these as the principles of cooperation and from the literature there are
three approaches to their identification. The first is the inductive, or 'evolutionary
approach', in which the motives of the originators of cooperation are examined for
generalist principles. Unfortunately these principles can become idealised and
normative, which can detrimentally affect the development of cooperatives in other
cultures. , A second approach is organisational, assuming the ownership structure is the
distinctive feature of all mutuals. Parnell (1995) is the most prominent of these
theorists, calling them 'people centred businesses', and arguing that democratic control
is the means to this end. Taking a less zealous tactic this group still reflect many of the
principles identified by inductive approach and are closely associated with the New
Mutualists, having the strength of inclusivity and flexibility, and the potential weakness
of irrelevance and meaninglessness. The third approach prioritises a specific political
value and eventually ending with a cooperative outcome. A benefit of this method is
that cooperatives can be evaluated against an objective, but this carries the risk of the
cooperative failing to fulfil an externally imposed value.
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After reviewing all three options Birchall reverts to the inductive approach for his own
analysis. To minimise the criticism of being normative, he interprets the principles
broadly and consequently drifts towards the stance of Parnell, exposing contradictions
that he only partially resolves. For example, in justifying the cooperative status of
producer coops, he states that restricted membership is allowed providing it does not
include 'irrelevant attributes such as gender or ethnicity' (Birchall 1997b: 51). It is
also acceptable in cooperatives that serve 'disadvantaged' groups as 'open membership
points to the first order value of equality' (Birchall 1997b:51), and collective
membership grants individuals 'mutual strength'. Using Birchall's own taxonomy of
cooperation two difficulties arise. First, a closed membership is opposed to the ethical
value of openness and second, as Gide and later Lambert argue it fails on the issue of
social responsibility. Social responsibility requires openness to the whole of society not
an isolated enclave, otherwise it is possible the co-op will pursue their own objectives at
the expense of society. Evidence of this was found by Togerson et al (1997) when they
examined the behaviour of the North American farming cooperatives. Birchall's error
is to use 'mutual strength' rather than Kropotkin's 'mutual aid'. In this analysis mutual
strength implies that there is a social actor who is the 'victim' due to their weakness in
relation to the cooperative. While this may be deemed acceptable if the social actor is
an agent of the state or capitalism it becomes more problematic when considering
individuals who do not wish to join the cooperative. For example should a cooperative
be considered acting in the public good, if as a bye-product of its mutual strength it
causes the marginalisation and deprivation of those individuals who through exercising
their free will chose not to participate in the cooperative? By contrast mutual aid
assumes assistance and does not preclude non-members from benefiting. Moreover it
allows collective and indeed sometimes closed action because it benefits society in
general.
However, excessive criticism of Birchall is unjustified, as his classification did attempt
to disentangle the philosophy from the practice of cooperatives, a task many others have
failed to achieve. Instead, most writers have produced lists of cooperative principles
often with minimal discussion regarding how these are related. Table 2.1 outlines some
of these lists, but does indicate some commonality particularly around stability,
solidarity, equity through collective economics, democracy, education and ownership.
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Table 2-1: Typology of approaches and main principles of cooperation by author
Author
Main principles of cooperation raised




Democracy, freedom to join, limited interest on capital,
distribution of surplus in proportion to purchase, cash purchase
and sale, purity and quality of products, education, neutrality,
sale at market prices, voluntary membership
Fauquet (1951) Self help, volunteerism, mutual aid, democratic autonomy, the
abolition of profit (in producer cooperatives they should be
restricted by only taking what was 'necessary' otherwise they
would be acting against the general good), educational purposes
to achieve 'moral excellence', socialist in nature (human not
capital focused with advancement by mutual help), and striving




Self-help, association, and merging of dual qualities of member
and user.
Lambert (1963) Endorsed those of Rochdale Pioneers and added disposal of
redundant cooperative without benefits to members, promotion
of members only to extent that is consistent with interest of
community, and the goal of the cooperative commonwealth.
Bonner (1970) Open membership, democratic control, dividend, limited
interest on capital, political and religious neutrality, cash
trading and education
Scharrs (1978) Not-for-profit enterprise which was voluntarily owned,
controlled and operated by or on behalf of members.
Cooperatives encourage diversity, fairness and competition as a
public interest philosophy
Groves (1985) Summarising American analysis of cooperatives Groves noted
the commonality of democracy, limited return on equity,





Voluntary and open membership, democratic member control,
member economic participation, autonomy and independence,
education training and information, cooperation among
cooperatives, concern for community. Supporting these were
the principles of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy,
equality, equity and solidarity.
2.6.2	 Stability
From King, who inspired the Rochdale Pioneers, through to the ICA re-formulation of
the principles in 1995 (Birchall 1997b), the implied goal was to create a society,
whether new or within the current environment, built on an understanding that
individuals were continually exposed to the vagaries of capitalism unless they united
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and established an alternative and reliable support network (Groves 1985). This search
for collective self-help was exemplified in the preamble to the Pioneers' principles:
-
The objects of this society are to form arrangements for the pecuniary benefit and
improvement of the social and domestic condition of its members' (cited in Laidler
1968:681)
In contemporary cooperative literature this stability is articulated through a public
interest discourse. Arguments draw on the cooperative principle of open membership
(Lambert 1963) and more explicitly by providing ethical competition for the capitalist
sector (Llewllyn 1997). Restricting membership access can result in cooperatives
especially producer cooperatives duplicating the anti-competitive practices found in
cartels. To avoid this an open-door policy was adopted which is common within
consumer cooperatives. It is the establishment of these organisations that represent the
paradigm shift in economic ownership, as while producer cooperatives may replicate the
behaviour of capitalist organisations, it is only cooperative organisations which aim at
unfettered shares in ownership that offer an alternative economic form. This is more
powerful because the least powerful actor within the capitalist system, the consumer,
becomes the owner within an open cooperative mutual system. Under a cooperative
society informed consumers will only want what they need and have no reason to
artificially stimulate demand for unnecessary goods (Can-Saunders 1938, Fay 1939).
Producers being specialists have no affinity with each other and only combine in
opposition to something; consequently social stability favours consumer cooperatives
(Fay 1939). Thus while a consumer cooperative society would be rational, efficient,
eco-friendly, inclusive and harmonious; producer cooperatives share all the
disadvantages of capitalist entities, especially when they are created to maximise the
benefits of members at the expense of non-members. The risks of maintaining the
supremacy of consumer cooperatives may result in the subjugation of producers, thus
losing the premise of equality (Mellor et al. 1988). If this occurs it becomes irrelevant
to employees whether they are employed by capitalists or cooperators (Fay 1939).
'Now, man as a whole — the moral man — cannot be indifferent to the ways that were
followed to satisfy the consumer. Does one dream of reaching a low price for products
by re-establishing the working conditions of the nineteenth century or by aggravating
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the exploitation of the colonial people?' (Lambert 1963:163)
-
Nor would consumers necessarily manage the most appropriate outcomes for the
economy. A desire for instant gratification or luxury items may divert the economy
from delivery of core needs. Consequently the power of consumers can never be
absolute, there must be a place for producer democracy, but 'the consumer must be
present at all stages of the economic decision' and its interest should 'never be inferior
to producers' (Lambert 1963:165).
Fortunately cooperators could overlook the complexity of the open membership
principle and employ the market variation argument. In this cooperation benefits the
capitalist market as its production reflects genuine demand, not inflated demand driven
by a thirst for profit and causing over production (Lambert 1963). This is a variation on
Laidlaw's maxim that cooperatives help keep the market honest (Groves 1985), a
perspective later endorsed by the Building Societies Association (Llewllyn 1997) when
petitioning the government for legislative protection in 1999.
2.6.3	 Solidarity
A communistic society based on mutual relations requires solidarity between the
constituent parties and this could be achieved either through community, cooperation or
association (Goodwin and Taylor 1982). For cooperators the choice was between
serving specific localities, or serving the broader community through association. In
adopting an inclusive approach cooperatives, through open and voluntary membership,
became mutual organisations breaking from the conservative insularity of communities.
According to Owen and Kropotkin the motivation for solidarity is explained
respectively by rationality or evolutionary responses. What neither author resolves
conclusively is its maintenance even in circumstances where the individual may benefit
more by breaching the collective will. In addressing this issue Fay (1939) believes that
the solidarity of cooperation arises due to its 'duality' (p38) because at its most
advanced it serves consumers and producers. In Fay's analysis, solidarity of
cooperation is only achieved when the consumer and producer voluntarily accept their
interdependence. In a cooperative society the solidarity is rooted in the understanding
that people are both wage earners and consumers, placing a priority on fairness in both
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consumer prices and wages. Hence solidarity helps hermetically seal cooperation.
Gurney (1996) describes this as the 'art of association' (p25). However, if solidarity is
solely employed by either consumer or producer cooperatives, by gfanting one
supremacy the impact will be negative (Lambert 1963). In a capitalist economy
sustaining solidarity becomes problematic due to the increasing heterogeneity of its
members (Groves 1985) and through individualism, which loosens social bonds and
commitments: 'too much emphasis on freedom, choice, and flexibility could mean lack
of commitment to people, inviting a lack of commitment in return' (Handy 1989
2.6.4 Equity Through Collective Economics
Achieving a stable society by employing solidarity requires a collective means of
accumulation and distribution of economic resources. What distinguishes cooperative
from other economic forms is the morality involved in their economic exchanges
(Watkins 1986). Again the Rochdale Pioneers instigated this with their insistence on
providing pure and unadulterated goods (Birchall 1997a). The 'dividend', a common
feature of consumer cooperatives (Birchall 1997a), is another example of strong moral
intervention, as it is based on the principle that surpluses should be distributed
proportionally to the use of services (MacPherson 1996). This form of equity originated
with Proudhon's liberal mutual perspective in which economics and social justice were
systematically interwoven. Later Marshall returns to this topic describing cooperatives
as seeking an 'uneasy equilibrium of opposites' (1981:129) between the market and the
state, thereby producing a 'rough equality' (Birchall 1988a:53). According to Mercer
(1995) and Watkins (1986) equity through collective economics was one of the
universal principles of cooperation proposed by the Rochdale Pioneers. More recently
Parnell (1995) stressed that cooperatives should serve the people involved in the
enterprise not, as in shareholder owned companies, the investors. A view drawn from
Proudhon's belief that property held by a few was theft, yet owned by the many who
had previously been excluded was freedom (Birchall 1988a).
Morality and the avoidance of being beholden to financiers also extends to raising
capital by lowering its costs, with cooperatives only offering 'limited interest on share
capital', which remained an ICA principle until 1995. Its replacement, 'member
economic participation', embodies its essence and extends it beyond the previous
:262).
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principle by including members contributing to and controlling the capital of
cooperatives. To MacPherson this ensured that 'capital is the servant, not the master of
the organisation. Cooperatives exist to meet the needs of the people' (1996:19)
2.6.5 Democracy
If members are to control the capital assets of their cooperatives a system of democratic
accountability is required. Lambert 1963 and the ICA (Birchall 1997b) emphasised the
centrality of democracy to sustainable cooperatives (Groves 1985). Its
operationalisation is sometimes problematic as it may be a 'key element' but its
effective implementation is not 'inevitable' (Mellor et al 1988:175). To Gide it was the
'cardinal principle', which made it distinctive from capitalism and members had a duty
to vote and use its services (cited in Lambert 1963:66). Clearly the weakness with
democracy as social glue is the very fractious behaviour it engenders. As will be
discussed in future chapters the implementation and maintenance of democracy has
been an area of considerable debate. However, it should not be forgotten that
cooperation, unlike capitalism, does proffer rights on people in the economic sphere
(Birchall 1997b), what Gide described as 'economic emancipation' (Lambert 1963).
2.6.6	 Education
From the beginning of the cooperative movement a premium has been placed on the
education of members. In examining the formative years of cooperation Gurney
demonstrated that the leadership's desire to unite the members behind a moral economy
required 'educating the working class through a 'dialogical' association — one which
not only aggregated the individual resources of its members but also defined a
collective identity' (1996:24)
Education went beyond the pursuit of homogeneity, being necessary for effective
operationalisation of cooperation (Bonner 1970) and the need to reduce 'unreasonable
irrationalities of taste' (Lambert 1963:144). These perspectives were summarised at the
1951 Cooperative Congress:
'If the mass of your members are not sufficiently instructed in economic science ...& in
particular, knowledge of what you aim at and how you seek it ...there arises a real
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danger to the Cooperative movement, that your numbers become a hindrance and your
possessions a peril ...Your movement is a democratic movement, if ever there was one.
-It therefore cannot repose on the good sense of the masses of your people' (Prof. James
Stuart cited in Watkins 1986:22)
Two issues emerge from the literature regarding education: first, the acknowledgement
that as cooperation is unlikely to be taught in schools so cooperators have an obligation
to educate; second is the concern about maintaining cooperative values and behaviour.
Sociologically the importance of education suggests connections to reciprocity through
habit and custom.
2.6.7 Ownership
Adjacent to these cooperative themes and objectives is the vexatious issue of ownership.
It could be argued that many of the present difficulties with demutualisations are an
outcome of failure to fully address this matter. However, this is an injustice to Buchez,
other French cooperative writers, such as Pouision, Faquet and Lambert, and the
Rochdale Pioneers. In 1831, Buchez foresaw the eventual decline of larger cooperatives
and suggested the principle of 'non-transferability', where the individual could
withdraw but the cooperative must be perpetual to allow new members to benefit:
The registered capital, ...would be untransferable [sic]; it would be property of the
association which would declared indissoluble, not because individuals could not leave
it, but because the society would be made perpetual by continually admitting new
members. In this way this capital would belong to no one person.... If it were otherwise
the association would become similar to any other business company; it would be useful
only to the founders and prejudicial to those that did not belong to it from the first; for
it would end in being a means of swindling in the hands of the former' (Buchez
1831:37).
Though Buchez could not guarantee that a cooperative could survive in perpetuity,
Lambert (1963) interprets this to mean that the assets would be transferred, not to
current members but another cooperative:




calling to life the motives of acquisition and selfishness, it is no use at all to start a
cooperative action.' (Lambert 1963:54)
-
This process of disposal Lambert calls the 'disinterested transmission of net assets '.
The logic of this argument was discernable in amendment 44 of the Rochdale Pioneers
constitution. Published in 1854 it stated: '.. . and in the last place, in the repayment of
all sums advanced by way of subscription as aforesaid, and the surplus (if any) of such
property shall be applied by the trustees for the time being of the society to such
charitable or public purposes as they think fit.' Rochdale Pioneers Statutes 1854:44).
The virtual elimination of the principle in cooperative consciousness was due to the
phenomenal success of cooperatives and their belief in invincibility, righteousness, and
the inevitability of their success (Lambert 1963). On reflection modern cooperatives
and mutuals have been challenged over ownership because they did not impose Buchez'
principle, which was exacerbated by operating in a society where the capitalist construct
predominated, effectively marginalizing alternative ownership perspectives.
2.6.8 Theorising cooperation
From the literature it is possible to compose a theoretical model of cooperation.
Figure 2-1: A theoretical model of cooperation
At its apex is stability which I have argued is the principle objective of practical
cooperation. This is achieved through a combination of solidarity, collective economics
and democracy. Solidarity is the process whereby individuals seek to co-operate with
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other like-minded individuals to minimise risks. Equity through collective economics is
the heart of cooperation producing a rough equality based on the premise of distribution
-
linked to effort not ownership. It is possible for equity to be absent for modern mutuals
in which member activity is passive, however economic fairness as an important
differentiation from joint-stock companies. In the short-term it can on this model be
replaced without affecting the structure but will ultimately result in complete
destabilisation if another element is removed. With all collective action, it is probable
that leadership will emerge or be required; the inclusion of democracy provides a source
of accountability and ensures a 'fair' distribution of resources.
Finally the figure has the twin foundations of education and non-transferable ownership.
Education teaches individuals the benefits of collective endeavour, while non-
transferable ownership ensures that members have no pecuniary benefit in undermining
democracy and destabilising the cooperative. By employing this model it is possible to
assess the relative strengths of different cooperatives, and understand the specific
challenges they need to address.
2.7	 Summary and Tentative Conclusions
With mutuality lacking a core literature I have drawn upon the work of utopian
socialists, New Mutualists, and the sociology of trust. Apart from attempts to
reintegrate mutuality into the English Socialist tradition (Cole 1944) and cooperative
debates in Europe between Gide and Fauquet (Lambert 1963), as far as I am aware there
were no significant attempts to theorise mutuality until the 1990s. Mutuality's
rediscovery by the New Mutualists, coincided with an intellectual and political search
for a more cohesive society following Thatcherism and the decline of grand narratives.
Employing a DurIcheimian discourse alongside a genetic imperative they argued that
although mutuality was "natural", it required external stimulation to expand.
Specifically this involved reciprocity and education. This interest in mutuality was
mirrored in sociology with debates regarding the conceptualisation of trust.
Sociologists perceived trust as an essential element in civic society (Giddens 1990,
Putnam 1993), which resulted in a broad definition based on benefits (Misztal 1996)
rather than process (Mällering 2001). By analysing trust as an act, 'leap of faith' or
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'suspension', M011ering released trust from its more pejorative definitions, thus enabling
a distinction between itself and related, but not identical, concepts of predictability and
reciprocity.
By theorising the process of trust it was possible to examine the effects of trust in
modern society. TOnnies view that trust weakened as communal bonds between
individuals became more disparate, was challenged by Giddens, who argued that
abstract trust would create new relationships based on a fuller understanding. However
with asymmetries of information, trust required greater consistency in decision making
(Ostram 1990) and therefore more 'suspension' (M011ering 2001). To achieve these
requires a combination of reputation, cultural norms and education. Unfortunately, the
alleged decline in trustworthiness has paralleled the erosion of these aspects of trust.
From these various literatures I developed a matrix of mutuality, comprising of four
interdependent variables: trust, reciprocity, longevity, and caution. Trust is necessary to
ensure decisions are made based on imperfect knowledge, while reciprocity (Mauss
1970) represents the obligations and habits (Camic 1986, Birchall 1988b), which are
placed on all participants, and acts to deter any free-rider behaviour (Olson 1965). For
mutuality to be effective each participant must make a chronological commitment,
hence the inclusion of longevity. Caution enables trust to occur as it assumes a degree
of predictability or minimisation of risk. Through these four elements mutuality can be
practiced, and thereby create a mutual community.
Without fully exploring these components, the cooperative movement has developed a
series of principles which reflect a practical version of mutuality. A cooperative model
can be constructed which seeks to explain how mutuality is delivered. Beginning from
the premise that the purpose of cooperation is stability and should work in the public
interest, it is built on three pillars: of democracy, to ensure accountability; of equity
through collective economics, for moral economic behaviour; and of solidarity through
an open membership and the need for voluntary interdependence. Finally these pillars
are supported by the foundations of education, to provide training in mutual behaviour;
and non-transferable ownership, which ensures that current members cannot gain from
the termination of the society. It is the latter element that has been omitted from most
cooperative structures, which in building societies was because most were terminating
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societies designed to release the capital to members.
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3	 History of British Financial Mutuals 1775-1979
This chapter tracks the changes in mutuality as Britain's financial mutuals evolved from
their late eighteenth century gemeinschaft origins to a late twentieth century gesellschaft
status. This process has not been without controversy and mutuals have attempted to
maintain a sense of community, even as they grew into national organisations. For most
of their history they have managed to successfully straddle these competing demands,
but the breakdown in patriarchy and corporatism, a rise in consumerism, and a series of
scandals, eventually weakened the bonds of mutuality between themselves and their
members. As trust in building societies began to ebb, credit unions were being formed
among excluded groups and were granted legal status in 1979. This chapter
chronologically follows these developments from the birth of building societies in 1775,
through to their growing crises in the 1970s, while the shorter final section discusses the
establishment of credit unions.
The development of financial mutuals in Britain is unlike that experienced elsewhere in
the Western world. Whilst other nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and
Germany had building societies (Cleary 1965), none were as ingrained and protected by
culture and legislation as those in the UK. In contrast, credit unions which have
extensive coverage in the USA, Ireland, and much of the developing world, were only
introduced into Britain in 1964 and involve less than 0.6% of the population (see table
4-4).2
3.1	 Early History of Building Societies 1775-1900
3.1.1	 Origins: 1775-1835
Price (1958) argued building societies arose in response to a particular combination of
events. These were the successful example of mutuality demonstrated by the friendly
societies; notably the industrial revolution, which led to migration into cities where
2 There is a marked discrepancy between the Great Britain and United Kingdom figures due the
popularity of credit unions in Northern Ireland, especially among the Catholic community (Berthoud and
Hinton 1989).
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housing was needed; and the evangelical revival which reminded people that:
-
'they were spiritual beings, had inspired them with a desire, among other things, for
home conditions better and worthier than had been known.'
(Price 1958:13)
Cleary added that industrialisation had detached people from their kinship groups
resulting in the creation of new social patterns. It is here that the historical accounts of
Cleary, Price and Gosden (1973) become divorced from what can be described as the
mythical accounts embodied by the writing of Barnes (1984). The historians argued
that because of the relatively high cost of subscription to a building society, only the
wealthier working class, such as artisans and innkeepers who often built houses for rent
(probably the incipient middle class), could afford membership (Tomkins 1845). By
contrast the mythological school painted building societies as working class temples of
early socialism.
The earliest building societies were 'fully mutual' (Price 1958) and engaged in physical
construction rather than merely the financial transaction. A group of men would come
together and purchase land for development (the reviewed literature is silent on the role
of women in building societies). They would pool regular savings until every member
had a house built. This process would occur in stages whereby once they had saved
enough for the construction of a single property they would draw lots to decide who
would own the house (later this was replaced by an auction between members) and then
begin work. This procedure would be repeated until all members had their own
property, whereupon the society would close. Thus these organisations became known
as terminating societies. Terminating building societies were risky ventures that relied
on mutuality for their stability and security. To build and finance properties often took
upwards of fifteen years (Cleary 1965), hence it was reliant on trust, in that those who
were in receipt of a completed property would not default on further subscriptions, and
it also required good fortune as it was common for members to fall ill and miss
payments, or even die. What appears to have held the societies together was a strong
collective community underpinned by a range of reciprocal measures. These may have
included a weekly meeting in the pub to discuss progress, interlocking trading
arrangements, and the sanction of social ostracism should default occur. Another
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advantage a mutual building society had was the physicality of the final product.
Though fraud did occur (Price 1958), a financial delinquent was forced to live in a
community with his fellow members and that provided a strong social stimulus for
continued membership.
The first recorded building society was formed at the Golden Cross Inn in Ketley,
Birmingham in 1775 (Price 1958) (see Table3-1).
Table 3-1 : The First Twenty Building Societies
Formation	 Name of society 
Possibly 1775	 Ketley's Building Societyi , Birmingham
17 February 1779	 Dudley Building Society
17 July 1781	 Northw000d's Building Society, Birmingham
3 October 1781	 Amicable Building Society, Birmingham
December 1781
	 Deritend Building Society, Birmingham
Possibly 1785	 Hill House Bank Building Club, Leeds
23 February 1785	 Sarcen's Head Building Society, Birmingham
21 March 1785
	 Sarcen's Head (No.2) Building Society, Birmingham
13 April 1786
	 Dudley Arms Building Society
18 October 1791	 Thomas Keeling's Building Society, Birmingham
18 October 1791	 John Pritchett's Building Society, Birmingham
12 December 1791	 Thomas Mantle's Building Society, Birmingham
11 June 1792	 Droylsden Building Society, near Ashton-under-Lyne
24 October 1792	 Rowley Regis Building Society, Staffs.
6 March 1793	 Longridge Building Society, near Preston
1 June 1793	 Horbury Building Society, near Wakefield
26 August 1793	 John Arrowsmith's Building Society, The Dog, Preston
Early in 1794	 Hawker's Building Society, Birmingham
Prior to 1795	 Isaac Badge's Society, Dudley
Prior to 1795	 John Marsh's Building Society, Dudley
Adapted from: Price 1958:59-62
Price (1958) suggested that Birmingham was the centre for building society incubation
because it was an un-incorporated town and therefore free from restrictive guilds,
allowing non-conformists to practice without punishment. Combined with its reputation
as a town of small industries and skilful artisans, it was fertile territory for innovation
within a booming economy. By 1825 there were 69 known societies and 848 by 1854,
with 102 formed in 1846 alone (Cleary 1965).
3 Hereafter the full title of a building society will use the proper name followed by BS, e.g. Planet BS
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3.1.2 Development: 1836-1874
Arising in response to a social need, early building societies enjoyed a problematic legal
title. Many registered as friendly societies either to secure exemption from Stamp Duty
or to avoid official fear of sedition, by unregistered and secret societies (Cleary 1965).
Legal recognition came with the 1836 Benefit Building Societies Act, which placed
them under the provisions of existing friendly society legislation, including exemption
from Stamp Duty (Gosden 1973). This action was not motivated by legal efficiency,
rather the government wanted to eliminate the Savings Banks, whose popularity was
harming the exchequer, and a concession on Stamp Duty to encourage building societies
was comparatively cheaper (Gosden 1973). Over time the act became as disreputable as
the motives that inspired it, with Price (1958) describing it as a legislative 'patchwork'.
Regardless of legal machinations, building societies were evolving into new forms in
response to other factors: financial mismanagement by some societies (Price 1958); the
difficulty faced by members wishing to leave because of the high price of "buy-out"
(Cleary 1965); and the challenge of recruiting new members, who upon joining, had to
match existing members investment (Gosden 1973). The problem of slow growth was
resolved by introducing two classes of investor (shareholder-member and depositor)
avoiding the requirement to match other members investment. Ultimately the solution
of permanent societies was originally extemporised by James in 1845 (Cleary 1965).
James' genius was to divide the interests of the investors and borrowers. Rejecting
building societies' original motivations he asserted that it was possible that investors
may not want to become borrowers, and may prefer a 'dividend'. Equally borrowers
would rather repay a loan than save. Providing there was more received from investors
than loans issued to borrowers, the society could survive in perpetuity (Cleary 1965).
Today's permanent building societies all developed from this simple principle.
The first permanent society was the Metropolitan Equitable in 1845 (Cleary 1965), and
these new organisations were not universally welcomed with claims they were vitiating
mutuality:
'In permanent societies this complete equality and mutuality has not hitherto existed.'
(Stone 1851:42).
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The majority of societies prioritised the rights of investors whether through excessive
interest rates for borrowers to ensure better returns for savers, or more dramatically,
disenfranchising borrowers by classifying them as customers (Gosden 1973).
Consequently permanent societies gained a reputation as investment clubs rather than
providers of dwellings by and for the 'industrious classes' (Gosden 1973; RCFBBS
1872).
During this period building societies were perceived as middle class institutions with an
upward distribution of assets, whereby the collective savings of poorer people would be
borrowed by petite bourgeoisie (Price 1958, Pooley 1991). Continued attachment to
terminating societies was strongest in the north (Price 1958) and among the working-
class (Pooley 1991), mainly because there was a sense of ownership and control, due to
their finite lifespan (Gosden 1973). Working-class fears were well grounded, as
management of permanent societies required specialist skills which the middle classes
were willing to supply (Boddy 1980; Gosden 1973). Excluded from management of
building societies, the working class minimised their risk exposure by becoming
depositors, as they could then withdraw their money more easily, clearly indicating a
diminution of trust. Nevertheless permanent societies continued to prosper (see table
3.2), until the patience of the public and Government was breached in the late 1860s
with a series of scandals resulting in a Royal Commission:
Building societies 'encouraged building speculation, kept defective accounts, charged
exorbitant rates of interest, imposed oppressive fines and did not observe their own








	 Total Terminating	 Permanent Total
North 258 15 273 475 234 709
North 37 7 44 50 36 86
Midlands
South 17 1 18 38 21 59
Midlands
East 14 3 17 35 21 56
London
and South
390 39 429 266 168 434
—East
South 34 14 48 35 32 67
West
Wales 9 1 10 52 21 73
Scotland 5 1 6 6 2 43
Ireland 1 2 3 2 5 7
Totals 765 83 848 959 540 1534
Source: Cleary 1965:48. Note: The Scotland figures are estimates as only incomplete information was collected.
The Royal Commission accepted that investors benefited often at the expense of
borrowers, that the middle class had usurped building societies, that 'building societies
do not build, they simply make advances on buildings ...' (RCFBBS 1872:para 13), and
most notoriously 'it can no longer be said that the element of mutuality is essential to
the type' (RCFBBS interim report 1871 cited in Barnes 1984:10) '...the present title of
benefit building society is a relic' (RCFBBS 1872:para 7).
Despite these comments the commissioners praised the way building societies had
encouraged house building for working and lower-middle classes, the security of their
investments when compared to banks, the training in 'business habits' to the working
class; and concluded with 'There is no reason a priori why the law should look upon
them with disfavour' (RCFBBS 1872:para 54).
In effect the Royal Commission argued that the law should be blind regarding socio-
economic change and concentrate on maintaining operational order. This was reflected
in its plan to grant discretionary powers to the Registrar; making building societies
bodies corporate, thereby obviating the need of trustees; limiting borrowing to two-
thirds of mortgage assets; reducing the Stamp Duty exemption to £200 (this appeased
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the working-class terminating societies); and enshrining model rules and interest
calculation tables in law. Among the items rejected were prescripting securities,
geographical limitations on societies, and sizes of advances '...Nor do we see why
comparatively poor people should be restricted from lending to the comparatively rich,
if it is in their interest to do so.' (RCFBBS 1872:paras 115-118). Most importantly they
dismissed the argument that building societies should be incorporated as joint stock
companies, which whilst appropriate for organisations that required capital at the start
was 'not so well adapted for those which are capable of growing gradually from the
smallest beginnings.' (RCFBBS 1872:para 69). However they did foresee the
demutualisation process and the argument used by its supporters:
'No doubt there may come a stage in the development of the former body in which it




The 1874 Building Societies Act implemented all the recommendations except for the
granting the Registrar "policing" powers over societies (Gosden 1973, Price 1958,
Cleary 1965). This lack of regulatory control eventually necessitated the 1894 Act.
3.1.3	 Crisis: 1875-1894
The twenty years following the 1874 Act were among the most turbulent and
controversial in the history of building societies. Societies were created in which
members rights were suppressed, annual accounts were withheld, the 1874 Act ignored,
exploitation was rife, and some organisations became little more than pyramid schemes
reliant upon a constant flow of new investors to stay afloat (Cleary 1965, Gosden 1973).
By 1893 the public distaste for building societies was reflected in a reduction of their
assets by £9,164,726 between 1883-93 (Gosden 1973:167). For Price, Cleary and
Gosden primary responsibility rests with the Bowker-Starr societies, Portsea Island and
Liberator building societies. By 1893 there were over 3000 societies (see table 3.3)
most of them variations of the Bowker-Starr societies. These type of societies
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combined saving with gambling, while under the auspices of improving access to
homeownership for the working class. Rather than borrowing money and repaying it
along with any attendant interest, a member was entitled to enter an annual draw for an
interest free loan. Similar in appearance to terminating societies they proved especially
popular among the working-class (Gosden 1973) but the organisers often controlled the
professional fees, limited the rights of members (preventing the right to remove
officers) and encouraged speculation as the ballot 'winner' could resell their 'loan' to
the highest bidder, often back to the society. Despite these practices they did encourage
some thrift (Gosden 1973) and their failure rates were similar to the permanent
societies.
Table 3-3: Building Societies registered 1874-1894









421 113 36 13 583 218 3
Bowker-
Starr









603 281 118 50 1052 409 2
TOTAL -	 _. 1408 1166 579 198 3351 1050 2
Adapted from: Gosden 1973:171 & Cleary 1965:113
The publicity given to the worst excesses of the balloting societies can be perceived as
an attempt to divert attention from the incompetence and corruption of the supposedly
respectable middle class management of permanent societies. Many ran liabilities over
the two-thirds of assets prescribed by legislation, and security was marginalised as
societies were desperate to lend money, particularly to industrialists. A downward trend
began with the failure of Portsea Island in December 1891 after liabilities exceeded
assets by £189,000 the extent of which had been withheld by the secretary's
'falsification of accounts' and the directors 'inadequate supervision' (Gosden 1973).
However, it was the 'much more spectacular' (Gosden 1973:171) collapse of the much
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larger Liberator that necessitated the 1894 Act (Bellman 1949).
In this environment mutuality between members fractured. Many sOcieties had no
contingencies for the even distribution of losses and therefore once poor results were
published members could withdraw on a first come first serve basis. Ultimately, this
was tested in court (Auld v Glasgow Working Mens Society) whereupon the judge
found for the plaintive as he had followed existing rules. Lowe (1901) called this a
charter for panic and the Registrar Brabrook said:
'It is one of the most iniquitous results of the current state of the law, that a number of
members, by taking advantage of an imaginary contract with other members, have
escaped without any contribution to the losses of the society, leaving an increased
contribution to be borne by the whole of the other members.' (Select Committee Q207
cited in Cleary 1965:130)
The scale of the losses ensured members participated in building society democracy.
However, societies such as Bradford Third Equitable which in 1877 sent out ballot
papers and copies of accounts, and Woolwich Equitable who permitted proxy votes in
1904, were rarities in undertaking experiments in broader democracy. Due to the
growth of societies this action was deemed unnecessary. Whereas smaller societies
retained local interest and goodwill, larger bodies were reliant on competitive edge,
therefore AGMs were no longer social occasions and 'size and a dispersed membership
meant that the election of officers at general meetings could be unrepresentative.'
(Cleary 1965:155). As membership participation became fragmented, mutuality lost its
cultural immediacy leading to a decline in physical reciprocity and direct accountability.
Although building societies disliked the Act (see Appendix A), especially the asset
disclosure section which led to a rush to foreclose numerous mortgages (Cleary 1965), it
did restore public confidence (Gosden 1973) as table 3.4 demonstrates:
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Amount received £29,853,449 £40,734,866 +36%
Due to shareholders £35,165,641 £38,312,729 +9%
Due to depositors &
other creditors
£17,718,606 £24,161,484 +36%











3.2	 The Twentieth Century
3.2.1	 Consolidation and Growth: 1895-1944
With the new legislation building societies began to reappraise their businesses, and the
attraction of lending small amounts became apparent, beginning the process of building
society mortgagees being owner-occupiers not landlords. Occasionally disputes
between these interests surfaced, with some societies opposing the Asquith
government's social reforms. Defending the rights of landlords was not universally
supported with Hill from the Halifax stating '...something ought to be done to make it
felt that building societies are in existence for the benefit of the working class' (Cleary
1965:167). Hill's intervention encapsulated the paradox of building societies who had
become associated with the working-class as their savers, while lending to and
promoting the interests of the proprietary class.
Notwithstanding this paradox after 1918 building societies successfully exploited the
government's fears of a Soviet style uprising, the avoidance of which led Bellman to
claim:
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'...the nation weathered the storm and it can be demonstrated that the Building Society
movement provided a goodly part of the ballast that kept the Ship of State on an even
-keel.' (1928:31)
Concern about civil unrest, especially from veterans (Bellman 1928) led to the
government encouraging building society mortgages through long-term finance.
Consequently by 1933 local authorities had become the landlord of last resort. As
homeownership was associated with aspiration it quickly became politicised (Boddy
1980), especially by the Conservatives (Pinto-Dushinsky 1970) leading Boddy to argue
that:
'Home ownership eliminates both the overtly antagonistic class relations of tenant
versus profit-seeking private landlords and the equally conflict-ridden relationship of
council tenants to local authorities' (1980:24). Moreover mortgages through not-for-
profit mutuals in which funds arise out of neighbours' small savings, reinforce the
dominant ideology of private ownership, by privatising the provision of housing and
housing finance. Collectively these 'obscure the fundamental class conflict between
wage-labour and capital' (Boddy 1980:26), resulting in class fragmentation.
Due to their size most building societies had been protected from the market but as they
expanded they became drawn into competition based on interest rates (Boddy 1980).
These were irrelevant when a building society served a local market but commodified
competition required larger organisations to secure cost savings. Consequently the
sector began to evolve into three classes: national, regional and local societies, with the
Halifax and the Abbey Road (later the Abbey National) emerging by 1939 as the largest
societies (Cleary 1965). In total the ten largest societies had 37% of all assets in 1922
and 53% by 1930 (Cleary 1965). Growth could be achieved quickly through merger but
the Registrar ruled that profiteering was occurring. In an early example of
carpetbagging directors of small societies with large resources were compensated with
pay-offs from these reserves:
'Such compensation was a substantial temptation to directors and was likely to
improperly influence them, in deciding whether a merger was in the best interests of the
members of their society." (Cleary 1965:231)
58
One of the main drivers to consolidation was the national socio-economic shift as
employment drifted southwards. For northern societies this posed the problem of
having a surplus of funds and if they remained spatially static insufficient lending
opportunities would arise, while southern societies had the opposite dilemma (Pooley
1991, Cleary 1965). That northern societies dominated the movement was, suggests
Cleary, a result of cultural differences. While southern borrowers appeared prepared to
access whatever credit was available, northern savers used their building societies as
savings banks, making frequent investments and withdrawals. This 'traffic' placed a
premium on local branches and effectively precluded the use of southern based
societies, even if interest rates were more competitive. However, Pooley (1991)
demonstrated that this process not only continued the practice of transferring wealth
upwards noted in the nineteenth century, but undermined the accompanying explanation
that this was acceptable as homeownership supported the local construction industry
and released better quality rental properties. Instead there was a transfer of money and
employment opportunities to southern England. Pooley ruefully commented that the
response of management to the unequal demand for loans justified permanent societies,
but working-class families in poor housing in the north proportionally gained less in the
twentieth century than in the nineteenth, resulting in building societies fuelling
'ideologies of self-help and thrift which effectively reinforced contemporary social,
economic and political structures.' (Pooley 1991:13)
Members' interests, rather than benefit for them, are absent from much of the discourse
around the inter-war years. However, Pugh's (1998) insight into the proposed merger
between Leeds and Woolwich in 1944 casts doubt on the assumption of pliant and
apathetic members. Though a postal ballot was held and the merger approved by Leeds
members (19,908 to 1,344) the law required a two-thirds majority at the subsequent
SGM on the 6 July 1944. Of the 335 present only 195 approved the proposal and the
merger collapsed. Amid a rancorous meeting members expressed concern about the
loss of local identity, jobs, a financial institution in a deprived city, and the board's
attempt to impose the merger as a fait accompli. Once again this demonstrates that the
accommodation between paternalistic management and members was dynamic and their
interests did not necessarily coincide. An obvious solution to this conflict was to limit
the engagement of members, which the Registrar was empowered to do under the
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Societies (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1940. He could dispense with the two-thirds
rule for merger (hereafter known as Transfer of Engagements - T.E.) 'if he felt that the
change was not judicious to the interests of members' (Cleary 1965:232). An outcome
of this diminishing of accountability would be the erosion of trust between members
and management.
3.2.2 Post-War Incorporation 1945-1979
The Government's concern about financial irregularities and the inadequacy of
membership supervision ultimately resulted in 1960 Building Society Act, which
extended the powers of the Registrar specifically to protect the interest of members, and
attempting to resolve ambiguities regarding their rights (see Appendix A).
Cleary argued that building societies `were self-perpetuating groups' (1965:266) hence
the legal requirement for limits on directors powers and the extension of the Registrar's
influence, thereby implying that there was insufficient reciprocity within building
societies. Nor did Cleary think the formalised rights for members would result in
greater involvement, because it was easier to withdraw shares rather than establish
opposition groups. Consequently I would argue that a form of legislative or regulated
mutuality emerged, effecting an artificial division between members and management,
with neither party fully understanding mutuality and their respective roles and
responsibilities. As we will see later future discussions of mutuality became transfixed
with formal rights of members rather than issues of reciprocity, trust, security and
longevity of commitment.
Membership rose rapidly during the 1960s and 70s from 3.9 million to 30.636 million
shareholders, while the industry consolidated from 726 to 273 societies (Boleat 1986).
A growth in prominence was accompanied by greater scrutiny. Societies faced criticism
for monopolistic practices (Barnes 1984; Boddy 1980), increased managerialism
(Barnes), or housing exclusion (Boddy). The rapid expansion was due to external
macro-factors and sectoral shifts. Primarily monetary policy throughout the decade was
fixated with curbing inflation through the management of supply of credit. As
mortgages represented individuals' largest single borrowing, successive governments
intervened in the core activity of building societies, culminating in the Joint Advisory
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Committee (JAC). Its objectives were to continue to support the housing market,
through a constant flow of mortgage funds, while simultaneously stabilising house
prices and maintaining an orderly housing market. The Memorandum of Agreement
argued that balancing these potentially conflicting demands would be achieved through
limiting changes in mortgage interest rates, and adopting a 'flexible' approach to
savings rates. To avoid 'contamination' of the policy banks were prevented from
competing for mortgages via the Corset (a legal restriction on the activity of banks to
aid fiscal policy) (Boddy 1980).
During this period the BSA cartel (building societies collectively agreed interest rates
under the Recommended rate System, known as the cartel) attempted to negotiate
between the desire by smaller societies for more competitive rates and the stability
demanded by larger societies who could sustain "uncompetitive" rates for longer.
Although there were occasional breaches in the mid-1970s by larger societies, it was the
smaller societies who adopted a more flexible approach (Boddy 1980). Although anti-
competitive, the cartel ensured a steady supply of mortgages at relatively stable prices.
Between 1975-8 there were 52 changes in the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), and 33
changes in the Bank Clearing Rate, yet the cartel recommended rate shifted on only nine
occasions. Security through stability therefore benefited consumers, government and
building societies during a period of economic flux. For Barnes (1984) building
societies' not-for-profit status and preferential tax system made it difficult for new
market entrants, while the Cartel was a useful smokescreen for oligarchic practices.
However, building societies remained popular (see Table 3.5) as they brought stability
and security to household finances. As Boleat argued building societies had been
successful but very fortunate: "able to operate in a rapidly growing markets without
significant competition" (1986:207) due to "constraints placed on their competitors"
(p209).
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Table 3-5: Building Society Deposits and Personal Sector Wealth, 1957-83







1957 4.1 5.5 16.1
1962 4.1 5.8 19.3
1967 5.3 8.6 26.1
1972 6.4 11.2 34.7
1977 7.9 16.4 43.3
1982 8.2 16.6 44.6
1983 8.4 16.3 46.3
Source: Boleat 1986:17
National non-competitive arrangements were supplemented by local monopolies
(Boddy 1980). In analysing housing industry networks in Tyneside he found that small
building society directors also held positions or had cormections to other housing
organisations (constructors, estate agents and surveyors).
Through controlling the supply of finance, building societies were able to effectively
ration its supply, often at the behest of government policy (Boleat 1986) and were
criticised for their unfair distribution of these resources (Boddy 1980, Barnes 1984,
Lambert 1976, Harloe et al. 1974, Weir & Kilroy 1976). Not only were building
societies' lending policies conservative (Boddy 1980), especially when available funds
were low, but these funds were used discriminately with those on low incomes
purchasing older properties most likely to be excluded (Lambert 1976). When
calculating mortgages, overtime payments, which are a significant contribution to
manual workers' pay, were omitted (Harloe et al. 1974). Women had a similar
experience, with assessments being made of their career prospects and when they were
expected to interrupt work to have children (Boddy 1980). Additionally those on lower
incomes were given mortgages for shorter periods and a smaller proportion of the
purchase price. Thus they are forced to raise a larger deposit and pay higher monthly
instalments (Boddy 1980). Resistance to loans on older properties and/or to poorer
households created areas where societies rarely lent. Evidence for this alleged 'red-
lining' was brought together by Weir & Kilroy (1976) who argued that if certain
categories of people and places were excluded this would have a profound effect on
housing distribution and may effectively create ghettos.
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Mortgage exclusion could be resolved by increasing the supply of credit, which could
only occur by attracting new investors (Boleat 1986). As most members had relatively
modest savings (Boleat 1986), investments would have to be sought elsewhere.
However, in attracting these investors building societies were accused of neglecting
their traditional members (Barnes 1984). By offering higher returns on term and notice
accounts building societies placed a preference on those with disposable cash assets,
and produced a hidden upwards transfer of wealth (Barnes 1984). The tax system also
favoured wealthier members with the 'composite rate' on savings meaning all members
paid the same tax rate on interest received, regardless of income or taxable status. On a
greater scale the Mortgage Interest Relief Assistance Scheme (M1RAS) redistributed
benefits upwards. Barnes (1984) estimated that the system cost the taxpayer £.15 billion
per annum. In sum building societies were engaged in activities that transferred their
wealth and that of the nation from the poorest to wealthiest. Combined with criticism of
mortgage exclusion critics wondered whether: 'they might as well be banks or become
part of banks, without all the privileges afforded to societies' (Barnes 1984: 161).
Another criticism was that the uncompetitive marketplace was distorting building
societies and the market, in particular the proliferation of branches and packaged
mortgages (Barnes 1984, Boddy 1980, Boleat 1986, Pugh 1998). Complaints about too
many branches may seem unusual today where building societies proudly boast about
maintaining extensive networks (Marshall et al 1999) but the opposite views were held
by press and politicians in the 1970s. Pugh (1998) and Drake (1989) believed the cartel
effectively curtailed cost competition, thus reducing the necessity of efficiency savings,
consequently differentiation was sought via service; specifically branch networks.
Moreover the interrelations with other housing professionals meant housing products
were bundled including the preferred professionals. Larger societies also engaged in
this practice and had pre-selected insurers for home and contents insurance as part of
any contract (Boddy 1980). These practices were not without critics (Wilson
Committee 1980) and by the 1979 election pressure for change was growing (Pugh
1998).
Along with branch expansion it was alleged that the construction of new head offices
and managerial indulgence were a cause of inefficiency (Barnes 1984). Barnes states
that the non-price competitive marketplace enables building society management to
63
have increased discretion, demonstrated in directors' salaries, auditors' fees and office
accommodation. Boleat (1986) disputes this arguing that management expense ratios
are distorted by inflation; whereas expenses rise in accordance with inflation, assets
may not. Efficiency from a financial institution is a combination of expenses and cost
of funds. Thus a society that takes most investment through branches may have higher
expenses but lower cost of funds than one that relies on advertising. Notwithstanding
Boleat's argument, management expenses rose rapidly during a non-price competitive
marketplace period and assets, like cash, are also linked to inflation and so they cannot
be the only factor affecting the ratio.
With consolidation, the choice between societies was diminishing. In 1983 the five
largest societies possessed 55.7% of all assets but had not merged or brought another
society in the top ten (Barnes 1984). Merger or TE was concentrated among the minute
societies (assets under £10 million) to medium, small or other minute societies (see
Table 3.6). Most of the decline in societies was due to dissolution of terminating
societies (the last of these from Salisbury closed in 1980), but since 1950 most of these
have been TEs as 'societies are in the last phase of a 30 year shift from the locally
based friendly society to the national multi-billion societies' (Barnes 1984:18)
Table 3-6: Building society takeovers and mergers, 1970-79
Transferer Transferee (acquiring society)
Large Medium Small Minute Total
Large (top ten) - - - - 0
Medium (over
£100 m)
1 2 - - 3
Small (over
£10 m)
3 7 14 - 24
Minute (under
£10m)
25 53 54 48 180
TOTAL 29 62 68 48 207
Source: Barnes 1984:58
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Table 3-7: Operating expenses (pence per £100 of assets) for building societies 1970-1978
Large societies Medium societies Small societies
1970 54.9 53.1 .47.9
1978 83.9 100.8 76.7
Though the largest societies grew gradually in the 1970s the significant change was the
expansion of regional societies: Midshires, Town and Country, Gateway; and the new
nationals: Anglia, National and Provincial, Britannia, and Northern Rock. As seen in
table 3.7 smaller societies appear the most efficient, but the Registrar disagreed,
believing that they had insufficient quality of management and supervision (Barnes
1984). Therefore the period witnessed the regulator taking an interventionist role
regarding stability and beginnning to force TE on alleged 'inefficient and un-stable
societies' (Boleat 1986:158). Yet the arguments for merger remain unproven, with no
evidence of economies of scale (Gough 1979) or only among the largest societies
(Gilchrist and Rothwell 1980). But the pattern has been for mergers of small societies
with relatively low operating costs, rather than between high-cost medium sized
organisations, with industry insiders seeking scale to achieve national coverage which
alongside the Cartel meant pressure for cost savings were limited (Barnes 1984).
Collectively questionable accounting practices, lending policies, the cartel and the
questionable use of management discretion regarding mergers indicated a need for
stronger accountability. This, in a mutual, should be to the members' advantage but the
relationship was determined by legislation which favoured the management:
'However, given its assumption of mutuality, the law provides a set of arguably
inappropriate rules and procedures to cope with this conflict, together with a regulator
of questionable powers.' 	 (Barnes 1984:138)
As the 1970s drew to a close building societies that had been so successful during the
20th Century and had dominated mortgage finance since the 1940s were facing a new set
of challenges, for which they were ill-prepared. They continued to exploit extraordinary
reserves of goodwill among the public (McKillop & Ferguson 1993), but the 1980s
witnessed a decade of upheaval in which their market and their sector was change
irrevocably. This began with the Wilson Report (1980) which heeded complaints from
banks that building societies operated in a "sheltered market" in which they benefited
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from the composite tax rate, were beginning to offer banking services, and considering
using the capital markets to access finance. Taken together this gave building societies
an unfair competitive advantage and the committee recommended tbe abolition of the
cartel and called for more equality of competition and treatment among institutions.
Policies that were enacted by the incoming Conservative government and are discussed
in chapter 4.
3.3	 Credit Unions: Origins and Development in Britain
Unlike building societies, credit unions originated in Germany in the mid-nineteenth
century. Despite a common philosophical ancestry, there is no evidence that the
Germans were influenced by British building societies. Instead they seemed inspired by
Owen (Moody & Fite 1971), a fact partially confirmed by Price (1958) who stated that
Germany had savings and loans institutions during the nineteenth century but the first
German building societies only appeared after World War I. During the mid-nineteenth
century the "peoples bank" was suggested by Proudhon (Hall 1971) and credit unions
were advocated by Haeck in Belgium, but it was Victor Huber's writings which were
the precursor for contemporary credit unions (Tucker 1922). He argued that poverty
was degrading and that a co-operative loan fund could alleviate this situation as it
benefited the individual economically and morally through "self-help". Nor did he
prescribe any artificial class barriers, believing that eligibility should not be drawn
along class lines. Huber founded only two associations and it was Schulze-Delitzsch
and Raiffessen who became the pioneers of credit unions (Moody & Fite 1971,
Reinhardt 1998). From Germany 'credit unions' spread into Italy and then across the
remainder of continental Europe. In contrast the early arrival of industrialisation in
Britain resulted in no agricultural banks and as a consequence a relatively weak co-
operative banking sector (Bolêat 1986).
At the beginning of the 20th Century credit unions crossed the Atlantic with Alphonse
Desjardin forming the La Caisse Populaire de Levis in Canada in 1900, and St. Marys
Cooperative Credit in New Hampshire in 1909 (Moody & Fite 1971). In the USA
credit unions were perceived as a means to resolve economic and social problems
especially in the nascent consumer society (Dougherty 1987; Reinhardt 1998). In
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contrast to banks credit unions expanded rapidly during the depression; up 107%
between 1929-33 compared to a 50% fall in the number of banks (Johnson 1993).
Thereafter the movement grew steadily until the 1970s, when paralleling the trend
among UK building societies a series of mergers caused by an increasingly competitive
marketplace reduced the total number. Additionally de-industrialisation resulted in the
liquidation of some smaller work-based credit unions.
Despite a burgeoning global spread of credit unions, the first known example in the UK
did not appear until 1964 in Wimbledon (Berthoud & Hinton 1989; Donnally & Haggett
1997). At the time these organisations were unregulated by specific legislation and
therefore formed as a company limited by guarantee, or an Industrial and Provident
Society (IPS) under the 1965 IPS Act, or remained unregulated (Berthoud & Hinton
1989). All three options were unsatisfactory; the latter had no legal status; IPS
legislation only permitted borrowing up to an individual's level of savings unless
another member guaranteed against their savings; and a limited company required
permanent officers responsible for any debt and had high registration fees (Berthoud &
Hinton 1989). However, this legal ambiguity did not apply in Northern Ireland. Thanks
to promotion by the Catholic Church, credit unions had grown rapidly both sides of the
border and when the Irish Parliament passed the Credit Union Act 1966, the UK
government replicated it in an Northern Ireland specific sub-section of the Industrial and
Provident Act 1969 (Berthoud & Hinton 1989). Until the mid-eighties most credit
union members in Northern Ireland were Catholic (29% of Catholics were members —
Berthoud & Hinton 1989), development among the Protestant community had been
thwarted by the Irish League of Credit Unions, which is the internationally recognised
governing body for credit unions and all Ireland jurisdiction (Donnally & Haggett
1997).
Britain however remained virtually untouched by credit unions, with 27 in 1974, and 50
in 1977 and a total membership of about 7,500 (Berthoud & Hinton 1989). Bt 1979
there were 59 societies mainly formed in urban conurbations (the first in Scotland was
formed at Drumchapel in 1970) among Catholic and Caribbean communities (Berthoud
& Hinton 1989). This would indicate a similarity with the early building societies.
Both formed in urban areas and among 'outsider' groups, whether because of their
religion (non-conformism for building societies, Catholicism for credit unions) or social
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status. It is likely that the Caribbean community faced racism, while the immigrants to
eighteenth century Birmingham were excluded from available housing and credit.
The first official reference to credit unions came from the Crowther Committee (1971),
which saw the potential for them in helping people obtain credit at an affordable rate.
Eventually legislation was enshrined in the 1979 Credit Union Act. The Act remains
the only primary legislation governing credit unions and it stipulates that:
1. The regulator is the Registrar of Friendly Societies to whom all credit unions
must register
2. Credit unions are defined by their common bond, which must be an exact
description of the credit union field of membership and approved by the
Registrar
3. They must have at least 21 and cannot exceed 5000 members. All must be over
16 and pay an entrance fee ranging from £1-5
4. Savings are in £1 shares and should not exceed £2000 and operate on 60 days
notice for withdrawal
5. Dividends cannot exceed 8%
6. The loan capital is the total savings of the members less any contingency
7. loans cannot exceed £2000 and must be charged at 12.68% APR on a reducing
balance ratio
8. 20% of profits must be placed in reserves until the fund reaches 10% of the
credit unions total assets
9. The maximum term for an unsecured loan is four years and ten years for a
secured loan
Though enabling existing credit unions to become legal entities, the Association of
British Credit Unions Limited (ABCUL) have described the Act as 'the most restrictive
legislation in the world' (Swoboda 1999), but the main purpose of the Act was to
safeguard the interests of members (Berthoud & Hinton 1989). Further analysis on the
effect of the legislation is discussed in 4.3.
Unlike building societies, credit union membership is restricted by a 'common bond'.
By law there are three permissible common bonds: employee (the staff and their
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immediate families of an organisation), associational (usually a collective interest e.g. a
church congregation) or residential/community (residents of a precise geographical
area). Conventional thought believes that a common bond encourages repayment
(Hunter 1994) but Donnally & Haggett argued that 'there is little evidence from the real
world to support this claim, and some evidence to oppose it.' (1995:3). As in building
societies, credit unions have a board of directors elected by members under the one
member one vote principle. Operational practice differs across the sector but most
require members to save regularly for a fixed period (invariably 13 weeks) before
borrowing. When borrowing a member will apply to the Credit Committee. Loans are
usually based on a fixed multiple of savings (often set a lower level for the initial loan)
and during repayments the members' savings cannot be withdrawn. Comparison with
banks that focus on the high cost of borrowing ignores the relatively small size of loans,
hence the need for higher interest rates to offset administration costs, and that at the
conclusion of the loan the members original savings remain intact (Donnally and
Haggett 1995). In effect the member's savings partially underwrite the loan, making it
semi-secure.
3.4	 Conclusion
The chapter demonstrated that there were commonalities between the early development
of building societies and credit unions. Both types of mutuals were formed by excluded
groups and served the wealthier members from those communities. Over time debates
emerged concerning the extent of professionalism and the impact on the communities of
mutuality. Specifically, the transfer to abstract trust is invariably resisted by the
working class membership, who feared losing control over the management of the
mutual. With their longer history building societies have experienced considerable
fluctuations in members' attitudes regarding trustworthiness. This has not been a linear
process, with a gradual dissipation of trust as personal reciprocity declines. Rather, it
appears to parallel the reputation of the society and acceptance of paternalism. Until the
late twentieth century building societies endured periodic scandals, which were
followed by a withdrawal of public support. Often these phases ended with new
legislation and management of societies, which ensured sufficient stability to encourage
a rise in membership. However, building societies responded slowly to the decline in
69
paternalism and the concomitant intensification of scrutiny and challenges to their
management processes. The next chapter examines how mutuals have attempted to
respond to an increasingly sceptical membership, framed against a political climate
aimed at removing paternalism and collective endeavour. Though mutuals have
previously suffered from tardy or inappropriate state intervention, this intensified in the
1980s by a government committed to privatisation of both the individual and society.
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4	 Recent History of British Financial Mutuals 1980-
-
2001
The final two decades of the twentieth century witnessed the most extraordinary
upheavals to financial mutuals in Britain. In 1997, eight building societies converted
into banks, taking with them two-thirds of the entire sector's assets. Meanwhile, despite
their relatively small size, credit unions became a major instrument of government
policy to tackle financial exclusion (H.M. Treasury 1999a and 1999b). The pivotal
points in these transformations were the 1986 Building Societies Act, which legalised
demutualisation, and the election of the Labour government resulting in a higher profile
for credit unions alongside a more permissive regulatory framework.
4.1	 The building societies 1980-1936
4.1.1	 Effects of deregulation, competition and new technology
The election of the Conservative Government in 1979 heralded a neo-liberal approach
to financial markets and extension of the right-to-buy policy for council tenants. In
1980 exchange controls were lifted, followed by the abolition of the Corset (system of
domestic loan supply control on banks) (Reid 1991). Furthermore, the Bank of England
altered the capital base rules for banks, injecting £8.4 billion onto banks revenue
accounts between 1980-86 (Llewellyn 1988). On the demand side the Housing Act
1980 encouraged Right-to-buy, which had an immediate impact with sales rising from
30,620 in 1978 to 207,050 by 1982 (Boleat 1986).
Suffering losses on their developing world investments, the banks welcomed the
opportunity of expanding in the relatively secure UK mortgage market (Llewellyn
1988) and used the relaxed capital rules to purchase market share, expanding from 8%
(£593million) in 1980 to 36% (£5078million) by 1982 (Barnes 1984). Despite the
increase in competition both building societies and banks were able to maintain profits
as the demand for mortgages continued to exceed supply (McKillop & Ferguson 1993).
Therefore, net national borrowing went from £7.3 billion in 1980 (Reid 1991) to
71
£16.535 billion in 1984 (Boleat 1986), while the mortgage rate rose relative to general
interest rates (McKillop & Ferguson 1993).
This development made the mortgage market attractive to new entrants especially
wholesale intermediaries such as Mortgage Express, National Home Loans, and the
Mortgage Corporation. These bodies accessed wholesale finance from the money
markets and employed new technology to 'obviate' the need for an extensive branch
network and thereby undercut the building societies (McKillop & Ferguson 1993:11).
Once demand had been sated, a wave of price-cutting and product innovation
commenced. In searching for market share lenders exposed themselves to higher risk
(McKillop & Ferguson 1993), and higher advertising spend, with building societies
spending five times more in 1987 than 1980 (£8.8 million to £41.1 million) and banks
spending over six times as much (£8.6 million to £50.3 million) (Speed 1990).
With an intensely competitive environment the building societies cartel came under
increasing pressure. In September 1983 Abbey National withdrew from the cartel and
during the next year the system went into terminal decline (Boleat 1986). Among the
sternest critics of the cartel were the new cohort of building society chief executives,
many of whom came from outside the sector, most notably Birch at Abbey National.
These men brought a more commercial profit centred approach and challenged the
prevailing culture:
'Terminology altered from "surpluses" which Peter Birch says, "I likened to things
choirboys wear," to "profits." It was to be another three years before Abbey's
published yearly financial statements fully blossomed forth in a new format company-
style Annual Accounts. ' (Reid 1991:35)
4.1.2 Membership Agitation
Building societies responded to the growth in membership agitation by increasing
authoritarian practices, designed to 'manage' participation. When the Liverpool BS
initially failed to achieve the two-thirds majority for its proposed YE to Midshires in
1982, it arranged an EGM but withheld information on the time and place of the
meeting (Barnes 1984). A dirtier campaign ensued during the Stockport Mersey to
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Bradford and Bingley TE in 1982 with the board marginally securing the requisite two-
thirds majority, only to be ordered by the Registrar to conduct a re-vote, as members
were not given the full 21 days notice. At the re-vote the number of eligible members
rose by 350, with leaders of the opposition to merger admitting to adding 50 of these
new members. In the previous year the society had gained just nine members, and 247
of the 350 new members joined between the 23 to the 31 December 1982. When the
new ballot was finally held in February the vote went 668 to 126 in favour of merger
(Barnes 1984). What drove members to oppose mergers was a mixture of personal
financial motivation in wanting to maintain beneficial interest rates, and a commitment
to the preservation of a local financial institution. These justifications coincided with
heightened activism at the turn of the 1980s, as paternalistic relationships were
questioned.
The most prominent example of these changes was at the Nationwide in 1982, when
Punt started asking questions about directors' expenses. During a prolonged battle
Nationwide changed the rules on proxy votes, Punt took them to the High Court, lost,
then requested details of staff expenses from both the society and the auditors. When
rejected Punt proposed that the auditor was removed and asked for the annual return to
be available to members prior to the AGM. Initially Nationwide refused citing the 1962
Building Societies Act, but later conceded, arguing they were legally correct but their
case was impossible to justify publicly. In response over 500 members attended the
AGM and grilled the board for five hours:
The Chairman... Ashworth said "If we reject the accounts as Mr Punt recommends,
what do you expect us to do?" "Resign" came the cry amid ironic cheers.' (Barnes
1984:142)
The sociologists have found a new victim" remarked one director gloomily "Look at
those bearded chaps in their sweaters and trousers. They are all at Kingston Poly, and
good luck to them. But they are not our kind of saver.'	 (McRae 1982:1)
The following year the process was repeated, with motions to the AGM again being
rejected and appeals being made to the courts. This time over 1000 people attended the
AGM, partially encouraged by a leaked memo from the Nationwide General Manger,
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asking staff to attend in a 'private capacity', removing all identifying signs and ask
planted questions (Barnes 1984).
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Other societies took an alternative approach and the Anglia asked its severest critic
(Paul Twyman) to join the board, but this was the exception, and ironically when
Nationwide and Anglia merged in 1988, Twyman became a director of the new society.
Punt meanwhile formed the Building Societies Members Association (BSMA), who
were committed to increasing public interest in building society accountability and
exposing democratic malpractices within the sector.
4.1.3 External Pressure for Change
Enhancing accountability was also the justification used by those pressuring for the
option to demutualise. In the short-term the issue was about creating a level playing
field between building societies and the banks. In relaxing the rules for banks the
government had created a market where building societies could be undercut on their
traditional business, while preventing them from accessing the banks' markets (Bank of
England 1990). Moreover, banks could access the wholesale money markets, while
building societies remained reliant on members' personal savings (Reid 1991).
Following the BSA sponsored Spalding Report in 1983, which recommended a
liberalisation of legislation including the potential for demutualisation, the government
responded by allowing building societies to raise money from the stock exchange, but
also removing any remaining tax advantages societies enjoyed over banks (Boleat 1986,
Reid 1991).
In the USA Savings and Loans (S & L) institutions began to demutualise in 1972, with
the first being Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association, who allocated shares to
existing depositors (Reid 1991). This resulted in speculative investments in other S & L
and to deter this new regulation was introduced in 1975, stating that the stock must be
sold at the market value, although depositors would have priority subscription rights.
Additionally the law allowed for a one-year protection for the S & L after conversion
and a liquidation account, equal to existing reserves should be created. This would
protect existing depositors should the company fail, but as they withdraw money the
fund would diminish accordingly and the balance would gradually be transferred to the
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new company's capital. These procedures were to influence both subsequent UK
legislation and the floatation of Abbey National (Reid 1991).
4.2	 The Building Societies Act 1986
Building societies wanted urgent legislative change as their market share fell, drifting
below fifty percent in 1987. A goverment Green Paper in 1984 argued for some
relaxation (Boleat 1986), and a bill followed this in December 1985 (Hammond 1998).
4.2.1	 Discussion of the 1986 Act
The Act became law in January 1997 (see Appendix A) and was based on the principle
of 'nature limits' for building societies. While accepting the arguments for change the
government wanted building societies to continue "primarily in their traditional roles —
holding people's savings and lending for traditional house purchase — while loosening
the legal restraints which they have operated for a century or more so they can develop
in other fields' (HM Treasury Green Paper 1984:1). Thus the Act offered limited
deregulation based on building societies core competencies (Hammond 1998), and was
considered restrictive (McKillop & Ferguson 1993). From the outset the act was
perceived as inappropriate because it continued the distinction between banks and
building societies.
'It is, in essence, akin to a preservation order like those imposed on National Trust
Parks and ancient buildings. However, in the present, increasingly competitive
environment, and with the lines of demarcation among financial services fast becoming
blurred, an imposed preservation order on the nature of business undertaken by
societies could, in fact, have the opposite effect to what is intended: it could threaten
their future survival.' (Llewellyn and Wrigglesworth 1990:29)
The legislation had three weaknesses: it limited the activities of building societies; it
restricted access to capital; and it confirmed a separate regulator for building societies
(McKillop & Ferguson 1993; Hammond 1998; Llewellyn and Wrigglesworth 1990).
Moreover, it placed smaller societies at a commercial disadvantage by preventing them
from offering PEPs, overdrafts, and estate management (Ingham and Wong 1994).
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Schedule 8 of the Act was substantially widened in 1988 (Drake 1989) to permit any
service unless specifically precluded or restricted in the areas of banking, investment,
insurance, trusteeship, executorships, and land services. Funding regulations were also
relaxed and the largest societies could have 40% of non-retail funds (Hammond 1998),
but the regulation remained restrictive to deter speculative investment by mutuals (Reid
1991).
However, the most significant passage of the 1986 Act was the capacity to convert to a
company (Reid 1991). For the government conversion should be possible but not an
'easy option' (Reid 1991:29). Moreover the law, for the first time, enabled members to
access their theoretical property rights contained within a building society. Previously
the residual value was locked and effectively transferred across generations, the 1986
Act transformed ownership into a 'hybridised model', as the traditional form was
combined, with a feature of investor-owned company, in which the residual can be
realised for short-term gain (Cook et al. 2001:26). The impact of this change was not
immediately apparent but would become the main challenge for building societies
during the late 1990s.
4.2.2 The Demutualisation of Abbey National
Abbey National argued that mutual status was 'outdated' and that demutualisation was
necessary because building societies were placed at a competitive disadvantage,
therefore losing customers to other providers. Furthermore, conversion would recognise
members' ownership, which would be 'enhanced', 'both in terms of value and control'.
By law the Transfer Document had to include the disadvantages of conversion, which it
considered were the risk of takeover, the loss of trustee status for deposit account
holders, and higher interest rates, all of which were considered briefly and arbitrarily
dismissed (Reid 1991:78). To forestall any legal challenges Abbey National arranged a
'friendly' court case with the Building Societies Commission, to test the status of free
shares for qualifying members. This was not envisaged or prescribed in the original
Act, and the Vice-Chancellor admitted that he was 'doing the best I can with this very
obscure statutory provision' and eventually accepted the case for free shares (cited in
Reid 1991:71).
76
The main threat to the conversion came from a small pressure group Abbey Members
Against Floatation (A_MAF), who ultimately recruited 1,405 members. During the
eighteen months prior to conversion they fought and sometimes out manoeuvred the
board in both the press and within the society. Throughout this period the board were
unyielding, refusing to grant AMAF a platform, include their literature in branches or
mailings, and declining a motion for a Special General Meeting, because it interfered
with the board's right to manage the business (Reid 1991). Their final tactic was to
nominate candidates for the board, through which Abbey National sent out the
accompanying manifesto statements. It is noteworthy that the vote for directors, where
members had access to AMAF literature was 3:1 in favour of the board's recommended
candidates, while the conversion vote where no opposition literature was circulated the
margin was nine to one. Facing intransigence from the board, lacking access to
members names and addresses, and sufficient finance for a direct mailing AMAF was
never likely to be successful, but their campaign raised serious points which the
Building Societies Commission felt the Abbey National had failed to answer,
particularly regarding the biased appraisal of the consequences of demutualisation
which was sent to members. The board received criticism from other members during
their roadshows to promote to conversion to members, with one individual stating that.
"A bribe is bad enough; it is even worse to be bribed with your own money." (Thomas
Lines at Edinburgh roadshow cited in Reid 1991:109).
Despite this public interrogation the conversion proceeded on schedule. At the outset
qualifying members were given £100 of free shares each and offered a share of an
additional 750,000 million cash shares valued at £1.30 million. In rejecting a tiered
distribution based on value of investment, the board believed this continued the mutual
culture of one member one vote (Reid 1991). With the offer of free shares the board felt
confident of victory, but still remained nervous about reaching the turnout thresholds.
In the event these were passed easily as 2.87 million savers voted (64.6%) with 89.5%
in favour, while 676,000 (64.1%) of borrowers voted, with 90.7% in favour. The scale
of vote led AMAF to reflect that 'a good bribe always win a good argument.' (Reid
1991:103). The subsequent share issue was 2.7 times over subscribed and Abbey
National Building Society converted into Abbey National plc on July 12 1989.
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In reviewing this first conversion of a British building society, Boleat believed the free
shares had been the key decision and Reid believed the conversion demonstrated that
-
members had a 'fragile' commitment to mutuality. Presciently she contemplated
whether the offer of free shares might encourage members at other building societies to
become 'AMAF in reverse' and campaign for conversion for share benefits (Reid
1991:188)
4.3	 Into the 1990s — housing recession and more
conversions
4.3.1	 Housing Recession
The housing recession of the 1990s created extensive negative equity, especially in
Southern England (Coles 1992). The impact for building societies was threefold: a
worsening balance sheet caused by mortgage arrears and repossessions (see table 4.1
overleaf); and as a consequence a reduction in the number of Southern based building
societies. All were transferred to larger societies, sometimes under the guidance of the
BSC. The third detrimental impact was on building societies' reputation; for example
the Solicitors Property Group described building societies behaviour over repossession
sales as 'bureaucratic, bungling, incompetence and inefficient' (Hunter 1992:33).
Table 4-1: House repossessions and arrears 1989-95 & 2001
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001
House
Repossessions




















0.15 0.38 0.93 1.48 1.50 1.12 0.81 0.17
Adapted from Council for Mortgage Lending da a 2002
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The only consolation for the building societies was that banks had greater losses, with
an estimated 2.78 per cent bad debt on advances in 1991 for the 'big four', compared to
0.71 percent for building societies (UBS Philips and Drew 1992). McKillop and
Ferguson (1993) believed that building societies' performance was only stronger than
the banks, because they were prevented from participating in riskier activities.
Certainly during the recession, discussions regarding conversions and the limits of the
law diminished.
Generally building societies performed well in the 1980s (McKillop & Ferguson 1993)
but this disguises five significant developments. First, the failure of many
diversification programmes with many societies moving into and then withdrawing
from activities such as estate agency. Second, building societies' costs were rising,
while banks were aggressively reducing theirs, through redundancies and branch closure
programmes (McKillop and Ferguson 1993). Third, as building societies continued to
merge there was conflicting evidence regarding economies of scale. Fourthly, only one
new society, the Ecology in 1981, was established during the decade. Finally, the sector
was undergoing a culture change:
'Undoubtedly, there has been a shift' from social to commercial objectives and this has
helped create a more performance orientated culture within the sector...' (McKillop and
Ferguson 1993:10)
4.3.2 The Cheltenham and Gloucester Demutualisation
At the forefront of the cultural changes was the chief executive of the Cheltenham and
Gloucester (C&G); Longhurst. Since his appointment in 1982 he improved the
efficiency and increased the organisation's size (Scott 1994a). Being too small to
qualify for the FT 100 following a demutualisation Longhurst agreed a friendly takeover
by Lloyds bank in April 1994 (Hughes and Whitebloom 1994). What drew the greatest
attention was the windfall to existing members of C&G, as Lloyds agreed to pay £1.8
billion for the business, with each member receiving £500 and an additional 10% of
their balance in their smallest account, for savers up to a maximum of £10,000.
Consequently the average payout would be £2200 (Hughes & Hunter 1995). This cash
bonus was 15 times that received by Abbey National members, sparking speculative
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activity in the remaining societies (Hughes 1994a, Whitebloom et al. 1994).
-However, a regulatory and legal challenge to C&G's planned distribution ensued, which
resulted in the Vice-Chancellor declaring that cash windfalls to members of less than
two years continuous membership and to borrowers were illegal, as the law was 'to
prevent speculative investment in building societies' (cited in Hughes and Hunter
1994:33). Some members disgruntled with the amended distribution joined C&G
Alternatives, a small pressure group established to oppose conversion (Hughes 1994b,
Scott 1994b). An unseemly dispute that pitted members against each other was
threatening to engulf the conversion; leading Scott to ruminate 'is this what mutuality is
supposed to be about?' (1994c: 20).
During the autumn C&G Alternatives grew to over 3000 members and in early January
1995 collected sufficient nominators to request a Special General Meeting (SGM)
(Hughes 1995a). After considerable delay C&G held the SGM at 4pm on Saturday 25
March, a day before all postal votes for the conversion were due (Zagor 1995).
The SGM was a boisterous affair with a 1000 members jeering and slow handclapping
the board, as Longhurst refused to answer any questions during a two-hour ordeal. At
one stage the chairman had to abandon a prepared 20-minute speech such was the
tumult. Despite wining the vote of those present the protestors were defeated by the
proxy votes held by the board (Gibbs 1995). A week later the takeover was confirmed
as members voted overwhelmingly in favour (see Appendix B).
4.3.3 Halifax and Leeds Permanent Merger and Demutualisation
In November 1994 the Halifax and Leeds Permanent announced their decision to merge
and seek demutualisation. Considered a staunch defender of mutuality three factors
influenced Halifax's decision: first, the C&G decision meant members now were aware
of the value of their shareholding. In a private poll in 1992 only 3% of members knew
their rights, following C&G this rose to 75% (Pugh 1998). Second, with the flat
housing market Halifax was struggling to grow organically and it was fearful of being
undercut by the larger banks. Third, they had lobbied unsuccessfully for a change in
building society legislation to allow the largest organisations to become mutual banks.
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These would offer the same services as other banks, be regulated by the Bank of
England, but retain a mutual ownership structure (Pugh 1998).
In parallel with these events the chief executive, Blackburn, was exploring a merger
with the Leeds Permanent. With considerable branch overlap and the combination of
Halifax's size with Leeds innovative culture, a merger was an attractive proposition.
However, the Leeds management suspected that its members would expect a windfall
similar to that enjoyed by those at C&G. Instead they sought merger with agreement to
convert, believing the issuance of free shares would help overcome resistance to any
branch closures.
The general public responded to the announcement by opening building society
accounts in hope of a windfall (Hunter 1995). Despite some opposition the merger was
approved with 97•79/ of Halifax savers and 97.6% of borrowers, and 95% of Leeds
investors and 94% of borrowers voting in favour. Only the small turnout among the
Leeds voters, 28%, marred the result (Pugh 1998).
On the 24 February 1997 Halifax members overwhelmingly approved the
demutualisation, (Wainwright 1997, Pugh 1998). It made its stock market debut on the
2 June 1997 being 'the biggest giveaway in British history — more than £18 billion
worth of shares were issued to 7.6 million people' (Miles 1997b: 3). The launch
smashed all existing records being the largest ever launch in stock market history,
creating more new shareholders in one day than any previous or subsequent flotation
(Ryle 1997, Miles 1997b, Pugh 1998).
4.3.4 Demutualisation Mania 1995-9
Halifax's departure from mutuality was soon followed by National and Provincial
(N&P), the Woolwich, Alliance and Leicester (A&L), Bristol and West (B&W), and
Northern Rock. First to depart was Bradford based N&P when they were brought by
Abbey National in a hostile takeover (May 1995). Though not the highest price, the
clinching factor was Abbey National's ability to give members an immediate cash
bonus, rather than wait two years for conversion following a merger (May 1995). With
an average windfall of £750 across 1.7 million members the takeover vote was a
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formality.
Though the Nationwide considered and ultimately rejected demutualisation (Wylie
1995), the Woolwich and the A&L announced their conversions in January 1996
(Brummer 1996, Hughes 1996). Woolwich upset speculative investors when they
declared a retrospective cut-off date for the two-year rule, thereby excluding 35,000
savers (Scott 1996a, Miles 1996a). Famously when asked to justify the action Robinson
said: 'I have no conscience at all about not enfranchising carpetbaggers' (Ciccutti
1996:1), thereby providing a label for speculative building society investors.
Notwithstanding this members approved the demutualisation and received an average
windfall of £2418 in July 1997 (Miles 1997a).
In contrast to Woolwich A&L pleased the 'carpetbaggers' with its decision for a flat
distribution of 250 shares for all members, regardless of longevity of membership or
investment (Scott 1996c). Again, the demutualisation vote, with 95% in favour, proved
a formality (Miles 1996).
With the building society movement in freefall attention switched to smaller societies,
specifically Bristol and West (B&W), Northern Rock and Birmingham Midshires. The
Northern Rock wanted to retain autonomy and the five-year protection from predators
granted by the 1986 Act to all converting societies, was an attractive defence
mechanism. However, when the government declared that new legislation would be
introduced to remove this protection if the converter attempts to purchase another
company, the Northern Rock board "panicked" (Miles 1997c) and demutualisation
followed on 1 October 1997 (Miles 1997d).
B&W secured a degree of autonomy when they announced an overseas purchaser in
April 1996, the Bank of Ireland, who paid £600 million for the business (Scott 1996b).
To ensure a successful vote, which would require the support of the estimated 60,000
carpetbaggers (King 1996), the Bank of Ireland offered an average windfall of £1,100
and demutualised in July 1997 (Baird 1997).
Meanwhile Birmingham Midshires continued to resist suitors until it was leaked they
were in talks with the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in July 1997 (Hunter 1997b).
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With an estimated 300,000 carpetbaggers (Scott 1997b) Birmingham Midshires were
aware that they needed to secure the highest possible price. RBS offer of £630 million
-
appeared reasonable until Halifax launched a hostile bid for £780 million (Jones &
Stuart 1998). After protracted argument, RBS were paid compensation and Halifax
agreed to pay £1250 per member which was approved in December 1998 (Jones, R
1998)
From the takeover of C&G in 1994 through to Birmingham Midshires in 1998 over £30
billion was distributed in cash or shares (Ryle 1997), whilst in 1997 alone 16 million
new shareholders were created (Miles 19970. Yet the distribution was uneven. Though
the average amount received per person (£2000) was the same in terms of class, only
30% of the distribution went to the working class, while the middle class accumulated
48% (Travis 1997). Moreover men, who were often the only beneficiary in joint
accounts if they were the first name on accounts, received a greater proportion of the
national windfall then women (Miles 1997c).
In justifying their conversions the building societies employed the same argument;
constraint of trade. Whether demutualisation was to gain access to the wholesale capital
markets or expanding into new ventures, all the societies felt inhibited by the current
legislation. Some of these complaints were addressed in the Building Societies Act
1997 which came too late to prevent the demutualisations.
Other explanations for the loss of two-thirds of the building society sector tended to be
neo-Darwinist economics or egoistic conspiratorial. Neo-Darwinists perceive building
societies as inefficient Victorian organisations that have no place in the modern,
thrusting, aggressive capitalist world of Thatcherite Britain (Brummer 1995, Hunter and
Saigol 1997). This view could be characterised as functionalist, as it assumes an
evolutionary approach to the development of mutuals.
In contrast, egoistic `conspiratorialists' argue that the main beneficiaries of
demutualisation were the directors, primarily financially, but also because managing a
bank was more exciting than a staid building society. The conspiracy link was the tactic
to 'bribe' members, who accepted the loss of mutuality and enhanced status for
directors, in return for a disproportionate and instant return on their investment. In
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popular vernacular greed was the overriding motivation on both sides (Miles 1997e,
Foot 1997 Guardian leader 1995)
Though owing much to psychology, I would identify this theory with Neo-Marxist
thought, as exemplified by Hird (1996) as it combines exploitation, seizing the means of
production, and the financing of the petite bourgeoisie.
4.3.5 The Rise of the Carpetbaggers 1997-1998
As the nation became aware of the unlocked financial rewards within building societies
a new phenomenon appeared: the carpetbagger. The term carpetbagger had its origins
in the aftermath of the American Civil War and was a derogative term to described
Unionists who went south with their belongings in a carpetbag (to grab political and
economic spoils at the expense of the defeated population). As noted earlier the term
was unused in Britain until Robinson, from the Woolwich, described speculative
investors as carpetbaggers.
Over time a carpetbagger became associated with a particularly virulent group of
investors who demanded demutualisations and pursued open conflict with those mutuals
that remained. Foremost among these was Michael Hardern and his pressure group
Members for Conversion (MfC). What made MfC unique was its lack of formal
structure or a spatial location. Instead it relied on the interne and e-mail as
communication and network tools, and therefore existed only in cyber-space. The
benefit of this structure was that a small geographically diverse group of members could
effectively campaign without the necessity of physical proximity, in marked contrast to
the origins of building societies. With building society legislation based on physicality,
anticipating that getting sufficient signatures for a motion would be difficult, a
technology minimising this task posed a threat to the sector's existence.
Hardern's first target was the Nationwide and he stood as a director along with four
others on a pro-conversion ticket in 1997. Despite fears about the outcome, Nationwide
won comfortably by 950,000 to 250,000 votes, surprising Brown-Humes & Blitz, who
linked the outcome to the election of a Labour goverment, believing: 'The collective
values still espoused by Labour, albeit in a watered-down form, are reflected in the
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ideal of mutuality, in which customers rather than shareholders benefit from the
organisation's surplus funds.' (1997:1)
City analysts had expected a Hardem victory (Merrell & Ashworth 1997), because of
the rush to open accounts with Nationwide during the campaign, with 25,000 new
accounts per day, equalling the average weekly rate for the society (Brown-Humes
1997a). Nationwide was not the only society affected. During June 1997 building
societies experienced their largest single monthly cash inflow in their history (£1.84
billion), despite deliberately offering uncompetitive interest rates and having high
minimum opening balances (Miles 1997). This was beginning to have a detrimental
impact on societies' ability to manage and branches were described by Adrian Coles of
the BSA as suffering from a 'feeding frenzy' as press and carpetbagger speculation rose
(Hunter 1997a, Miles & Saigol 1997).
Following the election the Nationwide moved to counteract the carpetbaggers by
introducing a lifetime `signaway' for all new members, this enabled the society to lower
their minimum opening balance to £1 and begin accepting new applicants (Scott
1997b). The signaway was an additional clause on the application form, to which new
members transferred their windfall to the Nationwide Foundation charity in the event of
a conversion. Theoretically the financial value contained within membership of a
building society would remain permanently locked-up, mitigating speculative activity.
Though opposed by carpetbaggers, 51 other societies had introduced a signaway clause
by October 2001 (Lawrenson 2001).
In response to this action carpetbaggers scrambled to join societies before signaways
were imposed, using the interne to inform and communicate the policies of various
societies. Meanwhile Hardem's notoriety had resulted in his expulsion from 35
societies, and attempts to become a candidate for directorship were rejected at the
Bradford and Bingley, Britannia, and Chelsea (FT Observer 1997).
Irrepressible as ever Hardem returned to the Nationwide in April 1998, this time
combining a conversion motion with a board candidature, and standing with another
carpetbagger, Andy Muir (Merrell 1998). To ensure support from members Nationwide
had spent 1997/8 cutting service charges, improving interest rates and declaring a price
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war on banks (Merrell & Emmett 1998). As the Nationwide demonstrated the benefits
of mutuality, Hardern accused their staff of 'assisting' members with their voting
-
(Verity 1998a), while just before the close of voting the society extended the polls by an
extra day (Caine 1998). In the event the results were exceedingly close. Although
losing the directorship election 60/40, the carpetbaggers received 49.2% of the
demutualisation motion with Nationwide's mutual status surviving by just 33,710
(1,135,597 to 1,101,887) (Verity 1998c). The result sparked renewed speculation on
future about other building societies (BBC News 1999c), and demonstrated how
difficult it was to argue against a free windfall.
4.3.6 Revenge of the Carpetbaggers 1999
In December 1998 carpetbaggers placed conversion motions and candidatures for
directors to seven societies: Britannia, Portman, Yorkshire, Coventry, Chelsea, Skipton,
and Leeds and Holbeck. Whilst another member, Stephen Major, proposed a similar
motion at the Bradford and Bingley (BBC News 1999a). Citing the 1974 'Woolwich
versus Hickmott' case whereby societies could refuse a motion if it interfered with the
management of the society, six societies rejected Hardern's motion and candidature.
The Britannia allowed Hardern to stand for the board, whilst disallowing the conversion
motion (BBC News 1999d,). Hardern's campaigning remained as quixotic as in
previous years, culminating in an abrupt withdrawal a few days before the close of
voting leaving Britannia with a £3 million bill, for restaging the elections (Jones, R
1999b, BBC News 1999e,f). Later in June Britannia expelled Hardern and his 300
supporters citing wasted expenditure on the election (BBC News 1999f, Nelson 1999).
As the remnants of Hardern's credibility were finally extinguished, the 'introverted'
Stephen Major (Jones, R. 1999a) quietly pursued the conversion of Bradford and
Bingley (BBC News 1999b). Though the campaign seemingly paralleled that at
Nationwide, there was a suspicion that Christopher Rodrigues, the Chief Executive,
wanted a demutualisation (Brummer 1999), as the Bradford and Bingley had neither
raised minimum opening balances nor introduced signaways. Members heeded
Bradford and Bingley's seeming ambivalence, with 62% supporting conversion on a
two-third turnout (BBC News 1999g). After accepting the result the Board supported
the formal demutualisation, securing over 90% of the vote (Jones, R. 2000a). Further
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suspicion of the board's original intentions came with the announcement that all
members would receive 250 free shares each, rather than a tiered distribution based on
loyalty and the amount invested (Jones, R. 2000b).
4.3.7	 Building Societies fight back
The scale of the initial conversion vote at the Bradford and Bingley led to days of lurid
headlines on the future of building societies, especially as this was the first vote
proposed by members to go against the views of the board (Levene & Inman 1999, BBC
News 1999h). The question became not if, but when, and who, would be the next
society to demutualise (Insley 1999). While borrowers were the main beneficiaries of
mutuality they were outnumbered five to one by savers, making the task of protecting a
society appear forlorn. However, there were indications that things were improving for
beleaguered societies. With a change of secondary legislation in 1997 a conversion
resolution required a 50% turnout, up from 20% (Brown-Humes 1997). Though
irrelevant at the Bradford and Bingley where the turnout surpassed these figures, a
detailed analysis of the results showed that over half of voting borrowers had rejected
the conversion proposal on a 60/40 split (BSA 2000). Thus the conversion motion
would have been lost if it had been a formal proposal and not a members resolution.
Another influence was the political focus on the issue of financial exclusion. Building
societies were able to argue that passbook accounts remain popular among traditional
excluded groups, while individual societies were involved in developing innovative
savings and loans schemes to address financial exclusion (BSA 2000). Similarly,
societies closed fewer branches then demutualised societies (Marshall et al. 1999).
With regards to competition building societies argued that they were more efficient and
they had taken market share from mortgage banks, as shown in Tables 4-2 and 4-3:
Table 4-2: Margin Comparison for Converted Institutions and Building Societies 1999
Mortgage Bank Interest Margin % Building Society Interest Margin %
Halifax 2.25 Nationwide (yr to 1.72
April 1999)
Abbey National 2.45 Britannia 1.07
Woolwich 2.10 Yorkshire 1.03
Alliance& Leicester 1.61 Portman 1.45




Leeds & Holbeck	 1.23
Source: BSA (2000:5)
This table shows the gap between the saving and borrowing interest rates. The narrower
gap the more competitive and efficient the organisation should be.





















£bn	 Share £bn	 Share fbn	 Share £bn	 Share £bn	 Share Ebn	 Share%
Mortgage
banks
193 45 63 25 9.1 24 168 32 1.7 6 -1.7 -4
Building
societies
98 23 7.8 31 10.6 28 95 18 9.6 32 11.1 28
Market 432 100 25.2 100 37.9 100 525 100 30.2 100 40.3 100
Total
Adapted from BSA 2000
Despite their competitive advantages building societies continued to erect defences
against carpetbaggers, with the Yorkshire introducing a higher threshold for member
conversion resolutions. Under previous arrangements these only needed a simple
majority to be accepted, it would then be followed by a formal resolution which has the
same rules as a directors' proposal. These required a 50% turnout of investors with 75%
voting in favour and 50% of borrowers also in support. The Yorkshire combined the
two votes and incorporated the statutory limits (Brown-Humes 1999a). This was soon
replicated by other societies, causing carpetbaggers to complain that it would 'virtually
render impracticable any resolution by a member to change the status of a society'
(Brown-Humes 1999b: 7).
As building societies explored these legal mechanisms, the carpetbaggers were engaged
in an internecine dispute. Dissatisfaction with Hardern's behaviour resulted in his
expulsion and replacement by Richard Yendall as the figurehead. Moreover, a pro-
mutual internet group led by Bob Goodall called Saving Our Building Societies
(SOBS), was engaged in guerrilla tactics by sending numerous disruptive messages to
carpetbagger.com




Meanwhile the demutualisation process led to a Treasury Select Committee
investigation (Treasury Committee 1999), which concluded that some of the advantages
claimed by building societies 'could be replicated in non-mutual organisations, and
that some building societies have not always shown these characteristics' (Treasury
Committee 1999:1). They went on to endorse loyalty bonus schemes, as offered by the
Britannia, and signaways, but criticised large minimum opening balances. They
expressed concern about introducing secondary legislation to increase the number of
members required to propose motions or candidates, as this would 'diminish'
accountability. Finally they accepted that legal changes were required urgently before
building societies were demutualised and requested three legislative amendments, the
most important of which was equalizing the majority threshold figures for borrowers
and savers (Treasury Committee 1999:1-2). Responding, the government dismissed the
report's recommendations, arguing building societies had to 'save' themselves and not
rely on government intervention (Graham 1999).
4.3.8 The Battle for Leek United
As the largest remaining societies demutualised or erected barriers to carpetbaggers,
little attention was given to the small community societies. It was thought that they
would either survive virtually unscathed because of their local knowledge and links to
their community; or economic realities would result in their takeover by other larger
societies. These theoretical discussions were interrupted in September 1999 when
Murray Financial Corporation (MFC), an Edinburgh based publicly listed acquisition
vehicle, specifically established to takeover building societies launched a hostile £30.5
million bid for Leek United BS (BBC News 1999j). MFC had no assets and among its
directors were Conservative MP Redwood and Ingham, Thatcher's former press
spokesperson. In contrast Leek United, led by Chief Executive McFadden, had assets of
£450 million, and 60,000 members. The attempted takeover received national
prominence because of the possible implication for the remaining building societies
(Levene 1999).
MfC's proposal was to transform Leek United into an intemet bank and build capacity
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by purchasing other small societies (Houldcraft 1999). It believed this would ensure
Leek's survival and protect employment (Jones, Phil 1999). Local support for the bid
allegedly came from former chairman, Hill, who owned the weekly newspaper, Leek
Post and Times (FT.com 1999). The other local paper, The Sentinel, opposed the offer
and the campaign was partially fought out in the letters and editorial pages of both
papers. The issue permeated the entire community, local MPs condemned the takeover
(Jones, Phil 1999), and even church leaders raised the matter in sermons (Scotsman.com
1999). The climax for local activism was a march in support of Leek United on the 30
October, organised by the Mutual Interest Campaign (a pressure group combining
building societies management and trade unions). Preceding this The Sentinel's
editorial lamented the fate of building societies and lambasted MFC:
The reality is that if mutuality is to survive, individual building societies cannot afford
to sit back and be picked off one by one like sparrows on a washing line "...MFC
arguments was "an area where rhetoric has overwhelmed reason. Thus we have old
Tory diehards like Sir Bernard Ingham and John Redwood... doing the rounds with the
battlecry that they are only interested in serving the cause of democracy. Sir Bernard's
powers ...are obviously on the wane. Even a blind man could see that Murray's interest
in Leek United is more related to the rustle of pound notes ...offering...the kiss of death,
eased by the prospect of a few pounds blood money.' (Sentinel editorial 1999:1).
650 people attended the march and speakers emphasised that the vote was a 'defining
moment for the future of the whole building society movement.' Sybil Ralphs, the
Moorlands council chairman [sic], stressed the communal aspect of the campaign:
'People come before profits and we need to send the message loud and clear that we
don't take kindly to outsiders coming in and taking away our jobs and quality of life.'
(Sellers 1999:1-2). The result on December 3 clearly endorsed Leek United's strategy
of emphasising the local embeddedness of the society (Houghton 1999b), with 22,712
(73.3%) voting against MFC, while 8,264 (26.7%) voted in favour (BBC News 1999i).
Unlike the knife-edge votes of Nationwide, this was the first overwhelming
endorsement of mutuality, signalling that communities can successfully resist unfettered
capitalism. The alleged inevitability of demutualisation was halted, not on economic
grounds, but on mutual values.
90
4.3.9 The Carpetbaggers Return — Autumn 1999-2002
Although the government rejected the proposed legislation recommended by the
Treasury Select Committee, they did tighten secondary legislation in November 1999.
Increasing ten-fold the number of members required to demand a special general
meeting, propose a motion at an annual general meeting or nominate a director for
election to 500 at larger societies and 100 at smaller ones.
The changes, which came into effect on 1 December 1999, were in response to the
carpetbaggers' effectiveness at gaining support via the interne (Asher 1999, Ashworth
1999). Leading carpetbaggers were stunned by the change, Major said: 'If it was hard
getting 50, it would be nearly impossible to get 500. ' (English 1999:1).
However, the carpetbaggers were not to be deterred. Using the website Yendall posted a
message on the 22 November asking members to sign a resolution asking seven
societies to 'consider taking steps to change the independent mutual status of the
society'. Once completed the forms, along with their account details, were to be
forwarded to Yendall's address for checking and collation. The response was
phenomenal, with Yendall submitting over 500 forms to the Portman, 300 to the
Chelsea, and 200 to the Skipton. These three were selected because they had not
introduced a signaway clause (Emmett 1999). The combination of the internet and a
dramatic dash to pre-empt legislative changes drew considerable press coverage (Verity
1999, BBC News 1999k, Jones, R 1999, Sherwen 1999a, Fagan 1999, and Hunter
1999). Hunter argued that the legislation had 'backfired', (1999:1) while Fagan
described the interne as the 'midwife to a faceless revolution to convert building
societies into banks' (1999b: 1). This anonymity fascinated Sherwen (1999b) who
noted that Yendall had only ever met one other carpetbagger, as there were no
conventions or conferences. Finally, Jones believed that the internet simplified the
process of collecting signatures for a motion, as previously it involved 'standing outside
branches in the cold, badgering those going in and out'. The ease in which
carpetbagger.com mobilised support 'within a few days suggests the "cyber-bagger"




On 15 January 2000 the Portman dismissed the motion as invalid, although no
explanation was offered. Carpetbagger fury was heightened when the Portman
proceeded to expel Yendall and the other nominators (Parkinson 2000), believing that
they `did not think the members [the carpetbaggers] understood the benefits of
mutuality' (Gulley, Chief Executive of the Portman, cited in BBC News 2000:2).
Alternatively the Chelsea and Skipton accepted the legitimacy of the motion and
confirmed that it would be put to the members, but that as it requested the board to
'consider' a change in status the directors would support the resolution. After all they
'considered' the future of their status all the time (Collinson 2000, Sherwen 2000).
Yendall considered it a 'cynical ploy' (Emmett 2000a), especially as the law forbids
members placing binding motions to the board. Accordingly in April the votes at both
societies took place, with 88 % supporting the motion at the Chelsea and 90% at the
Skipton (Collinson 2000). Soon after the societies announced that they had now
'considered' the matter and decided the best option was to remain a building society.
Though perturbed by the approach of the Chelsea and the Skipton, carpetbaggers were
incensed by the behaviour of the Portman. Recriminations followed at the AGM with
ordinary members critical of the board's undemocratic behaviour (Emmett 2000b: 26).
The board's apparent disregard for democracy led to another member, Tanner, creating
a new pressure group, Mutual Members, which wanted to improve democratic
accountability of building society boards (Levene 2000). To date Tanner has had
motions to reinstate members rejected and lost a board election, receiving only 22% of
the vote (Inman 2001, Portman 2002).
At the Chelsea, Naughton-Doe tabled a motion to convert the society, which was
rejected by the board due to 'unacceptable' wording (Macalister 2000, Jones, R. 2000c,
Money Miscellany 2001, Jones, R. 2001a). Meanwhile Yendall proposed a series of
pro-democratic motions at the Britannia in 2001, which were rejected and his
candidature for directorship failed after receiving only 16% of the vote (Nugent and
Gilmore 2001:12, Britannia 2002, BBC News 2002).
For carpetbaggers the 'holy grail' remains the conversion of the Nationwide (Jones and
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Levene 2001). The 2001 election was significant as under the three-year rule a
conversion motion could be re-introduced. However, the carpetbaggers 'candidate' for
directorship, Muir, saw both his share and total vote drop sharply since he stood in 1998
(Nugget 2001, Jones, R 2001b, Scott 2001). Reacting to this result Carpetbagger.com
declared that it would no longer submit conversion resolutions and `in this respect,
`carpetbagging' is dead' (cited in Jones, R. 2001b: 6). Despite this Muir tried again in
2002, suffering the indignity of receiving fewer votes than the pro-mutual, Tanner.
(Jones, R. 2002)
In the midst of this uncertainty over its future the Nationwide has attempted to establish
itself as the consumer's champion. This has been best represented by two policies with
divergent levels of success. First, when Barclays attempted to impose a £.1 levy on non-
Barclays customers using their ATMs (Automated Teller Machine) for withdrawals,
Nationwide defended their free use. Nationwide denounced the bank as `profiteering'
and 'ripping off customers' and threatened to take Barclays to court. The press backed
Nationwide, who were quick to argue that mutuals favour the customer because they do
not pay shareholders (Inman 2001: 6, Treanor 2001a: 16). Second, in an increasingly
competitive mortgage market lenders have offered discounted time limited fixed-rate
products for people re-mortgaging. However, once the period was complete the rates
soon become uncompetitive, as financial institutions relied on customer inertia to
prevent loss of business (Treanor 2001b). This was especially problematic for building
societies as it assumed existing borrowers should receive a secondary service, and it
meant existing members, both savers and borrowers, were in effect subsidising the
special deals to attract new members. Nationwide's solution was to abandon the special
deals and offer a single variable rate for all customers (Jones, R. 2001c). Though
certainly mutual behaviour the public have been less enthused and the Nationwide's
share of the new mortgage market collapsed, as other lenders exploited their
uncompetitiveness (Treanor and Jones 2001).
On reviewing the events of recent years a pattern of guerrilla warfare fought by pro-
mutualists keen on promoting greater democracy and carpetbaggers seems to be
emerging. The targets are all top ten societies and usually include the Chelsea,
Nationwide and Portman. Portman's problems stem from the ejection of members
following the 1999 motion; Nationwide is a focus because of jts size and therefore
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expected to be the last society that will be able to demutualise directly; and it is thought
that the Chelsea has a disproportionate number of carpetbaggers as members. In
hindsight the Leek United was a seminal moment for small societie;, as they have
subsequently remained free from hostile takeover bids. However, as we have seen
nothing should be assumed and the carpetbaggers only have to be lucky once, the
building societies forever.
4.4	 Credit Unions from 1979-2000
4.4.1	 Growth of credit unions 1979-2000
Once the 1979 Act received its Royal Assent most existing credit unions and informal
West Indian savings and loans groups applied for registration. By the close of 1980, 57
organisations were registered and a further 24 joined them by 1982. Nevertheless, there
were concerns about the lack of commonality in the wide common bonds, leading to
increased risk of defaults. Meanwhile, the Registrar found that the conversion from
initial optimism to the reality of managing a financial institution, had not been fully
appreciated or discharged adequately. Subsequently, stringent rules were imposed on
the establishment and management of credit unions with emphasis on financial probity
and prudence. Following the hiatus between 1983-5, 12 were registered in 1986, 14 in
1987, and a net 36 in 1988, bringing the total to 142 with 35,000 members (Berthoud
and Hinton 1989). Since then growth has been spectacular with over eight times as
many members in 1999 as in 1988 (see table 4-4).









1980 57 n/a n/a n/a
1986 75 21,000 £4,632,000 £5,419,500




530 214,660 £105,800,000 £122,300,000
1998 596 251,696 £126,378,365 £147,562,234
1999 641 293,118	 _£153,359,997 £180,061,508
Sources: 1980 8c 1986: Berthoud & Hinton 1998, 1995: Donnelly & Haggett I 997, 1998-1999: authors original research from FSA
end of year returns.'
"As at March 2002 no figures for 2000 were available from the FSA
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Though the fastest growing mutuals in Britain (Jones, Paul 1999a), credit union
development is still perceived as pedestrian by many inside the movement (Swoboda
-
1999, Spiers 1999). Partially this is a flawed premise predicated on a comparison with
growth in Ireland and the USA where credit unions serve almost half and a quarter of
the population respectively (Jones, Paul 1999a). Although the Irish credit union
movement did serve 10% of the population 20 years after its introduction (Donnelly and
Haggett 1997), in the USA by 1929 there were 974 credit unions, which had only
264,908 members (Moody and Fite 1971). Rapid expansion in the USA only began
during the 1930s depression when other financial institutions went bankrupt.
Additionally, in recent years the collapse of the Savings and Loan thrifts has presented
credit unions with a new market for affordable credit and secure savings (McCarthy et
al 2001). Furthermore the existence of building societies may have been a barrier on
UK credit union development. It remains to be seen whether the demutualisation
process offers British credit unions opportunities for expansion (Forrester 1996).
Disputing this analysis Swoboda (1999) believes there are examples of credit unions in
Britain that have prospered, despite cultural and organisational differences. Though
undoubtedly true, upon closer examination the successful credit unions appear to share
one of two characteristics: they are employment based (Jones, Paul 1999a) or located in
the West of Scotland (Donnelly & Kahn 1999). The latter was due to the strong
socialist and cooperative spirit in the Glasgow conurbation. Moreover, a similar
collective spirit was identified at employee credit unions:
'Employes have the advantage of being able to recruit new members via newsletters,
trade union branch meetings, and social interaction through day-to-day contact'
(Donnelly and Haggett 1997:23-24)
By contrast residential credit unions may have artificial boundaries, with no real sense
of community and trust (Fuller 1998), while Berthoud and Hinton's (1989) survey of
members uncovered no differences in belonging across the sector.
These empirical interpretations counter much accepted wisdom within the credit union
movement in which two opposed narratives have evolved; idealists and instrumentalists
(Berthoud and Hinton 1989). Idealists believe that credit unions are both community
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development tools and financial institutions; therefore common bonds should be
identifiable communities, preferable in low-income areas (Thomas and Balloch 1991).
Only through this approach can credit unions avoid being 'hijacked' by outsiders. This
argument is exemplified by Rimmer (1998) who accused Berthoud and Hinton of
'pathologising' credit unions and believed much of the literature was 'economisitic',
avoiding oppressed groups, and social and political benefits. Reflecting on her
participant observations she noted, 'the project reinforced the argument for some credit
unions to retain their smaller community base rather than entering the business arena
in competition with other financial institutions.' (1998:19). According to its critics this
perspective has dominated much of the development, especially those sponsored by
local authorities who have spent f15 million per year supporting credit unions and their
development agencies (Jones, Paul 1999a). The failure of this approach is evident in the
plethora of moribund credit unions in deprived areas (Donovan et al 1999) and a lack of
volunteers due to the top-down implementation (Dayson et al 1999, Donnelly &
Haggett 1997). Instead credit unions should aim for economic sustainability, be open
and viewed as co-operative financial institutions (Jones, Paul 1999a). For these
'instrumentalists' (Berthoud and Hinton) 'credit unions should be a business activity,
not a religious experience' (1989:123). Currently these views are embodied in the
promotion by ABCUL of 'New Model' credit unions; based on borough or even city-
wide 'live or work' common bonds, they employ staff and have shop premises from day
one. Between the two extremes McKillop et al (1997) indicated this conflict was a
Darwinist process as credit union movements went from nascent through transitional
(where they argued the UK was located) and into mature sectors.
In accepting much of this argument McCarthy et al (2001) challenge the argument that
volunteerism declines as credit unions develop. Seeing this as essential to the form,
they argue for its promotion wherever possible. In contrast, Toynbee (1999) has
described credit unions as 'very small savings and loan banks run by the poor for the
poor, amateur volunteers working together to help prevent one another falling into the
hands of loan sharks' (1999:14) and has criticised a culture whereby the poor are
expected to help themselves and accept a level of service 'that none of the rest of us
would bother with (1999:14). If true then credit unions are destined to serve the
marginalised.
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Repeatedly the literature despairs of credit unions' image as the 'poor man's bank' [sic]
(Forrester 1994, Donnelly and Haggett 1997, Conaty and Mayo 1997, Donovan et al
1999). However, Fuller (2001) found no evidence to support the perception that credit
unions improved financial inclusion, though Thomas and Balloch (1991) believed they
introduced stability and hope into people's lives blighted by debt. More explicitly
Donnelly and Haggett stated that 'credit unions are not for people who are so poor they
cannot afford to save' (1997:10-11).
Part of the difficulty is that many supportive policy papers promote credit unions' role
in tackling financial exclusion, while acknowledging the challenge of being stigmatised
(Conaty and Mayo 1997). Hayton (2001) believes there is a contradiction in much of
ABCUL's analysis because achieving sustainability and tackling financial exclusion are
mutually exclusive. To realise the former requires wealthy members thereby ignoring
the latter, and thus credit unions are not a very effective mechanism for reachitts the
financially excluded. However, a survey of 445 credit union members in Birmingham
found that 40 had used moneylenders and 58% of these had subsequently reduced their
dependency on them (Feloy and Payne 1999). Furthermore, analysing credit union
statistics Berthoud and Hinton (1989) argued that they 'may not have created economic
equality, but they appear to be much less unequal than the outside world' (1989:122).
Aside from these social and cultural factors British credit unions have been hampered
by excessively restrictive legislation (Swoboda 1999). This was recognised in the
1990s as government began to implement a more permissive legislative frame,
beginning with the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 (see appendix A).
Although criticised, it was not until the election of a Labour government in 1997, that
credit unions began to be addressed (Conaty and Mayo 1997).
From the establishment of Policy Action Team (PAT) 14 on financial exclusion,
through to the establishment by the Treasury of the Credit Union Taskforce and the
proposed amendments to the Credit Unions Act 1979 published in November 1998, the
government indicated its willingness to support 'fully the credit unions' ethos of self
help and wishes to encourage the movement's growth, and so strengthen its capacity to
provide financial services to the poor' (H.M. Treasury 1998:5). Legislative changes
introduced included extending the maximum length of loans and raising the maximum
97
investment by minors. Moreover, these were supplemented by further liberalisation in
July 2002 (see appendix A)
These legislative alterations have been issued alongside a tightening of the regulatory
framework. Primary responsibility for regulation has been subsumed into the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), who have concentrated on the financial stability of credit
unions. To achieve this they have tightened the rules on liquidity and introduced share
protection scheme for members. This latter change brings credit unions into line with
bank customers and building society members and will be used to guarantee investors'
savings at the recently collapsed Thameswood CU (Inman 2002).
Informing all these debates was the first thorough research into credit unions,
undertaken by Jones, Paul (1999a). Jones argued that many community credit unions
were too small and therefore unable to address issues of financial exclusion. A lack of
professionalism and a romantic attachment to an unobtainable ideology resulted in a
proliferation of mainly small (200 members of less) credit unions, run by over worked
volunteers who were encased in a failing model. These were focussing on anti-poverty
measures at the behest of local authorities (Swoboda 1999, Spiers 1999). The research
demonstrated that only five community credit unions in England and Wales (out of 348)
had sufficient assets to afford the employment of a full-time member of staff, compared
to 29 of the 70 employee bodies. 40% of community credit unions were financially
weak, failing to reach a 'basic' level of financial viability. Revealingly, he dismissed
the argument that growth will come through time, finding that the membership of most
credit unions reached a plateau at 200, after 9-12 years of operation and most fail to
progress beyond that figure after 12 years. He was dismissive of most training, because
financial viability was not a key learning outcome and there were no sense of shared
benchmarks or agreed ways of measuring progress. There was a fear of volunteer
burnout, with 66% of the smallest credit unions thinking this was likely. Most
strikingly, 96% of employee credit unions began with the intention of creating a co-
operative financial institution, by contrast 83% of community credit unions were
established as a community development exercise or assisting the excluded. For Jones
'credit unions are not, in fact, an effective way to build community where it does not
already exist... credit unions require mutual trust, which will be lacking if community is
weak or non-existent' (1999a: 96). In conclusion he argued that the movement was
98
'vibrant and very successful' (1999a: 103), but that lessons must be learnt from the most
successful, this included a more businesslike approach, larger common bonds with a
goal of financial sustainability, a view endorsed by 89% of employee and 71% of
community credit unions.
4.5	 Summary and Tentative Conclusions
As the 1986 Act was implemented nobody foresaw the eventual impact on the building
society industry. This changed with the demutualisation of the C & G and a wave of
conversions, including the Halifax then ensued. For members the C & G windfall
established a benchmark for the valuation of their stake and over time this, rather than
any business rationale, become the main motivator for supporting a change in status.
Eventually individuals saw a potential economic benefit and the aggressive investor, the
carpetbagger, was born. However, this functionalist neo-rationalist account fails to
explain why every society is not now a plc, or owned by a plc. Equally this failure to
demutualise challenges the Neo-Marxist viewpoint that the directors always maximise
their interests, at the expense of the workforce. Conventional wisdom has it that
members always vote for the money and the B & B conversion confirms this
impression. But this remains the peak of the carpetbaggers' achievement, no further
societies have demutualised and though they may argue that boards have not allowed
votes to proceed, the carpetbaggers have yet to convince ordinary members of their
arguments. To date no carpetbagger has been elected as a director to any society and
members have backed the boards in the rule changes to make demutualisation harder.
Reflecting back on the model of mutuality developed in chapter two, it is apparent that
building societies' management and members discarded all its tenets. Management
continued to assume trust would be based on the obedience of members. In turn this
undermined the reciprocity between both parties, whilst cultural changes resulted in the
abandonment by both sides of longevity and caution when making financial
assessments. Although in the cooperative model attention has focused on democracy, it
was the lack of educational programme and the concept of transferable ownership that
ultimately undermined the building societies. However, this analysis does not explain
why mutuality collapsed at this time. This will be continued in the following chapter
99
when potential organisational and external factors will be explored.
Regarding credit unions, with the publication of the Jones (1999a) report it would
appear that the instrumentalists would prevail. They have the ear of the government and
the FSA are increasing the regulatory burden especially on smaller credit unions.
Economically, as the larger credit unions are growing faster they are by default
becoming more powerful, drowning alternative voices within the movement. From this
perspective it is difficult to make a positive case for the idealists. Are they like the
terminating building societies to be marginalised and ultimately overwhelmed by their
larger more professional brethren? Both appear to have a fundamental flaw in that in
their desire to tackle exclusion they become exclusive, by virtue of their limited scale.
Fuller (1998) has argued this paradox is evident during the decision-making process for
the common-bond and Jones (1999a) has demonstrated its long-term economic
weakness. Defining community has obsessed the co-operative movement, but the
history of credit unions and early building societies indicate that 'effective' mutuality
may share more with open as opposed to closed structures. Almost as important has
been debates around the sanctity of democracy and participation, this reached extremis
during the building society demutualisation furore, with those opposed to mutuality
using mutuality to undermine itself.
Unlike building societies, the credit unions have been incorporated into the state during
their nascent stage of development. This resulted in two contradictory impulses, that of
engagement in anti-poverty activity and community building, versus a desire for
financial probity. Therefore, the intervention of the state is an important consideration
when assessing the effectiveness of mutuals and will be examined in the next chapter
(see 5.2.2)
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5	 Theorising Mutuality in Action
The previous two chapters demonstrated how practical mutuality evolved very
differently from the conceptual and theoretical models discussed in chapter two. More
specifically, the last chapter argued that two dominant discourses had arisen to explain
modern mutuality. A functionalist approach perceived mutuals on an evolutionary
journey from humble beginnings, through a growing need for professionalism and
ultimately a separation of management and member interests. This results in either
decline, or where available the conversion of the mutual to another organisational form.
Underlying this narrative is the argument that the organisational structure is inefficient,
providing neither the appropriate level of management accountability nor releasing
direct value to the owners. In effect mutuals lack transparency in operation creating
difficulties for management and frustration for their owners. Consequently this chapter
will commence with an analysis of the ownership and democratic functions of mutuals,
to assess whether large mutuals are hampered by their structure.
In contrast, a neo-Marxist perspective highlights the specific role of management in the
process of demutualisation. Beginning from working-class origins, mutuals are
gradually incorporated into the capitalist infrastructure through a combination of
increasing regulation by state agents and the encroachment of the middle classes who
introduce hierarchies and eventually create professional structures and bureaucracy. In
credit unions the struggle against capitalism is exemplified by the usurpation of activists
by professional managers, while in building societies the management ignore and
subsequently abuse the democratic process through using members' own money to offer
them windfalls in order to secure conversion. To help evaluate these narratives the
chapter will review the literature concerning the economic efficiency and accountability
of mutuals, the role of the middle classes, organisational forms, embeddedness,
Thatcherism, globalisation, and new social movements (NSM). From this array of
literature an enhanced neo-Marxist perspective will be developed, based on the
disembedding of mutuals by capitalist interests.
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5.1	 Assessing Endogenous Factors
5.1.1	 Economic and Accountability issues	 .
Economically mutuals access capital differently; they are often engaged in low risk
activities resulting in slow organic growth; without shareholders they are more reliant
on managerial competence, being reliant on long-term relationships. Mutuals'
ownership is predicated on the egalitarian principle of one-member-one vote, as
opposed to the fiscal weighting employed by joint-stock companies; they have an open
membership (although a credit union's common bond does impose restrictions); and
being owned by users there is no division between the interests of customers and
owners.
As was mentioned in 4.3 proponents of demutualisations believed that larger mutuals
were hampered by the inability to raise external capital leading to slow growth, a lack of
diversification and an inability to compete against plcs. However, the evidence does not
support the need for capital argument, with all but one former society returning capital
to shareholders (Cook et al. 2001). Due to the comparative ease of raising share capital
through the stock market, increasing capital through organic growth was unattractive
(Cook et al. 2001). Furthermore, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) questioned the logic of
seeking access to more expensive money since raising capital through individual
members' investment is not accompanied by costs for advisors, accountants and
stockbrokers or the payment of dividend on profits. Over the period 1979 to 1989 the
four high street banks paid dividends of £3.4 billion, while issuing capital worth £3.7
billion. This net increase of 10% could easily be matched by mutuals. Later Drake and
Llewellyn (2001) extended the argument demonstrating that building societies had an
inherent margin advantage because they did not need to service capital. Empirical
support came from Ellerton et al, who found that the remaining societies operated on
tighter profit margins than the mutual banks (the collective name for the converted
building societies) and that four of the largest societies could sustain this pricing
'indefinitely' (1997:14). However, a contradictory analysis was made by Moody's:
'We believe that while the mutuals are currently able to increase market shares, in
many cases they do not have the resources to sustain these levels of growth' (Fliegeman
and Maloney 1998:6).
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The apparent discrepancy was due to Moody's view that the mortgage banks through
diversification would be in a better position to 'cross subsidise mortg" age business'
(1998:4). However, they did not explain how premium priced services in a highly
competitive marketplace could be maintained. More recently Moody's revised its
opinion, finding that building societies were sustaining their margin advantage (BSA
December 2001).
According to Drake and Llewellyn (2001) managers of mutuals knew that capital raised
through organic growth was difficult to replace and thus took less risks, confirming the
centrality of caution within mutuality. Hence mutuals tended to undertake a relatively
narrow range of tasks often in long-term relationships, such as pensions, assurance and
mortgages. In contrast joint-stock companies were often complex firms involved in
high risk activities, as investors, with their limited liability, were prepared to gamble
their stake. It is probable therefore that once managers within mutuals started to
diversify they were often constrained by the cautious culture of mutuality. Their
frustration at this situation made the availability of demutualisation increasingly
attractive.
Until the 1986 Act conversion was prevented due to the unique property rights of
mutuals in which ownership could not be transferred or liquidated, instead dissatisfied
shareholders could simply close their account without losing their investment. Unlike a
plc this action imposed direct fiscal restrictions on the management by depriving them
control over assets (Fama and Jensen 1983). For savers who retained membership their
benefit was ex ante, in the form of preferential interest rates. An ex post distribution
occurs on demutualisation and assumes that the beneficiaries are the same actors who
made the original investors. In building societies with reserves accumulated over 150
years this was impossible, leading Clarke (1998) to argue that the current members do
not have a moral right to the reserves. Once ex post distribution was permitted, the
interests of borrowers and savers were divided, especially as new investors saw an
opportunity to appropriate the existing reserves with minimal investment (Cook et al
2001).
The absence of effective accountability was a particular concern within mutuality,
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becoming more acute as the institution grows. While the same difficulties exist in joint-
stock companies, neo-classical economics assumes that monitoring is asserted by
-
powerful voting blocks, tradable shares and the threat of takeover (Drake and Llewellyn
2001). Challenging this, Fama (1980) dismissed the involvement of stockbrokers who
were too busy to monitor companies. Instead shareholders delegate responsibility to
non-executives, yet supervisory functions along with remuneration committees, were
more prevalent in mutuals (Llewellyn and Holmes 1997). This led Drake and Llewellyn
(2001) to argue that the specific mechanism to address agency problems, was less
important than the outcome of that process. In mutuals the ease of exit by members,
imposed particular burdens on management and may be more effective than having
elected representation (Hirschman 1970). While across all sectors the degree of
competition may be the best form of control (Drake and Llewellyn 1988). Though
competition may have a negative effect encouraging firms into high risk areas to
appease shareholders, but 'as mutual owners have no direct claim on profits, they
therefore have no incentive to prefer risky activities. On the contrary, given the limited
deposit insurance, the owner/depositor in a financial mutual has a positive disincentive
with respect to high-risk, value-decreasing projects.' (Drake and Llewellyn 2001).
Regardless of this caveat the evidence suggests that the culture of caution protects
mutuals from managerial excesses and raises doubts regarding the validity of economic
performance based assessment. More problematic is the difficulty of security and
democratic accountability. Cook et al. (2001) stated that the difficulty in securing a
coalition of voters and the likelihood of free-rider behaviour was a considerable
disincentive to become involved. Moreover a lack of transparency resulted in more
conflicts of interests in mutuals than joint-stock companies (Hird 1996). Therefore,
though mutuals appear to provide at least equivalent accountability as other types of
business organisations, it is not automatically superior.
According to the logic of neo-classical economics, mutuals' inadequate accountability
structure would affect their efficiency. Davidmann (1996) cited various American
research, which were unable to form a consensus on the efficiency of mutuals, though
noting that mutual managers were more risk adverse. A positive outcome of this
behaviour was that nineteenth century mutuals were larger and had 'survived and
flourished much better' than their joint-stock counterparts formed in the same period
(Davidmann 1996:4). However, the same research concluded that joint-stock
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companies grew faster and were more profitable than mutuals, although once
performance was risk-adjusted McNamara found that efficiency was constant for both
organisation types, and mutuals maintain efficiency when there is a 'homogeneity of
interests among customers, and inefficient where there is divergence of interests' (Cook
et al 2001:27). To them the introduction of the 1986 Act ensured the latter.
Despite the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the inefficiency of mutuals Barnes
(1984) still argued that the management were appropriating resources. More recently
this perspective has shifted away from personal expense preferences, and towards direct
capture of resources by promoting demutualisation (Barnes and Ward 1999, Davidmann
1996). Davidmann believed that conversion offers managers increased pay, status,
income linked to profit, an ability to rapidly increase the size of the institution,
protection from hostile takeovers, and clarity of purpose. This analysis reflects the Neo-
Marxist egoistic conspiratorial discourse outlined in the previous chapter. Davidmann
held that appropriation was a function of lack of understanding regarding the mutual
form, suggesting the educative element of the theoretical model (see 2.6) was not being
fulfilled.
Alternatively it confirms that mutuals struggle under the dominant discourse of
capitalism, where their actual performance was measured and found wanting when
compared to the ideal plc (Llewellyn 1997).
Regardless of the environment in which mutuals operate, authors have identified
benefits that transcend capitalism. Kay mentions that mutuals are more effective at
sustaining 'relational contract structures', explaining why they predominate in life
assurance and mortgages when a long-term relationship with the customer is required
(Kay 1991: 315, Drake and Llewellyn 2001). For Cook et al. these relational contracts
ensure free and easy flows of information and flexibility of response to changing
conditions ' (2001:31) based on implicit trust, essential because of information
asymmetrics between the customer and institution. This negates expensive explicit
contracting and lowers transaction costs. Building societies have used these advantages
to offer better service than banks, such as longer opening hours (Gentle et al. 1991).
The Treasury Select Committee (1999) disputed this arguing that larger building
societies often performed no better than banks, however, Clarke (1998) found that
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customer satisfaction was higher in building societies than banks.
Smith (2000), Coles (2001), and Bullock (2000) show that current management of
building societies have a clear sense of what mutuality means to them. To Smith
mutuals should use their inherent capital efficiency advantage, to deliver more
competitive products, maintain a personal relationship with members, because they do
not have shareholders; and 'take a longer term view because they are not subject to the
short term pressure of the City' (2000:3). Smith warns longevity requires a greater
degree of trust which building societies should not abuse. Finally he outlines how in an
atomised society with increasingly variable incomes, there is a need for access to secure
'rainy day money' and 'the concept of membership, of people clubbing together to help
each other out at times of adversity becomes more appropriate' (Smith 2000:8). Coles
(2001) returns to principles and offers six pillars of mutuality: (1) democratic
engagement with members; (2) mutual financial indicators; (3) member friendly
practices; (4) treating existing members as important as new members; (5) being
involved in the wider community; and (6) developing a mutual culture. The first two
were present in the cooperative model in chapter 2, the second pair are aimed at
maintaining trust and reciprocity and the fifth helps build solidarity. Maintaining a
mutual culture captures the values embedded in mutuality and creates barriers to
demutualisation. Through an analysis of current membership of the Norwich and
Peterborough, Bullock (2000) similarly identifies the need to develop a mutual culture,
believing this is achieved by education of the membership as well as staff. Through this
process mutuals must earn members' trust through business performance (individual
satisfaction), which can result in loyalty and association (brand satisfaction), and
ultimately engagement and empowerment (governance). Bullock believed that all three
levels were necessary and required constant reaffirming.
It would appear that mutuality retains some intellectual capital among managers of
larger mutuals, indicating that smaller institutions are not necessarily more mutual.
Moreover, there is no clear evidence to support the functionalist argument that
mutuality becomes unsustainable beyond a certain size. However, research does
suggest that diversification and a desire on behalf of management to seek an extension
of powers are closely correlated to the decision to change status. Therefore the
intervention of the management and the role of regulation may offer a more productive
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explanation for the changing nature of mutuality.
-
5.1.2 Middle class capture of mutuality
It was argued in chapter 3 that the capture of building societies by managers, was linked
to the foreclosure of terminating societies by their permanent brethren, and the
imposition of state regulation. This brought in increasing numbers of middle-class
leaders who gradually altered the working class conception of self-help, replacing it
with paternalism and professionalism. However, it is likely that the founders would
have been the most enterprising and articulate individuals within working class
communities. The inter-class relationship within mutuals has often been fractious and
has resulted in a dual history for the movement (Mellor et al. 1988), one of a divided
middle class focusing on either managerialism or idealism, while the working class
'pragmatic idealism' is overlooked and education, which could overcome barriers, was
gradually diminished. Consequently where working class members have control of a
mutual, they fear losing intellectual purity, not merely because of the attachment to
familiarity, but because of the ease in which the values of respectability, self-help, and
thrift could be manipulated into endorsing the bourgeois hegemony (Crossick 1978).
Moreover, this can also result in the community, which comprise of the collective, being
re-designated, such as widening the common bond in a credit union. Yeo and Yeo
explained how this process occurs, starting from the perspective that the Owenites
established the concept of community and `..dominated and developed the idea of
community as mutuality.' (Yeo & Yeo 1988: 232). From this they constructed three
definitions of community. The first was the working class concept of communities of
mutual co-operation; second was the middle class view of community as service; and
finally the modern concept of the State as community. In essence the middle classes
through voluntary associations, sought to usurp working class communities, such as
mechanics halls and libraries. This was an attempt to formalise and regularise
communities and in the process secure leadership through 'patronism'. The idea was to
displace mutuality with hierarchy, while retaining the rhetoric of mutuality. The middle
classes wanted social harmony without changing society.
'A characteristic project of middle-class groups has been to marry the two oldest
definitions of 'community' and to conceal, or, as they would see it transcend, social
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antagonism. They have tried to force a union between the community as supplied from
above with its basically unequal social structures and community created from inside
RD
with its supportive and more ethical human relations' (Yeo & Yeo 1988:238).
According to the authors this process of interference continues today, with the middle
class acting in professional capacity as agents of the state via their '... . inability to leave
independent working-class mutuality alone and the recurrent attempt to absorb or
replace it with a practice designed to make middle-class service indispensable'
(1988:242).
Yeo and Yeo's analysis has parallels with Kropotkin's rise and decline of mutuals and
Winstanley's emphasis on freewill. Through this argument the cliched pragmatism
versus idealism debate, can be seen as a shroud for an attempt by the middle-classes to
construct and control the language of mutuality. In this process there is a dismissal of
independent collective action and working-class co-operators are instructed about what
behaviour is deemed mutual. In effect the middle-classes have usurped the philosophy
and narrative of mutuality. From this class based interpretation it is possible to perceive
trust as being connected to deference, rather than based on reciprocity and respect.
Thus the attitude of mutuals, such as the Portman (4.3.10), is based on an expectation
that members are passive and compliant.
Culturally, the development of building societies can be viewed as an accommodation
between self-help and paternalism. For Pooley (1991), the employment of self-help
whether as thrift and self-reliance, collective action, or altruism, reflected the ascendant
cultural values. These values operated within a capitalist society and benefited
economically building society managers. Under these conditions Samuel Smiles' 'Self-
Help' (1859), was popular as it reaffirmed current practice and enabled politicians to
justify their inaction. The inequalities caused by laissez faire capitalism produced
divisions within self-help, for Smiles' argument was premised on equality of
possibilities, thus those who were successful emphasised the self-reliant aspect, while
others stressed the necessity of collective action (Frylcman 1991). As Bourdieu (1984)
stated, working-class self-help was different due to economic dependency, and therefore
collective action was an appropriate response by an isolated group. Moreover:
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'Such expressions of working-class self-help were, however, antagonistic towards the
middle-class version of self-help. As a consequence self-help stood against self-help as
-
part of the class struggle.'	 (Frykrnan 1991:3)
This internal conflict operated simultaneously with the cultural clash caused by
paternalism, which was used as an agent of modernity, to enclose the traditional norms
upon which the original mutuals were based. This resulted in the organisationally
ambiguous position of paternalistic management and self-reliant mutualist membership,
both of which believed they owned the mutuals. As noted by Boddy (1980), Barnes
(1984) and Pooley (1991), building societies were able to sustain this position and
satisfy the political establishment fearful of socialism, provided power was centralised
within societies and they continued to offer services unavailable to members elsewhere.
Once mutuality is captured it has been possible to argue for growth and extension of
services through enhanced professionalism. Additionally, a linguistic discourse was
adopted which portrayed the middle classes as professional staff and the working class
as shareholders. For example, although the middle classes were responsible for the
collapse of the Liberator Building Society (3.1) and promoted community development
in a small location as the prime role of credit unions (Jones, Paul 1999b), they used
these failures to argue for greater professionalism to improve sustainability.
5.1.3 Organisational Theory
Functionalists have long argued that managers capture the firm, engage in self-
aggrandising goal displacement and that employees develop bureau pathology, adopting
the characteristics of a bureaucracy (Merton 1940). Furthermore informal
communication and administration systems become 'increasingly inappropriate'
requiring transition to more 'rational patterns of interaction' (Leonard 1966:81). In
opposition to this, Hall (1991) found the empirical evidence unproven and sometimes
contradictory, while only two of Weber's six dimensions of a bureaucracy, hierarchy of
authority, and system of rules for incumbents, correlated with size. To Smith (1970) the
connection between bureaucracy and size was an over rationalisation prevalent in
functionalist thought.
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Clarifying the status of mutuals within organisational literature is problematic. In
general they may share many of the same practices as joint-stock companies, but their
democratic ownership structure affects their objectives. Moreover the marginalisation
and reinvigoration of democracy causes oscillations between mutuals' capitalist and
socialist aims. These characteristics are shared by voluntary organisations (Michels
1949) and mutual-benefit associations (Blau and Scott 1963).
The gradual `professionalisation' of building societies resembles Michels' iron law of
oligarchy in voluntary organisations. This states that as a democratic organisation grows
it requires a bureaucratic structure and technically competent leaders. Centralisation of
power is therefore required to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the
organisation. Meanwhile the leaders become better educated then their members,
develop separate lifestyles, become indispensable to the organisation and are ultimately
assimilated into prevailing elites. Paradoxically, leaders become concerned with the
stability and survival of the organisation so will moderate their opinions, thereby losing
a further linkage with the members and drift from the original objectives of the
organisation (Blau and Scott 1963). Michels 'successfully' tested his theory on
revolutionary parties as they 'represent the negation of any such tendency and have
actually come into existence out of opposition thereto. Thus the appearance of
oligarchical phenomena in the very bosom of the revolutionary parties is a conclusive
proof of the existence of immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human
organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends' (1949:50). Once this
process begins it creates its own momentum from direct to representative democracy,
standing committees, a detached executive and difficulties with communication (Smith
1970). In the UK Michels iron law was affirmed by Allen who held that increasing size
and complexity required bureaucratic administration as the purpose of a trade union 'is
to protect and improve the general living standards of its members and not to provide
workers with an exercise in self-government' (1954:15). Resisting Michels iron law can
be achieved if the organisation remains 'permeable' to new ideas and interests from
members, and democracy can be assured by maintaining participation on issues which
power can cluster (Craig and Gross 1970). Blau and Scott insist that democratic
participation, which is the most effective bulwark against oligarchy, can be best
maintained through continual exchange between members and leaders and an educative
programme for members to minimise information asymmetrics. Alternatively
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Gouldner's (1955) perception that democracy alone may be sufficient as the leadership
will lose elections if they lose the confidence of the members, is questioned by Lipset
(1960), who believed democracy was most effective in a institutionalised and
legitimated two-party system. Ironically the advent of carpetbaggers may provide
opposition but not legitimation, which could have a terminal effect on building
societies. Another strategy is to rely on fluctuation in membership to measure
performance (Allen 1954, Lipset 1960). The weakness with this managerial approach is
that it replicates economic practice in the capitalist sector, and is methodologically
flawed, as many of the actions taken by leaders are invisible to the members (Mills
1956). Overall there is no sociological evidence that democracy alone ensures
mutuality, instead it can be viewed as an institutional manifestation of accountability.
Blau and Scott (1963) incorporated Michels' definition of voluntary organisations and
the iron law in their typology of mutual-beneficial organisations. When examining
mutual benefit associations they discuss two problems: oligarchical control and
membership apathy. They argued that at the beginning of an association members are
actively engaged in pursuing a common objective. However, this enthusiasm results in
proselytising which recruits less committed members who are happy to leave the
running of the association to an active minority. Once this occurs a 'vicious circle
begins' (1963:46) whereby meetings becoming uninteresting and voluntary attendees
receive paltry rewards resulting in less participation. The difficulty with this
functionalist interpretation is that it assumes participation is connected to formal
meetings, rather than a series of interdependent, informal, reciprocal relations between
members.
Another approach is Turner's (1962) schematic of trade union democracy, which may




V 5-1: Turner's evolution of mutuals





Turner argued that unions with closed membership were more myopic but had a greater
sense of unity leading to high participation rates. Aristocracy occurred where there
were different classes of members in a hierarchical structure; and bossdom was
exemplified by low levels of participation and a large gap in knowledge between laity
and the professionals. Applying Turner's schematic to mutuals we would expect that
building societies would be ruled by bossdom and credit unions would experience
exclusive democracy. The advantage with Turner's dynamic model is that it permits
different mutual experiences. Unfortunately being based on trade unions it does not
attempt to assess the impact of paternalistic management, which within building
societies resulted in open membership and aristocratic leadership.
In summary Michels and Blau and Scott provide an appealing theoretical understanding
of organisational behaviour in mutuals, which reflects elements of their historical
development. However, what is not resolved is whether the shift towards oligarchy is
beneficial to the members, instead there is an implied assumption that the loss of direct
democracy is morally wrong. Though this may be true, Marx and Weber provide
insights into the effect of increased managerial control (Edgell 1993). Marx argues that
creation of administrative classes divorces the means of ownership from the means of
production, however this managerialism does not alter the underlying trend that
competition is a coercive force which ensures all organisations must strive to make a
profit or die (Blackburn 1965). Additionally this new category merely results in the
'transformation' of the capitalist class (Scott 1982). This poses particular dangers in
mutuals where the means of ownership are widely dispersed, as the managerial class
will adopt capitalist language in abeyance of any contrary instructions and control; an
argument consistent with the behaviour of building society managers in the 1980s and
1990s. A Weberian perspective assumes that managerialism involves a shift to more
effective and socially responsible leadership as short-term profit making is replaced by
long-term growth and stability (Reed 1992:14). Both of these are the pinnacles of the
co-operation model, but Weber warns that leaders' activity entrenches internal conflicts,
due to the growing separation between their interests and the owners' interests.
Consequently a mutual could have competing substantive rationalities within the
organisation, while simultaneously members maximising strategies maybe incongruent
with the organisation they own (Eldridge 1971)
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The fact that such 'outside' interests can affect the mode of control over managerial
positions, even and especially when the highest degree of formal rationality in their
selection is attained, constitutes a further element of substantive irrationality specific to
the modern economic order. These might be entirely private 'wealth' interests, or
business interests which are oriented to ends having no connection whatsoever with the
organisation, or finally pure gambling interests. By gaining control of shares, all of
these can control the appointment of the managing personnel, and more important, the
business policies imposed on this management.' (Weber 1968 [1924140)
Thus Weber describes a capitalist environment in which managers appropriate the
means of production and yet face an inbuilt substantive irrationality from external
actors. Weber's analysis of shareholder companies is remarkably prescient of the rise of
carpetbaggers within building societies, while Marx demonstrates how propertyless
managers can appropriate resources and then conform to capitalist norms. In general,
mutuals have been under-theorised in organisational literature, hence the difficulty in
totally applying Michels, Blau and Scott, and Turner's models. Yet alongside Marx and
Weber they do suggest some parallels with joint-stock-companies. However, this can




Though internal considerations can partially explain the process of organisational
change, they omit any evaluation of exogenous factors. In effect a functionalist
interpretation can only apply in a vacuum, as it offers no satisfactory justification as
why mutuality is in transition today. Rather it is necessary to extend the neo-Marxist
analysis and assess the changing nature of capitalism and state in relation to the
dislocation of mutuality.
According to Polanyi (1957) any organisation needs to be embedded within a social
framework if they are to be effective and understood, a theme later extended by
Granovetter (1985) and the New Economic Sociology School (Smelser & Swedberg
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1994; Swedberg 1990). Polanyi adopted a historical analysis to comprehend the
evolution of the markets, which if left unfettered 'would result in the demolition of
society. ' (1944:73). In the 'Economy as an Instituted Process' (Polanyi et al.) he argued
that the 'human economy' was
'...embedded and immersed in institutions, economic and non-economic). The inclusion
of non-economic institutions is vital. For religion or government may be important to
the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability
of tools and machines themselves that lighten the toil of labour. ' ({1957] 1971:250).
He dismissed 'formal economics' as 'abstract' due to their reliance on rational action
and suggested that the 'real' economy was 'substantive'. Polanyi's historicism has
faced criticism from North (1977) and anthropologists who have cast doubt on the
'substantive' economy (Le Clair & Schneider 1968). Sociologically Granovetter (1985)
argued that the economy is structurally 'embedded' in networks. This actor-oriented
approach (Harvey 2000) departed from Polanyi's institutional analysis, enabling fresh
perspectives on ' embeddedness'. Dimaggio (1990) argued that economics was also
embedded in cultures, while Baker (1981) and Callon (1998) implied that networks are
the economy. Disputing this Harvey states:
'Thus, the idea of embeddedness here invoked suggests the continuous and
overwhelming invasive presence of incalculable externalities in market interactions.'
(2000:21).
Citing Polanyi, Harvey contends that `dis-embedding' or 'reverse embedding' have
historically occurred when 'all factors become commodities' and 'social relations are
embedded in the economic system' (2000:12). Consequently there is a 'mutual
conditioning' between economics and society, which enables Granovetter's theory of
networks to be applicable at a micro-level (e.g. motive for gain), and neo-classic
economic theory at the macro-level, where instituted economic processes are relatively
dis-embedded (Harvey 2000). Harvey's reconfiguration of Granovetter's work omits
his nuances and fails to consider his latter view that economic institutions develop their
own dynamics (Granovetter 1992).
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However, more problematically embeddedness itself may 'treat sociological concepts
as bolt-on accessories to core economic assumptions' (Dodds 1994:26). In using the
-
'metaphor' 'overlaid' to describe networks relation to businesses, Granovetter suggests
economic activity is a separate 'core' beyond society (Dodds 1994). The subjective
nature of embeddedness is criticised by Sayer (2000) who perceives it as a theoretical
idealised conception stripped of unpleasant egoistic practices. Amin and Hauser (1997)
remind us that capitalism is still exploitative and merely because markets are embedded
dose not imply they avoid being 'harsh and oppressive' (Sayer 2000:8). Embedded
practices are not necessarily the outcome of free compromises and agents may be
waiting for a different alignment of interest, often in a period of crises. Nor are
embedded economic markets free mechanisms that produce unintended effects
operating independently of agents (Habermas 1987) and may be swept away as easily as
less embedded markets (Sayer 2000).
Though esoteric, the embeddedness literature implies that institutions, such as mutuals,
can function effectively until societal values become commodified, or are disrupted by
the interests of other social actors. This may cause a particular problem for institutions
that offer an alternative philosophy to the dominant discourse. In effect the remainder
of this chapter explores the possible dis-embedding of mutuals through its relationship
with the state and capitalism, and more recently the severe system crises of
globalisation, Thatcherism, and social change.
5.2.2 Impact of State and Capitalism
Although inappropriate legislation and regulation has long been perceived as a key
factor in the development of mutuals (see chapters 3 & 4), there has been surprisingly
little sociological analysis into the nature of the relationship between mutuals and state,
though it has been debated in the cooperative literature (Mellor et al 1988, Yeo 2001,
Gurney 1996, Killingback 1988). Historically, the state seems to have an ambivalent
and sometimes hostile attitude to cooperatives. On occasions cooperatives have been
perceived as beneficial because their principles of self-help reflected the state's liberal
desires. Furthermore they are sometimes viewed as an acceptable bulwark against
revolution, or part of the moral regeneration of the working class (Mellor et al. 1988).
Some cooperators perceived risks in engagement with the state due to the cooperation
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belief in 'bottom-up' approach and the state's 'top-down' assertion of authority
(Fauquet cited in Lambert 1963). Other writers concentrated on buttressing an element
of Fauquet's belief that cooperatives could exist in society as a middle way between a
strong state and capitalism (Birchall 1996, Carr-Saunders 1938, Fay 1939).
In contrast to Lambert (1963) who believed that nationalisation was the antithesis of
mutuality, Gurney (1996) suggested the threat from the state is inspired from the right
not the left. Using historical evidence he argued that co-operatives became a 'social'
project and therefore divorced from the question of state power once their political
activities were prescribed following extensive social conflicts; forcing cooperatives to
concentrate on 'legitimate' gradual cultural evolution (1996:16). Killingback saw this
as 'a limitation upon mutuality' (1988:207), commenting that mutuality was 'beautiful'
to the State providing it remained small, unambitious and outside the competitive
sphere. As it grew the calls, lead by Conservative politicians and industrialists,
demanded that constraints and new taxes were placed on Cooperatives (Killingback
1988). The conflict reached its zenith during the depression when capitalists, from the
petite bourgeoisie to the industrialist, wanted controls on co-operatives so they could
maintain their own profits. The cooperatives had become too big, too successful, and
needed to be controlled. The government responded in 1934 by taxing the surpluses of
cooperatives, therefore drawing the parallel between these and the profits of joint stock
companies. Yet surpluses were re-distributed to customers via the dividend (a delayed
price reduction), rather than expropriated by shareholders.
What was apparent from Killingback's and Gurney's historical accounts was not just the
limited understanding that the state had of the motives of co-operators and how it
operated as an economic model, but how capitalist institutions shaped the state's
agenda. Ultimately this would have a detrimental impact on the way mutuals were
legally constituted and treated
In a dispute about the supremacy of private capital or private labour (co-operation,
mutuality) and with it the dominance of society (Yeo 1988), it is therefore unsurprising
that capital would pursue its objectives more effectively and ruthlessly than mutuals,
eventually securing legislation to limit free competition, allow price fixing and define
acceptable practice:
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'Co-operative societies were made to accept capitalist definitions of economic activity,
which in time thwarted their development. They remained: but the principle of
-
mutuality weakened' (Killingback 1988:209)
Not everybody saw conflict as inevitable; Marx and Huber feared that co-operatives
would accommodate with capitalism (Mellor et al. 1988, Lambert 1963), primarily
because of their acceptance of a dividend on savings or expenditure. Indeed partnership
was welcomed by conservative cooperative innovators such as Schulze-Delitzch, who
believed that competition shaped the market so that the strong formed capitalist
institutions and weak founded cooperatives (Lambert, 1963). Cooperatives'
schizophrenic relationship with capitalism is at its most extreme in the USA, where they
strive to differentiate themselves from socialism and be considered integral to the free
enterprise system (Groves 1985). This should not imply that in practice cooperatives
universally share a common philosophy. However, as discussed in 2.6.1 the pursuit of
mutual strength through a closed membership evident in the USA, can appear to
individuals trading outside the cooperative as displaying little difference in behaviour to
capitalist entities. Alternatively it was suggested by Lambert (1963) that mutuals aid
the efficiency of the market by production reflecting genuine demand, as opposed to
that inflated by a thirst for profit; while Llewellyn (1997) stresses the maintenance of
'fair prices'. This is a variation on Laidlaw's maxim that co-operatives help keep the
market honest (Groves 1985), a viewed endorsed by the Building Societies Association
(1999).
The difficulty with any form of accommodation is that the utopian philosophy
supporting mutuality was highly critical of capitalism (see 2.1), resulting in an uneasy
juxtaposition between commitments to mutuality and the capitalist system. One
outcome is that building societies are accused of betraying mutuality, if they behave too
capitalist or alternatively described as inefficient if they prioritise members over profits.
Notwithstanding this, other authors suggested that capitalist institutions display mutual
behaviour and confuse market pragmatism with cultural epistemology (Leadbetter and
Christie 1999). Ultimately capitalist organisations will always seek to maximise profits
within the boundary of the prevailing degree of social acceptability. What appears to
occur within mutuals is a pattern of cyclical interest in the political and social
motivations of cooperatives, with bouts of sometimes violent eruptions, preceding
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prolonged periods of acquisitive self-interest. The complexity arises because mutuals
operate within an alien environment where trust is formalised, limiting reciprocal
arrangements; and individualism dominates over society, threatening collective
commitments and stability.
5.2.3 Thatcherism
The state and capitalism have had a long and problematic relationship with mutuality,
but it is my contention that this intensified during the 'hypercapitalism' of Thatcherism
and latterly globalisation. As stated in the introduction, demutualisation was not
confined to Britain; however, it was in Britain that neo-liberal politicians achieved their
most sustained level of success in the Western democracies, through Thatcherism. The
extent of the changes wrought by Thatcherism led Reid (1991) and Pugh (1998) to
suggest that it was a contributory factor to the process of demutualisation, creating an
intellectual climate where such a move could be contemplated and accepted. However,
the 'hypercapitalism' (Kreiger 1986) of Thatcherism is not the sole explanation for
demutualisation, rather it is probable that a complex interaction of internal conflicts and
external pressures are responsible. The remainder of this section will assess the
phenomenon of Thatcherism and specifically its policy of privatisation which provided
the intellectual justification for demutualisation.
In common with emerging petite bourgeoisie social movements ranging from the
National Viewers and Listeners Association, National Federation of the Self Employed,
and the National Association of the Middle Class, Thatcher held the Post War
Consensus (PWC) was responsible for the crises engulfing Britain in the 1970s, and
believed the solution lay in a less interventionist state.
The concept of Thatcherism itself emerged only slowly with Jessop et al. still able to
convincingly argue in 1988 that there was a multiplicity of definitions. These ranged
from a denial of Thatcherism's existence, to a personality cult, or interpretations based
on the attitudes, policies and strategy of the Thatcher governments. Importantly the
nature of Thatcherism has altered over time with uneven consequences and a unity
difficult to discern. Moreover, Thatcherism's inconsistencies have granted it flexibility
in application and helped ensure its political appeal and reflect its tactical pragmatism.
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To Brown and Spark (1989) it is an ideology of neo-liberal economics and authoritarian
conservatism, while Gamble (1983) summarised it as 'markets good, governments bad'.
The outline of contemporary understanding of Thatcherism could be discerned in the
original pursuit of monetarist policies, which was seen as a realignment of interests
away from the industrial heartlands and towards the City and capital (Ross 1983, Nairn
1981). This was connected to the on-going restructuring of state-capital relations and
part of a global response to recession (Clarke 1987). In effect the economics of
Thatcherism were the precursor to globalisation, an analysis that assumes that
globalisation is a neo-liberal capitalist objective, rather than a broader cultural and
societal shift.
Another perspective emphasises the social effect of Thatcherism, describing it as
'authoritarian populism' (Hall 1983), with the objective of uniting free market
economics with a traditional Conservative party concern with social order. Deepening
the analysis Williams (1983) linked authoritarian populism with 'mobile privatisation'.
This extended social privatisation, first examined by Goldthorpe et al. (1969), in which
individuals retreated to private lives within nuclear families, with increasing mobility
which undermines the universality of welfare provision. As people individualised and
privatised their consumption, they began to question the benefit of a universal welfare
state, subsequently adopting consumerist and neo-liberal attitudes. Moreover this
analysis can be extended beyond the public sector as the demand for individualised
service invaded patriarchal economic structures within the private sector, particularly
financial institutions. Additionally as commitment weakened, mobility of consumption
increased, thereby undermining the longevity component necessary for sustainable
mutuality.
As described in 4.1 building society managers initially saw Thatcherism as an
opportunity to reform their 'staid' institutions and expand their services and operations.
This conflicted with members who remained wedded to mutuality, while increasingly
questioning the motivation and the power of the management. Culturally Thatcherism
was eroding the complicit pact between members and management, in which the latter
act responsibly and did not engage in excessive personal aggrandisement and former
exchanged influence for security and a reasonable quality service.
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However, it was the introduction of privatisation that probably enabled demutualisations
to occur and is Thatcherism's most significant legacy (Riddell 1985, McAllister and
Studlar 1989). Privatisation encapsulated the ethos of Thatcherism-emerging as a
pragmatic response to the final crisis of state, by increasing income and simultaneously
minimising capital expenditure. It was defined as the return of industries, assets and
activities to the private sector; based on the premise that exposure to market forces
would increase competitiveness, expand consumer choice, widen share ownership and
unburden the exchequer. Koldeire (1986) drew the distinction between the provision
and production of services, arguing that former was the primary policy objective of
Thatcherism, as it involved the withdrawal of state financing for a service. Privatisation
according to Edgell and Duke (1991) had five manifestations: contracting out,
denationalisation, liberalisation, increasing charges for public services, and
encouragement of private sector consumption, most notably housing through right-to-
buy. However, it was the privatisation of nationalised industries and the sale of council
houses, under the right-to-buy policy that attracted the most interest.
Denationalisation of state owned industries occurred either by issuance of shares, a sale
to management/employees, placement with institutional investors, physical disposal of
assets, or joint public/private ventures (Edgell and Duke 1991). The extent of
denationalisation can be seen on figure 5.2, rising from £377 million in 1979/80,
peaking at £8,189 million in 1992/3 before declining rapidly following election of the
Labour Party in 1997. In total £69,521 million over a twenty year period was raised in
privatisations. Privatised companies ranged from British Aerospace and Rover from
engineering, British Telecom, and Cable and Wireless from communications, the
utilities of British Gas, and the water and electricity boards, and British Airways and
British Rail from transport. As one of the purposes of the privatisation was to promote
share ownership, most of the privatisation were accompanied by considerable
promotional advertising and heavily discounted share offers, leading to oversubscribed
applications and large queues of potential investors on the final expression of interest.
All this created a perception that shareholding was popular, successful and exciting,
especially as small shareholders invariably made instant profits on their investments.
Ritual developed around the process of flotations, primarily due to their frequency, but
also an almost Freudian movement from initial offer to the crescendo of launch day.
Despite the apparent assurance of profitability, public opinion of privatisation was
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polarised, with Conservative voters and the self employed strongly in favour, while
public sector workers were against (Edge11 and Duke 1991). However, when
controlling for type of privatisation (welfare state or non welfare state) the authors
found a narrowing of views particularly over the provision of welfare state activities,












Sources: HMSO 1980-1996; The Stationery Office 1997-2000
Figure 5-2: Proceeds from Privatisations 1979-2000
The complex and dynamic nature of attitudes indicated that support for the privatisation
of consumption was most probable where extensive private provision was in general
use. This was exemplified by the right-to-buy policy, which enabled council tenants to
purchase their property initially with up to 50%, and latterly 60% discount. Sales rose
from less than 60,000 in the late 1970s, to peak at 204,600 in 1982, with total sales of
council homes surpassing 1 million in 1987/9, before declining to under 70,000 per
annum by 1999 (Social Trends 1999). With council house sales reaching a plateau this
would indicate that there is only limited demand for further privatisation, a view
confirmed by Edgell and Duke's (1991) quantitative research. By the mid 1990s
following the housing recession support for home ownership declined, with 74% in
favour in 1986 contrasted with 54% in 1996, although as there was some evidence of
the opposite view (61% in 1998) as prices started to rise at the end of the decade (Ford
and Burrows 1999). Ford and Burrows' suggestion that attitudes track the vagaries of
the housing market, indicated that the pragmatism in relation to perception of home
ownership highlighted by Edgell and Duke, remained pertinent.
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Promotion of home sales proved the easiest and most popular component of the
-
privatisations of welfare state, which offered a collective alternative to individualism
and Thatcherism. Therefore a dual strategy of private benefit and reductions in state
provision was adopted (Edgell and Duke 1991). However, reflecting Hall (1983) it is
likely that the narrative of 'crisis' within the welfare state created an environment in
which non-collective action was socially acceptable, 'sensible', and even the 'duty' of a
'good citizen'. Thus Thatcherism designed a self-fulfilling prophecy of decline, a
discourse which has been similarly employed by carpetbaggers with regards to building
societies (see chapter 9).
Thatcherism arguably enhanced micro-economic emancipation for the petite
bourgeoisie, by undermining the existing culture of paternalism, while simultaneously
protecting this new emancipation by minimising avenues and mechanisms of protest. In
this way Thatcherism can be presented as a cogent and pragmatic theory of
individualised consumerism, although its fails to address how a reformulated consensus
can be sustained to ensure long-term political stability. This could be described as the
myth of the mantra "no such thing as society". Not only does Thatcherism contrast with
mutuality, its implementation fundamentally challenges existing financial mutuals. Any
theory incorporating privatised individualism diminishes the reliance on reciprocity,
weakening communal bonds. Furthermore, in order to survive organisations may adopt
a brusque approach to democracy; this ultimately collapses if sufficient members
employ their newly found economic power to overturn the political regime. Though
this resulted in demutualisation, it also has a detrimental impact on smaller mutuals.
With increasing emphasis on individual needs, collective provision is attractive only on
ideological grounds and for excluded groups. However, while this provides a short-
term stimulus, it ultimately deters wider society and becomes associated with residual
supply. Thus credit unions are seen as the 'poor mans bank' and building societies are
instructed to have a stronger community commitment (Treasury 1999).
A similar outcome is already present in housing, where the sale of council properties
has been accompanied by declining expenditure on the remaining publicly owned stock,
reducing it to a residual provision for the poorest members of society (Malpass 1983).
Consequently there is a contradictory effect of Thatcherite housing policy on mutuals.
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Though building societies benefited from the rapid increase in home ownership via
right-to-buy and the withdrawal of local authorities from the mortgage market, the state
-
encouragement of private consumption of housing may ultimately undermine mutuality.
Early confirmation of this came with the abolition of the Cartel and rationing of
mortgages (see 3.2), resulting in more account turnover and a reduction in reciprocal
arrangements between staff and members. In the longer term if the purpose of right-to-
buy and shareholding was to legitimise the general notion of private ownership of
property, then it would be a small step to suggest that building societies, as collective
providers, should be transferred to the private sector. In effect Thatcherism challenged
the paternalistic management of building societies, disrupting the reciprocity between
members and staff, and providing the intellectual justification for their conversion,
while simultaneously marginalizing those that would not or could not become limited
companies.
5.2.4	 Globalisation
The process of disembedding of mutuals began by Thatcherism, was given added
impetus by globalisation. Prior to economic liberalism in the 1970s the activities of
building societies and housing finance in general were detached from the international
financial markets (Hamnett 1994). However, as described in 3.2 shifts in global
financial systems were used as justification for the wave of demutualisations in the
1990s. These events are often represented as occurring outside the envelopment of
states (Ohmae 1990) and beyond national control (Kapstein 1994). Others (Lash &
Urry 1987; Giddens 1990) have used the transformation in international financial
systems to justify a broader change — namely the processes of disorganised capitalism
and globalisation. This 'otherness' of change, offers a challenge to the concept of
embeddedness, especially in the global financial market, where the transmission of
money permits the separation of exchanges in time and place (Harvey 1982). Thus this
element of globalisation effectively disembeds all existing relationships, undermining
connections based on longevity and reciprocity, while increasing the conunodification
of society. Harvey was developing thoughts first expressed by Simmel in the
'Philosophy of Money' (1990[1908D, that money allows us space by neutralising the
need for proximity and the frictions of life. This according to Harvey has become more
relevant when combined with technology and the compression of time and space
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(1989). The anonymity of money and lack of physical form (more a belief source)
made it an ideal transmission for exchange relations in a technological age. Extending
-
the logic of this argument it is probable that institutions that use money as their product
will be more susceptible to any technological changes and time-space compression, with
all the implications that carries for the embeddedness of those organisations.
Drawing inspiration from Adorno, Dicken (1998) saw globalisation as the end of the
nation state and the homogenisation of culture (Featherstone 1995). Whilst Spybey's
(1996) belief that it penetrates all aspects of our lives, connects with Robertson's (1992)
phenomenological argument, Cohen and Kennedy (2000) disaggregate this from
globalisation (which they describe as an external process) and adopt globalism to
represent the subjective personal way we are drawing together. Collectively these
authors emphasise the social change aspect of globalisation. Rather than being
ensconced within nation states struggle is 'transposed to members of a figuration of
interdependent and competing nation states', which when added to the intensification of
trans-societal flows are limiting unilateral state action, 'then we have moved towards the
globalisation perspective' (Featherstone & Lash 1995:2).
Broadly four discourses emerge from the literature (Waters 1995) to describe
globalisation: (1) a historical process that preceded capitalism; (2) an outcome of
modern capitalism; (3) a product of late capitalism (incorporating concepts of
disorganised capital, post industrialisation and post modernity); or (4) a global
predominantly non-institutional process. According to Robertson (1995) theorists adopt
either the homogenisation (Giddens, functionalist, and Marxists) or heterogenisation
(Said 1978, Hall 1992) narratives. The former believe in a world-system, the presence
of the universal in the particular, imply 'convergent development', and employ a
'scientific and realist epistemology' (Robertson 1995:4). While `heterogenisers' dispute
these claims arguing that dominance of the West demonstrates the particular over the
universal and consider themselves as `hermeneuticians' accepting their reflexivity and
attempting `intertranslatability'. However, regardless of their theoretical stand most of
these authors believe the intensification of globalising tendencies is unique.
Axford (1995) criticises the 'unquestioning certainty' of the global economy doubting
the related assumption that somehow economics, rather than politics or culture is better
placed transform meaning, structures and identities. Instead globalisation is an
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asymmetrical process with multinational corporations wanting liberalisation, against
regional trading blocks that are established as a response to the uncertainty caused by
globalisation. Furthermore, Porter (1990) doubts the existence of global companies,
arguing that multinational corporation are embedded in their home nation and rely on
their national government to support its interests.
In contrast, Castells (1991) links social change to technological advances. Not only
does this technology enable growth in exchanges but that this increasingly occurs in
'real time'. This brings different cultures, economies and people into closer and more
intimate relationships and this new interconnectedness happens so fast that the nation
state is unable to manage and monitor. This enables the creation of new political spaces
outside of state boundaries (Marden 1997). Therefore in economic exchange the use of
cyberspace can mean that technological connections become more important than
physical location (Dicken 1998). This may effect the reciprocal relations predicated on
physical proximity.
These socio-economic arguments are supplemented by alleged effects of modernity
(Giddens 1990), particularly changing concepts of space and time, which enables them
to be experienced in isolation and disconnected from concrete places.
This was due to safer and quicker travel and communication combined with precise
measures of time and space. As a result interpersonal interactions declined causing
disembedding. This led to a reliance on abstract systems of knowledge and impersonal
communication (sans Weber's Iron Cage). Humans were able to sustain complex
interrelationships by the linking of space and time distanciation with reflexivity which
collectively 'stretched' social conditions. Cohen and Kennedy (2000) dismissed
Giddens analysis as 'modernity writ-large' (p50) arguing that globalisation has its own
unique features notably the sequestration and incorporation into a global environment of
the developing world by the imperial powers. While for Robertson (1992) Giddens'
discourse was illogical and incomplete, arguing that Giddens fails to successfully link
time-space distanciation to modernity, since if globalisation is a consequence of
modernity, then it has to demonstrate that distanciation, disembedding and reflexivity,
are central to modernity. But not only is Giddens unable to prove these are unique to
modernity, he compounds the error by stating that the process of modernity was
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connected with the emergence of the nation states and institutions, thereby disqualifying
'non-institutions' such as distanciation.
-
Even allowing for the exaggerated claims of Giddens, his time-space distanciation does
have a value (as Robertson accepts 1992:143) in helping us understand the process of
globalisation. Connecting advances in technology and telecommunications that have
reduced the costs of travel, with a wider availability of information thereby reducing
time horizons and faster dissemination of decisions, have left humans floundering to
cope with this comprehension of spatial and temporal worlds (Harvey 1989).
Consequently as the conceptualisation of place has become problematic (Massey 1994)
partially due to ethnic mixing and the resultant nationalism, there has been a
construction of spatially diverse 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983). These
communities drew upon Gemeinschaft principles, which may undermine the
cohesiveness of more Gesellschaft attitudes found in building societies.
The compression of time and space has hastened the spread of modernity, whether
imposed by force or choice. Modernity both changes and is changed by interaction with
new social actors; which is aggravated by the growth of reflexivity. Reflexivity both
originates in the concept of doubt in science, but through its practice ensures challenges
to the legitimacy of the ruling elites. This is 'reinforced by an intense disillusionment
with the consequences of modernity and the idea of material progress' (Cohen and
Kennedy 2000:36). However, advances in science and economic uncertainty forces us
to trust experts (Beck 1992) at a time when deferential relationships are diminishing.
Culturally, globalisation can therefore be perceived as the result of the 'universal logic
of modernity', with increasing levels of 'abstraction "disembedding' and 'hollowing
out' of meaning (Featherstone & Lash 1995:2), 'exacerbated' by deindustrialisation and
the subsequent emergence of the informational society. For mutuals this may have a
profound affect. First, distanciation challenges the concepts of personal trust and
reciprocity, by removing the necessity for personal interaction and shared spatial
communities. Second, this distinction and the reduction in deference, detaches
members and management, resulting in increased reliance on commodification and
abstract trust.
The concept of globalisation should not be viewed merely as a one-way process. To
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Giddens (1990) local events and cultures may be influenced by global factors, but for
others (Robertson 1992, Luke 1995, Beck 2000, Beynon & Dunkerley 2000) local can
and does effect the global. Classen (1996) stated that global experiences are
incorporated selectively, often depending on whether they enhance the position of local
elites or are considered desirable. With the merger between local and global identities it
becomes impossible to locate a 'pure' local, instead the local is a 'micro' of the global.
This re-making of locality re-iterates the compression of the world (Robertson 1992), in
effect globalisation is itself, its opposite, and its process (Friedman 1995) which
presents an unresolved teleological problem.
Rather than a conflict between systems or the re-embedding of the global in the local
Robertson (1995) argues it is a process of 'institutionalisation' whereby local
particularism is created globally. This activity can range from unstructured universal
process of localisation, to the promotion of local/indigenous identities by global groups.
Interpenetration between the particular and universal and the effects of time/space
compression, opens a perception of globalisation as a reflexive dialectic in which we are
all actors. The local translation and transformation of the global is considered by
Beynon and Dunkerley to be as important as the 'lateral extension of social connections
across time and space' (2000:36). This growing relevance of locality is in itself a
response to globalisation (Harmsworth 2001). Thus Robertson releases globalisation
from economic determinism, by emphasising the paradoxes caused by the interventions
of individuals. The participation of individuals in global finance, economic, and
cultural exchanges 'shrinks the gap' between global and local (McGrew & Lewis 1992)
causing a 'reconceptualisation of spaces' (Harmsworth 2001:4). However, Castells
(1991) suggests that a simultaneous and contra process is evolving whereby people
withdraw into their communities as a defensive mechanism against the vagaries of
globalisation, under the principle that 'if you cannot control the world then you could
control your neighbourhood' (1991:18) or a 'comfortable space' (Hannerz 1990:248)
free from external valuation. Alternatively it could provide easy access to the world
(Strassoldo 1992). Thus while the local provides security, consistency, and control in
an unpredictable and every faster global, it also enables the individual to create a
framework within which they can understand and comprehend these changes. As such
globalisation enhances the local community, while glocalism provides a 'psychological
construct' for the individual (Harmsworth 2001).
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For mutuals not only have they been structurally disembedded by capitalism, but their
-
culture values may have been incorporated, either into a hybridisation with capitalism,
and/or become hyperreal (Luke 1995). Hyperreality occurs when an artificial reality is
constructed by the media and subsequently absorbed by reality. Thus mutuals are
simultaneously expected to adopt capitalist norms, while being compared to an idealised
construct of mutuality. Furthermore the glocalisation literature suggests that resistance
is both an outcome and function of globalisation, and this is undertaken locally to
manage its encroachment, as individuals seek to make sense of their lives. Therefore
mutual organisations are both subjects of glocalisation, as in the spread of credit unions
as community based financial institutions and subject to it through internalised centres
of resistance, as in the activity of carpetbaggers within the building societies. However,
this form of 'collective individualism' unlike other resistance groups seeks to remove a
possible oppositional and glocal force to unfettered capitalism, through the presentation
of modern mutuality as a perversion from 'hypermutuality'
5.2.5 Social change through New Social Movements (NSM)
Most of the literature on resistance arises out of writing about New Social Movements
(NSM), hence there is an inherent bias towards either the left through discussions
regarding environment, peace, and women's studies (Zirakzadh 1997), or nationalist
and religious struggles of identity (Oberschall 1993). Castells (1997) attempted to
synthesis these but continued to frame social movements as offering an alternative to
neo-liberal capitalism. Unaddressed is whether individual proponents of globalisation
who establish oppositional forces within collectivist organisations are considered as a
social movement? In Byme's (1997) overview, although the New Right is classified as
a possible NSM because it sought to change society, it is disqualified by its willingness
to work through the existing structures of the Conservative Party, as it did not question
the existing conduct of politics. However, carpetbaggers operate within a society they
wish to transform and do not function through conventional sources of power.
Initially it is necessary to assess whether carpetbaggers are a protest movement rather
than a NSM. A 'pure' social movement offers a fundamental challenge to the
prevailing culture involving both protest and identity. It is autonomous, has no formal
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structure and does not interact with established political authorities. But some social
movements could be seen as protest movements as they draw on a wider body of
-
supporters who are interested in a specific topic, for example, the Poll Tax
demonstrators. NSM differ because they seek a cultural change through a series of
indivisible objectives that cannot be moderated through conventional politics.
Moreover, protest movements are often the public face of wider and deeper social
movements (Byrne 1997). This analysis is problematic when considering carpetbaggers
since although they have a single objective; they operate within a type of society and are
therefore seeking an irreducible culture transformation of that society. Similarly, if
NSM are assessed by the processes they employ, such as the rejection of hierarchical,
elitist politics and demand a decentralised and libertarian approach, then carpetbaggers
may qualify (see chapter 9).
With the end of deference, conventional class-based party political cleavages became
increasingly irrelevant (Marsh 1977), apparent through electoral apathy, volatility, and
dramatic falls in membership of political parties (Byrne 1997). Instead individuals and
groups have sought to by-pass the conventional political mechanisms both to achieve
their objective of communicating with the general population and as means of
expressing the rejection of the existing order and its norms. For Melucci et al. (1989)
this NSM desire to reach beyond the political elites, as their demands cannot be
achieved through reform, instead they want a thoroughgoing revision of the way society
is constituted. Heberle (1951) saw this absolutism as a threat to the established order,
which was based on tolerance and the respect for the views of fellow members of the
larger community. In opposition to formal structures NSM created looser informal
bonds (Diani 1992) with segmented, `polycephalous', interaction networks (Gerlach and
Hine 1970). Through these networks individuals could come together to organise, share
values and to participate in mutual education. NSM were based on individual
autonomy, therefore central coordination was often rejected and events were organised
locally. Although this sometimes led to disjointed campaigns, its flexibility allowed for
tactical dexterity, enabling groups to test and refine approaches. Most importantly for
supporters both the message and process for delivery of that message, were a rejection
of the existing order and its norms. (Zirakzadeh 1997, Byrne 1997).
This avoidance of conventional structures mirrored the demise of collectivism and
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collective action. With rises in unemployment and employment deregularisation the
informal networks that sustained the labour movement were diminished. Alongside this
the impact of privatisation and neo-liberal politics (5.2.3) led to a decline in the welfare
state, breaching the social contract between the state and the citizen. A breakdown in
reciprocity and trust, combined with the death of deference resulted in a crisis of
legitimacy, in the meaning and functions of state, and made it increasingly difficult for
institutions, such as churches, to enforce cultural norms (Castells 1996). These
organisations and institutions had 'become by and large, empty shells, decreasingly able
to relate to people's lives and values in most societies' (Castells 1996:355). Analogous
sentiments were expressed by Bellah et al. (1985, 1992) when discussing the dialectic
reality of individualism, believing that utilitarian element represented through personal
success, had been prioritised as the expressive element of civic responsibility. As a
consequence social solidarity was under threat, this was not due to narcissism, rather it
was a function of the banalisation of the workplace and the separateness between the
citizen and the polity. Narcissism was the outcome of this process, not its cause, as
individuals sought meaning in their lifestyle enclave. Furthermore, the intrusion of the
state into personal spaces has resulted in a rise of expressive politics, concerned with
protecting ontological values (Parkin, 1968). These have challenged traditional rational
functional views, that social movements were ultimately always driven by individual
instrumentality have been found inadequate (Kriersi et al 1995) and Olson's free-rider
principle collapses when the costs become the rewards (Hirschman 1970, Chong 1991).
However, nor are NSM the rage of outsiders, as classical American accounts argued
(Mayer 1995). Instead much of the membership is drawn from educated welfare
professionals (Parkin 1968), although even here, rationalists continue to state that they
only become engaged for instrumental reasons (Burklin 1985, Frankel 1987). In
contrast Melucci (1992) highlights how NSM seek to recast language and cultural
change, and that the effect of this expressive motivation is often disguised, as it occurs
through interpersonal relationships. This reliance on localised informal groupings and
promotion of reengineering of identity through self-awareness, neither resolves the
differences between individuals or the diversity of their individual goals. Instead
individuals continue to struggle to understand society and their place within it (Lyman
1995)
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Furthermore, NSM are reduced to another representation of the consumer society
ultimately selling individuals holograms of identities. Evidence that NSM, as a
collection of individuals lacking an ideology become a pastiche of their former selves,
may explain the loose federation of carpetbaggers. Equally it could be argued that
mutuality was an early social movement and contemporary interest represents a
reawakening of a collective identity.
However, using the resource-mobilisation approach (Ziralczadeh 1997) it could be
argued that credit unions grew not in response to a renewed interest in mutuality, but
rather as a function of the support provided by various agencies and government.
Furthermore, this is affirmed by the political opportunity structure theory, which
stresses contextual factors, in particular the space allowed by the political system.
Consequently the nature of social movements is influenced and affected by the
accessibility and outcomes of conventional politics. With regards to carpetbaggers their
resistance could be a function of the difficulty having a voice within building society
democracy.
Castells (1997) connects these explanations for the growth of NSM with the effects of
hypercapitalism and technology. He believes that a new society with a culture-centred
view of the world is divided between the old logic of strong power and the new logic of
a self-centred view of the world. Alongside this has been an emergence of powerful
resistance identities either of traditional nationalist values or NSM. So a network
society exists of pervasive resistance identities and individualistic project identities, that
resist but communicate neither with each other nor with the state. Thus we have
identity-less individuals (global citizens) and resistance movements attracted to
communal identity. The new conflict that arises from this dichotomy is around the
cultural codes of society. Thus knowledge in both its creation and its transmission,
become crucial to NSM as it both informs cultures, while establishing new NSM
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991). Messages are increasingly transferred via the interne
where they can project an image, usually through a 'spectacular', to force a debate and
induce people to participate. Although Castells is predominantly referring to religious
and nationalistic movements, the carpetbaggers use broadly similar techniques and the
attempt to convert three societies at once received considerable press (see chapter 4).
This activity provided support for Castells' view that new communication technology is
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fundamental to the identity of these organisations, acting as both recruiting officer and
empowering grassroots and organisational activity. For building societies the question
is whether the lessons from the relationship between carpetbaggers, democracy and use
of technologies can be employed to preserve mutuality, or whether the cultural codes
have become so distorted they are almost meaningless?
In summary carpetbaggers seem to display the characteristics of a protest group, as they
come together to address a specific issue, which they are individually concerned with.
Yet as will be discussed in chapter nine their behaviour and approach is symptomatic of
a NSM. The incongruence of this position is further explored in the conclusion (11.3.3).
By contrast from the literature mutuals cannot be currently considered a NSM, as they
possess a formal structure and engage with the existing political establishment.
However, individual members of mutuals may share many of the same values as NSMs,
and use their membership to promote the adoption of policies replicating or similar to
those of a NSM.
5.3	 Tentative Conclusions
At the commencement of this chapter there were two meta-theories to explain the
changing nature of mutuality. The functionalist interpretation saw demutualisation as
the inevitable result of expansion in which building societies become detached from
members to the point where accountability was non-existent and a conversion was an
appropriate action. However, a review of existing literature found neither definitive
causality, nor evidence that accountability would improve with demutualisation. Rather
mutuals appeared to offer equivalent performance to joint-stock-companies, while
comparisons ignored the 'caution' inherent in the mutual economic model. Instead the
evidence suggested that mutuals can be successful and sustained if they deliver
reciprocity and an educative programme for members.
The other perspective, which I described as Neo-Marxist egotistic conspiratorial, placed
greater stress on the role of management within mutuals. Certainly this chapter
provides some support for this analysis. The appropriation of resources, the takeover of
mutuals by middle-class professionals, and Blau and Scott's (1963) typology of mutual
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beneficial organisations, all suggest that the intervention of management was an
important factor. However, there were two drawbacks with this interpretation: it does
not explain why the challenge to mutuality arose in the 1980s; or why new mutuals,
such as credit unions were being created.
The remainder of the chapter developed the Neo-Marxist theory, with particular focus
on the embeddedness of mutuality. Eventually it indicated that a sophisticated synthesis
between the Neo-Marxist structural thesis, with a cultural post-modern glocal turn (For
ease of reference I have hereafter entitled this the embeddedness perspective).
Accordingly, demutualisation occurred because building societies become disembedded
from society. First, in political and economic sphere through Thatcherism and
subsequently economic globalisation, both of which marginalised any centres of
opposition to the neo-liberal narrative. Second, the culmination of paternalism resulted
in an accountability deficit and a transformation in the trust relationship between
members and management. This occurred during the post-modern turn in which
concepts such as mutuality were reconfigured and represented in a purer form.
Members, having being alienated and emaciated from conventional politics, sought
power through the assertion of rights in those institutions most likely to respond;
namely mutuals with their democratic structures. Alongside this assault on mutuality a
counter-culture of opposition to globalisation, glocalism, established a space for new
mutuals, such as credit unions. Many of these new entities deliberately prioritised social
over economic objectives and based their attachment on a small locality.
The historical account outlined in chapters three and four, indicated that changes in
relationship between members and management of mutuals was a continual process that
began with the creation of permanent building societies and the growing reliance on
abstract trust. Furthermore this was not a linear process as trustworthiness was
periodically diminished and replenished. However, chapter four suggests that the
change of government in 1979 and subsequent legislation quantitatively and
detrimentally affected building societies. Meanwhile credit unions that had struggled
for survival under the Thatcher government were given fresh impetus by the election of
Labour in 1997. As noted on page 132 the historical accounts adopt either a
functionalist and narrow neo-Marxist interpretation of these changes. Chapter five
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while assessing these analyses added a more sociological perspective, to argue that the
embeddedness of mutuals was central to understanding their transformations. To assess
the validity of my interpretation of the history and literature the remainder of the thesis
empirically explores the comparative validity of all three perspectives. At the core of
the presentation of the empirical data are two questions:
1) Was there a culture change within and outside mutuals that would threaten or
disrupt a mutual culture? If so what was the nature of this shift?
2) Was there a structural shift in economics, politics, or society that would
potentially undermine the mutual organisational form? If so what how did this
affect the relationship between mutuals and members?
To answer these questions it is necessary to return to the 'cultural of mutuality' and 'co-
operative organisational' models discussed in chapter two. In the subsequent chapters
each element of the former (trust, reciprocity/habit, longevity, and caution) are
employed to discuss the alleged cultural changes. It is my intention to demonstrate that
the mutual culture has been differentially interpreted by various social actors (managers,
members, and active members) involved in mutuals, hence each of the chapters
covering the findings from these social actors (7,8, and 9) will begin with an analysis of
their understanding of mutuality. The triangulation chapter will synthesis this
information and explore any deviations across the research subjects. A similar process
will occur with regards to the co-operative organisational model, in which its elements
of education, ownership, solidarity, equity through collective economics, democracy,
and stability, will be explored by asking all three social actors about their roles and
relationships with each other.
To supplement the two broad questions the final part of each chapter will examine in
more detail the specific influences suggested in chapter five. Therefore issues of
professionalisation and paternalism within mutuals will be assessed. Furthermore
respondents will be asked their assessment of the effect of organisational scale and
Thatcherism on mutuals. Finally, other exogenous factors including the effect of
capitalism, the role of the state, and the impact of globalisation will be addressed.
Collectively the final two chapters triangulate and assess the changing nature of the




With mutuality lacking a strong empirically based sociological literature, this thesis has
had to rely on the evidence gathered during the fieldwork. As explained in the
introduction this resulted in a analytical induction (Denzin 1989 [1970]) approach being
adopted, supported by grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1968) as a heuristic device
when employing cyber-ethnography. To enhance the validity of the data and the
veracity of any conclusions three different types of research methods were undertaken.
They were: (1) 28 in-depth semi-structured interviews (11 with building society chief
executives, 12 with credit union directors and staff, and five with other interested
parties); (2) two surveys of 100 building society members and 78 credit union
members5 ; and (3) two years of observing three bulletin board websites dedicated to
issues around carpetbagging and building society demutualisation. Though it was
intended that the three methodologies would provide triangulation, the prime
justification was to establish an understanding of different perspectives of mutuality
from differing social actors.
This chapter considers the methods employed in the research, their application, process,
benefits and challenges, and analysis. More technical information, including interview
questionnaires, lists of interviewees and coding frameworks are contained within the
appendix. Table 6.1 presents a chronological account of the research. It shows that the
observation was concurrent to the interviews, while the questionnaires occurred in
specific periods during 2000.
5 To ensure anonymity the four mutuals are henceforth called Community CU to represent the community
credit union; Employee CU to represent the employment based credit union; National BS to represent the
national building society; and Regional BS to represent the regional building society.
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Alongside the observation of the websites this was the main method of research
employed in this thesis. However, unlike the observation, the interviews provided
information on the beliefs and attitudes of both credit unions and building societies,
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enabling the author to contrast these different types of financial mutuals. Neither of the
other methods employed provided an insight into how building society and credit union
-
leaders and management perceive themselves, their institutions, their industry, and
mutuality. Consequently it was decided to seek interviews that explored these issues in
greater detail, and ensure a counterpoint to the carpetbaggers, from which it was hoped
to address some of the internal explanations for the paradoxical condition of mutuals.
6.1.1	 Design and Construction of Interviews
Having employed analytical induction and used grounded theory as a heuristic device;
the questions in the interviews were partly generalist in nature to ensure that emergence
of theory was not preconceived (Glaser 1992). However, in agreement with Strauss and
Corbin (1990) it is inevitable that questions will be influenced by other data collection
and literature reviews, while it is also necessary to verify possible theoretical
suppositions to ascertain the validity of the author's ultimate grounded theory.
Unfortunately, Glaser and Strauss' critical exchanges regarding this subject prevent
them from seeking any hybrid solution. I would argue that asking general questions
around different theoretical positions could be compatible with the need to avoid direct
questions. For example, all the interviewees were asked, 'What do they understand by
mutuality?' thereby avoiding any mention of the theoretically constructed component
parts discussed in 2.5.
6.1.2 Conducting Interview Based Research
Kuhn (1962) describes interviews as the interactional situation during which
information is exchanged in an informal manner. Through this technique the interview
avoids becoming an extension of surveys whereby the interviewer asks questions which
elicit responses with the interviewee. 'When interviews take this form, they become
authoritarian exchanges in which the power and prestige of social science shape the
information that is given.' (Denzin 1989 [19701: 103). Interviews offer a flexibility of
form in which the skilled interviewer can probe and explore the subject's views and
understanding of reality (Bell 1993).
Interviews are not without limitations. Primarily the benefit of adaptability permits the
subjectivity of the researcher to contaminate the data. Bias can emerge either in the
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construction of the questions prior to the interview, during the interview itself by the
conduct of the interviewer, or following the interview during the analysis. Whilst I
acknowledge that it is virtually impossible for subjectivity to be elim. inated, to minimise
these factors I took the following precautions. First, the questions were, wherever
possible, open and general allowing the interviewee to explore a range of topics.
Second, during the interviews I sought to be consistent in both the manner and order of
asking the questions. On a number of occasions this involved carefully avoiding
offering my own opinion when asked by the interviewee. However, to maximise the
benefit from the process supplementary questions were prepared for each interviewee
(though due to time constraints not all were asked) and during the interview follow-up
questions either to clarify or explore a previous point were asked. Finally, all the
interviews were either recorded and subsequently transcribed or if the interviewee did
not agree to a tape recording, extensive notes were made and transcribed within 24
hours of the interview. Once this process was complete to increase my objectivity I did
not undertake the analysis of the transcriptions for six months.
A particular issue is the extent of time spent on the interviews beginning with arranging
the interviews, through conducting, transcribing and data analysis. Among these
arranging the interviews was most problematic as all involved negotiations through
gatekeepers where trust had to be first established.
6.1.3 Preliminary Work and Pilot Study
Prior to undertaking the interviews I spent a considerable amount of time making
contact with representatives of building societies and credit unions. During these
informal discussions, topic areas for the subsequent interviews were covered. Once the
questions were formulated I conducted pilot interviews with the staff of a development
agency on the 19 July 1999 and a Chief Executive of a small building society on the 28
July 1999. In both cases questions were tested but the responses were not recorded and
any data collected was not used in this thesis. Nor were these counted towards the 28
interviews conducted.
6.1.4 Gatekeepers and the Selection of the Sample
While the questionnaires and the website observation provided information on
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members, it was thought that the interviews should focus on the management and
leaders of financial mutuals. In selecting this group I was aware of the difficulty in
obtaining a representative sample, although a more immediate problem was making
contact with any potential interviewees. My initial interviewee introduced me to a
colleague at another small building society, whom I subsequently interviewed.
However, I was unable to receive any further referrals, and attempts at contacting
building societies directly proved unsuccessful. I later learned this was not because of
opposition to my research matter; rather they were busy men (to date all chief
executives of building societies have been and continue to be men) running large
operations who regularly had requests for interviews by researchers. With the research
apparently floundering I received some good fortune when a mutual acquaintance
introduced me to a prominent contact within the building society sector. Not only were
they available for interview in November 1999 but they subsequently agreed to act as
gatekeeper to confirm my bona fides to building society chief executives. Meanwhile,
the BSA Trust agreed to fund my travel expenses for the interviews. No conditions
were placed upon the researcher but I have made presentations to three different forums
of building society personnel. I have provisionally agreed to make further presentations
subject to attaining my doctorate. At no stage has the BSA Trust requested a copy of
the research, nor asked for any additional factors to be taken into consideration.
Following a series of correspondence with the gatekeeper we agreed that I would
interview 11 of the 68 building society chief executives. These would be selected on
the basis of their size, with three each drawn from the largest and smallest societies, and
five from the medium sized societies (see Appendix C). Size was chosen as the key
variable to help assess the veracity of functionalist interpretation of demutualisations.
Once a shortlist was produced the gatekeeper approached the relevant chief executives
and received permission for me to contact them.
Though it may have been anticipated that chief executives of building societies may be
difficult to contact, I did not expect a similar challenge with regards to credit unions.
Initially I worked with the Credit Union Development Agency (CUDA) who facilitated
an introduction to a chairperson of an associational credit union. Once the interview
was completed CUDA were unable to provide further assistance, consequently I made
contact with another organisation with a CLIDA function. As there were 641 credit
139
unions in Britain in 1999 I decided to concentrate on those within Lancashire (22 in
total). This was due to financial constraints and the desire to operate efficiently.
-
Working with the CUDA I followed the same practice as that adopted with the building
society gatekeeper (see Appendix C). However, unlike the building society gatekeeper,
the C'UDA did not forewarn the credit unions of my approach, despite reassurances to
the contrary. What exacerbated the situation was that the gatekeeper had a poor
reputation among some of the potential interviewees, thus my work was tainted by
association. The outcome of this process was that three credit unions either declined to
participate or did not respond to my enquiries. Additionally another credit union stated
that they were too busy to be interviewed but did grant me permission to attend their
AGM. To ensure I interviewed the same number of credit union leaders as building
society chief executives I made a supplementary shortlist of two credit unions in Greater
Manchester.
Finally interviews were also sought with trade representatives and other interested
parties. In total three representatives from trade associations concerned with mutuals
and financial services. The non-mutual trade representative was interviewed as it was
hoped his external perspective may provide a broader context of changes in the financial
sector. An interview was also held with a former employee of the Register of Friendly
Societies who acted as regulator of credit unions until recently. Due to the potential
contentious nature of this individual's contribution, I have decided to withhold their
identity and cite them only sparingly.
Apart from industry representatives interviews were also sought with member groups
within building societies. Unfortunately only one of these agreed to be interviewed. No
response was received from two pro-mutual groups or individuals associated with
dissatisfied members. Additionally the Building Societies Members Association
(BSMA) declined to be interviewed but did forward copies of recent newsletters. On
ethical grounds the author declined an interview with another leading carpetbagger after
they demanded that I undertake a series of statistical analyses of building society
performance on their behalf.
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6.1.5 The Interview Process
Once the shortlist of interviewees was agreed with the gatekeepers, a letter was sent to
-
the potential interviewees explaining the purpose of the research and requesting their
participation. Wherever possible the letter was followed a week later by a telephone
call to book an interview. Unsurprisingly I spoke with personal assistants of all the
building society chief executives and appointments were arranged, often with long lead
time due to the busy diary of the respondents. The credit union leaders proved more
problematic as many operated on a voluntary basis and did not have a telephone contact.
Consequently when this arose I sent repeat letters to those credit unions. Eventually
those without numbers contacted me to confirm their availability.
All the interviews of the building society chief executives occurred in their places of
work, as this involved minimal disruption to their day and I believed was more likely to
ensure a positive response. With the interview topic relevant to their employment I
believed it was beneficial to meet them at work. Wherever possible this process was
replicated for the credit unions. Unfortunately a number of the credit unions did not
have an office location, which resulted in two interviews occurring at the respondent's
home and one at a local café. Additionally one credit union respondent was unable to
meet but did participate in a telephone interview.
With respect to the trade associations, interviewees were all initially approached
informally at industry conferences and seminars. A letter of explanation was sent once
outline agreement was reached and this was confirmed by telephone or e-mail. All of
these interviews occurred at their place of work. The interview with the former
regulator was arranged informally and a meeting took place at their new place of work.
Arranging the interview with the leading carpetbagger involved many months of
patiently building a rapport and establishing mutual trust. The individual was genuinely
concerned that I may be a 'spy' for the building societies and wanted to check my
credentials before agreeing to meet. This involved passing on details of my supervisor
and a reference from the Research and Graduate College and to my knowledge no
contact was made with these individuals. Finally, following an exchange of e-mails, an
interview was arranged for a pub near to their home.
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All except three interviews were one-on-one between the interviewer and the
interviewee. The three exceptions were at a large employee credit union, which
occurred while she worked with two colleagues in the room and two small community
credit unions where I was joined on both occasions by the full board of directors. In all
these interviews more than one respondent answered the questions.
On average the interviews took 50 minutes to complete, with the shortest taking 25
minutes and the longest about two hours. Before commencing, permission was sought
to tape record the interview: 20 respondents agreed and the other eight declined. Where
this occurred I made extensive notes during the interview. Most of those who were
taped insisted that any comments they made were unattributable, consequently I have
disguised the identity of all respondents. Needless to say, I have retained the original
taped interviews.
Different schedules of questions were used for building society chief executives, credit
union leaders, and trade association interviewees and copies of these can be found in
appendix C.
6.1.6 Analysis of Interviews
Although considerable difficulties were experienced in achieving a sample I am
confident that the eleven building society chief executives interviewed provided a fair
representation of the remaining 68 societies. Subsequent to the interviews being
completed, I have met other chief executives and senior officers and their comments, at
least superficially, appeared to conform to those of the interviewees. With a much
smaller percentage sample it is likely that greater errors are possible with the credit
union leaders. However, as highlighted in 4.4.1 the movement is conventionally divided
between idealists and instrumentalists, and I attempted to designate respondents
accordingly. However, more predominant was a 'pragmatic idealistic' stance and I was
concerned that this may be geographically specific to the sample. I was dissuaded of
this in meetings elsewhere in the country with other credit unions activists. The other
interviewees were not selected from a sample being representatives of trade associations
or other organisations.
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Though confident of the veracity of the data this does not extend to arguing that the
sample can be classified as statistically valid, hence no mathematical analysis has been
pursued. Once complete the interviews were transcribed by myself, first into Microsoft
Office 2000 before being codified and analysed using NU*DIST 4.0.
6.2	 The Surveys
When the website observation was underway and the interviews were being arranged it
become apparent that there was a deficit of information regarding non-involved
members of mutuals. With the carpetbaggers claiming to represent the authentic 'voice'
of 'ordinary' members it became desirable to evaluate this claim. Equally important I
wanted to assess not just the commitment of members to mutuality but also their
knowledge of the concept. As a result I decided to undertake two small exploratory
surveys of members of financial mutuals. It was decided not to proceed with a large
representative survey, as the purpose was to inform the other data collected.
6.2.1	 Survey Design and Construction
Accessing the research field proved difficult. Due to the Data Protection Act building
societies were unwilling to grant access to their member records, thus discounting any
form of random sampling. Instead I was restricted to conducting interviews with
members in the street outside specific building societies branches. This methodology
poses representative challenges that will be discussed later. Unfortunately the credit
unions adopted the same approach and an alternative strategy needed to be developed,
especially as most do not have conventional branches. Similarly, the footfall into credit
union branches or offices where they did exist was often miniscule, one received an
average of 20 people per week, and so standing outside would have been impractical.
Two credit unions offered to undertake the survey on my behalf and despite
considerable methodological reservations I considered I had no option if I wanted to
access members.
During the semi-structured interviews it became apparent that there may be subtle
differences between the motivations of building society and credit union members.
Therefore two separate questionnaires were designed. These had a degree overlap and
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of the 36 questions asked in the building society survey, 17 were replicated in the credit
union survey. (See Appendix D for copies of questionnaires used).
-
The questionnaires were designed in isolation by myself, and drew upon information
from the other research data being collected and the theoretical literature. Unfortunately
an investigation of the literature produced no empirical research on the attitudes of
building society members. During the survey fieldwork, Waite published a review of
all empirical information on building society members, concluding that:
'The clear impression is gained that the emotional and attitudinal dimensions of
mutuality have received little attention in a formal research context... The search of
academic literature involved well in excess of 1000 journals written in over twenty-five
languages and failed to find any research into the emotional and attitudinal aspects of
consumer behaviour with respect to mutual financial services organisations ....It can be
concluded that there is little in the way of empirical, authoritative research upon which
to base our understanding of mutuality in the context of the study.' (2000:6)
For credit unions the situation was slightly better with Berthoud and Hinton (1989),
Feloy and Payne (1999) and more recently a study of members of six Chicago credit
unions (Jacob et al. 2002).
6.2.2 Theorising the Methodology
Since Mills' (1959) study, survey based research has been criticised for being too
empiricist as facts are collected in absence of any theory. Though one important aspect
of the survey was to secure demographic data, the limited nature of the sample
effectively restricted the universality of this information. Instead answers to three
questions have been sought. First, I wanted to know the extent of knowledge members
had of mutuality, as this may inform their commitment to mutual institutions. Second, I
was keen to assess the extent of any 'gap' between the views of members and
management. While the semi-structured interviews could inform me of the latter, the
survey appeared the most effective way of achieving the former. Finally, I wanted to
address whether political affiliation and attitudes to privatisation affected members
attitudes to mutuals and demutualisation.
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Other criticisms of surveys listed by de Vaus (1991) included the inadequacy of
-
causality between variables; the inability of surveys to provide meaningful
understanding of social actions; their contextless nature; their assumption that human
action is based on external forces and by implication ignore the role of human
consciousness; and that some things are not measurable. Wherever possible the survey
propositions rely on more than one question to establish "causality", while the restricted
sample prevents any claims of universality. Meaningfulness is partially achieved by
triangulation with the other research methods, plus a number of questions have open
answers allowing the interviewee to shape their own interpretation of the topic. The
survey is designed to examine some of the influences that may affect social action rather
than study the action itself. What the survey has not attempted to capture is the national
'collective greed' exemplified by the wave of conversions in 1997. Rather I wanted to
understand how individual attitudes have been affected by events and circumstances
during the following three years. Knowledge based questions were included to help
inform the degree of the respondents consciousness. Finally, I have restricted questions
to those factors which I believe could be usefully informed by quantitative research and
used them in conjunction with other methodologies to develop a greater understanding.
6.2.3	 Pilot Study
Questionnaire design occurred in consultation with staff and researchers in the
Department of Sociology and the Institute of Social Research at the University of
Salford. All discussions provided crucial insights and gradually over a period of six
weeks the concepts, variables and ultimately questions were refined. To enhance the
veracity of the findings I undertook a reliability and validity assessment of every
question, the results of which are reproduced in appendix D.
Following this, three members of the employee credit union completed the credit union
questionnaire. Although not scientific the selection was random, being the first three
members that came into the credit union office on the 8 March 2000. I had the
opportunity to have a brief discussion with each of the respondents who commented on
layout, understanding and relevance of specific questions. Subsequently, a number of
minor refinements were made before the questionnaires were despatched.
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A slightly larger pilot was undertaken for the building society members' questionnaire
-
with six respondents being interviewed. In both pilots I attempted to replicate the
experiences that would occur for the full surveys, allowing the respondents in the
Employee credit union pilot to complete the questionnaire alone, while I interviewed
members of building societies myself when piloting that questionnaire. The latter
activity took place in Salford in March 2000. Though a few comments were received
from interviewees the main lessons were how I presented the questions and time taken
to complete the questionnaire. Subsequently I shortened the total length of the
questionnaire and made a number of questions simpler to read and understand.
6.2.4 The Samples
To recap, the purpose of the survey was to provide an indicative guide to the views of
members, rather than a representative empirical study. Moreover, time constraints
would limit the extensiveness of the survey due to undertaking "on the street" research.
Furthermore, the restricted nature of access resulted in differentiation in the sampling
for the credit union and building society members. Therefore I decided to seek a
relatively small sample of 200 members of financial mutuals, divided equally between
building societies and credit unions.
6.2.5 Sampling of Credit Union Survey
The two most common types of credit unions are employee or community based.
Consequently members of each type were surveyed to assess whether the credit union
form affected the demographics and attitudes of members. After discussions with a
number of credit unions, an employee credit union, and an inner-city community based
credit union agreed to participate.
In each case I visited the respective credit union and delivered 50 questionnaires for
completion and a further ten in case of mistakes. At this meeting I instructed the staff
that no assistance should be given to respondents and participation should be entirely
voluntary. I also provided a short summary of the purpose of the research, my contact
details, confirmation that identity would be protected and that the information would not
be transferred to a third party. At the employee credit union the staff advised that
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approximately 50 members would visit the office during an average week. We agreed
on adopting a random sampling whereby they would ask every third member entering
the office to complete the questionnaire. Based on the average number of visitors it was
anticipated that the survey would take three weeks to complete, after which the
questionnaires would be forwarded to me. At the meeting we also agreed that the
unanswered questionnaires would be kept in the same location and distributed by a
single member of staff. Completed forms would be placed in an envelope and sealed.
Due to the nature of the sampling frame employed, no claims will be made regarding
the representativeness of the sample, as only members who entered the credit union
office during the survey period were included. The research occurred between the 5-
26  April 2000 and I received the completed questionnaires on the 2 nd May 2000.
Although the community credit union had a branch office adjacent to a shopping
precinct and most members saved and repaid by cash, the expected footfall was only 20
members per week. To ensure sampling continuity we agreed to offer the questionnaire
to every third member entering the branch but extended the research period to five
weeks. Other processes employed were identical to those used at the employee credit
union. The research occurred between the 5-10 May 2000 and I received the completed
survey on the 29th May 2000.
Across the two credit unions a total of 78 responses were returned. Of those 55 came
from the employee credit union who fulfilled the sample criteria but only 23 arrived
from the community credit union. Furthermore they only returned the questionnaire
following two requests explaining that members had been reluctant to complete the
survey. No justification for this was offered. Clearly 23 respondents was not
representative and any results should be treated with the appropriate level of caution.
6.2.6 Sampling for Building Society Survey
Building societies can be classified as national, regional or local with all of the
demutualisations occurring within the first two groups. As the research is interested in
members' views of this process the sample was drawn from these two segments, with
one building society being selected from both the national and regional category. The
regional society had many branches south of Manchester, one of which was selected for
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the survey. This community was one of the most prosperous in the region and I wanted
to discover whether mutuality meant anything in a middle-class community. Similarly,
national building societies had endured criticism that they were too remote from
ordinary members and therefore I selected a branch located in one of the most deprived
parts of Britain.
Both of the building society branch managers granted me permission to stand outside
their respective premises and ask members who were leaving the office to participate in
the survey. I had to wear university identification at all times, explain to respondents
that the research was not being undertaken on behalf of the society and present myself
to the branch staff at the beginning of each day. These conditions were beneficial as
they helped confirm my autonomy from the building society. In neither case did the
society ask me to adjust the questionnaire, despite being given an advance copy.
In common with the credit union survey I wanted to interview 50 members from each
society and wherever possible used a similar sampling methodology, although the
requirement of conducting street interviews was clearly a departure from the process
followed during the credit union research. The research for the regional society
occurred between the 11-15 of August 2000. Having previously discussed the matter
with staff it was apparent that the branch did not receive many visits, with lunchtimes
being the busiest times. Therefore to achieve the projected sample size 17 interviews
were conducted on Monday and Friday between 10 and 3pm and 16 on the Wednesday
during the same time period. Sample selection was based on undertaking an interview
at certain fixed time intervals with interviews being sought from the first person leaving
the branch. If that person refused the procedure would be repeated until somebody
agreed. However, the time of the next interview would remain fixed regardless of how
long it took to secure an interview during the previous time segment. Fortunately only
once did it take longer than the allotted time to secure an interview, whereupon I
proceeded immediately to request an interview of the next person leaving the branch.
Table 6.2 provides details of times interviews would be sought.
For the national society survey the same procedure was followed but it took longer to
receive permission to undertake the survey (the manager had to check with head office),
consequently the fieldwork was completed between the 4-9 December 2000. In both
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locations the interviews passed without difficulty and achieving the required sample;
refusal rates were remarkably low with only 13 individuals from the regional and 17
from the national society declining to participate.
Table 6-2:Sample Selection Framework for Building Society Interviews




























6.2.7 Sampling difficulties of the surveys
As with any survey there are limits on the representativeness of the sample. In
particular there were three areas of clear weakness in the sample selection for this
survey. First, the restricted access in effect prevented any probability based work
occurring. Instead I was forced to rely on those that visited branches during the times of
the surveys. These raises a second difficulty that this selection omits anybody who did
not visit the branch during this period, or members who conduct their business
relationship remotely by telephone, interne or via automatic banking transfer payments.
It is possible that this most computer literate group will have less affinity with the
society, the branch and the staff and hence may be more amenable to demutualisation.
Unfortunately this survey does not enable their voice to be heard. Similarly with an
increasing number of standardised transactions occurring outside physical space, the
survey suffers from reliance on members who may have experienced an intensively
reciprocal relationship.
In modern banking a larger percentage of branch visits are to arrange new services,
resolve specific problems, or seek advice, rather than have a daily interaction. Thus
many of those surveyed will have left the branch having immediately experienced a
personal interaction with the obvious risk that this will affect their response. Finally,
particular problems surround the credit union surveys as parties other than the
researcher were in control of the sample. I cannot attest to the veracity or the validity of
the sample and have to trust the staff that they followed my instructions. Having
analysed the results I am fairly confident that no tampering occurred and the completed
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questionnaires all appear to have been written in different handwriting.
6.2.8 Analysis of the Survey
Completed questions were coded and analysed using SPSS version 10.0 for windows.
To enable cross-tabulations between the different research locations all entries were
made onto the same file. Due to the limitations with the representativeness of the
sample no attempt has been made to measure the statistical strength of probabilities.
6.3	 Cyber-Ethnography
As discussed in chapter four the main criticism of mutuality by members has arisen
from various carpetbagging websites. To assist the interpretation of this phenomenon a
study of their activity and dialogue was undertaken. Traditionally, ethnographic
methods are associated with participant observation (Bell 1993), though Werner and
Schoeofle (1987) argued it had 'limitless' possibilities. More recently the arrival of the
internet has presented new interpretations of research methods, one of those is cyber-
ethnography which is adopted in this thesis.
Ethnography enables the skilled researcher to study interactions between social actors in
specific locations which remain beyond questionnaires or interviews. Through this the
researcher can study what is actually occurring rather than how people perceive it (Bell
1993). Ethnographic research is not without risks, especially regarding bias as the
researcher may become too attached to members of the research group, or may
influence the research findings through their own interactions with the group. Complete
removal of researcher subjectivity may be impossible as even data analysis after leaving
the research field may be selective (Ely et al. 1991). Researchers therefore must work
to minimise bias in both their activities and the process followed, in particular securing
entrance, remaining in the field, and means of exit. In this research I had no previous
contact with carpetbaggers nor did I have a credit union or building society account.
Therefore I had no emotional attachment to the study group or vested interest in their
success but during the research period I did develop a sense of loyalty towards a group
with whom I shared few attitudes or values.
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6.3.1 Theorising Cyber-ethnographic Methods
Due to its freedom from temporal and spatial restrictions Mann and Stewart (2000)
-
recognised the importance of the interne/computer mediated communication (CMC) as
a research tool. O'Connor and Madge (2001) stated that three types of CMC research
methods had emerged: e-mail surveys, e-interviews (both synchronous by the authors
and more prevalently asynchronous) and cyber-ethnography. Ward' (1999) held this
was implemented in online chat-rooms, emailing lists, and bulletin board systems
(BBS). The latter is a virtual notice board usually within a larger website. Often there
are a series of bulletin boards with specific topic headings under which contributors
exchange messages, information, just read other contributors correspondence, and
conduct 'typed conversations' (Pleace et al. 2000:2.1). This research includes the
cyber-ethnography of three such bulletin boards.
Just as CMC is a relatively recent innovation, the 'e-methods' have yet to develop
standardised methodological approaches and analysis; therefore they currently have
more problems than robust answers. Regardless of this, cyber-ethnography does
possess some important advantages. It enables the researcher to study groups which are
geographically dispersed without incurring severe financial penalties. Similarly CMC
removes chronological barriers between participants and the researcher. Without travel
costs the researcher can indulge in extended periods of observation and return to the
research site during the writing-up phase to clarify and check issues and interpretations.
Consequently the researcher can adopt a more reflexive approach, returning to
participants and presenting thoughts for discussion and assessment. This observation
and interaction gives the researcher 'an idea of how CIVIC, with its ability to globalise
and re-locate communication and community, changes behaviour and communication
patterns' (ward 1999:1.9). Another perceived benefit of the internet is that its
unbounded and less normative culture permits a freer exchange of opinions between
actors (Waern et al. undated), a finding partially confirmed by O'Connor and Madge
(2001) in an empirical study of a pregnant mothers' bulletin board. My experience is
that this is more superficial and temporary than promoters acknowledge. During the
fieldwork a series of behavioural norms emerged, known as `netiquette', which if
departed from received swift rebukes from other users. What is also omitted is the
I Hereafter the author's practice of not capitalising their family name i.e. ward (1999) is duplicated.
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influence of physical world norms on the virtual space and how the extent of internet
usage and experience may affect attitudes and shape norms. Often I found new internet
-
users complaining to regular users about the personal nature of abuse. This
hybridisation between the physical and virtual world is emphasised by ward (1999) in
her discussion of the concept of 'virtual communities'. Like ward I found no evidence
of a dichotomous relationship, rather a sense that the virtual both affects and is affected
by the physical and vice-versa, and that this process appeared to be increasing.
In methodological terms cyber-ethnography may help ensure the voices of the shy,
silent or excluded are heard (Chen and Hinton 1999). For the researcher, pure
observation with almost no effect on the research group can be achieved. There are
ethical concerns about 'lurking' but it does provide distance and prevents the researcher
from 'infecting' the research area. To those researchers who chose to interact the
absence of means to assess acceptable credentials on the internet results in less implicit
trust based relationships. This can reduce the power inequality between the researcher
and the researched, sometimes resulting in a dialogical approach whereby the researcher
must explain and justify their existence and their work. The final benefit of cyber-
ethnography is that the data is easier to collate being prepared by the research groups,
with all information codified via bulletin board topic areas and available for instant
duplication.
As with all ethnographic research, the findings cannot be classified as generalisable.
This is especially true of cyber-ethnography where access is often restricted to those
who literate in the technology (Chen and Hinton 1999). Graham and Marvin (1996)
linked internet usage to income and class, while Mann and Stewart (2000) found that
users were predominately male, white and under 35. As the number of those online
increases some of these correlations will weaken but it is unlikely that the internet will
be representative of the whole population in the foreseeable future.
Being physically remote from the study group the researcher may have difficulty in
identifying participants, a factor exacerbated by the identity play commonly practiced
on the internet (Plant 1997). A researcher is thus attempting to disaggregate and
analyse both the data and the personas of contributors, challenging the methodological
efficacy of the results. A related concern is that the dialogical interactive exchanges and
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hypertext links make it difficult to distinguish between the author and audience (Waern
et al. undated). In this environment apportioning and accreditation can become opaque
or even invalid. Interpretation of the internet poses the problem of re-writing texts
already written, heightening the criticism of ethnography that researchers re-produce
and thus construct a new version of reality (ward 1999). Reid (1996) fears this will
result in a tendency to objectify the individuals who are hidden by the technology, with
conversations treated not with care but as detached exchanges in ether. Reinforcing this
is the absence of paralinguistic communication (Chen and Hinton 1999), although this is
now being partially offset by `emoticons' (O'Connor and Madge 2001), by which
participations type their feelings (for example the icon :) represents happiness).
Without these personal interactions ward (1999) is concerned that cyber-ethnographic
researchers will impose their own normative framework on internet study areas, again
replicating and exaggerating the problems of ethnography. For ward (1999) this can
only be overcome through modifications to interpretative research whereby a researcher
works outside their preconceived ideas through intensive reflexivity and allows the
participants to develop a depiction of the on-line community. An immediate example of
the risks of cyber-ethnography is the transposition of concepts of community. Attempts
to circumscribe virtual communities ignore their ephemeral construction, the
instrumentalism of most participants, and multi-membership of communities by an
individual (Waern et al. undated, ward 1999).
More pragmatically, with implicit trust-based relationships difficult to construct, the
researcher may be faced with challenges identifying and corresponding with
gatekeepers. Often website owners remain as anonymous as the contributors, to whom
they may have no stronger connection than the researcher. This crucial aspect of the
methodological process has thus far been overlooked or ignored by cyber-ethnographic
writers. Without a gatekeeper, formal processes of entering and exiting the research
field become amorphous and elusive, potentially creating methodological anxiety within
the researcher. Once within the field the researcher becomes acutely aware that they
cannot steer participants to a desired topic without directly affect the research field, as
any attempt is preserved on the bulletin board for future participants to discuss, and
used to influence subsequent conversations and social actions. Even sampling and data
selection become intensively problematic as there is no exhaustive list of internet users
and the sheer plethora of information and hyperlinks can create information overload.
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Finally, cyber-ethnography is plagued by unresolved ethical dilemmas, a fact confirmed
-
by the more recent BSA guidelines on internet research:
'Members should take special care when carrying out research via the internet. Ethical
standards for internet research are not well developed as yet. Eliciting informed
consent, negotiating access agreements, accessing the boundaries between the public
and private, and ensuring the security of data transmissions are all problematic in
internet research. Members who carry out research online should ensure that they are
familiar with ongoing debates on the ethics of internet research, and might wish to
consider erring on the side of caution in making judgements affecting the well-being of
online research participants.' (BSA, March 2002:41)
Though rather weak, these ethical guidelines for interne research are the first the BSA
has published (ward 1999). Waern et al. (undated) accepted that though much of the
data was 'open and easily available' the usage rights were unclear (undated: 4).
Sudweeks and Rafaeli considered bulletin boards were 'akin to the study of tombstone
epitaphs, graffiti, or letters to the editor: Personal? — yes. Private? - no' (1996:119),
while Sharf believed that the 'researcher should make a concerted effort to contact
directly the individual who has posted a message that he or she wishes to quote in order
to seek consent' (1999:254), a view endorsed by ward who posted messages to the
bulletin boards which she subscribed to, therefore 'it became the participants
responsibility to the read the message' (1999:1.10). However, can this still apply when
respondents are deliberately anonymous or when the subject matter is sensitive and any
open disclosure by the researcher may result in their expulsion from the website? When
following Alcohol Anonymous bulletin boards, Pleace et al. preferred to 'lurk' because
they believed the bulletin boards were a public forum and revealing their presence
'would result either in expulsion from the group or in a modification in normal
behaviour, because individuals knew they were being 'watched', that would invalidate
the study' (2000:2.4). Although carpetbaggers would not be considered a sensitive
matter, most contributors operated under a pseudonym for fear of being identified by
watching building societies. Unsurprisingly this self-protection has received little
methodological attention and I adopted a hybrid ward and Pleace et al approach (see
6.3.3.).
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Despite being methodologically problematic, I still consider that cyber-ethnography is
-
worthwhile providing researchers are cautious and accept and acknowledge its
limitations. It can provide crucial insights into many research areas and in particular
may affect our understanding of individuals and their identities, the relationship with
communities, and the diffusion of the virtual and physical world. I endorse Gaiser's
view that 'if the research question involves online social phenomenon, a potential
strength of the method is to be researching in the location of interest' (1997:136).
However, it does suffer from an extreme form of the criticism faced by conventional
ethnography regarding its validity, and further work needs to be undertaken into this
hyper-criticality of cyber-ethnography and its effect on methods and ethics.
6.3.2 The Sample
In this study I focused on observing the bulletin boards available on three carpetbagging
related websites. Carpetbagger.Com was the original carpetbagging website and home
of Members for Conversion. On the website there were six bulletin boards dedicated to
demutualisation issues. Subjects included: latest news, carpetbagging tips, mutuality v
conversion, other mutuals, and miscellaneous. Contributions were entirely open and
viewing was unrestricted until the software was updated and a new bulletin board for
members of the Portman was introduced. Membership was carefully monitored by the
webmaster, contributors had to send proof that they were a voting member of the
Portman, and as a result I was unable to access this bulletin board. Following a dispute
among participants of Carpetbagger.Com a similar website, entitled Moneybag.Com ,
was established in April 2000. The software employed was more advanced and the total
number of bulletin boards increased to ten, of which two were concerned with building
• society demutualisation. In contrast to these the Save Our Building Society action
group created an anti-carpetbagger site, SOBS.org.uk . This had one bulletin board
which ran until the summer of 2000, when due to disruptive posts it was terminated.
Observation of the websites began in January 1999 and ended in December 2000.
During this period hyperlinks to all building societies and other related websites were
explored and where appropriate these are cited in the findings.
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6.3.3 The Observation Process
One of the main benefits of cyber-ethnography is the ease of access to the research field,
-
merely logging on to the internet using a search-engine to locate websites containing
any of the following words carpetbagger(s), building society(ies), mutuality, and
demutualisation. From this I went through all the possible sites listed and entered
bookmarks against those with relevant bulletin boards. Subsequently accessing sites
consisted of clicking on the relevant bookmark. Once Moneybag.Com was created I
had the additional task of registering a moniker (I selected Fourier) and entering a
password provided by the website. This process was always undertaken in the
postgraduate office via the university server. By accessing the websites through the
university, the webmaster of the relevant site could quickly trace where I was
registering from, thereby confirming my credibility.
Initially I spent about two months just reading postings (the internet name for
contributors messages), learning how to interact with the websites and deciding how to
collect the data. My first message was to inform users of my name, telling them I was
researching contemporary mutuality and the impact of carpetbaggers and asking if any
users would be interested in being interviewed. Unfortunately I received no responses
either by e-mail or postings on the bulletin board. In common with ward (1999) I took
this silence as tacit acceptance and proceeded with the research. I followed these
postings with direct e-mails to the webmasters of both Carpetbagger.Com and
SOBS.org.uk informing them of the research.
Data was recorded by printing postings from contributors. Initially the software only
permitted one posting per sheet of A4, but as the technology was updated entire
conversation chains could be printed, (see Appendix E for examples). Apart from
repetition and matters I considered irrelevant to this study (such as jokes and
discussions about football matches) I printed every posting. Most postings were left on
the board for many weeks, consequently I visited the sites once a week to download all
messages. However, a few postings were deleted by the webmaster, usually because
they were libellous. After six months of study I noticed that a number of conversations
began to be repeated, especially those between new carpetbaggers seeking information
on where to locate the 'best bag' and website regulars. At this stage I took the
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conscious decision, due to an increasing plethora of information, to reduce the data
sample to new subjects or postings which added to my understanding of carpetbaggers
1•1
and the website.
During the research period I didn't comment on the discussions as I did not want to
disturb the rhythm of the website. Unfortunately in August of 2000 the site was
severely disrupted, allegedly by a research project at another university. This nearly
resulted in the bulletin board being closed, demonstrating the fragility of these
information points. All this activity reinforced the degree of paranoia among
contributors, which I believe justified my decision to remain lurking. Participants were
often aware of a wider audience of watchers and on occasions contributors were told by
others to tone postings down or curtail conversation.
Access was easy to attain, but it was ethically problematic. Although I registered my
interest when I first began monitoring the site, the existing literature passes no comment
on whether I should re-register every time I logged on. After all the transience of the
site meant new contributors were joining and leaving on an almost daily basis. Unless
newcomers trawled through previous messages they would have no knowledge of my
presence. I felt ethically becalmed once Moneybag.Com was established, as every time
you logged on your moniker would appear on the bottom of the screen. Thus
contributors were constantly aware of my presence, although again that assumes they
had read my introductory posting.
Like entrance, the exit from the research field was remarkably easy, however, this ease
of access encourages occasional revisiting. Often this was only to check a fact or clarify
information but there is a risk of the researcher never fully disengaging from the
fieldwork. This 'proximity' prevents academic distance occurring, something I
experienced until I took a conscious decision to stop visiting for one year prior to
discussing the data.
Using Gold's (1969) typology of participant observation I would describe my research
as predominately 'complete observer' and occasionally 'observer-as-participant'. I
would reject ward's (1999) argument that cyber-ethnography is not genuine unless
interviews occur. Instead the flexibility of the internet partially purifies Gold's scales
enabling the researcher to be completely detached without directly influencing the
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social group.
In the previous section I discussed some of the perceived disadvantages of cyber-
ethnography and the table below lists how I addressed these.
Table 6-2: Addressing Difficulties of Cyber-ethnography
Difficulty Measures taken
Access Interest was in this online group, while the survey provided
some access to non-internet users
Identifying Participants Due to pseudonyms being adopted I relied on the informal
checking process used on the interne. If an individual's
moniker is hijacked a swift complaint usually follows. This did
occur on occasions and where possible I have only used quotes
that can be considered 'robust'
Author and audience It is possible for a bulletin board to be the work of a single
individual but differences in writing styles and the self-
monitoring explained above is the only reliable reassurance
Interpretation I accept that the findings presented are my interpretation of




I have attempted to keep conversation chains together during
coding and where possible explained the context of quotes in the
findings
Absence of paralinguistics Where stated I have kept any emoticons
Concept of community This prolonged study taught me the fragile and diffuse nature of
internet communities, which I tried to incorporate in my findings
Status of researcher Offset by supplying my supervisor's contact details for any
carpetba gger who questioned my motivations
Gatekeeper All webmasters were approached for support but I realised
during the fieldwork that they often had no influence on
contributors and that the search-engine was the only effective
gatekeeper
Sampling and data selection Beginning by collecting all information and then gradually
reducing data as I refined my analysis
Ethics — informed consent Like Sudweelcs and Rafaeli (1996) I believe the bulletin boards
are public, but I still informed participants that I was
undertaking the research. However, I made no further input, did
not seek to influence discussions, or seek covert access into
private bulletin boards. Additionally, as all participants had a
false identity I did not believe I was exposing them to any risk or
abusing their trust
6.3.4 Data analysis
The data gathered was initially placed in date order and gradually coded into topic
areas. Its main usage will be in chapter nine when it will be used to explore the
attitudes of carpetbaggers and how technology is changing the relationship between
mutuals and their members. It was the collection of this data that drew my attention to
the potential of the partial post-modern explanation from paradox of mutuality.
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6.4	 Conclusion
Three methods are employed in this research: semi-structured interviews of mutual
leaders; surveys of members; and cyber-ethnography of active members. The findings
from which comprise the perspectives of the three social actors involved in the process,
which are subsequently triangulated in chapter 10. Prior to the presentation of results in
chapters 7-9 the methodologies employed have exposed important insights:
1) Attempts to distinguish credit union respondents between idealists and
instrumentalists failed because the dichotomy ignores how social actors
internalise and use both perspectives.
2) Despite its limitations the surveys of members provided empirical data on a
social group that has received minimal sociological attention
3) Ethics on the interne can be effected by the sophistication of website software.
Moreover, the absence of gatekeepers heightens academic anxiety. I believe
these are important methodological concerns that have been overlooked by the
literature.
4) The carpetbaggers engaged in considerable self-censorship and a Foucauldian
interpretation of this would contribute to our understanding of how online
communities negotiate their libertarianism.
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7	 Perceptions of Managers
This chapter explores the extent to which managers' attitudes and beliefs are an
outcome of the inevitable compromise involving the alleged dichotomy between
ideological purity and economic instrumentalism and how their conception of mutuality
is constructed by the prevailing orthodoxy of capitalism. The chapter begins by
reviewing how the managers described mutuality, before analysing their perspective on
demutualisation and attitudes to the state. Finally managers' understanding of the
contradictory nature of globalisation, producing both opportunities and threats for
mutuals is discussed.
7.1 Understanding of Mutuality
All the interviewees were asked: "What do you understand by mutuality?" In general
there was acknowledgment that the definition was elusive, abstract or obtuse. Three
building societies believed it was difficult to provide a succinct description for members
and one manager of a credit union was bemused by the term:
"I was going to ask you what the hell does the word mean I hear it that many times. Go
on you tell me, tell me, I haven't got a bloody clue." (CUCL\14)
This sentiment was echoed by two building society chief executive officers (CEOs), one
of whom believed that a multiplicity of understandings resulted in no clear perspective.
"I suppose you got a different answer from everybody on this which probably
demonstrates one of the huge weaknesses of this theme, because fyou can't in a
sentence describe a theme what the bloody hell use is it anyway. (BSR4)
Another CEO accepted that even his staff would struggle to formulate an answer:
"...in this organisation if you stop anybody on the stairs and say what's this about
mutuality, they'll say mutuality great, we're mutual and so-on. Ifyou ask them to define
what mutuality is [interviewee holds out open palms and shrugs]. I think it is one of
those things that can mean different things to different people." (BSN3)
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In a society such as Britain, arguably with a cultural bias towards pragmatism, the
opaqueness of mutuality can result in a more deterministic interpretation that demands a
-
more practical economistic definition, exemplified by the following quote.
"Mutuality to me is simply a corporate structure that enables me to deliver very good
value to the membership, and better value than I'll be able to deliver i f I wasn't a
mutual." (BSN3)
This view was shared by five other building society CEOs and implicitly endorsed by
the remainder. However, the most common response among all interviewees, with nine
mentions, is that mutuality is for the benefit of members. This suggests a paternalistic
approach to mutuality, based on service rather than cooperation. Interestingly, as the
interviews developed, six of the credit unions and two of the building societies
emphasised a more collectivist understanding of mutuality:
"People with a common bond working for the benefit of the whole." (CIJEIN2)
Other comments included phrases and words such as "common ownership", "common
commitment", "loyalty" and "interdependence". These responses indicate a non-
commodified perspective of mutuality which some building societies have sought to
minimise. For one CEO it was the romanticism and historical roots attached to the
social definition of mutuality that was the greatest concern:
"I think it's like the brotherhood, it's like the movement, it has roots I'm afraid that I
mean .never mind the political situation, it probably has left wing roots in people's
minds 	 It has connotations of a certain sort of genre, certain sort of social history
which it carries forward and therefore it confuses some people in a modern world. It is
an old fashioned word in the modern world. So what we have to do is modernise the
word or modernise the perception. So you won't hear us talking about it unless we're
asked.... its not that we don't particularly want to say it, we're not hiding anything, it's
just that when we say it, it confuses people. They don't quite know what it means and
when they start to think about what it means they have this sort of old-fashioned view
and old-fashioned goes with warm, cuddly, inefficient, not-quite-up to date, probably
don't know what they are doing, passbooks as opposed to proper accounts" (BSN2)
Though an isolated voice his obsession with modernity reflects a sense of unease among
the interviewees from the larger building societies over the usage of mutuality. This
quote demonstrates how mutuality has been defined and labelled by the dominant
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culture, and how social values have been made subservient to economics through the
construction and appellations of negative connotations. By associating capitalism with
..
modernity, mutuality, which is as much an outcome of early modernity as capitalism,
can be presented as irrelevant, thus helping to reinforce the superiority, inevitability,
and most potently 'natural' status of capitalism. As a result building society CEOs
must either struggle to clearly articulate mutuality, deliberately avoid its usage because
of its image, or reduce it to a meaningless platitude, to conform to an inappropriate
capitalist lexicon, by equating it to ownership, such as the 2001 Standard Life
advertisements. The most contemplative CEO was acutely aware of this danger and
feared that ownership discussions resulted in commodified and legalistic interpretations
of members and democratic rights. Once mutuals became engaged in this narrative, the
route to demutualisation was open to directors, managers and members. Alternatively
he descried mutuality as "a sort of veil" which hangs over the enterprise and the rules:
"I think what it implies is an attitude of mind to the way you try and run the business
because you've got to say well there are priorities, if our priorities are not quite as
simplistic as they would be in a plc, where it is very simply: rate of return on capital
and employees; maximum dividend to shareholders in the long run that's not our
business. The mutual structure we have in an independent building society allows you to
have a broader set of objectives, so it makes the job of directors more difficult because
they have to decide what they want to do, how do they balance the respective interest of
shareholders and borrowers. ... you've got the discretion to invest in things with very
low rate of return if you so chose because you are not there to maximise profits."
(BSR5)
His analysis of mutuality as an attitudinal and behavioural concept develops some of the
thematic components of mutuality outlined in chapter two. In particular his stress on
longevity and stability:
"So I think the building society and the life insurance and the friendly society structures
are where they are because they relate to the underlying product sets; long run stability,
long run credibility and those things infuse with the decisions our board take but I don't
think it has particular meaning for the way and the things about which members vote, I
think members are there and you're accountable to them." (BSR5)
Other interviewees emphasised the importance of community, trust and reciprocity to
mutuality. Although no questions directly referred to these key words, their frequency
of usage across the interviews is displayed in the table below:
162
Table 7-1: Number of interviews in which key words were mentioned









Stability/caution/ low risk 9 5
From this it may appear that the building society interviewees' perception of mutuality
was closely correlated with my own interpretation. However the credit union
interviewees referred extensively to the relationships with members and on reviewing
the data they often equate reciprocity to trust. The only significant difference concerned
longevity and this may be explained by the nature of the core product provided by each
sector, with building societies offering mortgages, and credit unions small loans. When
analysing the transcripts it is apparent that interviewees were concerned that broader
cultural influences are affecting the delivery of the mutual elements.
7.1.1 Community
Though all those that mention community consider it important, credit unions
interviewees appear to have a greater affinity for their community, while building
societies believe it is desirable:
"The credit union started during the last depression, four or five years ago. People
were in a desperate position and we recruited most of members at that time. People
were still deprived even in a nice area...." (CUAID1)
"But its always been managed out of [the hometown] so we see ourselves in a way as a
two-faced business you might say. We've got our local face which is our local branch
network very tight to [the hometown] with little branches in [nearby villages] and all
the areas banks would have long since discontinued, we have an extended branch
network there. If then you were out of our core heartland area we have offices in
commercial centres ... so the nature of the business has adapted as we've grown so
we've tried to keep the strong footprint in area." (BSR5)
Notwithstanding this attachment, locality has been greeted with some scepticism:
"A lot of local societies have actually become local in the last couple of years [laughs]
those that appeared local probably did take business from anywhere but once the
carpetbagging became a problem they did impose local restrictions. So a lot of local
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societies have suddenly become local." (BSR1)
Re-discovering a community is more problematic for the national societies, who feared
that its absence may limit their effectiveness of any defence against carpetbaggers.
"Even in our heartland here we have always had huge competition from [other national
societies] . Even our home base wasn't exactly the home base you would find in some
other societies which grew up and had a tremendous stranglehold on an area, we never
actually had that, it does effect the member franchise if you like, it effects the — we don't
have a community in that sense. I think I might regard that as a bit of a weakness — off
the record I would never admit it" (BSN1)
In contrast a larger society argued that it invested £700,000 in its local community
annually and its continued presence was vital in a depressed area. This suggests that
rather than a functional link between size and commitment to community; a more
effective measure may be the extent of local embeddedness of the building society and
its centrality to the micro-economy. Nor should this analysis be limited to building
societies as two community credit unions admitted that their society was unknown in
the wider community and the national credit union interviewed conceded that it had no
profile or identifiable community.
7.1.2 Trust
From an external perspective it could be assumed that a voluntary credit union operating
once a week cash collections from a community centre may have some difficulties in
securing trust from members. However, most interviewees trust either did not warrant a
mention or was considered extensive among members:
"Collection points are very informal, there is a high level of trust. They even tell the
tellers when they make a mistake in the customer's favour. If error occurs the other
way people are very kind" (CUCID4)
"In all the years I've been involved in this credit union we didn't give out a dividend.
Out of the membership that we have do you know how many people asked about that ...
two ... I think that is truly wonderful (CIJCIN4)
Nevertheless it is feasible that trust is a greater issue among non-credit union members.
In contrast to credit unions, the building society interviewees were acutely aware of the
commercial benefit of trustworthiness:
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"In personal finance you want a comfortable relationship, you want to feel it's going to
be there and trustworthy. I've got an advert they won't let me use because it tries to sum
up what's it all about. The advert says you should be safe, secure and slightly sexy and
i f you don't do the last part there you fall behind, but you still got to be safe and secure
at the same time. So we've got to be a bit more exciting and up to date but we've got to
be safe and secure." (BSN3)
Trust in the name building societies helps societies reach new customers through non-
personal delivery channels, but even this is enhanced by a sense of informal trust:
"In fact we have got a lot of evidence that our penetration on postal accounts is much
stronger in areas where we have a branch. If you actually look geographically, and we
recruited the customers off the page through the press over the years, the penetration is
much stronger where we've had bricks and mortar." (BSN1)
From the largest to the smallest building societies informal trust remains important to
their business case and there was no evidence from the interviews that trust became
more formalised as the society grew. What seemed more influential was accessibility to
informal trust. Overall, the evidence suggests that mutuals, regardless of their size,
continue to be reliant on informal or reputation-based trust even when, like credit
unions, they fail to recognise its importance.
7.1.3 Longevity
Similarly to trust, building societies use their long-term commitment to members and
communities as a marketing tool. When a regional bank began to close branches in its
heartland, a regional society launched an "aggressive" and clever advertising campaign
of distributing free sticks of rock imprinted with the messages "We'll be here long after
the rock has gone". Three interviewees believed longevity was an important
commercial advantage, however there was widespread concern that increasing short-
termism would have a deleterious impact on building societies.
"But that's a more difficult marketing story than here's the best rates in the market
which is instant gratification and easy to go down the pub and say I'm getting x, then
say I've made a very sensible decision and over the long term I will benefit. But I think
as a mutual that is the position that you are having to deliver and it is something we
have to get better at, is getting across that message." (BSN1)
165
Stimulating this culture shift to short-termism was the appearance of best buy tables in
newspapers and the consequent rise in account turnover, known as 'churn'
-
"A classic question why aren't you top of the best buy tables if you're mutual give
better deals. So you are able to point out well if you look at the people who are top its
very seldom the same people for any length of time, so if you spend your time chopping
from one to another you can always beat the system and unfortunately if you came
fourth everyday you would never appear in the best buy tables. Whereas somebody who
comes first and then 31s' they will appear one week, drop off the next and maybe back in
again. The impression you get sometime, again it is the short term ism of them and
particularly those tables, they're a snap shot." (BSN2)
These quotes suggest that the culture of short-termism is created and sustained by the
capitalist sector, which ensures continual market activity and creates a superficial image
of dynamism. This is presented as a benefit to consumers as they are apparently offered
an ever improving commodified market. To mutuals they are faced with the choice of
competing on price with the potential degradation of informal trust with members, or
maintaining 'uneconomic' services:
"...because supporting uneconomic branches is not just drain on our management
expenses it's a direct attack on the viability of the society. To do it and pretend
everything is ok is not to do our members any favours in the long run." (BSR4)
Moreover, the arrival of carpetbaggers, who argue that building societies should release
'value' to current members, poses a direct assault on longevity. Addressing this is
challenging if a member only has limited savings because it would be many years
before the equivalent benefit of a windfall would be accrued. Consequently
carpetbaggers are challenging more than 'wealthy' building societies, they are attacking
the concept of mutuality, and by implication any long-term based alternative to
capitalism.
"It really is not right for a very small but active minority to agitate and disrupt and
potentially threaten the benefits to a very substantial majority of members, who are
broadly satisfied enough with the state of play [and want] to allow the status quo to
continue, it really isn't up to them to decide because they don't take that broader
[view] . They don't take the long-term view, they take the view that I'm in it for me and I
want it now and hang everyone else. That is not how society has evolved over the years,
that way anarchies lies and you can't be that individualistic. You certainl y can't if you
are part of an institution that is trying to serve a broad constituency." (BSR3)
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Longevity is understood to be a mainstay of mutuality, yet opportunistic members with
a short-term pecuniary agenda have questioned it. By detaching longevity from
mutuality it is easier to argue for a commodified mutuality.
7.1.4 Reciprocity
Both credit unions and building societies closely identified physical interaction between
social actors with their delivery of mutuality. Many credit unions contrast the personal
service they provide with the drift to more impersonal delivery offered by other
financial institutions:
"Whereas banking now has got so divorced so remote ... For people who haven't got
much money and want to keep track of what they've got and also want to know how to
handle and manage, I think you've got to have that personal touch and involvement and
that part of that mutuality thing and you've got to support your members and your
volunteers. You can do a lot more for your members you can probably get arrangement
with traders, special deals for instance and things like that, so it becomes not just a
place where you can put money in and take money out" (CUCD2)
The quote indicates that credit unions perceive reciprocity going beyond customer
service, a view shared by at least one regional building society interviewee. Of more
immediate concern for financial mutuals is the effect of growth on reciprocity. For
many credit unions interviewees who are steeped in close personal relations engendered
at community collection points, the transition to a branch based delivery generates a
desire to retain the proximity of their organisation's formative years.
" I know when you expand you are coming out of that comfort zone and you're losing
that one to one, but we hope we never lose that because when someone they can save
and save and save but when they apply for a loan we bring them in, we ask them for
relevant information, if the loan is a small loan and their savings are growing and they
are looking for that larger loan which will put their payments up, we will ask for proof
we have actually done it this week because things have changed for us. .... changes
have taken the policy where we had people and given them a loan because they were
eligible for the loan now we have to assess". (CUCIN4)
This perspective was shared by most credit unions respondents and demonstrates the
paucity of the instrumentalism and idealism dichotomy. Instead all interviewees
internalised and negotiated the alleged division, most of which acted pragmatically for
idealistic purpose:
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"The perception is in the discussions that we have had with our members and board
members in particular is that both groups of people have different Objectives, people
who are in industrial situation and saving and borrowing perhaps having it deducted at
source don't have the same commitment and ethos as what members from the
community who come out in all weathers to deposit their savings and repay their loans.
So yeah we've got to look at that but if its worked right we feel it can be beneficial to
both sides in that sense essentially it will be a community based credit union serving
both those who work and live here." (CUClN2)
Reciprocity in building societies is exemplified by their more cautious lending practices
than those of banks. For two national societies reciprocity has become more
commercially overt with their decisions to offer the same rates for both new and
existing members:
"So we don't have this marketing strategy that most players in the market do, [and] are
still adopting of giving better deals to new customers than they give to their existing
ones. Now what that means is that by and large there is always somebody out there that
is offering a better price than we can offer, because if we offer it we offer it to
everybody, but they are only offering it to today's new customers and their intention is
that in six months time those new customers will be old customers and the rate will be
knocked back. ... Its behaviour that is just not in keeping with an organisation that is
owned by its members." (BSN1)
As a result the societies rarely top the best buy tables and therefore are perceived as
'uncompetitive'. This provides further indication of how a cultural component of
mutuality countervails the prevailing orthodoxy, while capitalism seeks to breech bonds
between organisations and communities through the aggressive commodification of
services. Thus reciprocity as practiced by building societies challenges the capitalist
culture which is dependent on client apathy to secure profits. Elsewhere, the majority
operate personal reciprocity through branches. Local and regional societies use their
community embeddedness and branches to develop relationships with staff at levels.
Three interviewees described the personal attachment members have to branch staff,
often receiving Christmas presents and being invited to weddings. All of the building
society interviewees argued that due to the complexities of arranging a mortgage there
would always be a demand for a branch based service, and there was widespread
scepticism that technology advances would end this. This runs counter to banks who
are promoting cheaper technologically based delivery mechanisms. Two interviewees
were concerned that the closure of bank branches would result in building societies
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serving a residual, high cost low profit, market, while the banks offered increasingly
price competitive products. By deliberately eschewing reciprocity, the banks may
reduce costs sufficiently to undermine the fiscal stability of mutual.
7.1.5 Caution and Stability
Security is the common purpose and original objective of all financial institutions, what
makes financial mutuals different is that their capital is limited to the amount they can
raise for members, resulting in evolutionary growth and cautious innovation. In the past
this behaviour may have been interpreted as paternalism but four of the interviewees
instead emphasised the necessity and benefit of maintaining adequate capital solvency
ratios. One interviewee, when discussing the fate of mutual insurers, explained this:
"The only argument that people have is that it does constrain your growth because
growing a life insurance business rapidly within a mutual is difficult, because you are
again in the same constraint about the solvency issues whether you've got sufficient
capital in relation to your lines of business. But that again is part of stability, part of
stability is not being able to grow immensely rapidly and then find you have grown at
the wrong time, the wrong way and with the wrong customers and you then have to
retrench, so I think that is just wrong and you do have greater stability within a mutual
than a plc without any doubt at all" (BSR5)
The interviewees from the three largest building societies argued that a cautious
management style was not a disadvantage, providing societies concentrated on their
core business:
"....plugging away suits us as we spend all our time wondering what we were doing, not
worrying about some deal or whatever." (BSN2)
These sentiments were shared by smaller building societies, three of whom believed that
waiting for innovations to be proven by other organisations before implementing them
was an acceptable management approach providing: "the consistency that we pride
ourselves on with our customers, we can win them to our modest changes we are
making... " (BSR5).
While three of the credit union interviewees echoed the need and benefit of stability for
their organisation, two others suggested that the existence of their credit union helped
bring stability to members' financial lives:
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" ... I think credit unions are great for giving people confidence and for, you know,
helping people to get more control over their financial affairs or what have you and
manage their lives." (CUC1D2)
From the interviews it was apparent that the components of mutuality remain important
and that building societies used these in various promotional narratives. Credit unions
while not always articulating mutuality often appear immersed in its implementation.
There was no evidence that the larger mutuals had 'lost' touch with mutuality, in fact
the largest building societies were often the most innovative in finding new ways to
express its benefits. Rather they may be more affected by the disruption to mutuality
inflicted by the overweening dominance of capitalism and the attempt to commodify all
elements of economic exchanges.
7.2 Relationships with Members
The first myth dispelled by the interviewees was that CEOs of building societies were
universally hostile to carpetbagging. All were asked whether carpetbaggers were a
positive influence on building societies. Five respondents agreed, two were equivocal,
although three were unsure, but they did not believe the activity was immoral or illegal,
and only one held that it was wrong and their influence had been detrimental. Perhaps
surprisingly interviewees from the largest societies, who had often had bruising
encounters with carpetbaggers, were most likely to perceive them as a benign force.
"It [carpetbagging] certainly opened our eyes to a number of issues and in a strange
way strengthened us. We now know exactly why we are here, what we are doing, why
we are doing it?" (BSN2)
"I have no argument about the fact that the carpetbagging movement was a rallying
call to the sector to look to its business and I believe it hasn't been all bad. It has made
the sector much more conscious about its obligations to its membership, to what it 's
doing the value it is delivering." (BSN3)
In support of this all the building society interviewees expressed a desire to further
enhance member relations. In comparison credit union interviewees, while lamenting
member participation, rarely mentioned a positive programme of membership
170
engagement. Table 7.2 details the number of interviewees per sector that discussed
member relations
_
Table 7-2:Discussions on key concepts surrounding member relations6
Topic No. of Building Society
Interviewees
No. of Credit Union
Interviewees
Education of members 6 2
Improving communication 7 3
Increasing participation 9 1
Member apathy 1 2















The table indicates the salience of different aspects of member relations with building
societies and credit unions. It is likely that the more recent and direct attack on the
building societies has forced interviewees to address the role of members, while the
proximity of credit unions to their members and the importance of other issues,
particularly sustainability, de-prioritises this aspect of mutuality.
7.2.1 Member Apathy and Disinterest
In Barnes' (1984) critique of building society democracy he argued that member apathy
resulted in an absence of accountability for managers, a process which suited their
interests. Furthermore a paternalistic management justified this inactivity as a
demonstration of contentment. Three building society interviewees and one from the
credit unions used this argument:
6 These results are not meant to represent the views of all interviewees, instead these are an analysis of
how they perceived the role of members. When interviewees volunteered an opinion on one of the topics
this was recorded.
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"So you know if the business is running well and you don't get huge turnouts, and
you're not challenged that often, I don't think you need to take that as a criticism or a
self-criticism. It just means people are relatively content with the way things are going
... "(BSR5)
In contrast, the larger societies avoided the argument and one credit union interviewee
described it as "a load of codswallop" (CUCIN4). Other interviewees were genuinely
concerned about member apathy.
"Our biggest mutual supporters are in this region and this area and they're the people
who are least likely to vote. We did some research and it told us that members were
more likely to vote for the man-of-the-match on television then they were to vote in a
building society election." (BSN3)
One credit union and one building society interviewee both expressed their dismay at a
lack of member participation
"I get a bit pissed off when you have an AGM 	 you want the members to get a bit
involved in and they can't be bothered to come, you know Coronation Street's on or
bloody Eastenders is on, or something's on and they can't come, or can't do that
because I'm making my tea at that time. But by Jesus they would run from here to
Blackpool to get their bloody share withdrawal or loans and it wouldn't matter what
time of day it was, you know." (CUC111\14)
Perhaps an explanation for this discrepancy from Barnes' findings is that building
societies would like ordinary members to become more engaged to counteract the
impact of the carpetbaggers.
"The trouble is that if things are going OK then the membership don't get off their
backsides. We need to whip up people's interest." (BSL1)
7.2.2 Communication and Education
Regardless of its motivation, a more prevalent and optimistic view was the desire to
improve engagement from members, the first step of which was more effective
communication:
"There's a temptation for even the most enlightened management not to listen to their
customers, because they think that's a process that takes far too long and may be
inexact anyway. I think for a membership based organisation not to believe in
democracy is almost a war crime." (BSR2)
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"So you have got to find a management that can simplify the issues and get it to a point
where members can make decisions about key points. ..." (BSR5)
Interviewees accorded different benefits of improved communication including
"winning hearts and minds" (BSN3), gaining market differentiation, and for two
respondents even involving members in policymaking:
"But there is definitely a responsibility on management to try to explain the nature of
the business that's being run, what's being done, why its being done, and are there
serious alternatives or whatever. I think the e-commerce debate might well be one of
those and it's a debate that we have to have with our members." (BSR2)
Interviewees indicated that member communication and education was being improved
through newsletters, director profiles on election literature, and advertising in local
press for non-executive directors. Though important it was emphasised that a personal
interaction was more likely to be successful. For the smaller societies this was best
delivered through local branches, but the CEOs of the larger societies, who
acknowledged having minimal contact with members, had introduced a series of open
forums:
"We hold Talkback events 	 for members where I will I go along, it doesn't matter
what level you are, people will come along and fire away and have a conversation ....
Also the fact that we go and do it as directors, and I think people are appreciative that
we put ourselves on the line and again that is unique. I don't think anybody else does it
...." (BSN2)
Three interviewees, whilst accepting the enhancements in communication, argued that
the education of members was best achieved through actions of societies. The most
prominent example of this was the national building society-led campaign against
charges for ATM withdrawals
"I think it is a very big issue for us across the board to get across the message: (a)
about the value; and (b) our behaviour towards customers in that we have been through
all our behaviour so that it is in the members interest. If it isn't in the members' interest
then why are we doing it? If you go through all your policies like that, you do actually
knock out a lot of things that are making a lot of money, but the members didn't
necessarily realise we were making a lot of money so other people get away with
charging them, and we are just seeing it now with ATMs which is an interesting case in
point and that's been an excellent opportunity for us to make a point about an issue that
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really underlines where we are coming from overall. Because we've been jumping up
and down saying they shouldn't be doing this and we got a petition out, we got
over 60,000 people signed it now which is good news. But most importantly at every
branch counter every time somebody rings us up our members are getting the message
Ah [they're] doing something in our interest. It really is underpinning what we are
saying in terms of how we look after our members and the difference between a mutual
and a non-mutual." (BSN1)
The employee based credit unions also felt they needed to improve their
communications with members. This issue was not raised by the community credit
unions, but an industry interviewee was concerned that information may be held by a
small number of volunteers and not disseminated to the whole membership. The
concern expressed by most respondents and the attempts to engage members
demonstrate that they understand the crucial nature of education. Though this was not
mentioned overtly the interviewees implied that the future of mutuals was dependent on
the commitment of members.
7.2.3 Ownership and Democracy
This reawakening of interest in the role of members has coincided with the assertion of
membership rights displayed by the carpetbaggers. What remains unknown is whether
these new initiatives are merely a sop or a genuine change in strategy and attitudes by
senior managers. Central to the debate is the vexatious question of ownership and the
nature of mutual democracy. According to one interviewee, many within the sector
"want to move away from the concept of ownership because it is confusing as the
debate is always discussed in terms of personal monetary advantage." (TA2). Seven
societies saw members as owners but this disguises a sense of unease about the
implications of this status:
"Well the interesting question is do they own the building society, that is one of the
great questions of the age. I think we are in the camp that we think they do but that's
not universally accepted elsewhere ....Even those [building societies] who accept they
[members] might own it legally don't accept they own it emotionally, morally or
whatever." (BSN3)
Four respondents adopted the term "beneficial trustee" to describe the ownership rights
of members, although one believed this imposed too great a burden on members.
Alternatively, one argued that members have rights and responsibilities, which include
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the right to vote for directors and the responsibility to continue to operate the business
as an "independent mutual". What all were united upon was the belief that the
-
introduction of monetary gain subverted the democratic process.
"I think it [democracy] can be a great help as long as its not abused. If people are
merely voting for money then this is slipping away from democracy. If people are voting
to change our status without a monetary reward we would accept it." (BSR1)
One interviewee compared mutual status to the position of the National Trust:
"Members of the National Trust have all the benefits of membership and free entry, but
you couldn't just have a special general meeting to sell off the Lake District. People just
don't believe that they have that power to do that. I think our members are in much the
same situation." (BSR3)
From the interviews it appears that building societies have no objection to democratic
participation, but they believe ownership has been corrunodified to accumulate private
wealth. Similarly, arguments that managers are autocrats and have no interest in
democracy were unsubstantiated. Not only did seven respondents describe democracy
as beneficial, they supported this claim by trumpeting their efforts to increase electoral
turnouts in director election. Many of these, which are invariably uncontested, now
receive turnouts in excess of 20%, with societies phoning members and reminding them
to vote and more recently making a contribution to a charity for every vote cast.
They unanimously rejected claims that they were unaccountable and argued that the
most effective form of accountability was by the media and regulatory authorities which
pressurise under-performing societies; and mutuals are unique because they are
accountable to members who are simultaneously owner and customers who can either
"vote with their feet" (BG CBS) or vote directors out of office.
"When you talk to one of the directors here, we think, we feel phenomenally
accountable. I don't think the chief executive of a bank has to stand up in front of his
customers, or her customers and be re-elected every three years in order to stay in
office. What you have to do is to go and chat up some investors and i fa few major
shareholders are happy you are going to stay there ... so I think our accountability is ...
to the right people. It is the very people who are shouting about bank charges, cash
machine charges, we are accountable to those [people] we can't afford to hit them in
the face and say sorry I've got to make lots of money." (BSN2)
The interviewees were keen to highlight this difference between the attitudes of mutuals
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and banks, although off-the-record a number did express grave misgivings about the
expulsion of members by the Portman Building Society. Nevertheless, two felt that
-
building societies were being asked to attain a higher threshold than that imposed on
banks.
"We treat customers [sic — evidence of assimilation of capitalist lexicon] as people we
have to talk to and the fact that they vote for us means I have to do my bit. ... If you are
a plc with six main investors, it's a lot easier, you just talk to those six people, you don't
have to talk to six members or more." (BSN2)
This set of data suggests that though the motivations for re-engaging with members
were a response to the carpetbaggers, building societies are attempting to construct new
relationships with members. However, the non-pecuniary ownership of mutuals has
been subverted by the capitalist concept of ownership, which has resulted in the
commodification of democracy. This situation is exacerbated by the social constraints
on the democratic practice of building societies, entailing a higher, and probably,
impossible degree of objectivity. In this way capitalism both undermines the non-
financial relationship between members and the mutual and reconstitutes the definition
of mutuality into its own likeness.
7.3 Managing the Mutual
Central to functionalist accounts for the decline of mutuals is the belief in a detachment
between members and management, a process that begins with the professionalisation
of staff who gradually subvert the organisation to their own interest. To the Neo-
Marxist interpretation this argument belies the reality of demutualisation. Though a
separation of interests may occur this is caused by the impediments of operating a
mutual in a capitalist environment and the middle-class patriarchal usurpation of
management, a managerial approach incompatible with mutuality. To assess these
arguments it was first necessary to identify when the detachment begins and how it
manifests itself. Consequently we have drawn from the testimony of the credit union
interviewees as all appeared to be undergoing a shift from purely voluntary
organisations to semi-professional institutions.
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7.3.1 Becoming more Professional
Six of the credit union interviewees were full-time members of staff; either as
-
development workers or office managers, but there were no discernable differences in
opinion between them and the volunteers interviewed. All wanted to expand their credit
unions and believed this could only be achieved if they employed more staff and
adopted more professional working practices. With the exception of a single case this
seemed a reaction to the difficulties of recruiting and maintaining the enthusiasm of
volunteers:
"The danger is that people will lose heart and we'd have a struggle to keep hold of the
rest of the volunteers. At the AGM there was only one new applicant to be a director
and he was a volunteer before so not exactly knocking at the door wanting to be
volunteers or take on responsibilities." (CUCIN1)
Additionally four argued that as a financial institutional credit unions involved
considerable responsibility and became more complex during development. Therefore,
finding appropriately skilled volunteers was difficult:
"You have to get the right people in charge. You need more than a calculator to run a
credit union." (CUAID1)
Instead there was awareness that credit unions needed to become more professional and
move away from the purely voluntary ethos:
"I think there is a much healthy regime at the moment, there is much healthy
atmosphere around credit unions now, much more realistic, much more honest ... its
much more target focused and business focused. Its very clear that credit unions being
seen as businesses have won the day. I've letters saying they weren't businesses they
were charities, of course they weren't charities, ... but people have it in their head that
it is that kind of charitable endeavour." (CUC11N3)
However, this desire for professionalism was accompanied by unease among six
interviewees, that expansion may result in lessoning the bonds with the community
Interviewer: "Is there a danger of moving to bigger less community oriented credit
unions?"
Respondent: " Too far I think yes. For us I think we do need to offer more services
	
As I was saying if we try to become too big and too successful and too sophisticated we
cut out that local involvement, then we do lose ownership." (CUCID2)
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From the interviews it was unclear whether credit unions were becoming detached from
-
their members, although a number feared they might be. Though all accepted the need
to become more professional, one expressed scepticism regarding the enthusiasm for
increasing the range of services:
"There has been no demand whatsoever to my knowledge and I think I have the ear to
the ground as far as our credit union is concerned in anybody wanting that kind of
facility and service." (CUCIN2)
If this interpretation were correct it would suggest that the interests of some credit union
staff and members are being stretched. To assist this analysis the next chapter asks
members what services they would like to receive. If this proposition is confirmed it
would suggest that a breach between members and managers can occur very early in the
gestation of the mutual, and is partially influenced by response of managers to the
disinterest of members.
7.3.2 Paternalism in Mutuals
Building societies began the shift to professional organisations in the mid-19 th century
with establishment of permanent societies. The historical account of their development
in chapters 3 and 4 suggests that patriarchy and the import of capitalist managers were
responsible for the deterioration of relationships between members and managers.
To asses. s the veracity of this explanation all the building society interviewees were
asked whether they thought building societies were paternalistic institutions, nine of
which agreed with this statement. A typical answers was:
"If you look back at old yearbooks up to the Second World War and probably just after
you got a real sense that the management of the societies were very clear about their
social obligations, that was a very strong driving force." (BSL2)
Two interviewees who had come into the sector from banking argued that all financial
institutions were paternalistic. This argument overlooks the difference in ownership
between the sectors. Paternalism would be more invidious in a mutual where
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accountability was to members, who were invariably people of a lower social class than
the managers. Moreover, another interviewee, who had also worked in banking stated
that banks began to address paternalism earlier as "in practice because all the
governing seats in the movement were held by dinosaurs, nice chaps, but dinosaur they
threw away the structural advantages of shorter lines of communication. And boards
20 years ago were composed in the main...of stuff-shirts or nice chaps who could be
relied upon not to do other than say ra-ra from time to time, and rubber stamp
conservative decisions, within reasonable parameters, who didn't disturb the ships very
often." (BSR4). It could be argued that the interviewees adopted this historical
interpretation of building societies because it suited their personal agenda as agents of
change, but three of the respondents admitted being paternalistic, justifying paternalism
in terms of the necessity of building society managers to behave more compassionately
than their banking sector brethren
Interviewer: "How would you describe the culture and managerial structure of the
[regional] Building Society?"
Respondent: "I would suggest that it is, that we would see ourselves as a traditional,
almost paternalistic organisation. Both from the members point of view and our staff
point of view"
Interviewer: "You readily admit that its paternalistic."
Respondent: "Yes I don't see anything terribly wrong with that." (BSR1)
Interestingly all three of the avowed paternalists represented medium sized societies,
two of which were less committed to democracy and member participation than the
other interviewees. If the functionalist detachment thesis is to be sustained it has to
explain why the larger national societies, who conceded being more remote from
members, have demonstrated a greater desire to engage members and transform their
organisations into less patriarchal institutions. Instead the evidence suggests that
paternalism has a closer correlation to minimal member participation than the size of the
mutual.
7.3.3 Import of Capitalist Managers
Another explanation for the conversions of mutuals was the loss of a mutual culture
caused by the employment of managers with no previous knowledge of the sector. It is
assumed that this culminated in the 1980s when building societies began to ape the
behaviour of banks, an opinion shared by five of our interviewees.
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"For many building societies it went wrong in the seventies and eighties. We forgot
what we were set up for and just looked at the bottom line. The socreties that started this
off were those led by ex-plc men. They ran with obsolete products and maximised
profits." (BSL1)
Originally brought in to address specific skills shortages, such as accountancy and
compliance after the collapse of Grays Building Society, according to three respondents
many of these new managers struggled to understand mutuality:
"There is nothing wrong with that as a technical training but you have equally got to be
clear about the values you are bringing with that, so you need the skills but also got to
select not just on those but on do they share the values and I think for a long time that
just didn't happen and people just recruited on skills and not on values and that's where
we got to, with a lot people in saying hey this is a terrific business you can rape this
business really easily, lets go and make ourselves rich and some people have done
that." (BSR5)
As a result many compared societies with joint stockholder companies and changed
working practices, treatment of members, and ultimately made more mutuality inclined
staff redundant:
"I think the mistake dare I say it Mr Rodriguez [CEO of Bradford and Bingley] made
from all I hear and understand, is that he threw out the baby with the bathwater, he
made all these wholesale changes. Now in our middle management layer we have
encapsulated there the official rem emberers [sic] of the society. These are who know
our business intimately who understand what has happened and so on. We have tried in
my philosophy in both senior management and at that level, is to try to integrate the
best of the old with the best of the new" (BSN3)
As this new management became ensconced they began to get restless at the slow
growth inherent in the sector. They sought diversification into areas such as estate
agents but continued to believe the constraints placed on the sector frustrated their
ambitions, a view shared by three of our interviewees
Interviewer: "Why did building society convert?"
Respondent: "Mostly it was the ego of the people involved, being a bank gives the chief
executive a higher profile and more money." (BSR2)
For another interviewee the problem for the building society incomers was that building
societies were not a 'sexy' enough industry:
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"It was led by boards of directors because they thought being a board of a plc was (a)
much sexier and much more exciting then being a boring old buildilig society and (b)
we can make ourselves very rich by doing it and most of them have and I think it has no
more to do with it then that." (BN3)
Significantly, all eleven interviewees thought personal aggrandisement could explain
most, if not all the demutualisations:
"I think cynically the prime driver was greed of the directors and the board of those
institutions and I think that has been the biggest single difference, they got very rich."
(BSR5)
Though geed could explain specific conversions, two interviewees did not assume there
was a connection between the import of managers from the private sector and
subsequent demutualisations. One argued that other managers had come from the
private sector and not converted their societies:
"I don't think you can lay the blame at the import of harder headed corporate
businessmen than prevailed previously, because I was one of those I came from a
banking background on invitation rather they saw it as an easy life in a cosy sector that
needed changing." (BSR3)
Rather the attitudes of the new managers and the subsequent conversions were a
response to cultural shifts in wider society, movements which in his opinion were
continuing to influence building societies today:
"So a variety of things that came together that meant there was more profit
maximisation in that particular period than there had been in previous periods. The
assumption people make is that if there hadn't been a wave of conversions that
behaviour would have continued. I suspect that that wouldn't have been the case, I
suspect it wouldn't have taken longer to behaviour to change, but I think the
consumerist trends and shill in political thinking would have fed its way through into a
number of societies anyway, whether or not there had been a wave of conversions.... I
also think there was a social thing in the eighties where the whole environment was very
much every man for himself which was less of a mutual ethos." (BSN1)
This viewpoint echoed comments elsewhere by three other interviewees who believed
the demutualisations should be seen in context of the Thatcherite culture:
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"And perhaps that was simply part of the Thatcher era...I think we probably all got a
bit carried away with the glamour of all that" (BSR2)
-
In summary it would seem the individual managers did bring into mutuals a more
capitalistic attitude, but it is possible that they were the embodiment of broader social
forces, namely Thatcherism. In particular the decline of paternalism exposed a
contradiction between the role of members and management. For a generation this was
ignored as building societies invariably duplicated the behaviour of the more socially
aware banks. Only as the paucity of this approach has been realised and removed, has
the relationship between management and members come under scrutiny and attempts
made to address it. Based on the interviewees, the functionalist explanation is too
simplistic since it ignores the social and cultural influences on the changing
relationships and cannot explain how the largest societies are working harder to
communicate mutuality than most smaller building societies and credit unions, both of
whom are supposed to be closer to their members. However, it is possible that larger
societies' efforts may be in vain, with the communication proving to be ineffective, with
external factors, specifically capitalism and the state, having a greater effect on
mutuality.
7.4 Impact of Capitalism
In 7.1 it was shown how capitalism affects and distorts elements of mutuality, defining
both the mutuals and permissible behaviour. In recent years the dominant discourse
within the financial sector has linked the necessity of scale and the employment of high
technology. Essentially the argument was that the advances in technology required
huge investments and these could only be made by organisations with sufficient
capacity to operate on a global scale. Building societies with their national, regional
and local markets are therefore perceived as too small to survive. Moreover, the gradual
erosion of building societies creates an impression of a sector in decline, a view
endorsed by three interviewees:
"Ifyou look at and see a decreasing number from 71 to 68, to what, and I think that
does not encourage you to get up in the morning with a springing your step, it doesn't
help. I think you have to find ways to insulating yourselffrom that and finding out what
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you can do, if you can't stop it."(BSR5)
The reaction of other interviewees to the size debate was an acceptSnce of the risk
combined with a belief that they can be small enough to survive:
"I think that there is a polarisation that is accelerating between big and small. At one
end of the scale whether you are a mutual or not there is the global player, universal
institution trying to be all things to all men, where you can to seek to drive out
economies of scale purely out of your bigness and that requires certain efficiency. At the
other end there is the niche that knows its local market, is close to its members, is
nimble and is equally efficient, that's the choice. Those institutions that are in the
middle ground are potentially too big to be small and too small to be big and have the
worst of all worlds." (BSR3)
Alternatively the larger societies while acknowledging the difficulty of competing
dismissed the claims of economies of scale:
"There has been no history of economies of scale, that's the other curious thing. ... if
you look over the last 15 years at which institutions have been the most cost effective
they haven't been the largest institutions, they have tended to be the medium sized. So
there seems to be the case that you have to be a certain size to have the advantages of
the economies that do exist but over a certain size and the complexities of running the
operation mean you run into dis-economies of scale at some point." (BSN1)
The challenge for mutuals is that any emphasis by the market on rapid acquisition and
merger-led growth inevitably portrays them as ineffectual because of their reliance on
organic capital growth. Capitalism's desire for activity conflicts and affects attitudes to
mutuals' objective of stability.
Equally the attention on technology based solutions provides another opportunity for
capitalism to be seen as dynamic, while mutuals can be perceived as complacent and
parochial. The interviewees rejected this dichotomy arguing that they were investing in
new technology, or that as local societies members had not expressed a demand for
these services. Three interviewees dismissed the correlation between scale and
technology and one believed that speculative investments in technology was
incompatible with mutuality:
"Well the reason we haven't gone for an Egg competitor is actually quite simple
because ... we had gone out on the internet with a loss-leading savings product then
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it's the rest of our members that are paying for, you just can't justib) that. We are
basically in an impossible position; you either go on with a lower priced product than
everyone else and people say oh look building societies can't compete with Egg, or you
go on with a price that competes and rob all your existing members." (BSN1)
The current capitalist fixation with size and new technology presents mutuals with
fundamental questions which confront their historical raison d'etre. For in pursuing the
demands of the dominant culture they risk losing their mutual relations with members.
Alternatively failure to respond can be presented as managerial incompetence.
Mutuals are also hampered by the language of business which forces them to adopt
capitalist accounting standards. These are designed from the perspective of shareholder
investors and concentrate on issues of profit and income maximisation.
"One of the criticisms always made is that building societies are inefficient but the
cost/income ratio used in banking only works if you are trying to maximise income. The
system is designed for profit maximization. Using this model the more an institution
exploits their customers the more efficient they become. ... Part of the problem is that
the dividend is not seen as a cost on the plc balance sheet. Instead it seen as what is
distributed after the surplus, below the bottom line. Brian Pitman does not see a
dividend as a cost but building societies have to class labour, property and capital as
capital expenditure but dividends are not seen as a cost". (TA2)
Not only do building societies have to write annual reports using 'capitalist linguistic
infrastructure', but their costs have to be presented differently, both in terms of dividend
and large losses.
"If you actually look how plcs behave then what the discipline forces them to do is to
watch shorter-term horizons and also what you tend to see periodically is an absolutely
shocking year with a big loss and everything including the kitchen sink being thrown in
the loss and then that forgotten and another pattern of nice steady growth in profits.
We don't actually have the luxtuy of doing that because if you make a loss as a building
society the regulator makes you merge with somebody." (BSN1)
So prevalent are capitalist regulations of building societies that even membership is
forbidden
"We have a member services department we don't call it customer services. I was a bit
fed up with the new style of accounts because we have to talk of customers, loans to
customers — under regulation. I thought that was bad, just because the banks don't have
members." (BSR3)
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7.4.1 Defining the Mutual
Not content with imposing inappropriate accounting regimes on mutuals, the capitalist
-
culture has defined mutuality for mutuals. In practical terms this is demonstrated
through the marginalisation of mutuals:
"The [credit union] image as the poor mans bank is inevitable in this country, banks are
very strong, we have a bank culture" (CUCED4)
Similarly, building societies have been forced to justify staff pay and retain unprofitable
branches. Although the interviewees were not opposed to accountability regarding
these issues they did display a modicum of frustration that standards imposed on
themselves were higher than those on banks. Furthermore, these social constraints may
prevent mutuals from competing effectively.
"One of the dangers of a mutual is that it tries to run it with the people actually running
it not getting paid either and with the best will in the world you are going to get some
nice people maybe but not necessarily the best people who are good at running things.
Because the people who are good at running things will want to get paid for doing that,
its their profession. So we have had to rationalise the payments, we are going to pay
people very well but we are going to pay to actually deliver to the members rather than
pay them to make money out of people." (BSN2)
This process results in building societies becoming marginalised and being described as
inefficient or labelled as community services, while the banks are unfettered to close
branches in deprived areas, to pay management extraordinary salaries, and to target the
most profitable accounts with no responsibility to improve access. All of this occurs
because capitalism dominates and shapes everyday discourse forcing mutuals to use this
language if they are to be understood, while the images of building societies and credit
union are carefully controlled and monitored by the state and media.
"Building society has the same problem. We have a little bit of the problem with the
word there as well ... But they have in some ways some other connotations, but we
obviously do use those in trying to point out why we are different. But again you see if
you look at our business, travel insurance, equity ISAs etc and so-forth, building
societies aren't thought of as doing those products. One of the problems we have is that
building society does mortgage and savings doesn't it, yet we have the best current
account out there." (BSN2)
"The very name credit unions is a bad name. People think it's some sort of union, like
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a workers union or a trade union or something like that. We can't use the word bank
unfortunately because community bank would be a much better use of words. So I think
that it's an off-putting word." (CUCIN1)	 -
7.5 Impact of the State
Capitalism's control of mutuals is exercised through the state, by regulation and the
actions of state agencies, both of which are affected by prevailing cultural values:
"The key moment was the arrival of the Thatcher government, which believed in the
free market and had little time for quasi-socialist alternatives. She did not understand
the philosophy of building societies and was not attached to their survival. All she saw
was that they had prevented many people from buying their houses due to mortgage
rationing in the post-war period." (TA1)
Another respondent felt that the labour market liberalisation policies pursued by
Thatcher potentially mitigated against mortgages and as result undermined long-term
relationships with members.
"I'm not sure government answered the dilemma with a more flexible labour force
going forward how do you underwrite a mortgage that requires a 25-year commitment.
Then its by the way despite this difficulty we'll withdraw progressively from the social
infrastructure that 's there to support mortgages. We'll take away interest payment when
you're are unemployed, we'll largely take it away and leave it to you guys with
mortgage payment protection insurance where you are trying to sell a product to
people, which is a valuable product but most people that are buying houses either can't
afford to think they are going to be made unemployed or don't want to so the take up on
those is I 7%." (BSR5)
Working within this alien and sometimes hostile environment, mutuals had to operate
within restrictive legislation. Lacking influence, governments could afford to be tardy
with mutual legislation. Four interviewees believed it was the frustration at this
situation that resulted in Abbey National's decision to convert.
"I think if we go right back to the early eighties when one or two of the larger societies
were looking for new powers and it was fairly clear then that those new powers, that if
they were to be granted, they were going to be granted too little too late and the Abbey
National just got fed up with it and did its own thing." (BSR2)
In contrast two interviewees believed that Abbey National had wanted to convert and
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used regulatory difficulties as an excuse. Regardless of the precise motivation the
regulatory framework created difficulties for ambitious and expansionist societies.
-
Moreover, the construction of the 1986 Act encouraged regional societies to change
status as it enshrined a five-year protection from hostile takeover, an opportunity that
resulted in at least one conversion.
"I think in the Northern Rock case, I think there was greater certainty for five years
post demutualisation that the management would continue to run the business rather
than never ending speculation about whether the Royal Bank of Scotland or NatWest
was going to make a bid." (BSR3)
Another interviewee was annoyed that their society's carefully designed defence against
carpetbaggers was destroyed by politicians' inability to understand the functioning of
mutuals and the difference between share and deposit accounts. Furthermore, suspicion
of politicians' motives were heightened by their reluctance to introduce anti-
carpetbagging legislation:
"For some reason the government which claim to support mutuals seem very reluctant
to do anything to safeguard the status of mutuals, of the model, of the building society
model. I think that's a problem, a real problem."(BSL2)
Frustrations with legislative impediments were also expressed by credit unions:
"What wants changing is the restrictions, we want less restrictions on what we do
whilst accepting that we are handling other peoples money therefore we have to be
accountable and obviously the procedure and the records in place and be supervised in
that sense." (CUCIN2)
Criticism of the regulation should not be mistaken as criticism of the regulatory staff. In
total eight of the interviewees (two from building societies and six from credit unions)
felt they had a good relationship with the regulators.
Interviewer: "Did you have problems registering and what's your view of the
registrar?"
Respondent: "No. She was very thorough, very friendly, very nice but she's distant in
London and unless we do anything seriously wrong we are not likely to see her
again....No the Registrar fine there's a need for regulation and there needs to be
accountability and she was doing her job. She was very nice, we were all scared about
the interview but she was very good." (CUCIN1)
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The contrast between the relationship with regulators and the imposition of the
regulation was most apparent in one building society's registration process:
"So you could actually begin a building society in 1980 with f5000, ten people
providing £500 each. The society was actually registered on the last day before that was
increased to £50,000 and we always wondered if that change in regulation was brought
in quickly to try and head us off Having said that the Registrar of Friendly Societies
was very helpful and actually met our people at the station in order to take delivery of
the forms and the money." (BSL2)
This control of mutuals was for one interviewee connected to attempts by the regulators
to inculcate building societies with capitalist values.
"Now the Building Societies Commission I think they are unhelpful in that they appear
to imply that commercial practice in the banking or plc world is the model that we
should all aspire to, which to me appears to be pretty bad.... its perfectly possible that
building society people need different sorts of attributes, an understanding about the
community perhaps being one of them. So I think the commission didn't help, that then
infused boards, non-executive boards with a view that these are the rules that we have
to play by so we have to get in a more commercially aware, plc trained group of
people....i f you understand why your values and accounting are different, so you should
be proud to use the word surplus not profit. ...But I think regulators simplifi, things I
think if that's what our friends of the Bank of England are doing we'll do the same,
we'll use the same words and that doesn't help, it doesn't help if you are trying to be
different which we must be. (BSR5)
Supporting this, the credit union interviewees held that the regulators lacked an
understanding of small financial institutions; attempting to impose similar compliance
guidelines upon them as larger financial institutions, whilst simultaneously they adopted
a more overt interventionist approach:
"The FSA writing to us about the millennium bug and demanding a disaster plan. Yet
we had no computer for goodness sake, we told them it's a filing cabinet, but they still
insisted on one" (CUCID2)
"I don't mind I think it does require regulation we have to have that. I don't care who
does it as long as they do it in a language that we can all understand and that they have
to realise they are speaking not only to the big bankers and the movers and the shakers
and all the rest of it, but they are also speaking to the person in the street and they've
got to tailor to the needs of the people they are dealing with." (CUCED2)
"Then we got it registered and ... the priest, he became the first chair and was
immediately told by the Registrar that priests shouldn't be the chairs."
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Interviewer: "Why not?"
Respondent: "Because I suppose there is less stability with them than there is with
Methodist ministers but they said well they could be sent away.. .Anybody could drop
dead or move their job or whatever it happens to be." (CUC1N2)
A second credit union also experienced this insistence on a different chair, while yet
another was forced to close for two weeks during a FSA investigation. Although no
evidence of wrongdoing was found, the credit union lost momentum and the goodwill of
members, and no apology was forthcoming from the FSA. One interviewee alleged that
the regulators and government also interfered with the national structure of credit
unions:
"On a national level through a national organisation representation they've been a
pain in the backside at times because of the stand they took on wanting one national
body and then as a way of doing that they said they would only accept one national
body rules. It took them twelve months to sit down and talk with us and they suddenly
found that as a national organisation we were probably a lot closer to them then
ABCUL." (CUC1N2)
Two other interviewees found themselves under pressure by the regulators to join
ABCUL. However, this was explained by an interviewee as outcome of a bureaucratic
state only wanting to work with large professional entities, regardless of whether it is a
single trade association or larger building societies.
Although national state interference clearly irritated five credit union interviewees, four
were more preoccupied with the attitude of the local state. Criticism ranged from
having. too close association with the council, encouraging a dependency culture among
credit unions, promoting the development of too many small credit unions by linking
this activity with local authorities' anti-poverty agenda.
"Sometimes people see us as a branch of the council that's the other problem,
especially as it's the council property and we're not in charge unfortunately and so if
the council have a poor image then the credit union will have a poor image."
(CUCIN1)
"As far as local authorities is concerned I think it has been fairly easy for them to do
that, you know, it's been very convenient for them. We must tackle poverty so we'll get
involved with credit unions, we'll do it through them but I don't think it is the answer."
(CUCID2)
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Through this process credit unions became isolated from mainstream financial services
and have been unable to remove the stigma of being the 'poor mans bank'. From the
interviews it is apparent that the state has failed to understand mutuals and as a
consequence has imposed ill-advised and inappropriate regulation. Additionally it has
attempted to fit mutuals within a capitalist framework and when this has delivered
unsatisfactory results, engaged in a process of marginalisation, reducing mutuality to an
extension of the social services.
7.6 Economic Globalisation and the Processes of
Glocalisation
Despite this concerted effort by the state and capitalism to denigrate mutuals they have
at least temporarily weathered the tempest. Whether they have sufficient energy to
survive another assault remains unknown, but the pessimism that was so prevalent
among building societies in the late 1990s has ebbed and is being supplanted by a
renewed sense of vigour. Equally, though credit unions are undergoing a traumatic shift
to professionalism the interviewees were confident about the sector's future. Though a
degree of these attitudes could be described as bravado, many contrasted the approach
of the banks with their own attempts to reconnect and maintain connections with
members, as discussed earlier in the chapter. All except three of the interviewees
believed that the process of financial globalisation being followed by the banks was
having a detrimental reaction among their customers.
"They gee it as being four or five global financial services businesses and they are all
racing to get there because however big they are they are not big enough they have got
to get bigger. That leaves a vacuum between them and their customers and that's
clearly the space that we should be progressively seeking to occupy. They will take
many of their customers but many of them including them with a little bit more non-
conformist among them will say hey do we want to be part of that. Do we really want to
be supporting Anthony Hopkins and his American application for nationality, aren't we
something a little bit more local then that. Within that gap we as building societies
could and should prosper." (BSR5)
At least six of the interviews described a changing cultural tide as people began to
question the validity of only having one form of ownership, and seek more from life
than pure materialistic benefits.
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"That is the big challenge now going forward because more and more now the
consumer is wanting to have a voice, consumer movement is becoming more populist,
you can associate that with the environmental movements, concerns about standards of
living rather then just making money etc, etc. if you like our country is changing from
being totally materialistic to well I'll like to go out to the country at the weekend so stop
spoiling my countryside, I know you can make a fortune by putting a lot of houses on it
but don't do that. Those were issues that if you went back 25 years were irrelevant,
people didn't have a refrigerator said I need a refrigerator. People have a refrigerator
now so suddenly that's not the same issue. There are real problems don't get me wrong
but the overall wealth of the nation in physical, structural and material terms has
increased enormously... .In many ways the opportunity for mutuals to come in and say
yes we see those as important, so yes we have to run an efficient business but we'd
rather get it into context of what life is all about." (BSN2)
According to the interviewees this cultural change is being accompanied by growing
unease, and sometimes disgust at the behaviour of the banks.
"Where the banks are it seems to me are doing everything possible to drive people out
of their branches and then when they've driven enough out they say well there's not
enough need for a branch in this area. The stories that we hear about - almost frog-
marching people out of branches to use the machines outside. Abbey National closing
down thousands of till positions, which means they put big advertising hoardings up
where cashiers used to stand." (BSR1)
One credit union interviewee described how one member who had never previously
borrowed asked for a loan:
"He said I tell you why he said we normally pay cash for everything we don't borrow
but I've been inundated with all this stufffrom the banks you know, have this card and
do this and do that and we'll give you all these different facilities. So I filled the form in
and sent it into my bank and they turned me down and I've never owed anything in my
life. Well I said that's it, he said yes it is and I went into them and said why have I been
turned down, I've been a good customer all iny money's come in and I've paid ever
demand and bill, "you've no credit rating" therefore they turned him down. He hadn't
been a drain on society in that sense and yet the banks didn't want to know him either
and so he's had numerous loans since then, he pays them off regularly and comes in
and pays over the odds in that sense really... The banks just didn't want to know him
they weren't even prepared to check on him in that sense from his own bank records, no
he hadn't borrowed anything from anybody else anywhere so he didn't have a credit
rating." (CUC1N2)
As banks globalised and became more distant from customers both building societies
and credit unions believed their role as local and professional but personable financial
providers would be successful.
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"It has sharpened up in two areas, one is the one we just talked about is the balance of
price advantage to the individual and perhaps to the systems and tile other is offering a
choice of ethos to the customer, that's more subjective. Do you want to give this part of
your life, your trading life, your personal financial connection to an organisation with a
mutual ethos or do you want it to be totally anonymous and happy for it to be traded by
Barclays or in Deutsche bank." (BSR4)
"Talking to people when they come in and inquire we tell them if they are considering
borrow even if they are not, their money that they invest with us is there for people to
use within the community and we're borrowing and saving off one another and
supporting one another and encouraging the money to be kept in the local community,
as well by encouraging people, by controlling in that sense, if people are borrowing
locally they are more likely to be purchasing their articles or whatever it happens to be
or their services more locally." (CUCIN2)
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that managers' conception of mutuality has been and
continues to be shaped by the dominant discourse of capitalism. Managers feared being
prescribed as 'social services' believing this undermined their legitimacy as economic
agents. The cultural components of mutuality still have relevance but are under threat
from depersonalisation, short-termism and commodification of services. These affect
both the competitiveness of mutuals and marginalize their cultural values. Similarly the
commodification of ownership has perverted their democratic structures. The import of
capitalist managers, who did not understand mutuality, alongside the environmental
shifts caused by Thatcherism and globalisation, have together ultimately undermined
and restricted the activities of mutuals.
However, mutuals are confident they can prosper because of resistance to globalisation
by the public and an increasing interest in the glocalisation of services. If true this may
partially explain how the building society avoided terminal decline in the 1990s, but
what remains unknown is whether ordinary members share this optimistic view of the
future, a question that will be addressed in the next chapter.
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8 Attitudes of Members
-
As stated in chapter six, there has been only minimal research on the views of members,
and only in the work by Berthoud and Hinton (1989) was any attempt made to contrast
this with the opinion of managers. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether
members of different mutuals hold differing views of their mutual and mutuality, or
whether other factors such as class, gender, age, or political allegiance have a stronger
influence. In particular it is necessary to assess the validity of the functionalist claim
that mutuals become more remote from members as they grow, or whether changing
social and political conditions affect this relationship. The chapter commences with an
overview of independent variables collected from the sample, before reviewing
members' knowledge of mutuality, their perception of accountability and democracy,
the extent of their commitment and nature of the reciprocity with the mutual, before
briefly examining their view on the future of the mutual. Finally, in an attempt to
explore the embeddedness narrative, members' attitudes towards mutuality are
contrasted against their opinions of privatisation.
Before outlining these findings it is necessary to highlight an important caveat. The
results are presented in table form and on occasions have been aggregated to emphasise
a particular analysis. However, in doing this I accept that there may be a degree of
selection bias in the resultant tables, due to employing slightly different survey methods
in the collection of the data.
8.1	 General Information on Sample




Employee CU 55 31%
Community CU 23 13%
Regional BS 50 28%
National BS 50 28%
TOTAL 178 100%
Table 8-1 confirms the size of sample and the distribution of respondents across the
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chosen mutuals. As previously noted the response rate from Community CU makes any
findings statistically unsafe and to demonstrate awareness of this the number of
respondents has been placed alongside the appropriate percentages. This sample is not
meant to be representative but does provide an indication of the general views of
members.













Saver 106 59% 21 34% 7 30% 37 74% 41 82%




69 39% 34 62% 16 70% 11 22% 8 16%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
The first question asked how members would describe their economic relationship with
the mutual (Table 8-2). Though the majority perceive themselves purely as savers,
there is a contrast between building society and credit union members, with the latter
using their mutual for both services. The most likely explanation for this is that credit
unions demand members show commitment to saving for a fixed period before being
allowed to borrow. In contrast 81% of building society members appear to use just one
service, which may affect their commitment to the mutual.















15 8% 1 2% 9 39% 2 4% 3 6%
1-3
years
41 23% 23 42% 2 9% 13 26% 3 6%
3-5
years
24 14% 8 14% 5 22% 5 10% 6 12%
5-10 yrs 36 20% 14 26% 5 22% 9 18% 8 16%
10-20
yrs
25 14% 1 2% 0 9 18% 15 30%
20 years
plus
26 15% 0 0 11 22% 15 30%
No
response
11 6% 8 14% 2 8% 1 2% 0
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
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Another measure of commitment may be how long the respondent had been a member
of the mutual. Table 8-3 details their responses and shows an even split with 49% over
-
and 45% under five years of membership. The contrast between credit unions and
building societies is because neither credit union began trading until the 1990s, while
60% of National BS respondents had been members in excess of ten years. As
carpetbagging only began in 1995 the longevity of membership by the building societies
respondents should provide an insight into the views of ordinary members.
Table 8-4: Gender of Respondents
Number of Percentage Employee Community Regional National
Respondents of total CU CU BS BS
Women 99 56% 9 16% 18 78% 37 74% 35 70%
Men 99 44% 46 84% 5 22% 13 36% 15 30%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
The gender portrait of members (Table 8-4) reflects a bias towards women, with the
exception of Employee CU where there is a preponderance of men; directors are men,
which reflects their workplace, while the all the employees were women. A survey of
the building societies was undertaken during the day outside branches, and it is likely
that the nature of women's employment has affected the sample. In the case of
Community CU the chairperson, a woman, confirmed that most members were women,
although she did not have any statistical evidence in support of this statement.
Furthermore, women are slightly more inclined to be members for longer with 54%
being members for over 5 years compared to 42% for men, and 39% over ten years
compared to 15% for men.













18-30 28 16% 13 24% 6 26% 2 4% 7 14%
31-50 76 43% 32 58% 8 35% 20 40% 16 32%
51-65 54 30% 7 13% 7 31% 18 36% 22 44%
65 plus 16 9% 0 1 4% 10 20% 5 10%
No
response
4 2% 3 5% 1 4% 0 0
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
There is an even spread of ages throughout the sample (Table 8-5), with a slight
weighting for those over 50. However, this disguises the differences between the
mutuals, with the credit unions having a much younger age profile than the building
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societies, in particular Regional BS.
-
















12 7% 2 4% 0 2% 9 18% 1 2%
Technical 65 36% 045 82% 1 12% 13 26% 6 12%
Skilled Non-
Manual
28 16% 7 13% 5 16% 8 16% 8 16%
Skilled
Manual
7 4% 0 2 8% 1 2% 4 8%
Semi-skilled 11 6% 0 2 16% 1 2% 8 16%
Unskilled 15 8% 0 1 22% 3 6% 11 22%
Unemployed 5 3% 0 1 8% 0 4 8%
Retired 17 10% 0 2 12% 9 18% 6 12%
Home
manager
9 5% 0 1 4% 6 12% 2 4%
No response 9 5% 1 1% 8 0 0
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Respondents were asked their occupation and from this an occupational class schema
was extrapolated (Table 8-6). The difference in the class basis of the building societies
is probably explained by the location of the branches selected, being from different
socio-economic areas. Consequently almost half of Regional BS respondents were from
professional and technical classes, while 46% of National BS's were either semi or
unskilled, or unemployed. Although the sample from Community CU is small the data
suggests that its member are less likely to be the financially excluded than those from
the National BS. Though contrary to much credit union rhetoric, it does reflect Jacob et
al. (2002) who argued that American credit unions do not adequately serve those most
excluded. However, this data goes further and indicates that National BS is more
inclusive than the credit union that operates in the same community. However, to
confirm this proposition requires a much larger sample but it does suggest that an
individual institution, not necessarily the institutional form, is an important variable
when assessing financial inclusion. Equally it cannot be argued that all industrial credit
unions are more inclusive than a regional building society branch in a wealthy borough.
A cross tabulation of the class profile against gender shows that all the unemployed and
home managers were women and all but two of the technicians were male. Additionally
women comprised of 23% of skilled non-manual and 5% of skilled manual, while the
196
situation of men was reversed with 28% and 7% respectively. Although only a small
and unrepresentative data set, this information suggests that it does reflect the gender
-
and class inequalities in Britain.
The most unrepresentative of the variables was the political affiliation of respondent,
with more Conservative than Labour supporters. However, this is partially due to the
unevenness of the sample size at Employee CU. Regional BS respondents favoured
Conservatives, while National BS and Community CU preferred Labour. Considering
the location of the surveys the resulting distribution of support is unsurprising. Further
analysis demonstrated that men were stronger supporters of the Conservatives (47% to
24% for Labour and 85% for the Liberal Democrats) than the women who preferred
Labour (36% to 29% for Conservatives and 14% for the Liberal Democrats). While the
class and age analysis showed solid support for the Conservatives among professionals
(42%), technical (49%), and those over 65 (75%), this contrasted with stronger Labour
backing for skilled manual workers (72%), semi-skilled (64%), unskilled (53%),
unemployed (80%) and the under 30s (43%). Therefore although the sample is biased
towards Conservatives respondents, it still divides along conventional class dimensions.













Conservative 66 37% 26 47% 5 22% 25 50% 10 20%
Labour 55 31% 8 14% 11 48% 8 16% 28 56%
Liberal
Democrat
20 11% 5 9% 1 4% 8 16% 6 12%
Floating 6 3% 3 6% 0 3 6% 0
None of
them
14 8% 1 2% 3 13% 4 8% 6 12%
Other 2 1% 1 2% 0 1 2% 0
No response 15 9% 11 20% 3 13% 1 2% 0
. TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
8.2	 Respondents Knowledge of Mutuals
In previous chapters it was argued that education was a crucial aspect of mutuality.
Therefore members were asked various questions to attest their knowledge of mutuals
and to help assess whether there was a link between this and their commitment to
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mutuality. Within mutual literature emphasis is placed on the difference between users
as members and that of customers within joint stock companies, consequently
-
respondents were asked their perception of this.













Customer 62 35% 7 13% 1 4% 24 48% 30 60%





13 7% 1 2% 1 4% 9 18% 2 4%
No
response
1 1% 0 0 0 1 2%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Though 57% saw themselves as members, Table 8-8 shows a clear distinction between
credit unions and building societies, with the latter users clearly having less
understanding or acceptance of membership. A trend towards users as customers was
correlated with size, with 60% of National BS users perceiving themselves as
customers. Cross tabulations presented an alternative explanation with gender, age, and
to a lesser extent class as the key variables. Among the building society respondents,
50% of men saw themselves as members (plus 11% argued they were both), while 61%
of women perceived themselves as customers. All 8 of the respondents under 30 saw
themselves as customers, as did 73% of pensioners. Moreover there was no evidence
that the length of use was correlated with a perception of membership. Finally, while
professionals saw themselves as members, the unskilled and unemployed were more
likely to be customers. These findings would suggest that the educative relationship
with members has been patchy and predominantly aimed at men.




Users are owners 117 66%
Users are not owners 36 20%
Don't Know 25 14%
TOTAL 178 100%
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Respondents were then asked a series of questions on the distinctive aspects of
mutuality. Two-thirds considered themselves as owners and there were no significant
differences between the different mutuals (Table 8-9). After cross-tabulation, the only
measurable distinction was that those that perceived themselves as members had a
greater sense of ownership (79%) than those who thought they were customers (50%
with 32% against and 18% don't know).
Table 8-10: Respondents' Knowledge of Whether Users of Mutuals are Known as Members
Number of Respondents Percentage of total
Users are known as members 155 87%
Users are not known as
members
10 6%
Don't know 13 7%
TOTAL 178 100%
After asking how they perceived their relationship with the mutual (Table 8-10) almost
90% of respondents confirmed that users of mutuals were known as members,
suggesting a difference between their knowledge of mutuality and the treatment by their
mutual






















15 8% 1 2% 0 5 10% 9 18%
Don't
know
69 39% 33 60% 5 22°0 20 40% 10 20%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 1000 0 50 100% 50 100%
Table 8-11 demonstrates that although 53% thought users could stand for election there
were considerable differences between the mutuals, with respondents from the largest
and smallest having a greater knowledge of this aspect of mutuality. After cross-
tabulation the only variables that had a slight effect were age (57% of 18-30s did not
know and 69% of over 65s did) and length of membership. It is more likely that the
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high profile contested elections that have been a feature of National BS have ensured a
stronger awareness of mutual democracy. Similarly, perhaps Community CU has better
-
educative process than Employee CU, which indicates that claims that industrial credit
unions struggle to recruit volunteers because of the passive nature of membership (i.e.
savings made by direct debit and credit union established by the organisation) may have
some validity.





Abbey National 13 13%
Abbey National & Halifax 5 5%
Abbey National or Halifax, plus
another mortgage bank
8 8%
Other mortgage bank 6 6%
Britannia 10 10%
Nationwide' 5 5%
Bradford & Bingley 5 5%
Other building society 6 6%
Could not name any 14 14%
Did not think there were any left 6 6%
TOTAL 100 100%
While the majority of members have some understanding of the constitutional aspects of
mutuality, I wanted to know what institutions were mutuals, thus the building society
respondents were asked to name up to three other building societies. As Table 8-12
demonstrates many thought the Halifax and the Abbey National were still building
societies, while only 21% named an existing building society. This presents a challenge
for the building societies as they attempt to differentiate themselves from mortgage
banks. Moreover, as a number of building society interviewees highlighted, the former
building societies have been tardy in removing any association of their name to building
societies. This suggests a degree of public goodwill in the words 'building society' that
may be absent in banks.
7 As half the respondents were members of the Nationwide it was probable they would appear less
recognisable on this list
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Interestingly six did not think there were any building societies remaining and another
14 could not name any. Many others struggled to recall a society, a typical response
-
being that there are "so few left". It is possible that the wave of demutualisation has
created an impression that building societies are in terminal decline and are being
marginalised from the public consciousness of mainstream financial institutions.





















64 36% 14 25% 9 39% 15 30% 26 52%
Don't
Know
10 6% 5 9% 5 22% 0 0
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
To assess members' knowledge of contemporary debates within mutuals, respondents
were asked whether they were aware of the demutualisation process. Intriguingly Table
8-13 shows that respondents from National BS, which had been under the most
sustained assault from carpetbaggers, were less aware of demutualisation than those
from Regional BS who had faced no challenges. Cross-tabulations indicated that
approximately two-thirds of, men, those aged between 31-65, and those who had held
membership between 1-10 years had heard of demutualisation, compared to a 50%
chance for women, and those aged under 30 and over 65. However, the most significant
variable was class with almost 80% of professionals and technicians aware of
demutualisation, compared to 20% knowledge for those in working class occupations
and the unemployed. As windfalls from demutualisation require savings of a least £100
and is often tiered with higher benefits for those with greater investments, it is possible
that that awareness is linked to those that have gained most from the process.
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Bradford & Bingley 12
Alliance & Leicester 9
Woolwich 4
National & Provincial 3
Northern Rock 3
Birmingham Midshires 2





Following this question, and to confirm the validity of the previous question,
respondents were asked to name any demutualised building societies. Table 8-14
demonstrates that awareness correlated with the size of the institution, with a slight
northern bias probably due to the survey locations. The only converter not mentioned
exemplified this, the Bristol and West, which had few branches in the north.





Were aware of term 67 67%
Were not aware of term 33 33%
TOTAL 100 100%
Linked to the previous two questions respondents were asked whether they knew the
term 'carpetbagger' and if so what they understood it meant. Table 8-15 shows that
two-thirds recognised it and identical results were found from respondents from both
building societies. However, upon closer analysis, 86% of men knew of carpetbaggers
compared to 60% of women and only 44% of those under 30. Additionally 76%
Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters had heard of carpetbaggers in contrast
with 58% of Labour voters, and a similar trend was apparent across class with
professionals having 80% awareness as opposed to 40% for skilled manual workers.
There was no evidence that recent members had a more mercenary attitude than long-
standing users as awareness rose with length of membership. From these findings I
would propose that knowledge and comfort with financial services directly affected
awareness of mutuals and mutuality. From this it is probable that the majority of
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carpetbaggers are middle class men.
-
This was partially confirmed when respondents were asked to define carpetbaggers,
though all stated they were individuals who joined a building society in the hope of
receiving a windfall, this was often accompanied by more pejorative statements, which
exposed sharp differences between the members of Regional BS and National BS. At
Regional BS many were neutral or equivocal about carpetbaggers, though three men
stated that they had received an unfair reputation:
"It's a misnomer, a critical term of a shrewd investor who puts money into a building
society in case it goes private"
In contrast three women were more critical describing it as "cheating", "legal but
underhand" and carpetbaggers as "get rich quick merchants". At National BS
carpetbaggers received an even more hostile reception with no respondent prepared to
defend them. Opinions included "People who open accounts to close building societies
down", "Out to make money and get what they can", "Making money by false
pretensions", "Moving in and taking what they can", "Its just a version of a rip-off".
These quotes demonstrate that opponents of demutualisation adopt a moralistic
argument rather then the narrow economic arguments made by supporters.









Above 5% 2 3%
Depends on Surplus 6 7%
Don't know 47 60%
TOTAL 78 100%
To measure member awareness in credit unions I asked respondents if they could state
how much dividend members received. As Table 8-16 shows only 7% answered
correctly that it was dependent on the surplus made. Instead 14 members of Employees
CU thought it was 5%, which had been the previous years dividend. This suggests that
respondents' knowledge of how a credit union functions is no greater than that of the
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building society respondents. Thus there does not appear to be a clear link between size
of institution and understanding and educative processes. Rather knowledge of
-
mutuality correlates more with gender and class, with mutuals struggling to differentiate
themselves from banks among women, the young, and the working class. As the middle
classes benefit most from demutualisation this may detrimentally affect building
societies desire to remain mutual. However, it is possible to communicate more
effectively with less knowledgeable groups through social arguments.
8.3	 Trust, Accountability, and Democracy
Although the building society interviewees in the previous chapter wanted to develop a
more holistic understanding of mutuality, for members, especially carpetbaggers (see
chapterl 0) the debate has concentrated on accountability and democracy.
The interviewees argued that accountability was through a range of social actors of
which the membership was one part. This is partially supported by respondents'
answers, which are presented in tables 8-17 and 8-18.






Should Not 47 47%
Don't Know 13 13%
TOTAL 100 100%






Should Not 10 10%
They already are 1 1%
Don't know 17 17%
TOTAL 100 100%
Many respondents felt that members were inadequately qualified to contribute to the
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management of the society, typically justified by comments such as "we don't know
what we're talking about". In this respect respondents were willing to leave the
-
running of the society to the professional management. However, respondents did want
the board to be more answerable, suggesting that either they were insufficiently
accountable and too remote at present, or that the accountability needed to be closer to
members. From this it appears that members have no overwhelming desire to be
involved but cross tabulation showed that deference toward management was stronger
among men, and older and more long standing members, while virtually all younger
members and over 50% of women would like a greater voice. This also applies to those
who perceive themselves as customers and those with less knowledge regarding
demutualisation and carpetbaggers. Thus building societies are adequately serving the
needs of their traditional constituency but as usage of private sector financial services
becomes more widespread, less knowledgeable individuals are likely to seek more
engaged and trusting relationships with institutions.





Regional BS National BS
Should 76 76% 40 80% 36 72%
Should Not 12 12% 5 10% 7 14%
They already do 5 5% 0 5 10%
Don't know 7 7% 5 10% 2 4%
TOTAL 100 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Many societies have cited legitimate legal reasons for avoiding conversion and believe
that any vote is unfair because members are voting to receive a free windfall. From
Table 8-19 it can be shown that building societies are right to be fearful of the outcome
of any vote, especially as a few respondents confessed that they would like the windfall.
Three-quarters of respondents wanted a vote and this remained constant for all
variables, but the results from National BS indicate a degree of wariness about the
continuous demutualisation elections.
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Table 8-20: Respondents' View on Whether Directors Should be Allowed to Expel People Who





Should Not 74 74%
Don't Know 8 8%
TOTAL 100 100%
)
A number of societies, most notably the Portman, have expelled members who proposed
a conversion vote. This has proved a contentious issue among carpetbaggers and even a
majority of the building society interviewees were unhappy about the action. Table 8-20
demonstrates members' distaste for this approach. When asking the question even those
that supported mutuality believed expulsion was an undemocratic practice, comparing it
to the actions of a "third world dictatorship".





Mainly True 4 3%
Neither true or false 19 16%
Mainly False 14 12%
False 76 63%
Don't know 5 4%
TOTAL 121 100%
Respondents were asked whether their mutual ignored the views of members and the
overwhelming majority rejected this statement (Table 8-21). Not one of the credit union
respondents accepted the argument, and though this is weaker in building societies with
more saying their society neither ignored nor listened to members, a majority still
trusted their mutual. Therefore though members would like a greater level of
engagement and more democratic processes, a significant majority still believe their
mutual listens to and heeds their opinions. It would be interesting to compare this
degree of trust to that felt by customers of banks. Clearly trust between members and
their mutual does not necessarily coalesce around conventional accountable structures,




	 Commitment and Longevity
Mutuals were originally started to provide services for those who faced financial
exclusion and Table 8-22 details whether they are still serving this market.





















28 16% 0 0 11 48% 4 8% 13 26%
No
response
11 6% 2 4% 1 4% 4 8% 4 8%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
These confirm the findings in Section 8.1 that National BS includes a more deprived
constituency than Employee CU, with 26% of its members only possessing a single
account compared to none at Employee CU. Equally, though the survey of Regional BS
respondents was in a wealthy district, there were still 4 people who only held a building
society account. However, Community CU drew members equally from those with and
without an account. Across the sample women were twice as likely to not have another
account than men (20% to 10%), only 60% of the working class and unemployed had
another account, and 31% of those over 65 had a single account.




With another building society 9 5%
With two other building societies 2 1%
With a bank and a building
society
14 8%
With a bank and two or more
building societies
2 1%
With two or more banks and a
building societies
8 5%
With a bank(s) 88 49%
No response 55 31%
TOTAL 178 100%
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A number of building society interviewees had complained that the increase in
'churning' was having a detrimental impact on reciprocity and longevity within
mutuals. This research offers some evidence of this with 97% (37 Out of 38) of those
with an account for between one and three years possessing at least one other account.
Further evidence is found in Table 8-23 where 88 respondents had a bank account and
26 members of Regional BS and Employee CU were multiple (over two) account
holders. Additionally only two of the working class respondents were multiple account
holders, while those more aware of demutualisation and carpetbaggers were more likely
to have multiple accounts. Therefore it is possible that the tendency to churn is closely
related to the personal financial sophistication, which favours the middle classes.
Consequently building societies are perceived differently by the classes, with the
working class reliant on them for most services, while the middle class use them as a
shrewd investment with the potential of a windfall.


















46 46% 27 54% 19 38% 21 46% 12 38%
Depends on
circumstances





8 8% 5 10% 3 6% 3 7% 1 3%
Don't know 2 2% 1 2% 1 2% 1 2% 0
TOTAL 100 100% 50 100% 50 100% 45 100% 32 100%
Further endorsement of this analysis is presented in Table 8-24; here it is apparent that
members of Regional BS are more likely to stay with the society regardless of whether
the local branch closes. However, when analysed for class, working class loyalty is
connected with reciprocity and immediacy of service provided by the local branch.
Therefore the branch is an important means of delivering mutuality to the working class,
while the middle class have a more commodified relationship as they have access to a
number of providers for other services. Again this highlights the balance building
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societies must have between being marginalised and serving their most loyal supporters.














Yes 56 32% 23 42% 1 4.5% 22 44% 10 20%
No 104 58% 27 49% 21 91% 20 40% 36 72%
Don't
know
7 4% 1 2% 1 4.5% 3 6% 2 4%
No
response
11 6% 4 7% 0 5 10% 2 4%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
It is possible that loyalty to a mutual is inversely connected to ownership of a
demutualised company's shares; therefore respondents were asked whether they have
received a windfall. Table 8-25 shows that members of Employee CU and Regional BS
were more likely to have received a windfall and these findings are reflected in the class
analysis. 26% of the working classes have received shares compared to 40% of middle
class respondents who did. Moreover, almost as many Conservatives had received
shares (44%) as did not (46%), compared to only 20% of Labour supporters. Again
there appeared a correlation with personal financial literacy with 39% of those knowing
about demutualisation and carpetbaggers owning shares. Finally, length of membership
is significant with an equal percentage (46%) of those with between one and three years
membership and 42% of between three and five years having received a windfall. This
may indicate that newer members were partially motivated by opportunism, which may
explain the preponderance of those with shares joining Regional BS which has never
had a conversion vote.
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23 13% 7 13% 2 9% 7 14% 7 14%
Mixed 33 18.5% 21 38% 1 4% 6 12% 5 10%
Disapprove 33 18.5% 1 2% 2 9% 11 22% 19 38%
Strongly
disapprove
13 7% 0 0 7 14% 6 12%
Don't
know
55 31% 19 35% 15 65% 13 26% 8 16%
No
response
11 6% 3 5% 3 13% 2 4% 3 6%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Following this question respondents were asked their view of demutualisation and as
Table 8-26 demonstrates, opinions were evenly divided. Attitudes at National BS were
most polarised and this may be because the issue has been extensively debated during
the past five years. Only respondents at National BS were clearly opposed to
demutualisation with 50% against and 18% in favour, with Regional BS dividing 36%
to 22%. Most respondents from Community CU did not answer the question, while
though 38% were undecided at Employee CU only one person was against the process.
After performing cross-tabulations only the length of membership and ownership of
other demutualised shares were significant. The greatest opposition to demutualisation
was among those with the longest membership with 54% of those with over 20 years
membership and 32% of those between 10-20 against demutualisation. This suggests
that there may be a connection between longevity of membership and commitment to
mutuality. Equally those with demutualised shares favour demutualisation by 30% to
25%, compared to 12% to 29% by those opposed. Therefore loyalty to a mutual is
closely related to the extent and length of personal service and negatively correlated to
the personal financial awareness of the investor, which can be identifiable as multiple
account holders and demutualised companies shareholders.
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Should 30 30% 19 38% 11 22%
Should not 56 56% 24 48% 32 64%
Don't know 14 14% 6 12% 7 14%
TOTAL 100 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Respondents were then asked whether their building society should become a bank and
though a majority rejected the notion, Regional BS failed to receive an outright
majority. After cross-tabulations though women were more in favour of conversion
(33%) than men (21%), the only significant correlation was ownership of demutualised
shares with 40% of those with shares wanting conversion compared to 43% who did
not. In contrast only 25% of those without shares wanted demutualisation and 63%
were against.
During this question respondents volunteered their opinions of the possible conversion
of their society and responses fell into three categories. Two made it clear that they
wanted conversion and a small number who claimed not to be carpetbaggers believed it
was a decision for members and the board, though they would not offer their own
opinion. One of these had previously described carpetbagging as a misapplied term and
hence this group were probably serial carpetbaggers. A second group were more
pragmatic; hoping for a windfall if it should arise but believing it would not lead to an
improved service. Finally seven had previously received demutualised windfalls but the
deterioration in service that followed left them opposed to the process:
"Lots of people want it but it's a short-sighted policy. We had a mortgage with the
N&P and had no real say. The service got so bad we left."
The evidence demonstrates that many members are committed to their mutual, but this
is invariably correlated with class and length of membership. Additionally the most
sophisticated investors display little commitment to their society and once they received
their personal benefit, either through commodified products or a windfall, they depart.
In contrast working class members' commitment is non-price sensitive being mainly
reliant on the continued existence of branches. Overall a small majority of members
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remain opposed to demutualisation and the most implacable among those had
previously been beneficiaries of the process elsewhere. This suggests that reciprocity
-
may become increasingly prominent for mutuals as it attracts business from supportors
of mutuality and those alienated by banks.
8.5	 Reciprocity
The extent of participation is usually perceived as the main measure of reciprocity
within mutuals, the main indicator in building societies is electoral turnout and 14 of
National BS respondents confirmed they had voted at the previous directors election, all
of who supported the official candidates. Unfortunately none of the respondents from
Regional BS confirmed they had voted. The probable explanation being the contested
elections at National BS and the accompanying press coverage, compared to the
uncontested elections at Regional BS. As credit unions are smaller they are assumed to
have greater levels of participation. In the survey credit unions respondents were asked
whether they had attended the AGM, a social event, or any other meeting. Eight
members of Employee CU and five from Community CU had attended their respective
AGMs, meanwhile three from Employee CU had gone to a social or any other function,
compared to seven from Community CU. In all cases it was the same people who went
to the AGM and the social occasions. In addition I was invited to the Community CU
AGM in 2000 at which 14 members were present. Based on this collective evidence,
members of the credit union display no greater engagement in their mutual than that of
National BS, suggesting that controversy not size of institution is more likely to affect
participation.











Yes, definitely 14 18% 4 7% 10 44%
Yes, maybe 14 18% 10 18% 4 17%
Don't know 13 15% 8 15% 5 17%
No, not really 36 48% 32 58% 4 17%
No, definitely
not
1 1% 1 2% 0 4%
TOTAL 78 100% 55 100% 100%
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Promoters of credit unions argue that the common bond provides cohesion and helps
bring a community together. To explore this, respondents were asked if the credit union
provided a greater sense of belonging. Table 8-28 shows sharp distinction between
respondents from the two credit unions, with 60% of Employee CU respondents arguing
that the credit union has not been a cohesive force, contrasted with 61% of Community
CU members who believe it is. Once again this demonstrates that members of industrial
credit unions have little attachment or engagement with their institution, perhaps they
regard this service as an employees perk rather than an independent mutual financial
institution.
Table 8-29: Respondents' Attitude on Whether They Would Remain a Member of the Credit Union




Yes, definitely 22 40%
Yes. Maybe 14 25%
Don't know 6 11%
No, not really 12 22%
No, definitely not 1 2%
TOTAL 55 100%
To further assess this proposition respondents from Employee CU were asked whether
they would remain a member if their contributions were not deducted directly from their
salary. Almost a quarter would leave if this service was stopped and only 40% would
definitely remain members. However, this does mean that 40% do see a value in the
service beyond mere convenience, but it does offer further implicit support for the
company perk proposition. If this response is universal, it may have a serious impact on
the future development of credit unions, as live and work common bonds are now being
promoted as the norm. As a result credit unions may have two classes of members with
different levels of commitment and reciprocity, an experience currently endured by the
building societies.






Don't know 4 4%
TOTAL 100 100%
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Proponents of globalisation within the banking industry have trumpeted the use of the
internet which will reduce costs through reductions of interactions between social
-
actors. Table 8-30 demonstrates that only 7% of respondents had used the intemet for
banking. Among the respondents who did not use the internet there was no desire to use
the technology and many expressed opposition to losing the personal interaction with
branch staff.






Don't know 17 17%
TOTAL 100 100%
Due to concerns about security it may be anticipated that respondents would be nervous
about intemet banking but they were also resistant to accessing information in this way.
Table 8-31 shows that only three more respondents had used the internet for financial
information, while during the interviews only two believed there was a benefit in using
this service. Overall many were suspicious that the internet was a means employed by
financial institutions to close branches. As one respondent said, "I like getting my book
stamped by her, you can trust them".







Most of the time 7 7%
Not all of the time 1 1%
Inconvenient 4 4%
TOTAL 100 100%
Respondents' antipathy towards new technology is reinforced in Table 8-32, which
demonstrates high levels of satisfaction with branch opening hours. Internet banking is
invariably presented as a convenience issue, but there was no evidence that respondents
found the current service delivery ineffectual. No respondent wanted hours reduced
which raises questions about the motivation of banks that argue that branch closures are
offset by access to internet banking.
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Table 8-33: Respondents' Attitude on Whether there were too many Bank/Building Society





Regional.. .BS National BS
Too many 12 12% 11 22% 1 2%
About right 40 40% 21 42% 19 38%
Not enough 41 41% 13 26% 28 56%
Don't know 7 7% 5 10% 2 4%
TOTAL 100 100% 50 100% 50 100%
In the early 1980s financial institutions were criticised for opening too many branches
but as banks reversed this policy in the late 1990s concerns were raised about financial
exclusion (Pratt et al. 1996). Table 8-33 confirms this anxiety with 41% believing there
were insufficient branches. Moreover 56% respondents from National BS, which was
in a more deprived location, felt more branches were required, while a majority of
Regional BS respondents (64%) did not want any further branches. This evidence,
while supporting Pratt et al.'s (1996) findings that branch closures disproportionately
occur in poorer communities, suggests that respondents were aware of and opposed to
the process. Arguments by financial institutions that branch closures are concerned
with restructuring camouflage a class bias. Following this it would be expected that
institutions that keep branches open will accrue considerable goodwill and this is
partially confirmed when analysed against support for demutualisation. Fully 75% of
those against demutualisation believe there are insufficient branches compared to only
30% of those that support conversion, suggesting that the reciprocity attached to branch
retention is an important component of mutuality.






Regional BS National BS
Should close them 13 13% 6 12% 7 14%
Should not close them 80 80% 40 80% 40 80%
Don't know 7 7% 4 8% 3 6%
TOTAL 100 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Table 8-34 provides further endorsement of this perspective with 80% opposed to their
mutual closing little used branches, with identical opposition from both societies. This
may be partially because the surveyed branch of Regional BS was itself only
moderately busy, a fact accepted by four respondents who were concerned that the
branch was about to close. Support was solid across all categories, even 80% of those
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who wanted the society to become a bank opposed closure. This suggests a
contradiction, with respondents wanting demutualisation but being opposed to the
probable impact of that process. Similarly, building societies may need to close
branches to maintain competitiveness but most respondents ignored this consideration.
This demonstrates the risk of building societies relying on branch interaction as a means
of delivering reciprocity, but as Table 8-24 shows, members' reciprocity through loyalty
to the society is only moderate.









Professional 54 69% 46 84% 8 35%
Friendly 69 89% 48 87% 21 91%
Community/people
oriented
25 32% 12 22% 56% 13
Amateurish/poorly
run
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Without branches different variables had to be employed to assess reciprocity at credit
unions. Against a list of options respondents were asked which best described their
credit union and were permitted more than one selection (Table 8-35). Further evidence
for the near absence of community cohesion at Employee CU was apparent as only 22%
believed the credit union was community and/or people oriented, this contrasts with the
56% at Community CU. Part of the explanation for the equivocal Community CU
support may be due to the process of transformation from wholly voluntary to a
professional service. Unsurprisingly some respondents may reflect fondly on those
earlier days when all members were known to each other.
More strikingly only 35% of Community CU respondents considered the credit union
professional as opposed to 84% at Employee CU. From these results it is apparent that
the transformation to professionalism has not been complete at Community CU. These
findings expose the dilemma facing many credit unions, of how they balance the
requirement to become more professional without sacrificing their community
reciprocity. However, neither society was considered amateur and both received high
marks for friendliness, from this it is clear that both credit unions still receive
considerable degree of goodwill from members. What this table does not provide is the
views of those who have chosen not to join the credit union.
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None 25 33% 25 46% 0 0%
Cash points 24 31% 10 18% 14 61%
Money advise 15 19% 10 18% 5 22%
Credit cards 11 14% 11 20% 0 0%
Cheque books 10 13% 8 15% 2 9%
Internet banking 5 6% 5 9%
More collection points 4 5% 4 7% 0 0%
Longer opening hours 3 4% 2 4% 1 4%
Don't know 2 3% 1 2% 1 4%
Miscellaneous 7 9% 3 6% 4 17%
Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy argues that as organisations become more professional
they become more detached from members, however Table 8-36 suggests that this is yet
to occur at the credit unions. Rather at Employee CU the members are demanding
services currently beyond the organisation, and the staff at Community CU wanted to
offer money advice and ultimately a cash point, both which were requested by
respondents. The challenge for the credit unions is managing expectation, clearly the
respondents at Employee CU would like a full range of banking services and this is
unattainable with the current size of the organisation. If this is not communicated
effectively, members may perceive their mutual unwilling to accede to their demands,
which are influenced by the provision of services by larger capitalist entities.
8.6	 Caution
In chapter two it was argued that caution is a main component of mutuality as it enables
trust and reciprocity to flourish, and encourages both the mutual and member to engage
in long-term planning. While building societies offer low risk savings accounts and
secured lending such as mortgages, credit unions employ the policy of saving before
borrowing to ensure stability of lending for relatively small amounts. Though this
cautious lending strategy benefits the mutual, it is unclear whether it assists the member.
To address this issue the following four Tables (8.37-40) analyse different aspects of
this debate.
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Much easier 63 81% 42 76% 21 92%
A little easier 7 9% 6 11% 1 4%
Neither easier of harder 6 8% 5 9% 1 4%
Don't know 2 3% 2 4% 0 0%
TOTAL 78 100% 55 100% 23 100%
In Table 8-37 90% of respondents believed using the credit union made it easier to save
money. It may be anticipated that this question would receive strong affirmative
response from Employee CU respondents who have their contributions deducted from
their salary. However, it is Community CU respondents who feel they benefit most
from the credit union.









Bank 37 47% 31 56% 6 26%
Save up/gone
without
14 18% 10 18% 4 17%
Store credit 13 17% 7 13% 6 26%
Never borrowed 10 13% 9 16% 1 4%
Moneylender 8 10% 2 4% 6 26%
Kinship group 8 10% 3 5% 5 22%
Though respondents clearly believed they benefited from membership of a credit union,
it was necessary to assess whether using the service had merely displaced other
legitimate credit sources. Table 8-38 does indicate that respondents appear to be using
more credit and moving from conventional finance to the credit union, except at
Community CU, where members are accessing credit unavailable through other means.
In addition, borrowing from stores and moneylenders are both more expensive than
credit unions (Dayson et al. 1999), while no high street bank offers loans less than £500.
Credit unions are also recycling money within the community, unlike the banks who
due to globalisation are removing money from communities and investing it elsewhere
including tax-free havens or using it to speculate on the money markets. This is
particularly acute in Britain since unlike the USA it does not have a Community
Reinvestment Act that forces banks to invest in the communities where they draw their
income. Moreover even the 31% who have never used credit can be interpreted
218
positively. In an increasingly consumerist society access and use of credit has become a
social norm. A credit union may provide reassurance to those nervous about borrowing
-
that they will not become over-indebted.
Table 8-39: Respondents' View on Whether they would use Credit more or less if they Were Not









Much more 10 13% 3 5% 7 30%
A bit more 6 8% 5 9% 1 4%
About the same 38 49% 30 55% 8 35%
A bit less 12 15% 9 16% 3 13%
A lot less 7 9% 5 9% 2 9%
Never use
credit
1 1% 1 2% 0 0%
Don't know 4 5% 2 4% 2 9%
TOTAL 78 100% 55 100% 23 100%
This is partially supported in Table 8-39 which shows that membership of the credit
union neither encourages or discourages usage of credit. However, the less financially
aware respondents from Community CU believed that the credit union has prevented
them from accessing more credit.










Much easier 35 45% 20 - 36% 15 65%
A little easier 20 26% 16 29% 4 17%
Neither easier or
harder
19 24% 17 31% 2 9%
More difficult 1 1% 0 0% 1 4.5%
Don't know 3 4% 2 4% 1 4.5%
TOTAL ,_ 78 100%	 _ 55 100% 23 100%
Finally 71% of respondents accepted that being in the credit union had made it easier to
save money. Again this finding was stronger among the less financially sophisticated
respondents at Community CU. Although the sample is small, nine of those who had
previously saved up rather than borrowing found the credit union made using credit
much easier. Overall, these tables suggest that respondents prefer credit from credit
unions because that it does not increase risks of over-indebtedness, it does not
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encourage excessive credit usage, and it makes it easier to save money and mange their
finances. On this basis it appears that members find credit unions an appropriate
vehicle for the delivery of cautious borrowing.
8.7	 Assessing Functionalist Claims
Functionalist arguments that foresee an inevitable decline in mutuality have two strands.
First, that due to economic globalisation and the requirement for financial institutions to
become larger to achieve economies of scale and remain competitive, smaller regional
entities cannot survive. Second, mutuality is most effective if there is a personal
relationship between the members. Unfortunately this is lost as mutuals grow and
become more professional, resulting in a separation between the interests of members
and management. These two trends make it almost impossible for mutuals to prosper
since attempting to resolve the first inevitable causes the second. In chapter four the
relative merits of these arguments were discussed, but much of the interpretation is
based on conjecture regarding future of global economic development. Rather than add
to the speculation the respondents were asked their attitudes of these issues.





Strongly agree 2 4%
Agree 6 12%
Neither agree nor disagree 4 8%
Disagree 18 36%
Strongly disagree 13 26%
Don't.know 7 14%
TOTAL 50 100%
Table 8-41 shows a clear rejection of the first functionalist interpretation, with 62%
believing that Regional BS could survive. Many of the respondents made strongly
worded references to the "cult of bigness" arguing that provided Regional BS was well
managed it could continue to develop. Most preferred the immediacy of their
relationship with Regional BS, often comparing it with the service they received
elsewhere:
"I am very loyal to them. They have very good customer liaisons and no queues"
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"There should be something different to the banks. The banks are too powerful,
-
everything is becoming too big"
Another respondent believed that small organisations could be quicker to respond to
market changes. There was also a rejection of globalisation with five respondents
bemoaning the growth of multinationals:
"I like things small, there are too many multinationals"
Even among the minority who felt Regional BS would succumb to demutualisation
there was no desire for change, rather a sad acceptance of the inevitable attached to
sense of dejection:
"It's very good I wish it was a wee bit bigger, but long term it'll just get swallowed"
Not only was there minimal support for the functionalist attitude but the minority who
believed the society could survive came from the middle classes, while the most
vociferous opposition to change was from the working class. Consequently, without
any cross-class popular support or acceptance the functionalist argument is actually part
of a process of financial exclusion of the working class.






Mainly true 4 8%
Sometimes true 3 6%
Neither true or false 2 4%
Sometimes false 3 6%
Mainly false 38 76%
TOTAL 50 100
Respondents at National BS overwhelmingly rejected the second functionalist
interpretation, with 82% believing that the society was not too large to care about
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members (Table 8-42). Supporters of the statement were drawn from across the
occupational classes, age and gender, indicating that these were members with specific
-
complaints. However, three of the four who felt the statement was mainly true were
also in favour in conversion to a bank, while 100% of those who considered themselves
members believed it was false. Only respondents who thought they were customers
supported the statement and this may indicate that as consumers they have different
expectations than members. Indeed they may see no reciprocal relationship between
them and the mutual. The findings would suggest that providing National BS continues
to treat users as members it will survive, but this may be affected by the alien consumer
culture. Once again demonstrating how mutuals are affected by capitalism rather than
any evolutionary inevitability. Based on this small-scale research, respondents have
rejected the functionalist accounts of the future of mutuals, therefore it is likely that
other factors may be responsible for any transformation.
8.8	 Thatcherism proposition
Rather than a process of economic inevitability, the synthesised embeddedness and a
neo-Marxist interpretation of demutualisation emphasises the role of the capitalist state
and the imposition of Thatcherism which made conversion culturally acceptable. To
assess this claim respondents were asked a series of inter-related questions about
privatisation culminating in the opinion of this change. Subsequently cross-tabulations
can be performed to judge whether an acceptance of Thatcherism results in an
endorsement of demutualisation.















140 79% 45 82% 13 57% 42 84% 40 80%
Not
aware
31 17% 7 13% 6 26% 8 16% 10 20%
Not sure 7 4% 3 5% 4 17% 0 0
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Initially respondents were questioned about their awareness of the phrase 'privatisation
of nationalised industries' and with the exception of Community CU over 80% had
heard of the term. Further analysis indicated an age distinction with only 50% of those
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under 30 with knowledge of the phrase, compared to 46% who had not. In all other age
categories the response rate was in excess of 80%. Additionally a class difference was
noted with 61% of the working class aware of the phrase (39% were not), but or .ily 10%
of the middle classes were not.





British Rail 57 32%
British Gas 46 26%
British Telecom 33 19%
Electricity Board 27 15%
Water Board 24 14%
British Steel/Coal Board 16 9%
Other 4 2%
Respondents were then asked to name industries which had been privatised and Table 8-
44 shows that almost a third mentioned British Rail, compared to 9% who mentioned
British Steel or the National Coal Board. All classes, age groups, and genders
mentioned the privatisation of British Rail and all those who passed comment were
critical of the process.















13 24% 0 15 30% 7 14%
No 131 74% 40 73% 22 96% 28 56% 41 82%
No
response
12 7% 2 3% 1 4% 7 14% 2 4%
TOTAL 178 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Once respondents' knowledge of privatisation was assessed they were asked whether
they had bought shares in privatised companies. As Table 8-45 demonstrates only 20%
had and most of these were members of Employee CU and Regional BS. This is
reflected in the class analysis with only 5% of the working classes buying shares
compared to 24% of the middle class, and 30% of Conservatives as opposed to 15% of
Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters. In addition 36% of those in favour of
demutualisation had purchased shares. Furthermore 32% of those who had received
shares in other demutualisations also had shares in privatisations, compared to only 13%
who had not, suggesting that the Neo-Marxist synthesis may have some validity.
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33 19% 11 20% 2 9% 13 26% 7 14%
Mixed 58 33% 28 52% 6 25% 12 24% 12 24%
Disapprove 23 13% 3 6% 0 10 20% 10 20%
Strongly
disapprove
21 12% 1 2% 3 13% 3 6% 14 28%
Don't
know
27 15% 9 16% 12 52% 2 4% 4 8%
TOTAL 177 100% 55 100% 23 100% 50 100% 50 100%
The final aspect for the embeddedness proposition to be explored was the respondents'
attitude towards privatisation. Table 8-46 shows the evenness of the division with 26%
of the sample favouring privatisation and 27% against. This disguised the polarised
positions within three of the mutuals. Clear majorities in support of privatisation of
+16% at Employee CU and +20% at Regional BS contrasted with —28% at National BS.
Only Community CU was equivocal and this is probably due to the lower awareness
level of privatisation than at the other mutuals (see Table 8-43).
After conducting cross-tabulations, attitudes to privatisation divided along class, gender,
political allegiance, ownership of shares, and ultimately attitudes to demutualisation.
Among the middle classes 34% supported privatisation compared to 16% against,
producing a net +28% support. In contrast only 15% of the working class supported
privatisation and 39% opposed it. Consequently there is a 50% net difference in the
attitudes of the classes towards privatisation. Similarly men (+23% net) were keener on
denationalisation than women (-14% net). Unsurprisingly Conservatives endorsed the
process (+33% net) while Labour supporters expressed their disagreement (-24% net).
Support was also high among those who had purchased shares in privatised companies
(+38%), compared to a net —10% for those who did not. Also those who had received a
building society windfall were more inclined to support demutualisation (net +27), as
opposed to those who had not (-9%). Finally the embeddedness analysis that the culture
of privatisation established an environment for demutualisation was endorsed by the
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cross-tabulation of attitudes about demutualisation. This showed that 51% of those who
favour demutualisation also believed privatisation was a good thing, while only 24%
disagreed. Of those opposed to demutualisation 28% expressed support for privatisation
and 36% were against.
8.9	 Summary and Conclusions
The survey of mutual members has identified a class-based cleavage rather than a
functional division due to size or type of institution. It is apparent that the middle
classes place less value in reciprocity and display less loyalty to their mutual, engaging
in a more commodified relationship. By contrast the working classes are strong
supporters of a branch-based relationship and are committed to their mutual regardless
of its size. With regards to demutualisation it is clear that the middle class have been
the major beneficiaries and are more prepared to sacrifice mutuality providing they
receive a windfall. Demutualisation detrimentally affects the working class because of
the subsequent threat of branch closures, which are more preponderant in working class
communities, and they are less likely to receive a windfall. Finally the survey has
demonstrated a connection between the attitudes towards demutualisation and
privatisation, supporting the embeddedness interpretation that demutualisation was an
outcome of Thatcherism, rather than a function of the size of the mutual.
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9 Attitudes of Active Members
-
Although most members are passive with minimal participation beyond voting rights a
few have become more engaged. As discussed in chapter 3 this renewal in activity
arose in the early 1980s and continues today. During these twenty years the objective of
members involved has changed dramatically, but as will be discussed later, many of the
arguments employed are universal.
Collective action by members was originally restricted to specific societies in response
to a management decision, usually to merge with another society. This changed with
the formation of the Building Societies Members Association (BSMA) in 1982, which
is dedicated to the enhancement of democracy and management accountability to
members. BSMA remains a relatively small pressure group with less than 500 members
and communicates either informally or through a quarterly newsletter. Once
demutualisation began a number of pro-mutual groups were formed, but again these
were society specific. It was not until 1996 that a new industry-wide wide organisation
was formed; Members for Conversion (MfC). Unlike BSMA and the pro-mutual
groups these wanted to encourage more societies to demutualise. They furthered their
objectives by signposting potential converting societies to interested members and
supporting pro-conversion candidates and motions. Not only were MfC anti-mutual but
also they used new technology and the intemet as a means of communication. Initially
this was via e-mail correspondence and later through public bulletin boards, once the
Webmaster had agreed to manage the website. His revamp resulted in eight bulletin
boards being established: New Campaigns, Carpetbagging Tips, Current Conversions
and Takeovers, Rules and Regulations, Mutuality vs Conversion, Other Mutuals,
Miscellaneous, and About this Website. MfC was a collection of individuals who
converged on the website bulletin boards and with the exception of Michael Hardem,
they all remained anonymous. Through using the bulletin boards they were able to
communicate almost instantaneously reducing both the time taken to exchange
information and the problems associated with a geographical spread of members.
Gradually MfC metamorphosed into Carpetbagger.com
 and it is this group which are
the predominant focus of this chapter. The term that denigrated opportunist investors
was adopted as a badge of honour. It had the added bonus of being "newsworthy" and
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"sexy". The response of carpetbaggers themselves was to re-evaluate the original
definition as: "An astute investor, often of modest means, who spots brilliant investment
-
opportunities" (http://www.carpetbagger.com/main.htm) . The website also reminded
surfers that carpetbaggers were progressive democrats who had opposed the backward
and racist sentiments of the Confederacy States. To them the metaphor fitted their
analysis of the contemporary building society movement. They perceived themselves as
the resistance fighters struggling against an antiquated system. This moralistic tone is
central to what could be described as the carpetbaggers' narrative, which I will discuss
later.
After Carpetbagger.com other websites arose including COBS, Members First, and
Bobbins. However, these either lacked bulletin boards or were spoof websites created
by carpetbaggers who wanted to criticise pro-mutual support. The most infamous of
these websites was the `Porlcman' which in its original form altered the Portman
Building Society's website (see appendix E).
In response to Carpetbagger.com pro-mutuals members coalesced around Save Our
Building Societies (SOBS) and its eponymous website. For a short period in 1999-2000
SOBS had a lively bulletin board but this gradually degenerated and was eventually
removed. SOBS continues to function, using the website as an electronic newsletter and
issuing regular press releases. More recently, two further sites have begun: Mutual
Members, who claim to be a pro-democracy site without a bulletin board. In many
respects Mutual Members share the same philosophy of Members First and are
supported by both BSMA, which now has a website, and Carpetbagger.com in that they
believe in fair elections and the right of members to vote on conversions if they get
sufficient nominations for elections. In contrast building society management remain
unsure of Mutual Members motives, as to whether they are an extension of BSMA or a
'stalking horse' for Carpetbagger.com. The other group is Themoneybag.net, formed
after a split within Carpetbagger.com . According to the Webmaster this arose when
some participants became disenchanted after Totalise plc purchased a stake in
Carpetbagger.com, believing that this compromised the integrity and independence of
the website. An alternative perspective is that the key contributors were unhappy that
they were not being financially rewarded, unlike the Webmaster, this was indicated by




"Hard to exploit though. Webm aster does not post very much and we regulars would
not take kindly to someone else getting all the money so would disappear leaving just
another SOBS type board." (Dilbert, Re: my view of this ..., Current Conversions and
Takeovers, 8 December 1999).
The ensuing dispute and resulting division was invariably bitter with invective being
thrown on both sides. What aggravated the situation was the personality of the leader of
the breakaway faction, known as Pilot/Dilbert whose robust promotion of carpetbaggers
and demeaning of the views of pro-mutualists even disturbed other carpetbaggers. This
antipathy was heightened when Pilot/Dilbert adopted a similar style when arguing with
carpetbaggers loyal to the Webmaster.
"Nothing against people making money [discussing Dilbert 0800 carpetbagging
information line] . However, I an against unprincipled chancers fleecing naïve,
unknowledgeable [sic] newcomers. Not good for our cause. The BS Corporate Swine
fleece us daily and [you] seem to want to do likewise. Sony to say this but, you are a
notorious far right-wing Tory zealot." (Harry the Haddock, Message to Dilbert, Current
Conversions & Takeovers, 22 January 2000)
"I'm not going to waste words on you. You have so many chips on your shoulder that,
together with your haddock, you could open a fish and chip shop ....A chancer — oh I see
— you only respect 'no risk' investments like bagging I suppose. ... Carpetbagging is
essentially a right of centre of activity — I want to see the end of inefficient mutualism
which I see as part of socialism. If you are socialist carpetbagger then I suggest you
mixing your metaphors (not to say your drinks!)" (Dilbert, Postscript, Current
Conversions & Takeovers, 23 January 2000).
Themoneybag.net
 attracted many of the long-standing contributors to carpetbagger.com
and website 'hit rates' followed this transfer of intellectual capital. Eventually
Carpetbagger.com was reduced to a small cohort of contributors with loyalty to the
Webmaster and/or had been engaged in a dispute with Pilot/Dilbert. A few
carpetbaggers used both sites, attempting to promote collective agendas and the transfer
of information and news. In December 2000 Themoneybag.net  briefly closed after
Dilbert/Pilot terminated the service and publicly withdrew from carpetbagging.
Although the sequence of events proved impossible to clarify completely it appears that
Pilot/Dilbert felt unappreciated as he signed off with a missive critical of many
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contributors8 . Shortly afterwards the site recommenced and changed to broaden the
appeal of the service beyond building society conversion to include
-
 general financial
information, which Dilbert/Pilot was already developing, were introduced. A similar
process was also underway at Carpetbagger.com, in both cases due in part to the decline
in demutualisations and the failure of successive campaigns. As at September 2002
Themoneybag.net
 remained the busier site although both had less correspondence about
demutualisation. In the media Carpetbagger.com remains the most cited site mainly due
to the public profile of the Webmaster. Meanwhile a largely anonymous site
Themoneybag.com has been unable to establish media image, although it has been at
the forefront of campaigns to demutualise Standard Life.
This chapter will draw on the ethnography of the various bulletin boards of
Carpetbagger.com , SOBS, and Themoneybag.net  to complete the portrayal and analysis
of mutuals in the late twentieth century. Specifically it will begin by examining
whether these groups can be perceived as a New Social Movement within mutuals, this
will include reviewing the roles of key participants and their attitudes and whether this
is broader than the narrow confines of demutualisation. In the following section the use
of the intemet will be assessed and in particular the effect of time and space
distanciation on local building societies. Thereafter the opinion of website users
regarding tenants of mutuality will be discussed.
9.1	 Carpetbaggers — A New Social Movement?
Chapter 3 outlined the evolution of carpetbaggers and their transformation from a sole
campaigner in 1996 to a highly discussed pressure group by late 1999. Though
carpetbaggers' stated objective was the conversion of mutuals, they adopted the
language and narratives of conventional New Social Movements (NSM). It is my
contention that just as NSM seek the reorientation of capitalist society, so carpetbaggers
perceive themselves, however inappropriate this may seem to their critics, as in the
vanguard of changing mutual societies. It should not be assumed that all carpetbaggers
ii Dilbert's final post was withdrawn before I could examine it, but was discussed extensively in the
following weeks by other carpetbaggers.
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share the same ideological motivations as there are many degrees of engagement, but
for the most committed there is disillusionment with mutuality, with those in authority
-
of mutuals, alongside strong libertarian attitudes.
9.1.1	 Personalities
Carpetbagging may have begun with one leading figure but his continued prominence
within the media contrasts with the views of many long-serving carpetbaggers:
"Dear Hacks,
By now you will have realised our general consensus on Michael Hardern ... 	 whilst
he showed us the way forward, he didn't lead us on the path towards our aim.
Hardern is currently nothing more than a media puppet." (Posted by Cherry & Whites
Bagger, titled: To Central Hack City, BBC et al; 14 December 1999)
For leading carpetbaggers Hardern's legacy was contradictory giving the 'movement'
publicity but his erratic behaviour became an increasing embarrassment. With the
departure of Hardern Carpetbagger.com lacked a public spokesperson until the
Webmaster volunteered in the autumn of 1999:
"It has to [be] said that whilst there are a lot of people on the site and they've all got
views and opinions and a lot of enthusiasm, when it comes down to it there are very few
people that are willing to actually do something. In particular put their head above the
parapet and go into the public eye and say I'm the new king of the carpetbaggers or
whatever it is. Which actually sent, me and another regular by the name of Ord, ... we
discussed late in the autumn what are we going to do we've got the building societies
AGMs coming up, the top ten, are there are going to be any campaigns, whatever, and I
said well look I think we should do these three that 's my view, Portman, Skipton and
Chelsea and if we can find two other people to figurehead the campaigns at two of those
societies then I'll do the other one. And we went back to the regulars who had been so
appalled at you know why I supported Hardern in the first place and nobody was
willing to do it, we couldn't find a single person to do it. Now I wasn't very keen to
become the public figure for all three because I knew that would attract a lot of
publicity and I was in working out a contract at the time and meeting a lot of people
and knew that the media and papers so I thought right I can't be doing with any this
stuff At the end of the day it became a choice between going public and taking all the
flak that comes with that or just letting the whole thing collapse and I wasn't willing to
do the latter." (Interview with the Webmaster)
The only other carpetbaggers that are publicly known were Naunton-Doe, Muir and
Major. Major led the successful campaign to convert Bradford and Bingley in 1999,
and although he was not a regular contributor, the website supported his motion.
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Similarly Naunton-Doe has used Carpetbagger.Com and Themoneybag.net to secure
nominators for elections at the Chelsea and the Nationwide. The remaining
-
carpetbaggers prefer to remain anonymous and adopt a pseudonym to protect their
identities from "watching" building societies. During the fieldwork requests were made
for carpetbaggers to be interviewed, but only the Webmaster agreed. Although the
anonymity of carpetbaggers causes difficulty when attempting to verify statements, the
length of the research period enabled me to identify the key personalities on the
websites. The predominant carpetbagger is known as Ord and has been a regular
contributor since 1997. Ord posts virtually everyday and is recognised by most
carpetbaggers as the intellectual leader of the site. Less emotional than many
contributors Ord posts often involve an analysis of a building society's financial
performance, followed by a critique of their current mutual status:
"Directors 'pay 1998 as a % of assets. Spot the odd one out.
Nationwide 0.0051%; Bradford & Bingley 0.0053; Britannia 0.0061%; Yorkshire
0.0109%; Portman 0.0272%; Coventiy 0.01075%; Skipton 0.0210%; Chelsea
0.0244%; Leeds & Holbeck 0.0164;
I think that the Portman directors will come to regret the decision they took today."
(Ord, Spot the Odd One Out, New Campaigns, 30 December 1999)
The Webmaster claimed there were between 10-15,000 people who visited the website
every month, the vast of majority of whom could be described as carpetbaggers. Most
users 'lurked' on the website, so correspondence was limited to a core group of about
30, with others making smaller contributions. Using this data and months of
observation I have classified carpetbaggers into five categories.
1. Leaders — Ord, Webmaster, Pilot/Dilbert
2. Key contributors — Act Mutual or X, Miss Marple, McBag A'Lot, Danbert
Nobacon, Robert Shilling/Building Society Bob
3. Occasional contributors — Ten Passbooks, Walter Plinge
4. Information seekers — individuals usually asking a specific question
5. Lurkers — The vast majority who make no contribution. They may return a
proxy form during an election campaign, but usually their support is passive.
These categories are flexible and people may move between the groups as their
circumstances and participation levels alter. The leadership has remained static since
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1999, until Dilbert/Pilot's alleged 'retirement' in December 2001. Key contributors
regularly change with Miss Marple ceasing contact in early 2000 and Danbert Nobacon
-beginning shortly after. Of course it is possible that a contributor may change or
operate simultaneous identities, a practice often used by Robert Shilling/Building
Society Bob, along with 'jokes' about the apparently close relationship between these
two pseudonyms. Additionally there are historical posters that receive the occasional
valedictory comments. These are either founders or former key contributors, most no
longer post or make occasional interjections. Examples of these include: Hawkeye,
Sarah Count, Tim, Lady Bagchester, Two Bags, Beccles, and Ali Bagger. Of the
original commentators only Ord has remained continually involved although Ali Bagger
and Beccles have returned in the last year.
Usually the contributors were exchanging information and giving advice about fresh
bagging opportunities, and regulars discussed the availability of 'bags' in towns they
were visiting. More light-heartedly some exchanged tips on how to store passbooks, and
which passbook cover was the most attractive. The websites users intra-advisory
services were supplemented by relevant news items, which were often 'cut and pastes'
or links to other websites.
"below is from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/business/newsid  544000/544649.stm
Interestingly, the Beeb seems to be portraying demutualisation in terms of economic
determinism, rather than nasty evil greedy baggers on the rampage
	 	 -)"
Occasionally disputes arose, most inflammatory are accusations that their activities are
immoral. The best example of this was the 'Weary Bagger' discussion that was
partially reproduced in the Daily Mail:
"This whole discussion area strikes me as rather distasteful. I'm not in favour of idiots
like Disgruntled rampaging around bringing discussion down to the level of the
playground, but sometimes I think I might actually prefer that to the stomach-churning,
self-righteous hypocrisy I've seen here.... the fact can't be avoided that what we are
doing is parasitic, and no amount of sanctimonious debate on democratic rights and
fat-cat mutual directors can change it. We aren't doing this for the greater good of the
country. We're doing it to get something for nothing, and we should have the courage
to hold our hands up and admit the fact. And, to tell the truth, we should all have
enough of a sense of shame about this to try to get on with it as discreetly as possible.
The sight of the likes of us raucously demanding large sums of money we've done
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absolutely nothing to earn can only serve to disgust most people." (Weary Bagger, A
Little Honesty, Mutuality vs Conversion, 3 January 1999)
-
In responding to Weary Bagger JD believed his investments were made to secure a
better old age as he had been made redundant in his 50s. Weary Bagger acknowledged
this believing: "the real world is a hard place, we can all use the extra, and top
businessmen are on the take all the time.." (Weary Bagger, A Little Honesty, Mutuality
vs Conversion, 3 January 1999)
As the criticism grew, Weary Bagger defended the original statement by classifying
carpetbaggers: Those that invest the minimum amount and "keep their fingers crossed
for a windfall". Another set who Weary Bagger believed were the majority who
invested prudently, while being aware of windfall opportunities. Both of these practices
were "slightly cynical" and "hardly a shinning advert for the nobility of the human
spirit." However, Weary Bagger reserved the most strident criticism for "the scum".
They are overtly cynical "but they aren't content to leave things there — I mean those
who then have to gloat about what they're doing as if it's something to be proud of
bragging about wiping the smiles off the faces of Building Society staff who are merely
doing a job that they stand a pretty fair chance of losing: and those mealy mouthed
hypocrites who rant about their "right" to take part in democratic elections to oust
corrupt Boards of Directors, as if they are crusaders for integrity, when all they are
really interested in is a tidy personal profit. "(Weary Bagger, A little honesty, Mutuality
vs Conversion, 8 January 1999).
Nor was the distaste for the more money motivated carpetbaggers isolated to Weary
Bagger, but those who raised such issues were invariably accused of being a building
society stooge.
Frustration with this paranoia was exemplified in an exchange beginning with Dilbert
accusing G. Gecko of being a 'plant':
"Whenever a contributor to this site expresses any sort of qualm about carpetbagging,
you can be sure the accusation "plant" is never going to be far away... Ultimately, the
arguments for conversion seem to me to carry the greater weight, and it then becomes a
matter of mere financial prudence to try and make sure that my family and I will be
amongst the beneficiaries when the inevitable happens. ... That doesn't change the fact,
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however, that those who take carpetbagging to its most cynical extreme (the £100 in as
many societies as possible brigade who don't give a damn about the interest rate being
earned or whether conversion will actually benefit anyone other than themselves) are
never going to win any popularity contests. There's no point in denying this fact, which
is why someone posts it every so often — and you don't have to be a plant to do so."
(ALKIADT, For goodness sake, New Campaigns, 8 January 2000).
"Most carpetbaggers are aware that the open flouting of any "greed is good"
statements can only be used to harm our cause. Therefore they tend not to make them.
Those people that do will continue to be mistrusted by me as BS plants. (Or just plain
stupid)
The choice of handle is usually a giveaway. If it seems designed to offend when we have
a case to win in the press and public arena, then we can do without such people." (Ord,
For goodness sake, New Campaigns, 8 January 2000)
These exchanges demonstrate the sensitivity of carpetbaggers to any hostile criticism
and a self-created belief that they are an oppressed group under surveillance by building
societies. This necessitates the requirement for assumed identities as they 'fear' that
building societies will expel them if they are 'exposed'. Evidential support for this
came when the Britannia terminated the membership of the carpetbaggers who
nominated Michael Hardern for director in 1999, a practice later followed by Leek
United and the Portman when rejecting demutualisation proposals. Additionally most
carpetbaggers were pursuing membership with other building societies and wanted to
avoid harming their chances by public disclosure.
9.1.2 How the website operates
Table 9.1 shows that Carpetbagger.Com  usage peaked during the
Portman/Slcipton/Chelsea conversion proposals at the turn of the millennium. 'Hits' to
the site rose from 22,837 per day at the end of October 1999 to peak at 73,570 during
week commencing the 16 January 2000, before declining slightly to approximately
58,800 at the end of February. Unfortunately subsequent data was not available,
although the establishment of Themoneybag.net
 resulted in fewer contributors and is
therefore likely to have less hits.
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Table 9-1: Usage of Carpetbagger.Com










































Prior to the winter 1999 campaign most discussion concentrated on advice. While
building societies were converting most contributors were content to use the website as
an electronic information service. Its politicisation began when Michael Hardem was
defeated in the Nationwide directors election of 1998. Amid claims of underhand
practices, carpetbaggers began to organise and discuss tactics and strategy. An early
victim of this transformation came when Michael Hardem was deposed. According to
Richard Yendall regular contributors threatened to withdraw from the website, even
going to the extent of launching a temporary service, unless Hardem's access ended.
There was no democratic process involved as carpetbaggers had, and continue to have,
no constitution or rules. Instead they were a loose confederation of interests and
therefore could responded swiftly, informally and flexibly to any given crisis. Such an
event occurred in November 1999 when the government announced changes in
secondary legislation resulting in raising the number of members required to propose
motions from 50 to up to 500 in the largest societies. The immediate response was
despair with Ord announcing his retirement:
"Congratulations to SOBS/Bob on an excellent lobbying job. You've effectively sunk
the BS Act of 1997 without trace. It looks like we'll have to concede defeat. C'est la
vie. All fair in love and building society wars.
I may be contacting people to send then a Christmas card as final gesture before
bagging enters the History books.
In the meantime we'd better all hit the bottle and keep our fingers crossed that Santa
exists after all. You never know." (Ord, Calm down everyone, New Campaigns, 13
November 1999)
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Rather than ending carpetbagging the final sentence signalled its transformation into a
type of NSM. The website became a communication centre for the campaign to secure
sufficient supporters for conversion motions before the 1st December deadline. Press
releases were issued and pleas to carpetbaggers were made by their 'leaders' and other
prominent contributors. To ensure the veracity of nominations members were asked to
forward a copy of their passbook with their proposal form. After ten days of
campaigning the website had secured over 300 nominators at the Chelsea and Skipton
and 500 at the Portman. Understandably carpetbaggers were delighted and Yendall
received 21 postings from contributors offering their congratulations appreciation. At
the same time the regulars began to realise the importance of getting organised and Ord
asked regulars to get in contact and start writing to the press.
Despite the success some carpetbaggers remained unhappy that the motions included a
10% donation of windfalls to charity, exposing the difficulty of running a campaign
where the objective is personal aggrandisement:
"You know, I'm getting pretty sick and tired of this "giving windfalls to charity thing".
Giving to charity is meant to be a voluntary act.
Windfalls should go to the folk that bother to get off their backsides and go for it. If
they want to give some or all of it to charity later that's their business.
It's the old Brit thing again.., anyone that makes a penny more than his neighbour is a
money grabbing pig." (Carpet Pilot, The charity thing, Carpetbagging Tips, 5 December
1999)
But it was the rejection of the motion by the Portman and the subsequent adoption of
them by the Chelsea and Skipton on a technicality that caused the most disquiet.
Contributors were stunned at these unexpected events and some began to question the
future of carpetbagging: The more thoughtful contributors reminded others that
carpetbagging was a long-term activity and investment should be planned accordingly:
"It's a patient game. Long-term economic forces are on our side. Short term sentiment
(and abuse of the reserves) mean that some of the larger BSs are on the front foot at the
moment ....So you certainly can't afford to assume that your bags will become windfalls.
BUT if you've got time on your hands, they might." (Ord, Reply from Ord,
Miscellaneous, 29 December 1999)
With the expulsion of members from the Portman the website had its first martyrs and
had a cause beyond windfalls, an interpretation shared by the Webmaster:
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"But yeah it has moved on there are various motives behind why people do it but they
basically see it as a cause, a campaign, and one they enjoy fighting".... You know in
some ways when we lose a battle like when we lost at the Portman I'm not that bothered
because the battle goes on.. .1 do genuinely feel there is something very wrong here and
I just can't even i f I wanted to — I'm not sure I could bring myself to walk away from it,
because it just annoys me that a, what these directors are saying and b, the sort of
tactics they are using to silence other people. So the ultimate objective is actually not to
convert the societies it's to get what we regard as a fair vote."
Simultaneous to this politicisation of the website, many regulars were increasingly upset
with the extent of disruptive posts, usually by those claiming to support mutuality.
Over time lists were drawn up of these contributors and regular users issued warnings to
new visitors. Others complained that the site was "over run with rather a lot of idiots"
(Fox, Disruption, About this web site, 14 December 1999). Responding Miss Marple
and Beano the Bagger believed that disruption was inevitable on a website where people
disagreed with each other and that contributors come and go in waves, leaving after they
have secured the information they want or the discussions become repetitive. However,
Dilbert's outburst was a precursor to the eventual split between carpetbaggers that
resulted in the formation of Themoneybag.net . At the time Dilbert cited the
Webmaster's sale of the website as a motivating factor in the establishment of
Themoneybag.net , exposing carpetbaggers sometimes contradictory attitude to
capitalism. This was apparent in November 1999 when `Newbagger suggested floating
carpetbagger.com
 and securing income through selling advertising space on the site; he
received a curt response from Miss Marple:
"Thank you, - but No Thank You!!!
It is a pleasure to have a site WITHOUT advertising." (Miss Marple, Re: Message to
Webmaster -> Possible floatation of Carpetbagger.com ? New Campaigns, 29 November
1999)
Other contributors also preferred the collective approach of Carpetbagger.com  leading
to McBag T'Lot to speculate that there was no advertising because "there is such a
thing as MUTUALITY but we don't see it even i/it is staring us in the face" (McBag
T'Lot, Doesn't Webmaster realise. Current Conversions & Takeovers, 8 December
1999). As was seen earlier in the chapter, even Dilbert, the most Thatcherite of
contributors, used the neo-Marxist discourse of exploitation to justify opposition to
selling the website. After Yendall had sold the website this complaint resurfaced as an
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issue of intellectual property:
n0
... this site would be NOTHING if it were not for those regular old hands who were
posting here daily, through most of the evenings. They have made this site what it has
become, not [Webmaster] . These old hands put together the FAQ 'S which you could
always find on the site to assist the newbies on their first visits ....I do not see why I, or
the rest of us, should bolster what has become a commercial concern to line the pockets
of the honourable [Webmaster]" (Jim, This site and the other one, Miscellaneous, 26
April 2000)
Disputes regarding ownership of the website ultimately resulted in Dilbert/Pilot creating
Themoneybag.net . This appeared to attract more experienced carpetbaggers, although
some, notably Ord communicated on both sites. Among newer users the division
centred on their attitudes towards the censorship of disruptive or unwelcome posts, with
Dilbert/Pilot seen as dictatorial compared to Webmaster's view that a more relaxed
approach was preferable:
"Great to hear your negative view on censorship. I had one post deleted...I think your
stance on the issue will prove more popular than the one held by Herr Pilot" (Sir
Michael Mouse, Questions about my Totalise involvement, 20 April 2000).
Finally, throughout the period of observation a small group of 'elite' carpetbaggers
maintained an exclusive e-mail group:
"When cb.com become disruptive — the regular baggers formed a private mailing list to
keep in touch, the list did not include RY [Richard Yendall] as he was not one of the
actual bagger activists at that time.
That mailing list still exists and RY is not a member of it. About 45 people are on the
list and it has spawned a share tips mailing list since then. Now that we have our own
web site, the list has become less important but it's still alive and well." (Pilot, Richard
(CB.com) has sold us all out!) Themoneybag.net , 18 April 2000).
Though many regulars were aware of the 'inner circle' they were concerned that their
withdrawal from public discussion would adversely effect new carpetbaggers:
"I thought the whole point of this site was to encourage new baggers with
advice/facts/guidance. When I first came here I was a total newbie and don't think I
would have started without this site.
If all the 'bagging gods 'publish in secret, it would be a great loss for the rest of us!"
(Bags of fun, Secret Site, Carpetbagging Tips, 26 October 1999)
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Despite the use of new technology the website experienced a pattern of growth,
division, and decline that characterise many protest movements. Nor was equality of
-
access evident, with an elite group maintaining a strict demarcation between themselves
and other carpetbaggers.
9.1.3 Main arguments employed
The predominant arguments used by carpetbaggers incorporate two narratives, one of
economic determinism and the other of anti-democratic behaviour. These discourses
are used in tandem to argue that building societies' economic performance will result in
their decline in an increasingly competitive environment and this should be welcomed
as they no longer act mutually, which carpetbaggers see as the defining component of
mutuality. Evidence of this combined narrative can be clearly identified in the
following quotes from Ord, Act X, and Pilot. Ord was responding to a request for ten
good reasons for demutualisation while Dilbert was dismissing the arguments of a pro-
mutualist:
"directors having to earn their pay rather than jut sitting on their backsides & rake in
salaries of f350,000...economies of scale from mergers and consolidation which BSs
don't like to do because directors' fees suffer. ...directors will become accountable to
shareholders whereas at present they are a law unto themselves ...BSs are in the
rearguard when it comes to technology ....the mutual dividend will be always be wasted
on inefficiencies and directors. ..Building societies have lost track of their roots & don't
listen to members. They are affront to original mutual idea of the co-op, friendly
society, burial society and early trade unions. They are a disgrace to any democratic
country. The Chartists& co-op pioneers of Rochdale would have wept to see the
Portman directors in action... The most competitive mortgages & savings accounts
come from non-mutuals ...BSs have kept up with the competition so far by running down
their capital ratios (and therefore members' windfalls). At the moment the only people
whose finances are being revolutionised by BSs are the BS directors themselves." (Ord,
Members will be better off, Mutuality vs Conversion, 1 February 2000)
"Conversion is inevitable, as the best rates in the future will come from organisations
that can grow by acquisition, adapt in a rapidly-changing market and invest heavily in
new technology. This process his already underway; nearly 200 societies have
converted or merged since 1980....Directors' arguments against these resolutions may
have more to do with protecting their position and salaries than a belief in
mutuality ...The arguments mutuals are better because they don't pay dividends is
simplistic and irrelevant." (Dilbert, Portman, Chelsea & Skipton — Another Plant!!
Current Conversions & Takeovers, 9 January 1999).
The power of the 'inevitability' narrative establishes a tautological response to any
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questioning of the carpetbaggers argument:
"It was a surprise for me to see that most of the big lenders are banks not building
societies, and the Building Societies account for less than 20% of the market. It looks
like the Building Societies have been out-evolved, and are set to fade into obscurity like
the British Empire." (Lisa, Like the British Empire, Mutuality vs Conversion, 12
January 1999)
"Yes, but how many of the top lenders are ex-building societies? The top two for start.
It seems a bit unfair to approve of a movement which forces mutuals to convert into
banks, and then criticise the remaining mutuals for having a smaller market share!"
(Chris, Like the British Empire, Mutuality vs Conversion, 13 January 1999)
When the remaining building societies seemed intent on staying mutual, carpetbaggers
argued that their own activity had preserved the sector and help it rediscover mutuality:
"Yes, in fact the possibility of windfalls is without doubt responsible for a large
proportion of the most profitable investment in many building societies. We put in
large sums at low interest rates. So we are keeping many of them in business.
If there were no hope of windfalls — huge amounts would be withdrawn and placed with
Egg etc" (Dilbert, A story for you, New Campaigns, 6 January 2000)
For some carpetbaggers such as Dilbert and Next_2001, there is a strong ideological
justification for conversion:
"Mutuality is like the council owning your house on your behalf— not really the ideal
situation is it?... [socialism] is outmoded just like mutuality ... ." (Dilbert, Scottish
Widows, Current Conversions & Takeovers, 24 November 1999).
"Consider the miners argument was:
1) by doing away with UK coal the cost of coal would go up as there would be less
competition.
2) the industry deserved special protection because without it they and many of
their relatives would lose jobs.
Well fancy that I wonder how many of the pro-mutuals supported the miners
argument?" (Next_2001, The Debate, Mutuality vs Conversion, 10 January 1999)
Finally, a less commonly expressed opinion but more often implied perspective is the
comparison between carpetbaggers own experience and that of wealthier members of
society, including building society directors. Usually this argument involves abusing
'fat cats' while questioning why the small investor is considered as immoral:
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"I was actually made redundant by a finance house so I have absolutely no compulsions
in making a legal gain from this sector. ...I suggest thati f a
trader/marketmaker/salesman on the investment wing of a building societies uncovered
a quick way of investing the society funds, risk free, chance of big results — then he
would probably have been considered for a promotion, if a similar person from an
investment bank or similar had earned his company this type of profits he would
probably been made a partner/director/vice president etc so why does the industiy
reward their 'in-house carpetbaggers' then have the gaul to vili.6) the outsiders." (JD,
Has this been said befoe? Mutuality vs Conversion, 3 January 1999)
9.2	 Mutualists — Resistance or Collaborators?
Unlike carpetbaggers it is more difficult to ascertain the motives of mutual supporters
(hereafter called mutualists), as there were fewer of them engaged in discussions on
bulletin boards and it is impossible to clarify completely their relationship with building
societies. Were they as carpetbaggers argued, the 'stooges' of building societies, or
were they a genuinely independent interest group? What makes their position more
ambiguous is whether they are supporting an existing power structure or resisting an
onslaught from the dominant capitalist culture.
9.2.1	 Personalities of mutualists
The most prominent mutualist was Bob Goodall who acted as the figurehead and media
contact for SOBS. Bob's infrequent communications were usually restricted to
defending slurs made by carpetbaggers against his reputation. The level of invective
reached a pinnacle when a carpetbagger specifically created a website to denigrate
Goodall, which demanded that he was "wanted dead or alive" 'for crimes against the
greater carpetbagging community" (www.Michael_mouse3.tripod.com). Another
tactic of carpetbaggers was to impersonate Goodall on the SOBS bulletin board and
there was no evidence of him reciprocating this behaviour. However, a number of other
contributors including Lesley, GMC, Greg, and Margaret wrote extremely disruptive
posts on the Carpetbagger.com website, which often provoked equal hostility from
carpetbaggers.
There were a number of occasional contributors who challenged carpetbaggers, such as
Chris, however, only VoR and Dave in Deutschland (Debagger Dave) combined
longevity with intellectually coherent arguments. VoR was posting prior to the website
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observation and appeared to stop contributing during the summer of 1999. VoR's
approach was to concentrate on trying to persuade carpetbaggers to consider the
-
implications of their activities:
"... No amount of words from my keyboard are likely to stop everyone from doing what
they want. But that's no reason to give up. Far from it.. .If I can't stop people hijacking
the BSs for their own personal gain then at least I can ensure that they are not allowed
to do it in a conscience-free manner. I don't believe that ANYONE has a right to wash
their hands of the consequences of their actions and this is what a lot of carpetbaggers
are effectively doing at present." (VoR, " year wait for B&B, Current Conversions &
Takeovers)
Dave in Deutschland/Debagger Dave only began posting in January 2000 when
carpetbaggers targeted Standard Life and initially adopted a strident approach. This
culminated in almost ritualistic debates, often abusive, with Danbert Nobacon.
Gradually this faded as he concentrated on questioning the logic and coherence of
carpetbaggers' arguments. Like VoR, Dave in Deutschland wanted to persuade
carpetbaggers to think about their actions, but openly admitted that he argued from a
socialist perspective:
"Well for me it 's principle thing. I'm an old fashioned socialist — I make no bones
about it, I believe that society should be structured for people and not governments or
financial institutions ....That's why mzituals were introduced — a way to hit back at the
(then very real) injustices of the "system". ... I don't see why I should have to sacrifice
the profits on my policy and principles which I hold dear just so somebody else should
make a short term gain." (Dave in Deutschland, Carpetbagging, Mutuality vs
Conversion, 16 February 2000)
9.2.2 How the website operates
Created as a campaigning organisation SOBS.org operated very differently from
Carpetbagger.com which evolved from a information service. Consequently the website
at SOBS held less import. Most effort was placed in drafting press releases of which
104 Were written between the middle 1998 and April 2000. This compared to 12 by
Carpetbagger.com in the same period. With the exception of a rudimentary bulletin
board most of the information on the website was in read only format. Nor did Goodall
engage in any monitoring or 'cleaning' of the bulletin board and as a consequence was
often reduced to meaningless exchanges of invective between carpetbaggers and
mutualists. For mutualists such as VoR and Dave in Deutschland they avoided the
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SOBS website preferring to post on Carpetbagger.com . Eventually the extent of the
disruption forced Goodall to warn contributors:
"Sometime ago, I posted a message asking that all contributors refrained from using
foul language and entering into personal abuse on this forum. Unfortunately this
situation has got even worse. ... This forum is designed to stimulate debate on the future
of mutuality, nothing else. This is the last warning. If matters do not improve I will be
forced to introduce more draconian measures." (Bob Goodall, Site Disruption — Last
Warning, SOBS.org, 11 December 1999).
Unfortunately the situation continued and Goodall closed the bulletin board in March
2000.
9.2.3 Main arguments employed
With the few mutualist campaigners accessing Carpetbagger.com  there has been less
time and opportunity for a robust positive case for mutuality to develop. Instead the
focus has been on criticising the contributions of carpetbaggers. Unsurprisingly
mutualists main argument centres on the perceived greed of carpetbaggers, dismissing
carpetbaggers' rhetoric as sophistry, designed to deflect from the issue of personal
aggrandisement:
"No one ever says that carpet bagging is illegal or receiving windfalls is immoral.
What a lot of people object to is greedy individuals using a democratic process to force
a business into a state it does not want to adopt. You do not want these BS to change
because you believe it best serves that BS's business but simply to make a fast buck and
hang the consequences." (Steve, Anti-carpetbaggers, Current Conversions &
Takeovers, 4 January 2000).
What frustrates mutualists is that carpetbaggers are under no obligation to remain
members yet they use a democratic principle within mutuality to defeat the concept of
mutuality:
"Why don't you lot just leave us alone??? If you think banks are so great, go to a
bank.... In the meantime, stop trying to dent the rest of us our choice of a building
society. You may think we're wrong, but don't take away our choice. I realise this plea
will fall on deaf ears. For you lot, sensible financial planning comes second to tr_ring to
bully your way to a fast buck." (Chris, Hands Off, Mutuality vs Conversion, 5 January
1999)
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Finally, when mutualists argue that conversion will result in job cuts carpetbaggers state
that building societies are supposed to be for the members and not the staff, and job
-
insecurity is a fact of life:
"Do any of you greedy opportunists actually care about the damage you will do to the
small BS that you are attempting to de-mutualise? You must know that they will not be
able to survive when competing against the big boys. This will ultimately result in take
over and resultant loss of people jobs and livelihood. Do any of you care a toss. I bet
the answer is a resounding 'NO" (anonymous, Do you lot care about BS job losses?
Miscellaneous 4 January 2000)
"But we DO care. That's why WE are trying to SAVE OUR BUILDING SOCIETIES,
not by preserving them in some sort offestering museum pieces, but by allowing them to
evolve naturally into modern efficient PLCs who ARE accountable to their owners."
(Tout Ye! Do you lot care about BS job losses? Miscellaneous 4 January)
"Job losses? Oh dear how sad. Welcome to the real world of downsizing, and the
opportunity for early retirement at 50 on half pay. Yipeeeeeeeeeee! !" (Dr Who, Do you
lot care about BS job losses? Miscellaneous 4 January 2000
This final quote once again reflects the insecurity and feeling of hopelessness
experienced by some carpetbaggers, alongside their ambiguity towards capitalism.
9.3	 Campaigning on the Internet
There was a clear contrast in the campaigning approach of SOBS and
Carpetbagger.com . While the former used the interne as an information source and
adopted practices of other protest groups, Carpetbagger.com used the interne to build
and sustain its community. Without the intern& it is unlikely that carpetbaggers would
have been so effective and they definitely would not have been as coordinated. The
importance of the internet as a virtual shared space for carpetbaggers became apparent
to the wider public with the successful campaign for conversion motions in the winter of
1999.
"It is also the first example I can think of the power of the internet being deployed
effectively in the UK, with the possible exception of the city riots earlier this year where
the internet was mentioned, as being used in the organisation." (bigger bagger, my
view of this..., Current Conversions & Takeovers, 8 December 1999)
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To campaigning groups the internet enables the swift transfer of information and ideas
_
without relying on the conventional media which carpetbaggers was considered as
controlled by vested corporate interests. What Carpetbagger.com  have demonstrated is
that formalised structures predicated on local power networks can be rendered irrelevant
if the technology is employed to overcome spatial isolation, a conclusion that ActX
quickly realised:
"The internet has threatened building societies before — internet banks. It threatens
building societies again — carpetbagger. com . Here is another case of new technologies
altering the power structures in societies, allowing grass root dissent to be channelled
through regulations that in the past were unlikely to be usable due to the inability of
grass roots individuals to organise in a large enough way." (ActX, A note to any
journalists reading, Current Conversions & Takeovers, 27 November 1999)
Limits of internet
However, one weakness of internet campaigns is the absence of clear hierarchies,
especially in an issue where individuals only shared a desire for personal gain. This was
acknowledged by Dilbert when explaining why contradictory posts are often made:
"Since we are only a loose-knit group of members who communicate via this site and
Email, it is not always the case the our communications both internally and externally
are perfectly clear." (Dilbert, Why it was cut from seven to three, New Campaigns, 23
November 1999)
It was only when the Portman expelled members that a collective issue arose that
attracted interest in a more coordinated approach. Carpetbaggers were unable to
maximise this opportunity partly because contributors would have to become more
overt and possibly publicly identify themselves, and without a campaigning culture the
'movement's' leadership could not motivate their potential supporters. Contributors
suggested either a legal challenge or called for a special general meeting at the Portman
but there was no fundraising capability for a 'fighting fund'. This never materialised
partly due to the rift within the leadership and partly because of a reluctance of
carpetbaggers to fund a campaign.
Subsequently carpetbagging websites have broadened their appeal by introducing
discussion boards on other financial issues, while maintaining the original campaigning
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websites. With the failure of conversion proposals the remaining contributors have
began to endorse the pro-mutual BSMA and Mutual Members believing that democracy
must be imposed on building societies before carpetbagging can recommence. This
tactical shift has been accompanied by an organised private bulletin board for the
expelled Portman members. The survival of the campaign is testament to the tenacity of
carpetbaggers, but the ease in which expelled members can remain involved
demonstrates how the intemet has been employed to sustain the 'movement'.
9.4	 Understanding of Mutuality
Not only have carpetbaggers developed a deterministic narrative regarding building
societies, they have also constructed definitions of mutuality which they believe have
been abandoned. Economically they argue that mutuality should result in better prices
for members, but by citing internet savings accounts, they 'prove' that mutual are
uncompetitive. They are supposed to serve the poorest members of society but "there
has for some time been a disconcerting contradiction between the ideology of mutuality
and the actions of some building societies in defending their mutual status. High
minimum opening balances (£2500+ in many cases) means mutuality is no longer for
all, as originally intended, but for the affluent." (Funk Soul Bagger, A story for you,
New Campaigns, 7 January 2000). Finally they are supposed to behave mutually but
the behaviour of directors militates against this:
"Mutuality does have a place in the 21" century UK, but not whilst it is hijacked by
some of the arrogant vermin who run some BS's in contempt of their members."
(Danbert Nobacon, Costs, New Campaigns, 8 February 2000).
However, carpetbaggers' assault on mutuality also extends to inverting its key
components and principles.
9.4.1	 Trust
For some, building societies might as well become banks because they are equally
guilty of exploiting their customers by indulging in "sharp practices" (Parker, A little
honesty, Mutuality vs Conversion, 4 January 1999).
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"If the Building Societies weren't so busy ripping off their customers and making such
huge profits over the years, selling useless endowments, having hidden terms in their
mortgages etc... maybe carpetbaggers would be slightly more sympathetic. It's payback
time!" (Dish the Dosh! A bad day at the office for ALL carpetbaggers, Carpetbagging
Tips, 5 December 1999)
This breach in trust between boards and members predated carpetbaggers and probably
arose during the housing recession of the early 1990s. Rich Bagger accused building
societies of making excessive profits during this period and failing to assist fully their
members. Subsequently carpetbaggers have highlighted mismanagement of non-core
activities, such as estate agents, and in particular Britannia's sale of Britannia Life
which lost £9 million in 1997, despite receiving £100 million of investment and was
sold £54 million below its market value (Ord, Britannia Life, New Campaigns, 12
December 1999). Yet no director or manager resigned over the Britannia Life 'fiasco',
which carpetbaggers argued demonstrated that directors could behave with impunity
due a lack of accountability.
However, the carpetbaggers' strongest message was that directors personally benefited
from mutuals at the expense of members. In contrast they (falsely) argue that in joint
stockholder companies directors are removed if they fail to deliver, while in mutuals
they under-perform and receive more pay. Most potently they described directors as
'fat cats' which resonated with the zeitgeist of the day, even exposing some of the non-
pecuniary benefits for directors. Others contributors examined the benefits that
directors accorded themselves for evidence of fat cat behaviour:
"How about the Community Award Scheme? ... note the donation to Wolverhampton
Musical Comedy Society which serves mainly arty well-heeled youngsters (one of which
is or was the Chief Executive's Daughter).. They got f2000." (Former member of staff,
Staffordshire Building Society Hypocrisy of the Fat Cats)
Nor was this distrust of the board restricted to carpetbaggers, the BSMA regularly
describes directors as fat cats:
"There are two types of people that plunder your funds — Carpetbaggers and Fat Cats.
No building society has ever disappeared through the actions of a carpetbagger. All
conversions [including the Bradford and Bingley] have been the result of fat cat
actions. But fat cats use carpetbaggers as an excuse to reduce the legal rights of
members even further." (http://www.building-soceities-members.org.uk/right04.htm)
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As chapter three discussed, this distrust of the motives of directors emerged with the
collapse of paternalism and the current imbroglio is a function of members and
-
management adjusting to a new relationship. Confirmation of the continuing resistance
of members towards paternalism of directors was encapsulated by Dilbert:
9.4.2	 Longevity
Carpetbaggers rarely discussed the link between mutuality and longevity; rather they
dismissed time as a historical irrelevance believing that today matters. This made it
difficult when mutualists argued the benefits of a long-term perspective:
"First, i f I were someone looking for a mortgage I might very well be interested in the
fact that, on average, building society rates consistently undercut those offered by banks
over the past ten years. Second, current data show this trend to be continuing." (Chris,
Mortgages, Mutuality vs Conversion, 2 March 1999).
"And what have the last ten years got to do with now?!?!?! ...Surely current/future
performance should be our judge, not the past??" (Rob, Mortgages, Mutuality vs
Conversion, 26 February 1999)
The only other occasion when carpetbaggers discussed longevity was in association
with windfall distributions. Following Bradford and Bingley decision to offer a flat
distribution many longstanding members complained that carpetbaggers were receiving
an equal reward. Responding carpetbaggers stated that a windfall was to reimburse
membership rights not the extent of investment or length of membership. However,
when the converting mutual insurers began to disproportionately reward loyal members
carpetbaggers were indignant, arguing that they as newer investors should receive a
greater proportion of the windfall as they would suffer lower returns for longer through
the demutualisation!
"Long term members have already had the benefit of a mutual organisation. It is recent
members who will have some of their with profit funds give over to pay for shareholder
dividends. Therefore recent members can expect to receive lower returns. People who
have joined in recent years have most to loose by a conversion. It is they who should
receive the majority of compensation." (TPC, Scottish Widows — Campaign? Current
Conversions & Takeovers, 24 November 1999)
In justifying why short-term members should receive a greater tranche of the windfalls,
carpetbaggers seem to accept that conversion to plc will worsen the performance of
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their insurance investment, while seeking to invert the relationship between longevity
and mutuality.
9.4.3	 Reciprocity
To carpetbaggers reciprocity between the building society and members was seen as a
cost against the business as staff time spent talking to members resulted in losing
business:
"If you really like to chat to a member of staff forf r half an hour when you check your
savings balance, fine, but then let's be clear — that is not free time, it has a cost, which
is reflected in 'costs' on the balance sheet, and which is the reason for lower savings
and higher mortgage rates." (Ten Passbooks, Leek's staff expenses, Current
Conversions & Takeovers, 1 October 1999)
Some like bigger bagger believed members who wanted reciprocity should pay a
premium for it:
"If what people want is a cheery chat surely that can be priced, say per fifteen minutes.
Make it explicit, and see whether there is a market for it." (bigger bagger, Agreed,
Current Conversions & Takeovers, 1 October 1999).
For most ordinary members the existence of a local branch is the most tangible sign of
the reciprocity of the society and when these began to close carpetbaggers were
delighted:
"Personally I think it makes perfectly good business sense for BSs to review branches.
As a member I don't want to receive worse rates because I am subsidising an inefficient
branch." (Ord, Mutuals shutting branches, Themoneybag.com , 21 May 2000)
More fundamentally, carpetbaggers questioned the validity of reciprocity between
borrowers and savers, often arguing that as investors they were subsidising mortgage
holders and on one occasion accusing borrowers of being the carpetbaggers:
"The REAL carpetbaggers are people like YOU, my friend. GREED, as you put it, is on
your part at the moment, as YOU are the one getting preferential treatment and nice
little discounts, cheap mortgages rates, etc, at the expense of my interest." (Hawkeye,
West Bromwich Building Society wins rule change, Mutuality vs Conversion, 30 July
1999)
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On occasions carpetbaggers acknowledged that they receive excellent service from their
society, although one carpetbagger believed the staff were being naïve in helping
-
him/her avoid selecting a account with a lower interest rate. Generally though there
were few complaints about the quality of service received, and it is probable that
carpetbaggers would be most inclined to share any poor experiences. Instead one
carpetbagger admitted being torn between the reciprocity though the service and a
windfall:
"Well call me old fashion, but the service I get is really good and they treat me as an
individual. The manager is brilliant as I have built up a rapport over the years and
does feel like a very personal service (even though hive in London). I honestly believe
I get good advice and I have some had [sic] of the best deals on interest rate deals [sic]
over the years ...I feel they are working for me and pro-actively work in my best interest.
I do feel a pang of regret that I voted for demutualisation because it all could change.
But then your loyalty is to yourself and your pocket. Ohh [sic] what a greedy society we
are... Call me sad but I enjoy the personal service of these old fashion, cumbersome,
people friendly societies." (StumbledAcross, B& B windfall Multiple Accounts,
Current Conversions & Takeovers, 25 October 1999)
9.4.4 Caution
They were few references made concerning the importance of caution and stability to
mutuals. This may have been because carpetbaggers saw these as a negative attribute
during a 'boom' economy. The comments that were made portrayed building societies
as old fashioned "Dickensian" institutions unable to respond to changes in technology
as they were wedded to outmoded means of delivery.
"The Internet and the forthcoming WAP enabled mobile phones which will allow people
to access the internet and bank on the move. (approx. 50% of people have mobile
phones, 5 years hence, almost everybody). Building Societies traditional branch
network will become increasingly costly (compared to internet operations) and
irrelevant. Mutual Organisations, in general, slow to adapt to any form of
change ....soon will be as dead as a dodo." (Mickey Mouse, Why are demutualisations
inevitable? Mutuality vs Conversion, 30 January 2000)
What is unknown is whether building societies' cautious approach will appear more
attractive during a prolonged recession. In effect mutuals are long-term institutions that
'smooth out' economic cycles therefore they are more likely to be viewed as antiquated
entities during the exuberant growth periods.
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9.5	 Role of members	 ID
Both carpetbaggers and mutualists want ordinary members to participate in building
society democracy which they believe is being circumnavigated by management and
directors. However, campaigning members are continually frustrated by the lack of
interest shown by ordinary members:
"It would appear from the number of members bothering to vote either in person or by
post in elections or on resolutions at societies' annual general meetings, that only a
small number of members take any interest in the affairs of "their" society." (BSMA
1995:11)
Though there is disagreement on whether members should pledge themselves to
mutuality before joining a society, with SOBS supporters arguing that people do not
join a tennis club to change it into a football team, both sides accept that members
should be permitted to propose motions and "exercise democratic rights without fear of
recrimination" (Yendall, Press Release 6, 20 January 2000).
9.5.1 Democracy
As Carpetbagger.com developed the upholding of the democratic rights of members
became increasingly important, and, as seen above, ultimately displaced windfalls as the
short-term priority. There are two, and not necessarily competing, explanations for this
change.. First, and most cynically carpetbaggers believe that a fair vote will result in
conversion because of the windfall available. However, the Leek United demonstrated
that this alone is insufficient reason for demutualisation. Second, repeated examples of
directors ignoring democratic principles created an environment where carpetbaggers
could construct an image of themselves as 'freedom fighters' struggling against
oppressive directors.
This construction of self began during the 1998 Nationwide election during which
carpetbaggers believed the society's desperation resulted in widespread voting
irregularities:
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"The abuse of the voting process by staff (advice/form filling/pressure on pensioners
AND YES opening envelops from unsecured ballot boxes and throwing away those with
the wrong answer). It was an abuse of democracy." (Ord, Nationwjde, Current
Conversions & Takeovers, 29 April 1999)
Carpetbaggers refused to accept the validity of the result and occasionally cite examples
of other elections where staff 'influenced' voting behaviour. Though carpetbaggers
condemn physical interference in the ballot they have increasingly focused on other
alleged malpractices. These include the use by directors of complex language to explain
motions, to confuse members; the design of ballot papers whereby 'preferred'
candidates are highlighted or even have a arrow directing members who to vote for; and
the almost universal use of the chairperson's proxy vote to automatically support the
directors. All these activities are also criticised by the BSMA and Mutual Members.
Although these were irritants it was introduction of higher thresholds to propose a
motion and the subsequent behaviour of the Portman, Skipton and Chelsea that enabled
carpetbaggers to re-configure their public discourse as the promotion of democracy
rather than purely financial gain. When the requisite number of supporting members
was raised from 50 to 500 carpetbaggers bemoaned the impact on building society
democracy:
"Teachers had 17,500 accounts in 1997. Of those 3,500 would be duplicates or have
allowed balances to slip below £100 at some stage. Assuming 10% turnover per year
then 2,800 others would have left the society, leaving only 11,200 people who could
propose resolutions. 500 people is 4.46% of that total ...Since there is no way of
gaining access to the members lists to write to all members there can be little chance of
a members' resolution ever happening at Teachers BSs.
The current legislation has killed off any chance of democracy in those smaller BSs
where it was most relevant/suited." (Ord, Teachers, Rules & Regulations, 24 December
1999)
They were further surprised when the Leek United expelled those members who had
signed the motion to propose the takeover by Murray Financial Services. This followed
previous expulsions at the Britannia and the Chelsea and led carpetbaggers to believe
that it was a deliberate tactic to deter members from signing motions and nominations:
"I personally know members of the Leek who would only be too willing to support
Murray, however they have all quoted the aborted support of resolutions at Britannia
and Chelsea. Genuine members exercising their democratic right, only to be thrown
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Out by a self elected dictatorship who say WE KNOW what is best for NOT YOU
Support what we say or be taken outside and never seen again!" (Realistic, Leek
United, Current Conversions & takeovers, 16 September 1999) 	 -
Moreover the perception of directors as an unaccountable oligarchy was reinforced by
the responses of the Portman and the Chelsea and the Skipton to conversion motions.
Carpetbaggers believed that the latter two had engaged in sophistry and made it
impossible for members draft acceptable motions. As discussed in 9.3, the Portman in
expelling the members who proposed the motions caused outrage among carpetbaggers
and presented them with another opportunity to define themselves as victims.
However, carpetbaggers' protestations of an abuse of democracy is a means to an end;
in effect carpetbaggers are demanding building societies act democratically so they can
use this democratic process to convert the society. Through this interpretation by
carpetbaggers, it is argued that directors of building societies undermined mutuality by
their flagrant abuse of the democratic process in order to secure benefits for themselves:
"Mutual directors are unaccountable and are planning to spend millions of pounds of
members money telling them what to do and how to vote instead of presenting the facts
(preferably using independent 3 rd parties) and ASKING them what to do based on a
personalised statement for each member of the effect on a windfall on overall
loans/savings
Democracy is being paid lip-service to, what are they afraid of? Real shareholders with
teeth perhaps?" (Dilbert, The Debate, Mutuality vs Conversion, 10 January 1999)
In this argument mutuals are presented as undemocratic because they interfere with
votes. Carpetbaggers adopt the practice of other elections to argue that building
societies should be neutral regarding their own future. Equally shareholders are seen as
equivalent to members the only difference being the liquidation of ownership, but this
ignores the permanency of the move, the transition of votes in cash, the undermining of
democracy, and that subsequent votes are based on wealth not individuality.
Carpetbaggers have consistently argued that mutuals are an economic anachronism,
however, their critique of building society democracy is endorsed by pro-mutual groups
and reflects a divergence between the management of societies and their members. By
aligning themselves with mutualists, carpetbaggers have a developed a powerful
construction of self as 'little guy' facing a mighty corporation.
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"typical Torygraph hack... we are forcing democracy and she describes us a 'shadowy
figures' too right love we live in a world where we get expelled frorn the Britannia for
even suggesting we have a vote and all these Fat Cats are driving their jags and
laughing at the MUGS (sorry members i.e. OWNERS) who are paying for their cock
ups" (McBag T'Lot, Typical, New Campaigns, 1 December 1999)
Through this the paradox of carpetbaggers can be perceived as both being able to
promote capitalism while opposing those forces capable of challenging it.
Carpetbaggers may be disingenuous in their demands for greater democracy, but their
treatment is symptomatic of the contradictions involved in a cultural shift from a
paternalistic society to one which is fully participative.
9.6	 Embeddedness of Mutuals
The views of members, particularly carpetbaggers, are the embodiment of a set of
values enshrined within Thatcherism and the thinking of the New Right. However, this
conventional analysis of carpetbaggers omits the subtlety of their philosophy, nor
should it be assumed that carpetbaggers are a homogenous group. Instead the remainder
of this chapter will reveal that carpetbaggers disagree, and ultimately show how their
own personal experiences of late capitalism affect their attitudes towards mutuality.
9.6.1	 Role of the State
Following the rhetoric of the 1970s carpetbaggers suggest that the government is in
thrall to building society directors who use their influence to generate support for
measures which ensure they remain unchallenged by members. This support by
politicians is reciprocated through directorships of building societies after their
retirement form parliament. The best examples of this are Rosie Barnes now a director
of the Portman, and Lord Stewaby who as minister introduced the 1986 Act and is
currently chairman of the Portman. A Labour government of which many
carpetbaggers instinctively believe supports mutuality and co-operation heightens their
suspicion of politicians:
"They/SOBS have already succeeded with the help of the present Labour government in
managing to raise the number of members required to propose a resolution. Were you
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asked to vote upon this change? NO, this just goes to show what SOBS, the building
societies who adopted this new amendment & the present Labour government who
Okayed it think of democracy & how it should be applied to members of mutual
societies." (Miss Marple, I support SOBS right to canvas, New Campaigns, 17
December 1999)
The introduction of the 75% rule angered carpetbaggers who highlighted the
incongruity between the government's election based on 42% of the population and the
percentage required to convert a building society. Furthermore, many carpetbaggers
believed that the government would suffer electorally if they continued with anti-
conversion policies, a few postulated an anti-establishment argument in which the
power elite sought to exclude the small investor from financial benefit:
"Not sure if this is right place to ask, but was wondering who these back-bench MP's
are who want us carpetbaggers to go away quietly, because we are getting in (on a very
small scale) of their gravy train that they lap up along with those charming pillars of
society-the City of London leeches. God do I sound angry. Bloody right I am."
(Bigbags, Who hates carpetbaggers? Rumour & Speculation, 23 May 1999)
Through both perspectives building societies are considered embedded into the existing
power arrangements and are therefore complicit in promoting the "establishment" over
the interests of their members.
9.6.2	 Relationship with capitalism
If the building societies and the state were viewed as moribund, carpetbaggers were
united in holding that these networks of power would be swept aside by capitalism,
which through an intensification of competition, ensures effective management.
"The free market works, hence the increasing competition. If Bsocs don't adapt they
will perish as surely as the horse and cart industry If you pretend that controlled
markets work better, you end up like Albania, or perhaps e.g. the
Portman/Skipton/Chelsea (some very rich unaccountable "leaders", and bugger off
everyone else." (labagger, Carpet Bagging is morally wrong...but still, New
Campaigns, 7 January 2000)
As Labagger's statement indicates, if the benefits of capitalism are questioned
contributors associate mutuality with the 'failed' state socialist alternatives. Underlying
these arguments are a strand of economic Spencerism, a belief in the inevitable and that
the fittest, and by consequence the biggest will prosper.
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"The general notion of Darwinism works just as well in society as it does in biology.
What is best (for the most) will in the end displace what is less effeetive....to be offended
at natural human rapaciousness is to deny the existence of what makes all thinking
humans tick" (ERA, A Warning to all Carpetbaggers, Current Conversion &
Takeovers, 4 December 1999)
This inevitability is unchallengeable, economic forces cannot be denied and those that
ponder the effect are brushed aside as antediluvian or inefficient:
"The only true job security comes from being up-to-date and embracing change and
technology.... Your argument is like the one in the 1970s that said that the best way to
safeguard jobs was not to privatise any nationalised industry." (Dilbert, P45 Givers,
New Campaigns, 1 December 1999)
Through the prism of inevitability mutuals are seen as antiquated and their reliance on
branch networks will result in their demise via conversions. By mentioning 1970s
working practices, carpetbaggers are seeking to associate building society directors with
inefficiency and corporatism, via the 'power elite' argument mentioned in 9.6.2.
Ironically this type of polemic has parallels commonly employed by Marxists who hold
that capitalism will inevitably collapse under its own contradictions. Thus once again
the carpetbaggers are employing the language and vocabulary of the left to promote a
Thatcherite agenda. However, at least one carpetbagger is aware of the risks of this
approach and warns others that carpetbagging should not engage in criticising the
beneficiaries of capitalism:
"I am getting a little fed up with the anti-wealth attitudes on this board. I am a fervent
Capitalist — that is why I want to convert mutuals to PLCs. lain not going to make all
this effort on behalf of anti-establishment commies." (Dilbert, Time for paws for
thought? Carpetbagging Tips, 27 November 1999)
9.6.3	 Globalisation
Considering their interpretation of capitalism, it is unsurprising that carpetbaggers
accept globalisation. However, that should not assume endorsement, as I could identify
no posts welcoming globalisation. Instead they hold that globalisation will disrupt all
existing power structures, with significant impact on medium sized financial
institutions:
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"We need to observe the current trends (consolidation, new entrants, internet/telephone
banking, secruitisation), extrapolate that into the future and decide whether a medium-
sized branch-laden society can survive in its current form." (Webmaster, I'm not a bank
fan eitherl Mutuality vs Conversion, 28 January 2000)
To many contributors these processes would favour the larger organisations with their
ability to exploit global economies of scale. This is compounded by the technological
revolution which is making it easier to enter banking but more expensive to afford the
appropriate technology. Moreover, the intemet has resulted in an information
revolution enabling savers to compare the performance of financial institutions and
make virtually instantaneous switches between accounts. It is likely that a narrative of
positive technology driven globalisation would be extensively used among those who
demonstrate their computer literacy through accessing the carpetbagger.com  website.
However, the globalisation thesis developed by the carpetbaggers also assumes that
consolidation is preceded by global demutualisation, which they argue proves that a
branch-based building society will be disembedded through fiscal imperative rather than
local connection.
9.6.4	 Glocalisation
Despite carpetbaggers welcoming globalisation because of the likely windfalls it will
help ensure, there is some ambivalence about its broader effect. In contrast SOBS
supporters were implacably opposed to globalisation as this undermines an essential
aspect of mutuals, that of serving a local community. Members First who held that
smaller societies should be preserved because they have remained committed to the
original principles of mutuality shared this view. These attitudes also had sympathisers
among carpetbaggers. When discussing future tactics a majority of contributors wanted
the smaller societies to remain mutuals because they were community focused. This
was in contrast with the larger societies that had become multi-billion pounds faceless
enterprises. However, there were some dissenting voices with Ord arguing that most
were too small to survive and therefore were "dead in the water" (Standard Life &
Prudential, Mutuality vs Conversion, 18 March 1999).
The limits of this purely economic analysis came during the attempted takeover of Leek
United. Throughout the campaign Ord made numerous posts demonstrating the alleged
inefficiencies of the current management but ultimately accepted Walter Plinge's
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argument that the people of Leek were "traditionalists" and therefore "will vote NO on
this deal" (Some Musings on Bleak Leek, Current Conversions & Takeovers, 30
-
September 1999). Others feared that the bid would presented "as big bad interfering
outsiders" (Phantom Bag, Some musings on bleak Leek, Current Conversions &
Takeovers, 1 October 1999) and the presence of Britannia's headquarters in the town
made conversion a contentious issue. The bid for Leek was the first attempt to convert
a small regional society and its failure despite the economic arguments and the windfall
available indicated to carpetbaggers that locality, if only temporarily, can resist the
forces globalisation. Furthermore even carpetbaggers accepted and some openly
endorsed a limit to economic determinism. Part of the explanation for this paradox is
that carpetbaggers also experience the effects of globalisation on their lives, through
increased job insecurity and thus they view windfalls as an opportunity to financially
protect their families from its effects.
"Jam sure most people on this site are sickened when they see the likes of Barclays
making such huge profits and yet they still want to make their staff redundant. The
problem in this information age is that progress' will destroy many current
jobs/trades/professions. ... There is not a person reading this who has a secure job and
unfortunately your members [talking to a building society union representative] are in
the same predicament." (General George, Protecting Jobs by remaining Mutual,
Mutuality vs Conversion, 17 February 1999)
Therefore carpetbaggers sympathise with local institutions and members of staff while
wanting a windfall, because they feel they must maximise their own interests to
minimise the possible disruption caused to their kinship group by globalisation.
9.7	 Summary and Conclusions
The previous section highlights the paradox of carpetbaggers. Though they accept the
logic of hyper-capitalists, predominantly because they are beneficiaries, they also fear
its effects on their lives. Opposition to the management of building societies emerged
during the decline of paternalism, and carpetbaggers are both a product of this process
and exploiters of its effects. This potentially compromises pro-mutual campaigners who
find their discourse hijacked and commodified by carpetbaggers who even use longevity
of mutuality to argue for greater compensation for themselves. In such regard,
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carpetbaggers have become a crypto NSM, superficially displaying similar
characteristics but pursuing objectives in opposition to most other NSMs. Therefore it
is unsurprising that their arguments sometimes superficially contradict their motives.
Finally the use of the intemet enables a 'privatisation of campaigning', whereby
participants can engage without meeting, enhancing the potential sustainability of the
movement. This new development raises questions about the continual validity of
Olson's Free Rider Principle as maximum benefit can be secured with marginal
engagement.
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10 Triangulation of Findings
This chapter brings together the empirical evidence detailed in the three previous
chapters to assess comparatively the validity of the theoretical interpretations. The
methods employed have enabled an examination of differing sub-sets of social actors
within mutuals and through triangulation it is intended that understandings of
contemporary mutuality are developed. This process has two objectives: first, to affirm
the veracity of the mutual and co-operative models discussed in chapter two,
specifically to ascertain how these concepts were accepted, recognised and
conceptualised by the various subject groups: particularly how social actors' and sub-
groups' understanding of the components of mutuality affect the narratives they employ
to explain its current condition. The second objective is to analyse the theoretical
discourses outlined in chapters 4 and 5 that seek to understand mutuality's evolution in
recent years, a process complicated by mutuality's non-linear progression. Rather
mutuals have simultaneously transformed into another economic form and been created
anew, while the concept of mutuality has been reimagined.
Within mutuals there are three identifiable constituencies, of which the primary and
largest group are the members. As stated in chapter 6, this segment is invariably
ignored by research and their views are rarely sought. Mutual members' views would
inform us whether a collective experience continues to operate, or whether members
have commodified the exchange relations. The second segment was the management,
who were mainly paid professionals, though a few of the credit union leaders were
volunteers. With mutuals become increasingly professional and the knowledge
asymmetry between members and management continuing to widen, the loyalty to, and
understanding of, the concept of mutuality by the leadership, would help researchers
predict developments.
With these two data sets it would be possible to counterpoise attitudes, to locate nuances
of interpretation, and identify shared values and contradictions. Overall this would
provide a perception of the current status of mutuality. However, a third and much
smaller constituency exists. Although most members have only a passive engagement










Credit Unions Building Societies
be regarded as a sub-set of members, but the advent of carpetbaggers with their strident
opposition to mutuality, justifies a separate classification.
Figure 10-1: Triangulation of research data
Figure 10.1 shows how these three segments were initially utilised in this research. The
order was chosen to demonstrate the relative degrees of knowledge about the specific
mutual organisation, rather than importance. The design also acknowledges that in
some mutuals, such as credit unions, the active members may become incorporated














Figure 10-2: Triangulation based on duality of credit union leaders
Figure 10.2 develops this theme to argue that active members may have dual roles
within credit unions. Also it would be inappropriate to equate volunteers solely with
idealists and managers as instrumentalists, as no evidence was found to support this
categorisation. Instead it could be argued that idealists, who currently manage smaller
societies, are part of a pro-mutual pressure group consensus. Additionally, as many of
these individuals are volunteers, it is possible that many have a common frame of
understanding with pro-mutual membership groups within building societies, rather
than the professional leaders. Equally some volunteers may desire a more professional
approach, while retaining unpaid directors, a view popular among credit union
interviewees, thus the use of broken lines to signify the permanence of categories.
Finally carpetbaggers have been segmented from other active members, since they have
no common interests, nor are they connected to mainstream members as the purpose of
their membership is to demutualise the society, not access its services. Although this
should not imply that carpetbaggers have no influence upon the general membership.
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10.1	 Understanding Mutuality
Among the managers and the ordinary members there was confusion regarding the
meaning of mutuality, with only 57% of members seeing themselves as members, as
opposed to customers. Moreover a few of the managers did not know the definition of
mutuality. -Where responses were secured, there was a tendency to use a narrow
economic interpretation, or adopt a paternalistic stance of service and benefit to
members. This confusion enabled carpetbaggers to inverse the economic definition and
argue that building societies should convert, because they were economically ineffectual
when compared to banks, hence this was usually supported by the argument that as the
purpose of building societies was to be democratic economic agents, their undemocratic
practices should lead to their demutualisation. Thus carpetbaggers began to construct
their own narrative of decline, based on the assumption that mutuals were not pursuing
'genuine mutuality'.
1 0.1 .1 Trust
Most of the leaders accepted that mutuals enjoyed high levels of trust, with building
society managers acknowledging that the term 'building society' was an important
marketing tool, since it engenders goodwill with prospective clients. An interrelated
factor was the presence of branches, which provided reassurance to members. For
example two managers stated that loyalty towards the society and usage of postal
accounts was higher in areas with a branch. Though the credit unions leaders
interviewed had not employed trust when promoting their services, they gave numerous
examples of informal trust relations with members. The surveys uncovered no evidence
of distrust of mutuals, but it should be noted that those most likely to be distrustful were
unlikely to retain membership or join the organisation. Members' instinctive trust of
management was indicated when 47% confirmed that they did not want any further say
in the running of the society. A number of these openly admitted that the professional
staff should be trusted and allowed to operate unfettered by members. However, a
majority of the respondents also wanted directors to be more accountable. This suggests
that though members trust the managers, the traditional paternalistic approach of
building societies is no longer acceptable. Instead members are searching for a newer
more equitable relationship. Carpetbaggers were also opposed to the paternalistic
approach of building society managers and wanted societies' policy making returned to
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the membership. In contrast to the general satisfaction, carpetbaggers cited the
behaviour of senior building society management as examples of misplaced trust. Due
-
to what were perceived as sharp business practices, their attitude during the property
recession, and personal aggrandisement, carpetbaggers believed mutuals were being
managed by a self-appointed oligarchy, intent on maximising a personal gain. This
view was shared by pro-mutualist campaigners and could be viewed as part of a cultural
trend against executive pay, rather than a specific feature in mutuals. However, this
supports the argument, that building societies are expected to perform against standards
in excess of and ignored by joint-stock-companies. Once again this suggests that the
dominant discourse places greater burden on alternative structures, than it is willing to
accept upon itself.
10.1.2 Longevity
Though building society managers still believed long-term commitment gave them a
commercial advantage, they were concerned that this was being undermined by the
market's obsession with growth and short-term values. In particular the use of best buy
tables was creating a situation where financial institutions would launch a product
merely to top the chart briefly, and then rapidly reduce the rate once customers had been
attracted. This was having two effects on mutuals. First, if they took a 'mutual stand'
and refused to participate in such activity, they were accused of being uncompetitive
and slow; and second, if they did compete they were charged with un-mutual behaviour.
Meanwhile, joint-stock-companies were allowed to create 'churn' within the market and
disrupt mutuals' relations with their members.
The importance of longevity to mutuals was confirmed in the member surveys as the
strongest opposition to demutualisation was among those with accounts for over 20
years; while the weakest commitment was from those with multiple accounts with
various financial providers. Thus the more sophisticated the investor the less likely they
were to support longevity within a mutual. Yet, some of those who had been members
of converted societies believed demutualisation was myopic since the service had
deteriorated markedly. Unusually, carpetbaggers were virtually silent on longevity,
except to state that only the current situation was relevant in the market. Ironically, the
only occasion when longevity enters mainstream carpetbaggers debate is when they
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were discussing windfalls. Here they adopted a seemingly mutual argument, believing
that newer members should receive greater windfalls, since they will be excluded from
-
the benefits of remaining in a mutual over the long-term!
10.1.3 Reciprocity
All the managers stressed the social interaction with clients that went beyond the
exchange relation. However, among credit unionists there was a fear of losing intimate
reciprocity during the transition to a more professional branch based service.
Most building society managers cited two ways in which reciprocity is practiced. First,
by parity of service and second, through the continuation of a branch based service. In
the surveys members did not express any reservations about equality of provision and
generally endorsed the quality of service. This was in contrast to the carpetbaggers who
believed reciprocity was expensive and should be charged to members. Additionally,
they were amazed that staff should not seek to exploit members, believing this
demonstrated a lack of commercial sensibility. Similarly, carpetbaggers wanted branch
networks reduced, arguing their continuation was a waste of the alleged 'mutual
dividend'. This is diametrically opposite the survey findings, as 41% stated there were
insufficient branches, a figure that rose in more deprived areas who have endured the
brunt of the branch closure programme. Nor was there any significant demand for
interne services, with 88% of members happy with branch opening hours and only 7%
accessing internet banking. It is apparent from the data that reciprocity is valued highly
by members, which may create challenges for managers who were concerned that
delivering non-commodified high cost services could result in mutuals serving residual
communities.
10.1.4 Caution
Carpetbaggers were diffident about the benefits of caution to mutuals, because it
indicated an old-fashioned mindset unable and unwilling to respond to new technology
and opportunities. Again this is used to reaffirm their narrative of decline. In contrast
90% of credit union members found membership made it simpler to save money, while
71% found it easier to manage their money. Nor was there any evidence that credit
unions encourage over-indebtedness, rather a net +13% used less credit than previously.
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Though demonstrating the care shown by credit unions towards their members, this was
also applicable to building societies, who undertook less repossession than the banks
'during the early 1990s housing recession. All the building society interviewees
believed their economic model with its reliance on organic growth was more sustainable
and stable than that offered by joint-stock-companies. Although acknowledging the
dynamism of the latter, they insisted that concentrating on delivering a core activity was
good business practice. Equally the smaller societies disputed the interpretation that
they were slovenly with regards to technology, arguing that it was sensible to invest
when prices were falling rapidly after the research and development phase. In such an
interpretation caution can be seen as a prudent management approach serving the
interests both of individual members and the organisation.
10.2	 Relationship with members
The earlier historical review (chapters 3 & 4) explained how the development of
mutuality differed from the co-operative model. On occasions the solidarity between
members has been negligible, stability has been disrupted by the state, and latterly by
carpetbaggers, and building societies never had the protection of the non-transfer of
ownership. Consequently the focus of member relations had been democracy and to a
much lesser extent education.
Interviews with building society managers disarmed the carpetbaggers' charge that they
were remote and arrogant. Instead they were willing to accept that mistakes had been
made and acknowledged that carpetbaggers had stimulated management to reconnect
with mutuality. What frustrated managers and carpetbaggers was the apparent apathy of
most members. Most managers believed that an active membership would improve the
mutual and rejected the view that inaction equates to contentment. As noted in 10.1.1
the many members were satisfied with the current management but did want greater
levels of accountability. This was endorsed by some managers who had undertaken
greater member participation through direct mailings, open questions on policy matters
in newsletters, and `Talkback' events, where members could quiz directors. Regardless
°fin addition to these activities managers wanted to enhance communication with
members and use member interaction as a means to improve their businesses.
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Moreover, 75% of members felt that their society did not ignore their views. However,
knowledge about mutuality was variable, especially among women, pensioners and the
-
under 30s, most of whom saw themselves customers. This is important because those
that considered themselves members were more likely by a margin of 8 to 5, to have a
greater sense of ownership. Without this commitment it is difficult to envisage
members becoming more involved in their society.
Members' interest in the affairs of mutuals was also higher in building societies with
contested elections. In contrast, in industrial credit unions with uncontested elections,
members had low sense of community and only intermittently became involved. Nor do
credit union members have a better understanding of how their mutual operates as only
7% knew how the dividend was calculated, suggesting that participation and knowledge
by members was linked to electoral competition, familiarity, and effective
communication, and had no correlation with the size or type of mutual.
While building society managers highlighted their consumer champion role, particularly
regarding the free use of ATMs, carpetbaggers were emphasising the abrogation of
democracy by chief executives. They claimed that building societies tampered with
voting slips, issued biased election literature and ballot papers, and altered the meaning
of members' nominations. And if all that failed they proceeded to expel members who
held an alternative view. Pro-mutual groups, who felt that the management had
sequestrated mutuality, shared many of these complaints. While some mangers
accepted these points they felt critics failed to distinguish between the behaviour of
different societies.
Where carpetbaggers differed from pro-mutual campaigners was through the usage of
these experiences to construct a collective identity as 'freedom fighters', struggling
against the monolithic building societies. In this scenario every expellee became a
martyr and all defensive actions by building societies are considered slights, merely
reinforcing their determination. In this carpetbaggers, rather than be seen as agents of
capitalism, positioned themselves as the Lilliputian opposition. This comparison was
extended when they reduced their argument to the issue of free and fair elections,
expecting such an outcome would increase the likelihood of a windfall. The
effectiveness of this narrative was visible in the members' survey, with 76% of wanting
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a vote on the future status, and 74% against expulsions for those who proposed
conversion. However, this was tempered by the majority being opposed to conversion
-
(56%), although women were less attached to continued mutual status than men.
Managers were aware of the paradox of this situation and disputed the automatic
ownership rights of contemporary members, equating them to a form of 'beneficial
trustee'. Usually managers compared the ownership rights of members to that of a
sports club or the National Trust. In this interpretation members could participate in
policy matters, but ultimately the assets cannot be sold for personal pecuniary gain.
Managers also challenged carpetbaggers' commitment to democracy, arguing that they
employed the principle of democracy to demand the implementation of a democratic
process, in which democracy will be exchanged for money. Managers noted ruefully
that this capitalist subjugation of democracy reduces mutuality to a cipher, while they
are simultaneously expected to be openly accountable to members, unlike their
colleagues in the banking sector.
The evidence presents a mixed picture of the relationship with members, with women
having less affinity and understanding of their mutual than men. Generally members
are satisfied with the management of building societies, although attempts at further
engagement would be welcomed. Where members agree with carpetbaggers is in
demanding 'free and fair' elections and the opportunity to vote for demutualisation. As
the majority of members were opposed to conversion, it could be argued that
management should have more confidence in their ability to win such votes. However,
these questions are asked in isolation, and in the absence of a probable windfall that
could result in a very different outcome. What this conclusion emphasises is the
destabilising effect of transferable ownership, confirming that non-transferability helps
ensures the stability of the cooperative model.
10.3	 Functionalist interpretation
Alone among the constituents the carpetbaggers asserted the functionalist explanation
for the changing nature of mutuality. To them building societies were too slow to adapt
because there had been insufficient pressure on the management. By contrast they
268
argued successful companies were those that grew rapidly by acquisition, and use their
global reach to maximise efficiency gains. This avowedly Spencerian analysis was
-
complemented by a neo-liberal ideology imbued with a conviction of the effectiveness
and omnipresence of the free-market. To carpetbaggers this was self-evidential, as
socialism had failed, which they equated to building societies. Furthermore,
carpetbaggers often employed a tautology, arguing that building societies were in
terminal decline as their numbers had fallen from over 3000 in 1900 to 68 today.
Unsurprisingly these interpretations were dismissed by building society managers who
stated that economies of scale were not linear, as medium sized financial institutions
were the most efficient, with diseconomies of scale appearing in larger organisations.
Even the banking representative interviewed considered the economics of scale
argument as ideological and not empirically based. Instead the obsession with size is a
function of a discourse of capitalism, which defines the parameters of success, thereby
excluding institutions that develop organically from the bottom up, on the basis of an
alternative model of ownership.
Nor was there sufficient evidence of the alleged detachment between members and
management that occurs when mutuals grow. It was previously noted that building
societies continued to enjoy the goodwill of their members, and that leaders of credit
unions desperately wanted to retain interpersonal links with members. Rather than
pursuing personal gain, professionalism was perceived as a means to achieve the
original idealist goals. Though the more idealist interviewees were concerned about
growth, they accepted it because they hoped it would ensure financial stability and
offset the risk of burnout among current volunteers.
Though managers would be expected to dismiss the economies of scale argument, the
surveys demonstrated a strong opposition to the functionalist discourse; 62% of the
members of the regional society rejected the thesis that their society was too small to
survive. Explanations ranged from an instinctive dislike of 'big business', to considered
arguments regarding the logic of economies of scale. Perhaps more surprisingly, similar
results were recorded at the national society, in which 82% of the sample disagreed with
the statement that the society was too big to care about individual members, and of the
four that agreed three were carpetbaggers. Across the sample the only support for the
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functionalist argument came from those that considered themselves customers not
members, again suggesting that the discourse of capitalism and members knowledge
and endorsement of mutuality was a more important factor than any evolutionary
business theory.
10.4	 Review of Narrow Neo-Marxian Interpretation
As outlined in chapter 4, the neo-Marxist argument evolved from the ineffectuality of
paternalistic management and their subsequent replacement by those focused on profit
orientation. Due to the historical and reflective perspective of this interpretation,
empirical analysis of this narrative was restricted to qualitative methodologies. The
only tentative evidence from the questionnaire that members preferred a less
paternalistic management was in their desire for greater accountability and opposition to
the expulsion of pro-demutualisation members.
The most extensive exposition of neo-Marxist argument came from mutual managers.
Building society managers believed their predecessors were often remote from members
and became introverted precluding innovation. Though common across the financial
sector, the passivity of members within a paternalistic society resulted in a slower
response to changing circumstances than that of joint-stock companies, with their
allegedly more interventionist shareholders. This was considered invidious, because
building societies thereby surrendered their structural advantage of shorter lines of
communication between constituent parties. However, in contrast three interviewees,
who described themselves as paternalists, argued that adapting to change involved
reciprocity, which could be enhanced through a caring managerial approach. This pro-
paternalist cohort was restricted to regional societies, while the mangers of national
societies emphasised the need to engage with and learn from members.
Regardless of opinions on paternalism, most interviews suggested that the influx of new
mangers not wedded to mutuality, which occurred in the 1980s, was the primary
responsibility for demutualisation. With the burgeoning of professions required to
operate a financial institution, building societies recruited individuals from sectors
untouched by mutuality. These managers found mutuals inefficient and sought to
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replicate the culture of joint-stock companies. Although a number of the changes were
necessary the interviewees believed that too many professionals were employed with
scant regard to the values they inhabited. Therefore it was unsurprising that when
demutualisation began to arise at board level, there was insufficient internal intellectual
opposition. Furthermore it was argued that the senior management were motivated by
egotistic and social motivations, because running a bank was seen as more prestigious
than leading a building society. This was fuelled by the considerable personal financial
gains available.
In complete contrast carpetbaggers argued that those that remain senior managers of
building societies rather than choosing to convert displayed 'genuine' greed. Managers
avoided demutualisation because of the ease of work and lack of accountability they
enjoyed. To carpetbaggers, and to some pro-mutualists, managers were a self-appointed
oligarchy whose sole purpose was to perpetuate their status. However, the managers of
joint-stock companies deserved greater pay than those in building societies because
their job was more complex. This exposed a contradiction in the carpetbaggers'
argument in that mutual managers were greedy and yet failed to maximise their personal
benefit. This apparent confusion led some carpetbaggers to decry all fat-cat salaries,
while others defended executive pay because they were capitalists and not "anti-
establishment commies."
Extending the neo-Marxist argument into credit unions Rimmer (1998) argued that
instrumentalists were subverting the movement. Although six interviewees were
concerned that professionalism may detach them from their members, all interviews
argued that the future prosperity of their credit union was dependent on a more
professional approach. Indeed the division between idealists and instrumentalists can be
seen as an artificial construct, with social actors displaying traits of both stances.
Overall there was insufficient empirical evidence to fully support the thesis that
demutualisation was driven by managerial aggrandisement. It does explain the
motivation for specific social actors but not why it occurred in the 1990s.
Interpretations based on the ending of paternalism were challenged by the data, which
showed it was still being practiced in prospering building societies. Moreover
remaining managers appeared to have forsaken material gain in order to operate a
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mutual. Similarly, even among credit unionists the instrumentalists seek professional
status to ensure the future of the industry, not for pecuniary benefit. Instead the
-
evidence suggests that the motivation for the mangers of mutuals extends beyond
money.
10.5 Assessing the Embeddedness thesis
Some of the more reflective interviewees suggested that managers of demutualising
societies were influenced by the prevailing social conditions, thereby emphasising the
exogenous factors outlined in chapter 5.
10.5.1 Intervention of capitalist state
Significantly managerial interviewees complained about the imposition of objectives
upon mutuals, which effectively curtailed activity and attempted to limit their potential
markets. This image construction was most apparent within credit unions, whereby the
local state, and subsequently its national counterpart, have defined its purpose.
Although credit union interviewees stressed their role in supporting deprived
communities, they feared ghettoisation, most notably through the phrase: 'the poor
man's bank'. The difficulties with this were twofold; by being defined as for the poor,
it was automatically assumed they were not for others, which has had severe impact on
credit unions' economic sustainability; and if aimed at the poor, credit unions were
assumed to be an extension of the welfare state. Thus local authorities employed credit
union development workers located within anti-poverty units, forsaking economic
viability for 'community development'. Though this interpretation was abandoned by
the national state, it still tasked credit unions with tackling financial exclusion; a role
interviewees were willing to perform if fiscal support was available and providing it did
not deter other potential members.
Circumscribing the mutual was evident in building societies during the demutualisation
period and in debates among carpetbaggers. Again a mutual form was construed as
serving deprived communities. Thus interviewees were frustrated when attempts to
offer more competitive services to wealthier individuals were criticised as un-mutual.
Similarly building societies faced opprobrium when increasing executive pay or closing
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branches. In contrast they noted that banks had less restrictions on their more
destructive behaviour within communities. Yet without the ability to manage costs,
-
interviewees believed building societies would lose market share and ultimately have to
merge or demutualise. A further handicap for building societies was that they were
perceived as old-fashioned institutions, congenial but largely irrelevant. Thus
interviewees felt trapped by the obligation to offer a community service and the
commercial imperative to reform and modernise.
Alongside this image construction mutuals were required to comply with a capitalist
lexicon. Thus interviewees bemoaned the replacement of 'surplus' with 'profit' in
balance sheets and the adoption of income maximisation ratios. One interviewee
believed these changes enabled a shift in attention towards a more profit centred
banking approach, negating the less tangible aspects of mutuality. This process was
reinforced by the supplanting of 'member' by 'customer', thereby undermining the
ownership component within mutuality. In changing the nomenclature building society
employees were further removed from mutuality, which became another reinforcing
factor in the transition to 'quasi mutual' status. However, being forced to alter their
language and therefore culture, was not matched by accompanying permissible actions.
For example an interviewee highlighted the disparity between the use of accounting
ratios which were short-term measures, against the restrictions on building society
balance sheet management. Thus while banks were allowed to accumulate and then
write debts off in a single year, thereby giving the appearance of one bad year among
many good, building societies were prevented from making a loss in any single year. If
this occurred the regulator would deem the society insolvent and demand a transfer of
engagements. Consequently the regulator seemingly imposed double standards, in
forcing compliance to plc rules, but only selectively granting the associated freedoms.
From the interviews it was apparent the twin processes of an externally defined
conceptualisation of the specific mutual, and necessity to conform and abide to the
capitalist lexicon, informed the development of legislation and regulation. This resulted
in a framework that neither matched the philosophy of mutuality, nor provided
sufficient liberty to enable mutuals to define their own identity. As detailed in chapters
3 and 4, building society legislation was characterised by poorly drafted attempts to
prescribe activities. Therefore it was unsurprising that interviewees cited the 1986 Act
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as a contributory element in the demutualisations. Specifically, the offer of five-year
protection for converters encouraged Northern Rock to convert, as no such immunity
-
was available to remaining mutuals. Credit union interviewees, who were exasperated
at the narrowness of their legislation, expressed similar views. All believed that the
development of the sector had been inhibited and the direction provided was
inappropriate. Thus legislation had assumed that credit unions would serve the poorest
and therefore it was necessary to closely regulate and restrict its activities, resulting in
economically unviable entities, too small to have any impact on financial exclusion.
Whereas building society legislation had almost inadvertently pushed societies to
demutualisation, the law on credit unions insisted on excessive mutuality at the expense
of economic sustainability.
For the interviewees it was the regulatory approach, which aggravated the inherent
challenges of the legislation. To some, regulators appeared to assume that capitalist
management systems were superior, seeking to impose them on all institutions with
minimal consideration of their impact. This was seemingly motivated by a bureaucratic
imperative for a single set of rules thereby ensuring organisational conformity. Apart
from the cultural difficulties this posed, credit union interviews questioned the
appropriateness and cost of compliance for entities of their size. Much of the regulatory
guidance was perceived as irrelevant or too excessive, with the result that the volume of
activity was encouraging the employment of paid staff. In this way, it was argued; the
government's objective of professional credit unions would be achieved, while the
space for diversity within the sector was being curtailed.
Working within prescriptive legislation, mutuals have attempted to lobby successive
governments, and yet when successful in securing concessions this has alienated the
carpetbaggers. Extracts from the websites have demonstrated a conviction that mutuals
should comply with capitalist discipline and standards. Any allowances granted by the
state are seen as evidence of collusion, with politicians receiving non-executive
directorships in building societies after leaving parliament. Using this discourse, often
incorporating humour to demean their subject, the carpetbaggers are able to present
themselves not as agents of capitalism, but a form of new social movement campaigning
against 'power elites'. It is alleged that these elites, while acquiring resources
themselves, criticise and obstruct private individuals' attempts to improve their fiscal
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position. Through this narrative, identities are exchanged whereby capitalism is
presented as the revolutionary force and its opponents are the conservatives.
-
10.5.2 Impact and influence of Thatcherism on demutualisation
debate
It was suggested in chapter 5 that the social acceptance of privatisation created an
environment in which demutualisation could occur. Certainly the building society
managers interviewed cited a culture of glamour pertaining to acquisition hungry
enterprise and the increasingly consumerist era in the 1980s, as diverting some of their
contemporaries from mutual endeavour. Moreover one interviewee believed Thatcher
viewed mutuality as quasi-socialistic and therefore in need of reform, a view endorsed
by many carpetbaggers who argued that building societies were moribund organisations
equating them to 'council housing', rather than dynamic capitalist companies.
However, the class-based dichotomy contained within the surveys suggests a more
complex interpretation of Thatcherism's effects. Although awareness of privatisation
was a fully 79%, only 20% of the sample had shares in privatised companies. The
majority of these were either Conservative supporters or from the middle class. Similar
groups, along with men (+23% net) were the strongest supporters of privatisation. Most
opposition was drawn from Labour supporters (-24% net), the working class (-24 %
net), and women (-14 % net). Through cross-tabulation it was possible to identify and
correlate attitudes towards privatisation and demutualisation. 51% (+27% net) of those
in favour of demutualisation supported privatisation, compared to 28% (-8% net) who
opposed conversion but favoured denationalisation. Similarly, those in receipt of
windfalls were four times as likely to approve of privatisation than those without. This
evidence suggests that the proposition that Thatcherism enabled demutualisation to
occur has some validity, but its endorsement was limited to the middle classes who were
the primary beneficiaries of both processes. Thus the carpetbaggers' argument reflects
the opinions of an articulate interest group and not a plea from an excluded minority,
nor the representative view of members.
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10.5.3 Connecting late twentieth century mutuality to aspects of
globalisation	
-
As discussed in chapter 4, the Halifax demutualisation was partially justified by the
necessity to compete in a globalised market. This argument has been associated with
transformations in technology, which carpetbaggers argued have improved
communications and information flow, but at severe financial cost. In effect those that
could not afford to invest in this new technology would soon become ineffective and
ultimately obsolete. The managers interviewed doubted the validity of this
interpretation, as noted earlier. However, the globalisation argument within mutuals is
cultural as well as economic, with members rejecting the thesis that regional societies
are too small to survive (see 103), and emphasising the importance of human
interaction in relations with financial institutions. Furthermore the active members,
such as SOBS and the credit union interviewees, hold that reciprocity is a desirable and
an essential benefit of mutuals, which is absent in banks. It is these intangible services
that attract and retain the commitment of new members. Both sides of these
globalisation arguments are found within the carpetbaggers' debates. Most adopt a
Spencerian attitude that change is inevitable and adaptation is a necessary response,
which in their terms means demutualisation. Others are less sanguine and reconnect
carpetbaggers with the dissent evident in other New Social Movements, preferring to
explain their involvement not as an ideological crusade, but motivated by a desire
protect their families against the insecurities of a globalised economic environment. For
these carpetbaggers, demutualisation is the conversion of theoretical collective
protection into a guaranteed transferable asset that the individual is free to utilise.
Nor were the managers interviewed blind to these contradictory flows and all were
impressed how the Leek United Building Society had successfully employed 'locality'
as a defence against demutualisation. Most went further, believing that a cultural shift
was underway in which the benefits of society and its mutual values were being
rediscovered. Simultaneously they argued that consumer voices were strengthening and
asserting their distaste at the more exploitative practices of the banks. Beginning with
branch closures, customers became aware that globalising banks were pursuing a
depersonalisation of service in order to increase profitability. Thus the interviewees
described stories of bank customers being 'forced' to use technology rather than branch
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counters, and how some customers found themselves excluded from services because
they were not 'profitable' enough. In response the interviewees argued that customers
-
were becoming alienated from both the excessive commercialisation of the banks and
the absence of any influence over the provision of services.
Consequently opposition was expressed to the accumulation of wealth by banking
executives, and one interviewee pointed to the wider effects of globalisation, in which it
seemed success could only be achieved at the expense of a community elsewhere. Thus
not only was globalisation alienating for the individual, but the process of distanciation
was making communities aware that benefits to themselves affected other communities.
The managerial interviewees celebrated this aspect of globalisation as it stimulated
interest in alternative glocal structures, which they believed mutuals were uniquely
positioned to exploit. In particular they cited the aspiration for some control over the
activity of corporations and the yearning to retain money within the local economy.
Therefore the contradictory debates surrounding globalisation creates a tension within
mutuals, which initially helped to justify demutualisation but latterly its extremities
have permitted an opportunity to redefine mutuality, as a viable and less chaotic
alternative to neo-liberal capitalism.
10.6 Summary and Conclusion
On reviewing the components of mutuality it is apparent from the survey findings that
members have more in common with managers than with carpetbaggers. Members
stressed the reciprocity delivered through branches, especially the quality of member
service. Implied within this is a resistance to a sales lead service, with only a cursory
regard to a client's requirements. Management broadly shared these sentiments, but
they feared an increasingly commodified marketplace might marginalize this type of
provision. In contrast carpetbaggers presented the concepts of mutuality as an
explanation for the systematic decline of mutuals. They saw trust being abused,
doubted the benefit of longevity, believed reciprocity should be commodified, and
thought caution concealed inefficiency and ineffectual management.
The presentation and delivery of these components has affected the relationships within
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mutuals. Carpetbaggers tend to adopt a tautological logic that building societies have
behaved in an un-mutual way, and that mutuality is an inherently inefficient system
when compared to joint-stock companies. Moreover they have equated mutuality to
democracy and argue that this should be employed to destroy mutuality. The surveys
indicated that carpetbaggers have enjoyed some success with these arguments among
members, but generally there are high levels of satisfaction with the performance of
building society management and support for mutuality. This is strongest among those
that perceive themselves as members, suggesting that in lieu of the protection ensured
by non-transferable ownership, that education and knowledge about mutuality is
essential to its continuation.
Of the three theoretical explanations for the condition of contemporary mutuality, the
empirical evidence does not support the functionalist proposition. Indeed the members
strongly rejected any assumption that mutuals are either too small to survive or too big
to care about members. These findings expose the extremist nature of the
carpetbaggers' functionalist interpretation. For if size is not the automatic precursor to
success, then their discourse is reduced to capitalist ideology and a Spencerian, and by
implication a 'natural phenomenon'.
The evidence also partially refutes the narrow Marxist analysis that demutualisation was
caused by managerial appropriation of resources. Though there is some evidence that
some executives were motivated by greed and desire for greater social status, the
proposition does not explain adequately why demutualisation only occurred among a
limited number of institutions in the 1990s. Nor is there clear support for the
interpretation that professionals have sequestrated credit unions; hence I reject the
concept of defined cleavage between instrumentalists and idealists. The mixture
between volunteers and professionals did not elucidate any strong distinctions as many
volunteer board members wanted professionalism to improve the service to members,
whilst many paid staff were concerned about becoming detached from members.
Although complex, the `embeddedness thesis' is supported by the majority of the
evidence. First, the state has on numerous occasions attempted to define and prescribe
the activities of mutuals, often through a desire to secure regulatory clarity across the
financial sector. However, this has usually meant making mutuals conform to capitalist
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conditions. Although some interviewees were suspicious of politicians' motivations, it
is equally likely that ineptitude and ignorance of legislators and regulators were
-
responsible, as the predominance of capitalist legislation eventually became the norm
and somewhat inevitably resulted in unsuitable mutual laws.
What transformed this process was the advent of 'hypercapitalism' in the 1980, with the
rise of neo-liberal economic policy, in the guise of Thatcherism, and globalisation.
Thatcherism polarised public opinion and established an intellectual and cultural
environment in which demutualisation could occur. Mutuals were undermined both
through pejorative language which described them as quasi-socialistic, and internal
class base division, as the middle class began to assert their ownership 'rights'. Within
building societies the carpetbaggers adopted the narratives of New Social Movements as
they sought to transform the societies. This conflict was given further impetus by
globalisation with its seemingly functionalist logic emphasising the importance of size,
while simultaneously increasing insecurity for individuals. Carpetbaggers employed
these arguments to explain why collective responses were invalid, and building society
managers pursued institutional security through demutualisations and ultimate merger.
However, hypercapitalism caused considerable alienation and members began to
express a preference for a more inclusive and connected society, a view identified and
employed by mutual managers. This apparent cultural shift to a glocal society has
provided mutuals with an opportunity to reaffirm their values and attract members
interested in regaining a sense of community. If this trend continues it is conceivable
that mutuals will become re-embedded within society, and hence the paradox of





The central aim of the thesis was to explain the paradoxical development of mutuality at
the turn of the millennium; specifically it contrasted the fortunes of building societies
and credit unions. Lacking a sociological literature that I could identify, my initial
focus was to generate a conceptual appreciation of mutuality and an interpretative
applied model. In chapters 3 to 5, I outlined how building societies and credit unions
had evolved from their original manifestations and the historically and theoretically
informed interpretations that had been developed to explain this phenomenon. Two
meta-narratives emerged. The first, functionalist discourse assumed that the growth and
eventual demutualisation of mutuals was an outcome of expanding organisations, the
pursuit of which was caused by the requirement to remain competitive. In contrast a
Neo-Marxist inspired view saw demutualisation as a means whereby managers
appropriated the resources of cooperative entities. However, neither of these theories
was entirely supported by the empirical research presented in chapters 7-10. This was
primarily because they were unable to explain why demutualisations occurred at the end
of twentieth century, why the process was not universal, or why the last successful vote
on conversion was in April 1999. The latter question was relevant because it contrasted
the discrepancy between the functionalist inevitability thesis, against the satisfaction
and goodwill towards building societies expressed in the member surveys.
11.1	 Growth by crisis and dismissal of functionalist theory
and incompleteness of Neo-Marxist perspective
The weakness of the functionalist interpretation is that assuming linear progress towards
an inevitable outcome fails to explain alternative outcomes. Exemplifying this analysis,
Ferguson and McKillop (1997) built upon Berthoud and Hinton's (1988)
instrumentalists versus idealists' dichotomy, to state that mutuals move through phases
of increasing professionalism. This is often perceived as instrumentalism, but there was
insufficient evidence to support the proposition that professional staff were more
instrumental than volunteers. Where I hold that Ferguson and McKillop (1997) are
correct is in their assumption that mutuals are affected by actions and attitudes of
external actors. Having made this observation it is therefore surprising when they
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present their professionalisation model in almost evolutionary terms. As chapter 4
indicates, moves to professionalism among British, especially non-Scottish, credit
-
unions were not in response to a rapidly expanding sector; rather it arose from the
perceived failure of the movement by observers from America and other cooperative
forms (Swoboda 1999, and Jones 1999). Thus the changes instigated in credit unions
which brought about increased professionalism, were responding to crisis, not part of
'natural' growing pains.
More generally crisis is the backdrop to many of the transformations in the history of
mutuals. A pattern emerges of prolonged periods of quiet acquisition followed by a
scandal involving either or both allegations of fiscal impropriety or managerial
ineffectiveness, of which the outcome is a phase of turbulent reform, often imposed by
external forces, most notably the government. Through such an interpretation crisis
should be viewed positively, as it invariably results in mutuals reconnecting with
mutuality and their members' interests. Both of the transformations in building
societies and credit unions assessed in this thesis have displayed evidence of this
pattern, suggesting that mutuals' development is propelled by a crisis to a new
consensus, as opposed to any organic and systematic growth. It may seem ironic and
contradictory that organisations created to bring stability to members' lives evolve by
massive intellectual upheaval. However, as Kropotkin (1904) argued, organisational
stability eventually causes managerial complacency and detachment, which requires a
'shock' to stimulate reform. Demutualisation was both a response to a crisis that began
with market liberalisation, and ultimately became a crisis, forcing building societies to
address mutuality or convert. It could be argued that credit unions' crisis was spurious
or questionable but the consequences were significant.
By empirically and theoretically strengthening Kropotkin's (1904) 'crisis' thesis of
mutuals' progress, this implies a dismissal of evolutionary interpretations and causality
being linked to its outcome. One facet of crisis is that its resolution is unknown by
those engaged in it, thus suggestions that credit unions changed to become more
professional is a result of crisis, not an explanation for change. Consequently the
functionalist narrative is theoretically problematic as well as empirically unfounded.
Though there was an undoubted appropriation of resources by building society
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managers, this is an insufficient explanation for demutualisation. Barnes' (1984) and
Hird's (1996) descriptions of a gradual enclosure of assets highlight the accumulation of
-
wealth and security achieved by managers. However, if life was so pleasant and
uncomplicated why did some managers pursue demutualisation? Opportunism simply
will not suffice. Returning to causality, something must have altered the attitudes of
these alleged complacent 'fat cats'. Consequently the neo-Marxist perspective is
incomplete because it lacks a conceptual frame, in common with the functionalist
narrative it is overly deterministic, simplistic, and exists in a vacuum. Any analysis
must also consider cultural and societal shifts.
11.2 Assessing the Embeddedness Thesis
As stated by Dodd (1994), the main weakness of Polyani's (1950) concept was the
separation between the substantive and abstract economy. Harvey (2000) disputed this,
holding that there was a mutual conditioning between economics and society. However,
Harvey's analysis requires further elaboration, as the economy is itself constructed on
the basis of social relations. It neither remains monolithic nor unaffected by society.
Therefore mutuals are currently operating in a society, which as discussed in chapter 5,
underwent a dramatic upheaval in the late twentieth century.
Through the embeddedness thesis it is possible to re-evaluate the historical development
of mutuals. Chapter 3 outlined the gradual embedding of building societies into the
corporatist state, culminating with the JSA in the 1970s. However, corporatism was
implemented unevenly and did not always include the non-indigenous population. In a
parallel of the first building societies, excluded migrants unable to access existing
provision established credit unions. So at this stage building societies were firmly
embedded within the corporatist state, while credit unions lacking a legislative frame
were un-embedded. Eventually, as the state began to address the needs of these
marginalised populations, credit unions were able to secure some legitimacy. Yet
before there was time to earn acceptance and become embedded, capitalism changed.
In a societal limbo credit unions adopted two apparently divergent strategies. At one
extreme the industrial credit unions sought acceptance by replicating capitalist
concentration on exchange and minimising the intangible communal elements,
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becoming known as instrumentalists. In contrast others sought embeddedness within
their communities. These 'idealists' stressed intimate reciprocal values and eschewed
professionalism, as it signified an endorsement of capitalism. These two approaches
suggest that embeddedness can occur in various ways and organisations can be
embedded into differing sections of society. It is also possible that being embedded in
one part of society, precludes or limits embeddedness in another. Therefore the debate
within credit unions was a struggle for legitimacy, only moving towards resolution by a
government seeking the incorporation of them into their network of delivery agents. To
ensure norm and mission compliance, this action involves the dislocation and
reformulation of any community embeddedness. One of the means to achieve this is the
imposition of sometime excessive regulation that forces credit unions to become more
professional. The transition was partially facilitated by disgruntled idealists who, as
noted in chapter 7, began to question the involvement and motivation of the local state.
The attempted 'capture' of credit unions by 'anti-poverty' workers, can be viewed as
part of a wider ideological conflict between the local and national state. In such a
scenario idealism and instrumentalism become meaningless titles, as credit unions were
caught between street-level bureaucrats and policy-making civil servants. Yeo and Yeo
(1988) show that this reflected the experience of other cooperatives. The eclipse of the
local state analysis by the policies of New Labour gave a renewed voice to the
cooperators that populate credit unions, and who simultaneously hold instrumental and
idealistic perspectives.
Such an analysis of credit union development should avoid the temptation to seek links
in the disputes between terminating and permanent building societies. No historical
evidence was found that demonstrated governmental preference for the latter, on the
contrary the Royal Commission in 1872 endorsed terminating societies. Partly this was
a function of the laissez-faire attitude, as support for working-class self-help relieved
the government of any responsibility. Apart from the occasional series of scandals the
state showed minimal interest in building societies until 1918. The Bolshevik
revolution changed this and building society leaders moved swiftly to deter any dis-
embedding. So in contrast to the other mutuals, particularly cooperatives, building
societies were tolerated, and occasionally encouraged. The three main reasons for
building societies' acceptance was their paternalistic management, a higher proportion
of middle class members, and activity that did not challenge capitalists' interests.
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Successive scandals meant that local leaders usually managed building societies in a
professional manner. In an age of deference this ensured effective power was withheld
-from members. Although sporadic outbursts of member agitation occurred, the stability
of most societies resulted in a mutually beneficial relationship, specifically to the
emerging middle classes who were unable to access housing finance from banks.
Unlike the working class cooperatives who seemed to inhabit the values of October
1917, it was believed that house ownership brought stability, which meant they were
less likely to revolt.
The symbiotic relationship between members and management only began to break
down with the erosion of deference in the1970s, and the subsequent expansion of banks'
services into personal finance. The latter involved the lifting of restrictions on banks,
while building societies remained constrained. Through this banks were able to exploit
the marketplace unencumbered by competition in their specialist area, thereby exposing
building societies as 'inefficient' because they were unable to respond swiftly to a
changing environment
11.3	 Disembedding the mutual in the era of hypercapitalism
Originally used by Krieger (1986), hypercapitalism represented the imposition of neo-
liberal economics from the late 1970s onwards. In Britain this included Thatcherism
and recently globalisation, see 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. Unlike previous incarnations of
capitalism, hypercapitalism opposes direct competition from most alternative economic
forms or interventions, primarily it has emasculated the state and denationalised its
assets. My contention is that hypercapitalism has also destabilised mutuals resulting in
their demutualisation. Therefore as the legislation that enabled demutualisation was
enacted in 1986, I would add this to the Edgell and Duke (1991) typology of
privatisation.
Upon reviewing the literature and assessing the empirical evidence, hypercapitalism has
sought to neutralise mutuals in a number of interrelated and sometimes superficially
contradictory ways:
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1. Commodification of the personal
2. Discredit and abasement of the mutual
-
3. Crypto-utopian discourse
4. Creating sites of residual activity/resistance
11.3.1 Commodification of the personal
From Polyani (1957) onwards, authors have asserted that exchanges between social
actors are becoming increasingly commodified. These are formalised on capitalist
terms with the aim to make a profit. Williams (forthcoming 2002) challenged this
proposition, arguing de-commodification was occurring both in the abstract and
substantive economic spheres. However, lack of evidence has not deterred proponents
of the commodification thesis, with Harvey (2000) arguing that relationships were
disembedding and being replaced with commodified exchanges. This was particularly
acute in monetarised exchange where distanciation detached personal obligations from
physical transactions; even Williams conceded that payment had become a substitute for
trust. Financial mutuals were therefore more likely to be prone to the effects of
commodification then other institutions, as, the supplanting of trust makes it more
difficult to assess the non-tangible benefits of mutuality.
Much of the trust literature compares trust in gesellschaft and gem einschaft, assuming
abstract trust was reliant on reputation and predictability. This implied a lessoning of
trust and withdrawal towards a purified form of gesellschaft. As Sennett (1974)
commented, this trust could have a serious effect on society, as social actors dismiss
institutional endeavours to engender trust, presuming it lacks emotional reassurance. If
occurring it would be expected that mutuals, which are reliant on trust to offset
asymmetries in the knowledge relationship, would be affected. However, the members
interviewed expressed high levels of trust in their mutuals, contradicting the views of
carpetbaggers. This suggests that the impact of commodification is an important
independent variable on the nature of abstract trust and subsequent attitudes towards
institutions that are dependent on a monetarised loyalty.
Through the increasing importance attached to money, mutuals have had to 'prove' that
they produced greater returns than joint-stock companies. This additionality earned the
285
sobriquet the mutual dividend, in itself an acquiescence to capitalism. Furthermore, the
mutual dividend has to be presented in interest rate differentials, not branch retention or
other non-commodified services. This potentially affects reciprocity as the members'
surveys stated that the quality of the interaction was considered a major benefit of
mutuals. Moreover reciprocity counterpoised the depersonalisation of services
underway at banks. Yet within building societies the advantage of reciprocity has been
challenged by carpetbaggers, who argued that time spent 'chatting' with members
should be measured and invoiced, believing that efficiency and subsequently
competitiveness was being undermined.
Commodification also affects longevity, as concentration on price enables banks to
temporarily compete with building societies and create churn within the market. This
has a detrimental effect because length of membership with a mutual was correlated to
extent of commitment to mutuality. A paradox of churn is that the banks' attitudes to
longevity are not economically logical; churn causes a greater turnover of customers,
which by definition is less efficient then customer retention. Commodification has little
relationship with efficiency but the pursuit of growth destabilises and disrupts other
organisations, specifically those with lower costs because they seek to employ non-
commodified delivery mechanisms.
Caution is also affected by commodification, for demutualisation is the replacement of
collective provision with a monetary asset for an individuals' utility. In such
circumstances commodification is 'better' than shared protection, because in an
unstable world only money can guarantee security. It is this that motivates many
carpetbaggers who believe they can receive a higher return on their investments than
they could through prudent building societies, especially as stock markets were rising
sharply during the demutualisation frenzy.
Commodification has also affected democracy. The issuance of windfalls is
compensation for surrendering membership and ownership rights based on the principle
of one member one vote. In effect members are being paid to forfeit democracy.
Although Williams (2002 forthcoming) may be correct about the limited extent of
commodification . the narrative is sufficiently powerful to undermine mutuality.
However, the members' surveys indicated widespread support for reciprocity, alongside
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requests for the opportunity to vote on conversion, demonstrating that non-commodified
values are present even within monetarised exchanges. This was most pronounced in
mutuals located within working-class communities, whilst the growth of credit unions
and the continued survival of building societies indicate that non-commodified
exchange exists even within the abstract economy. However, the presence of a counter
impulse suggests that the dichotomy between commodification and non-
commodification is highly complex, with each supporting and conflicting the other.
Academic distinctions do not reflect the reality as experienced by members who seek
the benefits of both. What should be noted is the existence of a class sub-text, with the
middle classes more prone to commodified exchanges and hence demutualisation, than
their working class counterparts, who continue to emphasise the importance of
reciprocity.
11.3.2 Discredit and abasement of the collective
Yea and Yeo (1988), and Killingback's (1988) historical review detailed how capitalist
interests in the 1930s had undermined mutual interests, a process renewed by
hypercapitalism. Not only were mutuals' activities restricted, but as discussed in
chapter 10, building societies were required to comply with capitalist regulation without
the freedom that this normally entails. The exploitative nature of capitalist companies
has resulted in increasing regulation aimed at protecting consumers. Over time the costs
for this regulation have been transferred to those being regulated, paying both for the
internal cost of compliance and the regulators operating costs. Capitalist companies
often begrudge these charges but accept them because they are universally applied. In
contrast, mutuals are engaged in low-risk investment and business management where
the likely subversion of member interests are diminished, yet they have to share the
burden of regulation. In effect, mutuals are being denied the opportunity to maximise
the competitive advantage inherent in mutuality, and are being forced to replace
reciprocity and trust with bureaucratised relationships. Thus mutuals are subsidising the
risk driven joint stock companies and having their market advantage neutralised.
In chapter 3 Barnes (1984) identified the contradiction of the regulator in closing the
smallest societies who happened to have the lowest managerial expenses. Similarly the
FSA has promoted larger credit unions as the expense of smaller community societies,
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without any evidence of an efficiency advantage. After all it is likely that voluntary
organisations have lower costs than those with professional staff, but from the
-
regulator's perspective volunteers are considered a higher risk because they are
sometimes unable to process the formalised regulation system. Yet the most notorious
collapse of a credit union, at Camberwell, was previously held as a model society
because it employed staff and had premises.
Usage of language also had an impact as the employment of capitalist lexicon detaches
members and staff of mutuals from the meaning of mutuality and alters the emphasis of
the business. Once the concept of profit is accepted the pathway to tangible ownership
and returns on investment are exposed. Finally regulation has interfered in the
objectives of mutuals by designating them as 'for the poor'. Once imposed it politicises
attempts to pursue sustainability through attracting members from across the social
spectrum. Distinguishing mutuals in this manner portrays them as second class
institutions and ultimately, as occurred to credit unions, can result in ghettoisation.
Meanwhile capitalist organisations are unencumbered by these moral guidelines, able to
act in the shareholders' interests and remain competitive. Therefore mutuals are
expected to perform at a higher fiscal and moral standard than joint-stock companies,
having both to engage in social activity and offer competitive products. This
marginalisation and containment of mutuals caused frustration among the managers
interviewed and ultimately results in an artificial divide between idealism and
instrumentalism.
Debates about the plurality of mutuality propagated by 'idealists' have a debilitating
effect when employed by supporters of demutualisation. The ambivalence of idealists
was apparent in the attitudes of BSMA and Mutual Members briefly discussed in
chapter 9. This allowed carpetbaggers and other critics to develop another means of
discrediting mutuals, through the concept of 'hypermutuality'. Hypermutuality begins
from the premise that mutuals' prime objective is to behave mutually, of which
democracy is the main expression. Furthermore as an idealised form hypermutuality
assumes mutuals should deliver equality of service to all members, regardless of needs
and risks. Hence those that offer variable rates dependent on investment levels are
criticised for acting un-mutually (Barnes 1984). Following hypermutuality can affect
the economic status of the mutual and here carpetbaggers are quick to highlight
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perceived weak performances. For example Nationwide's decision to offer universal
mortgage rates which can be seen as hypermutuality, was greeted by derision by
carpetbaggers when the society's share of the new mortgage market collapsed.
However, it is regarding democracy where the hypermutuality argument has centred. A
feature of demutualisation votes was disputes regarding their fairness. Beyond
accusations of leading ballot papers and the behaviour of staff, carpetbaggers believe
building societies should remain neutral during these elections. They argued that
managers should act as returning officers not candidates because of their influence over
members, an interpretation confirmed by the surveys. If managers insisted on
intervening carpetbaggers questioned the validity of mutuality, inferring that mutuals
that do not act hypermutually should demutualise and attempts to retain mutual status
were a means to maintain the status of management. This desire for a purer democracy
was connected to the 'necessity' for economic equality within mutuals, so that
carpetbaggers could claim that the mutual form was unsustainable. Rather it was
carpetbaggers' concept of hypermutuality which placed impossible demands on mutual
managers.
Abasement of mutuals was accompanied by the policies of hypercapitalism to discredit
and in some instances destroy collective experiences and impulses. Privatisation was
not just concerned with the removal of public assets; it also sought the privatisation of
the self, which was reinforced by policies to increase mobility (Williams 1983). This
process transferred risks to the individual who were encouraged to engage in self-
reliance, while the rise of mobility detached social actors from their communities. For
mutuals this threatened both reciprocity, as the links between individuals declined, and
solidarity. Furthermore, structural shifts in post-Fordism and post-modernism ruptured
existing social bonds, which caused distanciation (Giddens 1990). The combined effect
was to undermine personal trust between individuals and replace it with abstract trust.
However, the process was not universally welcomed as members still valued interaction
and wanted to retain local branches. Equally the collapse of community threatens the
longevity of commitment, as according to Mark cooperative values are reinforced by
protracted 'cultural disproportionate prior exposure' (2002:327). Mark shows that as
cooperation was rewarded by society, cooperators had a higher social standard than
non-cooperators (called defectors). Thus if a higher status co-operator interacted with
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any defector, the defector would imitate the cooperator, as the latter was socially more
attractive. Mark described this as an evolutionary imperative to cooperate. Although
-
universally applicable Mark acknowledged that the effect on cooperation was unknown
in a society where communal bonds are disrupted and individualism is given higher
status, thereby resulting in fewer opportunities to interact with co-operators. This
analysis indicates the necessity of longevity to cooperation, while noting the potential
threat caused by hypercapitalism.
11.3.3 Crypto-utopian discourse
Recently Stager-Jacques created `crypto-utopia' to describe 'any form of thought and
practice which treat perception, value and/or belief as hard reality' (2002:29). Having
reviewed the arguments employed by carpetbaggers this neologism encapsulated much
of their thought. Aspects of crypto-utopianism are prevalent in comments that elevate
the sanctity of market and an insistence that organisations must conform to capitalist
modes of behaviour. Typifying this approach was the criticism that mutuals refused to
partake in exploitative client activities, as discussed, this was complimented by criticism
of un-mutual behaviour for those that did. In such circumstances caution is viewed as
being risk adverse and therefore irrelevant or uneconomic. An important characteristic
of the neo-liberal narrative is the comparison between the staid cautious building
societies and the dynamic, innovative and enterprising joint-stock companies. Evidence
of this was apparent in developing the discourse for demutualisation, where the entire
process of application through to the launch was concerned with raising expectations
before an exciting denouement. Crypto-utopianism is also employed when comparing
the performance of capitalist organisations, as Llewellyn (1997) found when examining
literature on joint-stock-companies and mutuals. This usually involved contrasting an
idealised form of joint-stock company against the actual performance of mutuals,
thereby 'demonstrating' that mutuals were less effective.
The crypto-utopian discourse is evident in globalisation arguments that assume it is
beyond the control of states (Ohmae 1990) or that it is a process of universalism. Not
only did Robertson (1992) theoretically reject this, but also building society members
dismissed the implication that regional societies could not survive in a global
environment. Similarly the positive image of building societies among members
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confirms Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) argument that reputation can reduce costs.
Smaller building societies earn business based on the implicit trust of the phrase
building society, which should theoretically be more efficient then having to expend a
greater proportion of resources on market awareness. Equally when including dividend,
the cost of capital was higher for joint-stock companies. The design of accounts which
show dividends below profits obfuscate the true cost and avoids comparison with
building societies who must list their costs for raising finance, such as paying interest on
credit balances and maintaining branches, as expenses.
The ultimate usage of the crypto-utopian discourse was in the sequestration of NSM
language by carpetbaggers. This counter-NSM assumed the identity of a resistance
movement fighting for freedom from an oppressive regime, when its argument was for
the imposition of hypercapitalism. Such a tactic was described as `Starbuckstopia' by
Fournier after the practice of executives who 'sucked from under our feet all grounds
for oppositional practice, any 'alternative' being inexorably drawn into reproducing
what it was meant to overthrow' (2002:189-190). But carpetbaggers went further and
used the discourse of opposition to present capitalism as the alternative. Thus hyper-
capitalism becomes the revolutionary movement attempting to overturn vested interests
of corporate capitalism and mutuality, a process that according to their ideology is
inevitable and on going. Therefore mutuality has to address external threats both in the
competitive and ideological sphere combined with internal challenges that demand
adherence to hypercapitalism or hypermutuality.
11.3.4 Creating sites of residual activity/resistance
It is perhaps unsurprising that these systematic attacks on mutuals and other alternative
perspectives to capitalism and the gradual usurpation of the vocabulary of opposition
have created sites of resistance. Unlike the three previous factors, this is an unintended
by-product of capitalism. However, it can also be presented as a deliberate structural
outcome in which to reduce social costs to compete globally, non-profit making
commodified spheres have been transferred to the non-commodified sector. In this
interpretation credit unions were permitted and granted space to develop because they
served an excluded group that the banks were ignoring (Dayson et al 1999). Therefore
support for credit unions by the government offsets the worst excesses of
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hypercapitalism.
There are a number of weaknesses with this argument. First, it cannot explain why the
most successful credit unions have been among employed groups, such as the police,
which is not a residual occupation. Second, expansion is related to geography, with the
fastest growing credit unions clustered in the West of Scotland (Donnelly & Kahn
1999). Here it was thought growth was connected to a strong socialist tradition and
communal bonds. Third, the empirical evidence suggests few members join because
they are excluded, since most have bank accounts, instead they want to save locally with
people they know and trust. Though credit unions and even building societies may
originally be allowed to trade in certain markets, the nature of the service they provide
is attractive to many outside these groups. This empirically informed analysis endorses
Williams (2002 forthcoming) theoretical perspective that participation in some 'residual
providers' is through agency not exclusion. This was epitomised in the demutualisation
vote at Leek United BS where the community rejected commodification in favour of
reciprocity and solidarity, demonstrating that it was possible to be embedded in a
locality, employ non-commodified arguments and be successful. The result showed that
financial globalisation and its effects were neither inevitable nor even preferred by
members. Moreover, the members surveyed rejected the globalisation thesis, a view
confirmed by the experience of mutual managers.
The glocalisation argument presumes that the extremities of globalisation are forcing a
withdrawal into communities to search for security (Castells 1991). Undoubtedly this is
occurring' as some of the interviewees were concerned about the effects of globalisation,
but the glocalisation thesis is predicated on the assumption that globalisation has
occurred, when it is equally feasible that globalisation has not been as all embracing as
its supporters argue. Instead the desire for interpersonal relationships based on
reciprocity could be a function of the disenchantment with bureaucracy and abstract
interactions highlighted by Weber. This alienation may have caused a 're-imagining' of
locality as social actors began to adjust to a world where the state had been hollowed
out (Featherstone and Lash 1995). Regardless of organisational type, respondents
appeared to prefer immediacy and consistency in the delivery of supposedly
commodified products. Even among carpetbaggers there were those that preferred
interaction and wanted to preserve at least one mutual with which to invest. In
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conclusion the general public may not understand mutuality but they value its
components.
Rather than mutuality being in terminal decline, it poses an ideological challenge to
capitalism when supposed sites of residue become sites of resistance. For if due to their
organisational status mutuals attract new members because of the type of service they
provide, this raises doubts about the efficacy of hypercapitalism and the legitimacy of
its discourse. Mutuals suggest there is an alternative and even in its weakened form
collectivism continues to have a resonance.
11.3.5 Final Comments
Birchall requested that researchers into mutuality should address three levels of enquiry:
First, the 'concept of mutuality as a synonym for fraternity or solidarity' (2001:245);
second, the impact of the state on mutual forms and the potential of mutuals; and third,
the current situation including demutualisation. While accepting Birchall's
philosophical and contemporaneous aspects, I would suggest broadening the second
area of research to include how the economic structure of capitalism affects mutuals.
Notwithstanding this, using Birchall's taxonomy this thesis has shown that mutual
solidarity requires a culture of trust, reciprocity, longevity and caution to be fully
effective. These need to be embedded within society, thereby becoming acceptable
norms of behaviour. Without this mutuality succumbs to commodification and the
effects of individualism. Empirical research has been employed to demonstrate that
demutualisation is not an inevitable function of size, rather it is a reaction to changing
cultural and economic activity, heavily influenced by class, which initially either
rendered mutuals meaningless, or restricted them to non-commodified groups.
However the alienation felt by social actors has caused a counter-culture to develop
which financial mutuals are beginning to exploit.
Attempts to undermine mutuality and particular forms of mutuality by hypercapitalism
have largely failed. Whilst true in general at present, this should be tempered by lower
levels of support among the middle classes. The member surveys showed clear
evidence of middle class support for demutualisation, and confirmed that they were the
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main beneficiaries of both this process and privatisation. It may be that just as in
Scotland's credit unions, mutuals are stronger in communities where values of
reciprocity and collectivism remain culturally prevalent. The decouf5ling of middle
classes from mutuality is possibly related to the increased penetration of the profit
motive among this class (Williams and Windebank 2001). With far more middle class
members as a total proportion of the membership in building societies than credit
unions, this may be a contributory factor in the divergence in development. Through
this class analysis building societies have suffered from demutualisation because of the
changing behaviour of the middle-classes, as they became proponents of individualism
and privatised lifestyles. This shift is associated with Thatcherism, and can be viewed
as a major cause of demutualisation.
The components of mutuality outlined in chapter 2 have been assailed by
hypercapitalism. Attempts have been made to separate the interests of members and
managers and destroy the trust relationship. Furthermore, depersonalising financial
services to reduce costs has enabled hypercapitalism to define reciprocity as an
expensive cost, not an essential element of interaction. The commocliivaion .of
reciprocity has enabled mutuals' critics to claim it is an unnecessary luxury. By
presenting capitalism as 'thrusting' and 'dynamic', mutuals have been pejoratively cast
as 'pedestrian', 'hidebound', and cautious. Yet members value the security of building
society investments and attempts to draw savings into equity investment, initially
through highly desirable returns have wilted with the fall of the stock market.
Meanwhile, the benefits of longevity have been disputed by carpetbaggers and
challenged by the patently inefficient practice of encouraging churn. Despite the
criticism, mutuality continues to cause difficulties for capitalism, presenting a viable
alternative corporate economic model dependent on organic growth and customer
ownership, as opposed to a frenzy of activity and exploitation.
Unsurprisingly given the threat to mutuality's components, the cooperative
organisational model has tottered. Lack of solidarity between classes; a virtual absence
of educational exchanges, exacerbated by a diverging of knowledge between managers
and members; and the perversion and consequent commodification of democracy, have
all combined to disrupt mutuals from within. Most importantly the transferability of
ownership breached the philosophical origins of cooperation and created an
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unsustainable structure. However, building society history shows a different attitude to
transferability, as terminating societies were predicated on the distribution of assets
upon closure. Considering this historical reflection the introduction of the signaway
signals a confluence between cooperative and building society thought. Even without
external factors mutuality remains an essentially contested concept, with members
almost entirely reliant on the ability of managers to operate their mutuals and
communicate effectively with members. Therefore the concept of 'asymmetrical
mutuality' best describes the form of mutuality being practiced by contemporary
professional mutuals. This will only function if the components of mutuality are
prioritised alongside an organisational structure that enables mutuality to be
economically effective.
Regarding the paradox of mutuality it seems this went beyond inherent contradictory
forces within globalisation, as the attack on mutuality was part of a systematic challenge
to all perspectives offering alternative centres of power to capitalism. The period of
demutualisation followed the rise of hypercapitalism and its crypto-utopian ideology,
which while permitting residual providers sought to vaccinate more mainstream
services. Unfortunately for capitalism the process alienated many people who joined
entities incorporating reciprocity and human interaction. Ironically this may ensure the
continued existence of mutuals, as their struggle for survival has sharpened their
delivery of mutuality, which in turn makes them more attractive to the public.
Ultimately mutuals understand More's maxim that stability and freedom from anxiety
equals happiness extends beyond a utopian dream.
Finally a note on methodology. This thesis included a relatively new method; cyber-
ethnography. It has many limitations, but a previously unrecorded factor was the effect
that the quality of bulletin board software has on the ethics of the research. As more
advanced programmes list all the names of on-line users, regardless of whether they
were active or lurking, this releases the researcher from the practice of unmediated and
quasi-covert fieldwork. Hopefully this insight will inform and enhance the quality of
this new methodology.
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11.4	 Areas for further research
As mentioned in the introduction there are three areas where limitations of space
-
prevent more detailed discussion. Although internal power relationships have been a
recurring theme, the thesis has mainly examined them in relation to external challenges.
Therefore an area in need for more exploration is the relevance of the sociological
literature on power to mutuals, and whether new interpretations can be formulated,
perhaps using the currently fashionable actor-network theory (ANT)?
I have deliberately avoided attempts to address the issue of community; rather the thesis
has mainly addressed mutuality from the perspective of the individual. There is a vast
literature on community and one of the next stages could be to analyse the sense of
shared experiences or communalities.
Historically work needs to be undertaken into the early British credit unions, who were
they and how did they arise? Connected to this is a requirement to assess the parallels
between the formations of mutuals. For example, based on current evidence I suggested
they arose from excluded communities; can the historical evidence confirm this?
Alongside the credit unions have been popular among police forces. There is potential
to integrate this into the literature on 'cop culture', and occupational communities.
There is a strong class correlation to support for mutuality that requires further
qualitative research. What has happened to the middle-classes that make them less
prone to non-commodified relationships? During the surveys a number of middle-class
respondents were concerned about the effects of globalisation on their lives, and some
carpetbaggers expressed similar views. Could labour casualisation be moving up the
class structure and does this indicate a renewal of interest in collective provision by the
middle classes?
Although gender was barely discussed, the fieldwork did expose some intriguing
dichotomies. Women seemed less committed to building societies, yet they were often
dominant within credit unions. Research on gender and financial institutions has tended
to examine the workplace environment (Halford et al. 1997). Arguably the gender
aspects of the relationships between the mutual and its members requires further
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enquiry.
Carpetbaggers gave a completely different perspective to the NSM literature. Two
aspects worthy of further study are the rise of counter-NSM that endorse capitalism,
such as carpetbaggers and the Fuel Protesters. Also, does the use of technology enable
a privatisation of NSM campaigns, as maximum benefit can now be achieved without
any physical interaction? In a related topic should Olson's free rider principle be
revisited in view of technological shifts?
Apart from the surveys contained within this thesis, there have been few systematic
studies of members' attitudes, including those in other mutual forms, such as
cooperatives, friendly societies, and insurance companies. Funding should be sought to
conduct a representative survey. Moreover, the opinions of those not in mutuals should
be collected and analysed. Why people do not join will be as instructive as to why they
do. Another area missing from the thesis was the literature on consumption. Like any
other product, financial services are increasingly consumed. How attitudes to mutuals
fit into this topic area would be worth exploring.
The failure to conduct surveys makes it impossible to assess credit unions claims that
they are helping the financial excluded. The thesis disputed this assumption and
suggested that location of the mutual was a more significant factor. Research could be
undertaken into current financial inclusion patterns and how extensive these should be?
Methodologically more analysis is required on cyber-ethnography. Clearer guidelines
for researchers are needed, particularly concerning ethical issues. This should follow a
thorough review of current literature, to identify further gaps in our understanding.
Finally, the core paradox of the late 20 th century of mutuality is the growth of credit
unions, during the decline/stabilisation of building societies. Further research on how
other mutual organisations have responded to hypercapitalism would help to confirm
the key argument of this thesis that mutuality must negotiate a continued embeddedness
within a capitalist society. This is not predetermined and although mutuals can be
severely disrupted by exiguous factors, it can be partially dissipated by embeddedness
in local communities
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Appendix A: Details of Main Building Societies Acts
_
This section outlines the main clauses from the 1894, 1960 and 1986 building societies
acts, followed by legislation changes to credit unions in 1994 and 2002.
Clauses of 1894 Building Societies Act
Section 1 terms of shares and how losses should be met
Section 2 authorised the Registrar to dictate the format of the annual return;
insisted that all mortgages in excess of £5000 should be publicly
declared
Section 3 insisted that auditors must be accountants;
Sections 4-5 Right of members and Registrar to inspect books and appoint an
inspector
Section 6-11 Granted the Registrar power to dissolve a society and decide the
process through which these should occur;
Section 12 Banning balloting for advances (thereby outlawing Bowkett- Starr
societies);
Section 13 prescribing advances on second mortgages unless the society holds the
first mortgage;
Section 14 Limits on borrowing power and excluding mortgages with over a year's
arrears when calculating borrowing powers;
Section 15 Provisions as to name & deposits
Section 16 Deposits in and investments in savings banks
Section 17 Extending investment powers;
Sections 18-
19
Explanations of 1874 Act
Section 20 Relieving 60 societies from provisions of the 1887 Arbitration Act;
Sections 21-
22
Offences by building societies and false entries
Section 23 Outlawing receipt of gifts by officers;
Section 24 Officials as competent witnesses
Section 25 Incorporated all unincorporated societies formed after 1856 (pre 1856
societies continued to be excluded).
Sections 26-
30
Forms, annual report, repeal of specific provisions, short title and
commencement
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Details of the 1960 Building Societies Act
Section	 Purpose











38-49	 Duties of directors
40,50,51	 Registrar
and 54	 accounting powers




"special advances" must not exceed 10% of annual
lending. A new society must have 10 investors
pledging £500 each for 5 years.
Cannot advertise until 1 year's trading and then only
after permission of the Registrar
Can insist directors put £5000 of the own money into
business if the building society changes the nature of
its activity. Fix rules on where building societies invest
funds
Limits valuations made by directors which must now be
ratified at every AGM and must stop within 10 years
Copy of accounts to all new shareholders and those with
over £25 invested. Rules of building societies must
include provision on calling of meetings, voting rights
and number of members needed to call a meeting.
Meetings require at least 21 days notice and no more
than 56 and notice sent to all with over £25 invested. In
case of special resolutions, requiring two-thirds
majority notice must go to all members. Members have
a right to vote by proxy. Building society must keep a
register of members which can be inspected in certain
circumstances (e.g. arrears) or if they convince the
Registrar that it is worthwhile.
Auditing, supervision, qualifications, presentation of
accounts, appointment and retirement of auditors.
Can change the format of the balance sheet
Must declare interests and advances. Cannot receive
commission from insurer of mortgages
Members to receive accounts from both organisations
Engagement) TE	 (this must be previously approved by the Registrar) and
and Unions	 details of directors compensation.
The remainder of the act focuses on penalties, definitions and miscellaneous items.



















Sections 36 - 57
Aspects of the Building Societies Act 1986	 -





















Act as regulator for building societies
'Its purpose or principal purpose is that
of making loans which are secured on
residential property and are funded
substantially by members'
Rules to establish a building society,
constitutional provisions, definitions
and rights of members
States a building society must be
authorised with the BSC before its
permitted to trade
Introduced three classes of assets; class
1 mortgages (90% of all assets); class 2
other assets secured on land; and class 3
unsecured advances. But not more than
5% of assets could be in class 3.
However, societies with assets less than
£100 million could not engage in class 2
and 3 activities and the maximum upper
limit on class 3 is £5,000 per borrower.
At least 80% from individual members
and a maximum of 20% from money
markets.
Limits the activities of building societies
for trading in commodities, securities or
currencies
Allowed to own and develop residential
property. Limited to societies with in
excess of £3 million in free reserves
Can create and own an equity interest in
subsidiaries
Contains details of Investor Protection
Scheme and Investor protection Board.
90% of liabilities and a maximum
contribution of 0.3% of a societies
shares and deposits to the fund
Can offer conveyancing and estate
agency services. Financial services
included money transmission, personal
banking and cheque guarantees
The BSC can make a series of demands
if a building society does not fulfil its














conversions to a company status, others
to ask the society to reapply for
authorisation, restrict advertising, obtain
further information, appoint inspectors,
and a system of appeals against these
procedures
Section 45AA	 Requires the BSC to publish a list of
principles by which it will interpret and
operate
Section 45	 Sets out the criteria of prudent
management which the BSC should take
into account. These include
management of the balance sheet, risks,
and records. The quality, integrity,
prudence and professionalism of
directors should also be ensured.
Section 58-70	 There shall be at least two directors and
a chief executive and secretary.
Directors must be elected and members
are entitled to a proxy form and notice
of meetings. 10-50 people (depending
on the society's size) are require to
nominate a member for election to the
board. Directors must declare any
interests.
Section 71-82	 Specifies the accounting records and
systems, requirement to prepare annual
accounts and a summary financial
statement to be sent to all members.
Rules regarding the appointment,
qualification resignation and removal of
the auditor. Additionally the auditor is
required to inform the BSC of any
untoward practices
Section 83-85	 Allows for the creation of an
ombudsman to adjudicate on disputes
between societies and members. Also
explains the grounds for complaints and
their settlement
Sections 93-96,	 Societies may merge or TE. A merger
Schedule 16	 requires the approval of 50% of
borrowers and 75% of shareholders of
those that vote. Compensation to
directors has to be approved by a
separate vote
Section 97 — 102D, Building societies were permitted to
Schedule 17	 become companies this requires 20% of
all members to vote and 75% of
shareholding and 50% of borrowing
members to vote in favour. The
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I.
conversion procedure must be fair
between members who should receive
shares and to avoid speculative activity
only members of two years of more
should receive shares once the
conversion is announced. After
conversion the company is protected for
takeover for five years.
Adapted from BSA (1999) and Hammond (1998)
_
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Relevant Aspects to Credit Unions of 1994 Deregulation and
Contracting Out Act 1994 	 -
• Unsecured loans could be offered for four years (previously two) and secured
loans were extended from five to ten.
• Repayment periods (maximum two years) can be extended if credit union has a
least 10% of assets in general reserves, at end of previous accounting year
• Maximum loan to a member were increased to 1.5% of the credit union's assets
• A members existing shareholding can be used as security for a loan
• A new 'living or working' common bond was introduced
• The proof of an existing common bond will be relaxed, so that the applicants are
only required to make a statutory declaration that it exists
• The maximum shareholding by a member was increased to £5000 or 1.5% of
total assets
Non-qualifying members should be treated as full members when granting loans
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Outline of 2002 Credit Union Reform Bill
-
A. Allow credit unions to borrow money from external sources, other than
authorised banks and other credit unions.
B. Allow credit unions to differentiate between certain accounts by paying
dividends at different rates, and to pay dividends more than once each year.
C. Allow credit unions to provide additional basic services and charge fees (e.g. bill
payments).
D. Make the common bond requirements more flexible.
E. Establish appropriate regulation on the use of the name Credit Union.
F. Change the minimum coverage requirements for fidelity bonds.
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Appendix C:	 Semi-structured interviews
Contained here is further information on the interviews conducted as part of the thesis.
Below is the list of interviews followed by the generic questions asked.
Interviewees
Table C. 1 presents details of the 11 building society senior executives interviewed. To
ease identification each interviewee has been granted a code based on the geographic
focus of their institution, such as BSN1 for the first national building society
interviewed. The table also includes the date and how I recorded the interview.









BSL1 Local 7 5 August 1999 Written notes
BSR1 Regional 4 7 February
2000
Taped
BSR2 Regional 3 14 March 2000 Taped
BSR3 Regional 4 17 March 2000 Taped
BSN1 National 1 20 March 2000 Taped
BSL2 Local 10 23 March 2000 Taped
BSR3 Regional 4 28 March 2000 Taped
BSN2 National 1 30 March 2000 Taped
BSR4 Regional 3 6 April 2000 Taped
BSR5 Regional 3 2 May 2000 Taped
BSN3 National 1 23 May 2000 Taped
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Table C. 2 provides details of the credit union leaders interviewed. Again granting them
a number has protected each interviewee's identity. The code combines their type of
common bond with whether they are an instrumentalist or an idealia (while accepting
that this is problematic as most respondents supported both perspectives). Apart from
this information and the date of interview other information included is whether they are
a paid member of staff or a volunteer director. The identification code is CU for credit
union, followed by a C, E, A to describe the common bond (community, employee,
associational), and ending with ED or IN meaning idealist or instrumentalist
respectively.



































CUElN1 Employee Paid staff Instrumentalist 3 April
2000
Taped



















CUCIN2 Community Paid staff Instrumentalist 3 May 2000 Taped
TapedCUON3 Community Volunteer
director
Instrumentalist 5 May 2000










Finally, as discussed on chapter 6 a five other interviews were held, 3 with
representatives from trade associations, a former regulator, and a carpetbagger. Table
D. 3 contains rudimentary details of these individuals and provides an appropriate code,
with TA representing trade association, CB equally carpetbagger, and REG meaning
regulator.
Table C.3: Details of Other Interviewees
Interviewee Code Status Date of interview How interview was
recorded
TA1 Trade Association 23 September 1999 Written notes
REG1 Former regulator 7 December 1999 Written notes
TA2 Trade Association 12 November 1999 Taped
TA3 Trade Association 7 February 2000 Taped
CBI Carpetbagger 4 April 2000 Taped
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Generic Interview Questions
Each interviewee was asked specific questions followed by a series -of generic topics.
This was undertaken to make the interviewee comfortable and tackle some of issues
directly relevant to them. The generic questions are designed to stimulate a response
and allow the interviewee to express their view of mutuality. The following lists outline
the generic questions used in interviews with building society and credit union
respondents. The interviewee specific questions and the schedules used for the other
interviewee have been omitted in order to protect respondents' anonymity. However,
these are available upon request if required.
Generic questions for building society chief executives
1 How long have you been within the building society sector and what made you
join it?
2. What have been your main achievements and disappointments?
3. How do you view the building sector today and does it still have a viable future?
4. What significant changes have there been?
5. What do you understand by mutuality?
6. Has it meaning changed over the years?
7. What is your opinion of the mutual bonus system operated by Nationwide and
Britannia's annual mutual dividend?
8. Are there any other innovative means of delivering mutuality that you admire?
9." How difficult is it to be both the manager and employee in a mutual
organisation, where your customers are your bosses?
10. What should be the role of the staff and management in mutual (impact of
merger with CIB)?
11. Should building societies have a stronger relationship with the co-operative
union and should they be non-profit making organisations?
12. What role is there for members?
13. Should members be classified as owners (trustees)?
14. Is democracy, within a building society, help or a hindrance?
15. How effective is accountability in the building society sector?
16. How can members effectively monitor the performance of a building society
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where management has all the information?
17. Isn't there a danger that building societies will be run in the interests of
-
management rather than customers (captured by professionals)?
18. Is there a conflict between the directors' legal responsibility towards future
members and current members demands for service/income today?
19. What is your view of carpetbaggers and will they ever go away?
20. How do respond to those that argue that carpetbaggers force building societies to
be more accountable to members (rediscover mutuality)?
21. The 1980s and 1990s saw tremendous changes in the building society sector —
what is your view on the origins of demutualisation?
22. Another view is that building societies were paternalistic and old-fashioned
institutions that needed to change- what do you think?
23. What role did technology play in forcing change upon the sector?
24. In increasingly competitive global financial market do ALL building societies
have a future?
25. Finally, is a building society a financial services business that happens to have
an alternative ownership structure or a membership organisation that specialises
in financial services?
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Generic Questions for Credit Unions
1. Can you tell me about the origins and development of the credit union/
-
2. In what way, if at all, has the philosophy/strategy of the credit union changed
over the years? (Has the purpose changed?)
3. How does the credit union function on a day-to-day basis? And does it
adequately serve its members needs?
4. How important are volunteers to the credit union and could it operate effectively
without them? Is there a danger of 'burn out'?
5. What is the role of members within the credit union (AGMs participation) and
how would you describe the relationship between the members and the board of
directors?
6. What is the nature of the relationships within the board and how has this
changed over the years?
7. How accountable would you say the credit union is, where the directors hold
most of the information?
8. How would you describe the culture and managerial style of the credit union?
9. What image does the credit union have within the community and amongst
members?
10. What are the future prospects for the credit union?
11. What does your credit union class as financial viability and do you reach this
level?
12. On reflection in what way, if at all, would you have changed your common
bond?
13. How difficult is it to survive and grow as a credit union?
14. What do you understand by the word mutuality? And how is it practised in your
credit union?
15. Is it difficult to balance the need to operate as a financial institution and the
social goals of a credit union?
16. How difficult was the process of registration and how would you describe your
relationship with the registrar?
17. There is a body of opinion that believes that the Registrar has restricted the
growth of credit unions, what do you think?
18. How do you view the prospect of regulation being controlled by the FSA and in
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what ways will this impact on your business?
19. What relationship does your credit union have with the local development
-
agency, and how has this changed over the years?
20. Recently, there has been an argument that development agencies, especially
those controlled by local authorities, have encouraged dependency not autonomy
of credit unions and have hijacked the movement in order to tackle poverty —
what is your view?
21. Another argument is that central government is using credit unions to fight
social exclusion, rather then treating them as financial business mainly operating
in the voluntary sector? (Has the government asked too much and is it expecting
too much)
22. What is your view of the New Model credit union being developed by Liverpool
John Moores and ABCUL?
23. How important is a Central Services Organisation to the future prospects of the
movement?
24. In becoming more professional, by employing staff, is there a danger that credit
unions will lose touch with the members, and how can this be avoided?
25. What is your view of ABCUL and the other national organisations? Do you
think that if there had been only one voice the movement would have grown
faster?
26. There is said to be two schools of thoughts in credit unions — idealists (small is
beautiful, serving the community in a mainly voluntary basis) and pragmatists
(operating as a business) — is this division accurate and where would you place
ourself
27. Finally, is a credit union a financial services business that happens to have an
alternative ownership structure or a membership organisation that specialises in
financial services?
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Appendix D: Surveys Methodology
This appendix presents further information regarding the questionnaires, including the
justification for the questionnaire design, coding framework, and copies of the
questionnaires issued.
Justification for building society questionnaire design
Ql. When approaching potential respondents the interviewer will initially ask if they
have an account with the branch in question. This should prevent the only other
alternative response of 'not having an account' being recorded. The question is simple,
specific and direct, hence its choice as number one.
Q2. Reliability — The alternative question was when did you join x building society?
Although this would have received a more accurate response, it was felt the effort
involved in physically checking the passbook would have deterred respondents from
completing the question.
Validity— The truthfulness of the responses may be open to doubt, as people will
probably provide approximation lengths of membership. However, relativity (i.e. short
or long term) not accuracy is the concept sought in this question.
Q3. — To secure knowledge on what mutuality actually is (a word likely to
cause confusion) it was decided to examine aspects of the concept.
Validity - All the correct answers are true — they are statements of fact. The questions
are independent of each other, hence the use of 'user' throughout the questionnaire.
Also, respondents may not perceive themselves as members but in contemporary
consumer society are more likely to see themselves as customers.
There are no false questions that can distort the results. Although it is possible that some
respondents may decide that one response must be false in an attempt to second-guess
the researcher. However, those that actually know the answers will get all three correct
and those that do not are more likely to speculate.
The validity of 3c is problematic, as members need to have an account for a minimum
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of two years before standing for election and also collect a number of nominees. This
impacts on the reliability of the answer as those that know these facts may be confused
_
or circle false. However, this is offset for the need of brevity and avoidance of
qualifying clauses.
Q4. In effect Q4 is the logical successor to Q3. Q3 examines general knowledge and Q4
attempts to elicit local behaviour.
Validity — The question is both direct and follows an explanatory sentence. It is
conceivable that pedants may argue that the question does not precisely specify the
elections, but again this must be secondary to directness.
Reliability — The only other logical response is what elections? However, 'don't know'
should suffice.
Q4a, Merely a follow-up question on Q4 and check on 'membership'/'customer'
identity
Q5. This question began as 'What is the difference between a bank and a building
society?' This was problematic, as it required the respondent to compare two variables,
one of which was open to misinterpretation. The question also permitted both
knowledge and opinion to be expressed. As stating their constitutional differences and
their treatment of the respondent were valid answers. In the new question the purpose is
to test knowledge. If respondents believe certain banks are building societies, this will
help confirm one of the core propositions of the research (people no longer know what
mutuality is).
Q6. Again a specific behavioural question follows a general knowledge one. Providing
the respondents don't conflate question 5 into 6 the answers provided should be reliable.
The question is valid because it will be used to establish whether there is any link
between attitudes and multiply account holders.
Q7. This question concludes the first section of the questionnaire, which concentrated
on knowledge and behavioural questions.
Validity — The intention is to use this data to measure the impact of technology usage
against attitudes.
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Reliability — As only 10% of households have Internet access, it is probable that the
number of responses to this question will be minimal. This low response rate is the
justification for the absence of a don't know answer. The other conaem is that the terms
on-line banking and carpetbagging may not be widely known and this may affect
results. However, the suspicion remains that most respondents will answer no to all
three questions, leaving only those with specialist knowledge, hence the calculated risk
with these phrases.
Q8.to Q10 Examine peoples attitudes to the maintenance of branches in an era of
increasing competitiveness and Internet banking.
Q8. Reliability - This question can be seen as problematic in two aspects. Firstly, the
usage of a word as subjective as 'convenient' and secondly, the list of options available
for answers. The former is justified because the question is about behaviour (i.e. does it
opening hours match peoples' life patterns) and is about individual preferences.
However, the answers offered may be too prescriptive and they will need to be piloted
before their final inclusion.
Validity — This question is designed to be cross-referenced against 9 and 10,in order to
compare what people's attitudes about the local branch and their reaction to any closure.
Equally important is the need to explore the rise of the 24-hour society and its supposed
impact on branches. If the opening hours are mainly inconvenient it may suggest that
societal changes rather than competition is driving change in the banking sector.
Q9. Reliability— The start with 'some people say' is drawn from Edgell and Duke's
work on Thatcherism. The use of this neutral terminology avoids the reader being drawn
to a particular answer. The answers offered also present the respondent with a wide
range of choices, including an open option.
Validity — This question will test respondents' attitude to branches within their
community and builds on Q8. If respondents state that there are too many and that the
opening hours of their local branch are inconvenient this would seem to indicate an over
supply of branches open inappropriate hours. This result would support the theory that
branches are becoming increasing obsolete.
Q10. Reliability— This is one of the potentially one of the less reliable questions in the
survey as it asks respondents to predict their future action. However, the inclusion of a
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'depends on' response is deliberately designed to allow respondents a qualified answer.
Validity — The question was included to test whether people probable actions match
-
their attitudes and crudely gauge the level of loyalty to the building society.
Q11 —13 test the respondent's knowledge and attitudes towards demutualisation. Their
structure is similar to the series of privatisation questions in Edgell and Duke's
Thatcherism research (these questions are also included Q19-Q22). By employing this
ordering it will be possible to compare attitudes between demutualisation and
privatisation in both this research and Edgell and Duke's.
Q11.Reliability —The only difficulty surrounds the word 'process' which may be too
academic for the audience. However, in lieu of a better phrase it has been included.
Providing the respondents understand the word the question is fairly robust.
Validity — This is a knowledge question and is asked before any behavioural or
attitudinal questions. This ordering helps ensure the validity of subsequent questions in
this section.
Q1 la is merely an ancillary of Q11 and as an open question raises no reliability issues,
although it does reinforce the validity of the previous question.
Q12. Reliability — it was decided to ask all respondents this question because some may
not know what demutualisation is but can recall having received shares. The other issue
occurs if they confuse a building society with one of the converting insurers. Asking the
respondents to name the companies they have received windfalls from should minimize
this issue.
Validity — This question is attempting to uncover the extent of windfalls and the
likelihood of carpetbagging. A high response rate may indicate support for the argument
that the activities of carpetbaggers temporarily reinforce a building society.
12a Reliability — A straightforward test of knowledge question. Space is also provided
for opinions giving respondents freedom to comment on the pejorative nature of the
word carpetbagging
Validity — Carpetbagging is strongly associated with demutualisations. The degree of
awareness will help assess the extent of the demutualisation debate and the success of
carpetbaggers at reaching ordinary members consciousness.
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Q13.Reliability — This Likart style question allows for a range of opinions and
-
providing the respondent knows what demutualisation is (Q11) there should be no
issues of reliability.
Validity — This attitudinal question is created to use attitude as a variable against other
questions. For example are those most in favour of demutualisation more likely to
support branch closure or have an Internet account. As the purpose of the research is to
ascertain why building societies are converting, it is vital this question is asked in some
form.
Q14 and Q15. As there will be two questionnaires (one for Regional BS and the other
for National BS) these questions will only be asked to the appropriate respondents, the
other will be deleted.
Q14 and 15. Reliability — Once again the Likart scale has been employed and the
questions commence with the refrain 'some say.' These are both attitudinal questions
and they permit a range of options and avoid unnecessary bias.
Validity — In attempting to discover whether building societies become too big to
remain mutuals (a functionalist argument) it was important to include a question on size.
With the Regional BS and National BS at opposite sides of the spectrum this afforded
the opportunity to pose two of key critiques of building societies. According to financial
analysts (Fliegeman and Maloney 1998) the existence of the Regional BS and other
small institutions is debatable in contemporary society. However, the reaction of the
public may be different and it would lend support to the argument that the needs of the
customer are becoming subsumed by those of the shareholder.
Q16 —18. offer a further opportunity to probe the attitudes of the respondents and are
probably the most difficult section in the questionnaire.
Q16 reliability — The style of the questions in non-prescriptive and the respondents are
offered sufficient answers from which to choose. All the statements are posed in
affirmative language and are not ambiguous or contradictory.
Validity — These questions are designed to test respondents' sense of priorities. For
example is it more important to maintain a branch network or remain competitive, or do
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the respondents have unrealisable expectations. Statement (d) is posed to uncover any
latent carpetbaggers or pro-conversion respondents.
-
Q17 for reliability see Q16.
Validity — These statements are some of the standard criticisms posted on the
carpetbaggers website. They are included to measure support for their arguments, not
the outcomes. Thus, it should be possible through a cross tabulation between 16d and
17b, to find respondents who support the democracy of building societies but not
demutualisation. This is an important distinction as a number of building society
personal doubt the existence of these people.
Q18 Reliability — The primary difficulty surrounds the usage of wishes — what wishes is
the obvious question. However, by including the word mixed in the range of answers
this should ensure an even spread of responses. Again, this question may need
amending following piloting.
Validity— This question should indicate levels of satisfaction with the building society
as opposed to opinions on specific issues. The outcome should be a variable, which can
be counter posed against the other attitudinal questions.
Q19 —22 reliability — As their structure is the same see Q11-13.
Validity — The questions on privatisation should reflect respondents' philosophical
beliefs. Specifically is there a correlation between people who are opposed to both
demutualisation and privatisation. These sets of questions will help frame arguments
around the impact of societal changes (especially Thatcherism) on building societies.
Q23 —25 Are control questions and create independent variables
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Justification for credit union members questionnaire
To maximise the comparison between the users of building societies and credit unions
the following questions have been retained from the building society member's
questionnaire:
1. Are you a saver, borrower or both with x credit union?
2. How long have you been a user of x credit union?
	
2a.	 Which of the following words best describes your use of x credit union?
3. Can you confirm whether the following statements are true or false?
a) The users of a credit union are its owners.
b) Users of credit unions are known as members
c) Users of a credit union can stand for election to the board of directors
	
11.	 Some say x credit union ignores the wishes of their users — what do you
think?
18. Have you heard of the phrase 'the demutualisation of building societies'?
18a. If YES can you name any building societies that have demutualised?
19. Have you ever received any shares or cash following the demutualisation of a
building society?
20. In general what is your attitude towards demutualisation?
21. Have you heard of the process of privatisation of nationalised industries?
21a. If YES can you name any nationalised industries that have been privatised?
22. Did you buy any shares in privatised industries?
23. In general what is your attitude towards privatisation?
24. How do you see your political allegiance?
25. Please state your gender
26. Please state your year of birth.
27. Please confirm your current or most recent occupation
The justification for these questions was previously stated in the paper on the building
society members' questionnaires.
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Q4. Reliability — This lists the most often quoted reasons for people joining a credit
union (drawn from previous research especially that by Berthoud and Hinton 1989). The
answers also allow room for other explanations.
Validity — the purpose of the question is to explore whether people join credit unions
out of collectivist and altruistic or individual and financial reasons.
Q5. Reliability — A credit union may host numerous member gatherings beyond the
AGM and for the purposes of this question these have been classified as social and other
meetings. Included in the other meetings are events such as training sessions, money
management clinics or question and answer forums. The difficulty with the question is
that respondents may not be able to separate the social from other meetings, especially
where there are joint formal and social events. However, it could be argued that this will
reinforce the proposition that members will show their support primarily through social
not formal gatherings.
Validity — In measuring levels of commitment and support of credit union, a range of
indicators should be used. Reliance on the attendance at an AGM may actually inform
us of peoples' attitudes towards formal meetings and not their view of the credit union.
Q6. Validity — This is an image question, asking respondents to state their perception of
the credit union. The question was drawn from Jones (1999) who asked credit union
directors their views on how the members saw their institutions. Hopefully this may
indicate the extent of a correlation between the perceptions of credit union leaders and
ordinary members.
Reliability — A potential problem is that the answers are referring to different concepts
and there is considerable opportunity for overlap. For example it is entirely possible to
be both professional and friendly, hence the option for respondents to select numerous
boxes. In Jones original question he included 'Very Professional' and 'Shabby' as
answers, these have been deleted in the interests of brevity. However, 'Other' has been
included to give the interviewee the opportunity to express their interpretation.
Q7.Validity — One of the major arguments around credit unions is that they help foster
better community relations, hence it is necessary to test whether this is reflected in
members attitudes.
Reliability — This question was originally used in Berthoud and Hinton (1989) when
they examined community credit unions and it retains its Likert style format. However,
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to make the question more appropriate for the employee based credit union
questionnaire the word 'community' will be replaced by 'fellow workers'.
Q8. Reliability — The danger with this question comes through the necessity of asking
people to confirm a negative proposition. The only solution is to emphasise the use of
'not' in the question.
Validity — During the semi-structured interview with Employee CU they emphasised the
importance of payroll deductions to their growth. The question was created to test this
argument and confirm the role of convenience in the success of employee-based credit
unions. The question will be excluded from the questionnaire for the community based
credit union.
Q9-10 are both included to help secure access to the members as the credit unions will
only agree to co-operate if the researcher can offer then something in return. Beyond
this 'political' justification the questions do have an intrinsic value to the research.
Q9 Validity — Addresses the potential demand for new services from among existing
members. This question may help resolve whether credit unions are to remain simple
saving and loans organisations or if they are to evolve into multi-faceted financial
service providers.
Reliability — This question began with 'if offered what services would you use?' but if it
had retained this format it is likely that it would have produced numerous 'it depends
how much' responses, hence the alteration to a less complex question. Respondents are
given the opportunity to select from the most popular services the directors of credit
unions would like to offer (Jones 1998) and are also provided with an additional space
to state their own preference.
Q10. Validity — While Q6 asks for respondents view on the image of the credit union,
this question concentrates on the levels of satisfaction with the service it provides. The
combination of these questions allows us to test whether members are happy to accept a
people orientated rather than professional service. A response of this nature may suggest
that increased professionalism may act as a deterrent to certain members.
Reliability — A standard Likert style question created to test the variable of satisfaction.
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Q12. Validity — knowledge based question included to discover how important saving
rates are to members.
OP
Reliability — By asking for the dividend rather than the amount received it is hoped this
will avoid respondents stating a cash figure. The other risk with the question is that it
does not ask what year it is referring to. If a year is included this may confuse the matter
as people receive the dividend in the year following its declaration. For example if a
credit union issues a dividend following the 1998/9 trading year, then strictly speaking
this is the dividend for 1998/9. However, the amount does not get distributed until the
AGM in 2000, so many people may believe the dividend was issued in 2000. Therefore,
as both credit unions in the survey paid dividends in spring 2000 it is hoped that most
respondents will consider this figure when answering the question.
Q13. Reliability-.
 This question originally asked 'do you think you now save more or
less then you would have done if you hadn't joined the credit union?' However, it was
open to misinterpretation, as respondents may have prioritised the latter clause and thus
inverted the question. In addition the question contained a negative statement that could
have compounded the complexity of the question, hence its replacement by a more
affirmative and simpler question.
Validity — (This also applies to Q15 and Q16). These arguments seek to address the
government's argument that credit unions can prove assistance in combating financial
exclusion and help encourage money management skills. The former point is tackled
directly in Q15 and to a lesser extent in Q13, which focuses on the issue of thrift (a
popular mantra in both Third Way and Communitarian discourse). However, Q16
contains two objectives. The first is to examine whether credit unions do help cultivate
better financial control. The second is to pose the alternative proposition, whether the
promotion of credit unions merely reinforces a culture of instant gratification
consumerism.
Q15 and Q16 (see above for validity). Reliability — Both are standard Likert style
questions with no obvious contradictions or ambiguities.
Q14. Validity — The other aspect to the promotion of credit unions is the spectre of mass
indebtedness to moneylenders. The question is designed to gauge the relevance of this
scenario. It also offers the prospect of an alternative image in which previous prudent
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people (those that avoid credit or borrow from kinship group) are drawn into the
formalised credit sector.
Relevance — There are a range of likely options, which are majoritorian and not
universal in nature. There is also a possible answer for those that have not borrowed
from a credit union. However, it is possible that respondents may wish to tick more than
one box or base their answer either on their last experience (it is hoped that the usage of
mainly and usually should minimise this risk) or the amount borrowed. This may result
preponderance of respondents selecting formal lending based on the scale not the
frequency of the loans received. The only secure way to account for this outcome would
be to introduce a series of personal monetary based questions. As the key objective of
the questionnaire is to maximise responses it was felt that personal financial questions
should be omitted from the questionnaire. Thus it was decided to include the question,
without any supplementary inquiries.
Q17. Validity — Another argument for credit unions is that they are a possible
replacement for banks for those that are excluded from holding accounts. The question
will examine the extent of this phenomenon.
Reliability — A straightforward dichotomous question.
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Questionnaire Coding
The following lists contain details of the coding frameworks employed in the SPSS
analysis of the questionnaires. The four questionnaires used were designed to enable
the same SPSS coding frame to be employed, thus ensuring data could be compared.
To distinguish between them a filed was created to identify which mutual the
respondent was a member of.
Control	 (1) Employee CU; (2) Regional BS; (3) National BS; (4) Community CU
All the questions were coded as per the numbers adjacent to the tick boxes on the
questionnaires; therefore the following are the list of codes not displayed on the
questionnaire
Coding of Building Society Member Questionnaire
Most questions were closed ended, requiring respondents to only tick a single box and
were created giving each response a value within SPSS. With regard to closed-ended
questions were multiple responses were permitted, each answer was given a separate
field. For the open-ended questions the answers were first examined and a coding
frame was subsequently developed.
Q2	 (0) No response; (1) Under a year; (2) 1-3 years; (3) 3-5 years; (4) 5-10 years;
(5) 10-20 years; (6) 20 plus years
Q3a-c (0) No response; (1) True; (2) False; (9) Don't know
Q5	 (0) No response; (1) Nationwide; (2) Britannia; (3) Bradford and Bingley; (4)
Other building society; (5) Halifax; (6) Abbey National; (7) Other mortgage
bank; (8) Couldn't name any (10) Didn't think they were any left; (11) Abbey
National & Halifax; (12) AN/Halifax plus other mortgage banks
Q6 (0) No response; (1) With another building society; (2) With two other building
societies; (3) With a bank and a building society; (4) With a bank and 2 or more
building societies; (5) With 2 or more banks and a building society; (10) With a
bank
Q7a-b (0) No response; (1) Yes; (2) No; (9) Don't know
Q11 a & 12 (Yes)	 As respondents could name more then one society each was given
a separate field
Q15-16	 (0) No response (1) Should; (2) Should Not; (3) Don't Know
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Q1 8a As respondents could name more then one society each was given a separate
field. However, responses included water; gas; electric; British
Telecommunications; British Rail; Steel/coalfields; other. -
Q21	 Political allegiances stating included (5) Floating; (6) None of them; (7) Other
Q22 (1) Woman; (2) Man
Q23 For coding this was translated into age categories (0) No response; (1) 18-30; (2)
31-50; (3) 51-65; (4) 65 plus
Q24 (0) No response; (1) Professional; (2) Technical; (3) Skilled non-manual; (4)
Skilled manual; (5) Semi-skilled; (6) Unskilled; (7) Unemployed; (8) Pensioner;
(9) Home manager
Coding of Credit Union Member Questionnaire
Q2, 3, As per building society questionnaire
Q5	 (0) No response (1) Yes; (2) No; (3) Don't Know
Q6	 As respondents could name more then one reason each was given a separate
field
Q8 (Employee CU questionnaire) Q9 (Community CU) As respondents could name
more
then one service each was given a separate field
Q12 (0) No response; (1) up to 1%; (2) 2%; (3) 3%; (4) 4%; (5) 5%; (6) Above 5%;
(6) Depends on surplus; (9) Don't know
Q13 As respondents could provide more then one answer each was given a separate
field
Q17 As per Q6 on building society members' survey
Q18a As per Q5 on building society members' survey
Q21a As per Q18a on building society members' survey
Q24 As per Q21 on building society members' survey
Q25 As per Q22 on building society members' survey
Q26 As per Q23 on building society members' survey
Q27 As per Q24 on building society members' survey
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Questionnaire of building society members opinions
_
As you may be aware in recent years there has been a debate concerning the future of building
societies. This questionnaire is an important part of a research project af SALFORD
UNIVERSITY investigating the role of these organisations in contemporary society.
All information disclosed will be treated in strict confidence. Under NO circumstances will the
questionnaires be passed to any other organisation or placed on a mailing list. The anonymity
of respondents will be respected and guaranteed.
We would greatly appreciate it if you could complete the questionnaire as accurately as
possible and return it, using the stamp addressed envelope provided, by the ...............
Please tick one box unless other instructions are given.
1.	 Are you a saver, borrower or both with National building society?
Saver	 i 3
Borrower	 2 7
Saver and Borrower	 3 3
2.	 How long have you been a user at National building society/ 	
2a.VVhich of the following words best describes your use of National building society?
Customer	 1 0
Member	 2 ,i
Other (please state) 	 3 -
3.	 Can you confirm whether the following statements are true or false (Please circle
one)
a) The users of a building society are its owners. 	 TRUEJFALSEJDON'T KNOW
b) Users of building societies are known as members TRUE1FALSE/DON'T KNOW
C) Users of a building society can stand for election to the board of directors
TRUE/FALSE/DON'T KNOW
4.	 Every year the directors of National building society have to stand for election.
Did you manage to vote in the 1999 elections?
Yes	 I D
No	 2U
Don't Know/Can't remember? 	 3C
4a.	 If YES who did you vote for? 	





1. 	 1. 	
2. 	  2. 	
3. 	 3. 	
8.	 Do you have an account with any other bank or building society?





T.Have you ever used the interne for any of the following activities:_(circle as appropriate)
a). On-line banking	 YES/NO	
-(if yes please name the organisation) 	 -
b). Financial information	 YES/NO
(if yes please name the organisation) 	




Most of the time	 20
Mixed	 30
Not all the time	 40
No	 SC
9. Some people say there are too many building society and bank branches in [Your
community] town centre — what do you think?







Other (please state) 
	
 40
10. Would you move your savings and/or mortgage to another bank or building





Depends (please state )
	 	  4U
11. Have you heard of the phrase the demutualisation of building societies'?
Yes	 10
No	 20
Don't know/Can't remember 	 30
11a. If YES can you name any building societies that have demutualised?
12. Have you ever received any shares or cash following the demutualisation of a
building society?
Yes (if YES which one(s)) 	  1 0
No	 20
Don't know	 30




If YES, what do you understand it to mean?
13. In general what is your attitude towards demutualisation? - .
Strongly approve	 .	 10





14. Some say the National Building Society has become too large to care about
individual customers — what do you think?
Mainly True	 10
Sometimes True	 20





15	 Do you think the National building society should or should not do each of the
following? (Please circle as appropriate)
a) Close little used branches 	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
b) Offer better savings rates	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
c) Offer cheaper mortgage rates	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
d) Become a bank	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
e) Give users more say in the running of the building society
SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
16.	 Do you think the directors of National building society should or should not:
a) be answerable to the users?	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
b) allow users to vote on whether to become a bank?
SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
C) expel users who want change the building society to a bank?
SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW











Don't know/Can't remember	 3U
-
18a. If YES can you name any nationalised industries that have been privatised?
_





20. In general what is your attitude towards privatisation?
Strongly approve	 10




Don't know	 a 0
21. How do you see your political allegiance?
Conservative	 10
Labour	 20
Liberal Democrat	 3 0
Other (please state) 	 40
22. Please state your gender (circle as appropriate) 	 MAN/WOMAN
23. Please state your year of birth 	
24. Please confirm your current or most recent occupation.
Thank you for participating in this research and if you have any additional comments please
state them
below 	
If would like further information or are willing to be interviewed in-depth could you please state
your name and address below
THANK YOU FOR YOUR 'TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
Karl Dayson
Institute of Social Research
University of Safford
M5 4WT
Tel: 0161 295 4778.
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-Questionnaire of building society members opinions
As you may be aware in recent years there has been a debate concerning the future of building
societies. This questionnaire is an important part of a research project at SALFORD
UNIVERS/TY investigating the role of these organisations in contemporary society.
All information disclosed will be treated in strict confidence. Under NO circilmstances will the
questionnaires be passed to any other organisation or placed on a mailing list. The anonymity
of respondents will be respected and guaranteed.
We would greatly appreciate it if you could complete the questionnaire as accurately as
possible and return it, using the stamp addressed envelope provided, by the 	
Please tick one box unless other instructions are given.
1.	 Are you a saver, borrower or both with Regional building society?
Saver	 $16
Borrower	 2 n
Saver and Borrower	 3 0
2.	 How long have you been a user at Regional building society? 	
2a.1Nhich of the following words best describes your use of Regional building society?
Customer	 10
Member	 2
Other (please state) 	 . 3 0
3.	 Can you confirm whether the following statements are true or false (Please circle
one)
a) The users of a building society are its owners.	 TRUE/FALSEJDON'T KNOW
b) Users of building societies are known as members TRUE/FALSE/DON'T KNOW




	 Every year the directors of Regional building society have to stand for election.
Did you manage to vote in the 1999 elections?
Yes	 10
No	 2U
Don't Know/Can't remember? 	 30
4a.	 If YES who did you vote for? 	





1. 	 	1. 	
2. 	  2. 	
3. 	  3. 	
6.	 Do you have an account with any other bank or building society?







7.Have you ever used the Internet for any of the following activities:_(circle as appropriate)
a). On-line banking	 YES/NO	 --
Of yes please name the organisation) 	
b). Financial information	 YES/NO
(if yes please name the organisation) 	
8. Are the opening hours of your local branch of Regional convenient for you?
Yes	 10
Most of the time	 20
Mixed	 30
Not all the time	 40
No	 50
9. Some people say there are too many building society and bank branches in [Your




Other (please state) 	
	  40
10. Would you move your savings and/or mortgage to another bank or building





Depends (please state )
	  4U
11. Have you heard of the phrase `the demutualisation of building societies'?
Yes	 10
No	 2 0
Don't know/Can't remember 	 30
11a. If YES can you name any building societies that have demutualised?
12. Have you ever received any shares or cash following the demutuallsation of a
building society?
Yes (if YES which one(s)) 	  10
No ,	 20
Dont know	 30






If YES, what do you understand it to mean?
13. In general what is your attitude towards demutualisation?
Strongly approve	 10





14. Some say the Regional Building Society is too small to survive in today's
economy — what do you think?
Strongly agree	 10
Agree	 20
Neither agree nor disagree 	 30
Disagree	 40
Strongly disagree	 E.
15	 Do you think the Regional building society should or should not do each of the
following? (Please circie as appropriate)
a) Close little used branches	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
b) Offer better savings rates	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
C) Offer cheaper mortgage rates	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
d) Become a bank	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
e) Give users more say in the running of the building society
SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
16.	 Do you think the directors of Regional building society should or should not:
a) be answerable to the users? 	 SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
b) allow users to vote on whether to become a bank?
SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW
c) expel users who want change the building society to a bank?
SHOULD/SHOULD NOT/DON'T KNOW







18.	 Have you heard of the phrase the privatisation of nationalised industries'?
YES
NO
Don't knowlCan't remember	 311
-
18a. If YES can you name any nationalised industries that have been privatised?
_
-





20. In general what is your attitude towards privatisation?
Strongly approve	 10




Don't know	 5 0
21. How do you see your political allegiance?
Conservative	 1 0
Labour	 20
Liberal Democrat	 3 0
Other (please state) 	 40
22. Please state your gender (circle as appropriate) 	 MAN/WOMAN
23. Please state your year of birth 	
24. Please confirm your current or most recent occupation.
Thank you for participating in this research and if you have any additional comments please
state them
below 	
If would like further information or are willing to be interviewed in-depth could you please state
your name and address below
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
Karl Dayson
Institute of Social Research
University of Salford
M5 4WT
Tel: 0181 295 4778.
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Questionnaire of credit union users opinions -
As you may be aware in recent years there has been a debate concerning the future of credit
unions. This questionnaire is an important part of a research project at SALFORD UNIVERSITY
investigating the role of these organisations in contemporary society. -
All information disclosed will be treated in strict confidence. Under NO circumstances will the
questionnaires be passed to any other organisation or placed on a mailing list. The anonymity
of respondents will be respected and guaranteed.
We would greatly appreciate it if you could complete the questionnaire as accurately as
possible and return it, using the stamp addressed envelope provided, by the 	
Please tick one box unless other instructions are given.
1. Are you a saver, borrower or both with x credit union?
Saver	 10
Borrower	 20
Saver and Borrower	 30
2. How long have you been a user of x credit union? 	
2a.Which of the following words best describes your use of x credit union?
Customer	 10
Member	 26
Other (please state)	 3D
3.Can you confirm whether the following statements are true or false (Please circle one)
a) The users of a credit union are its owners. 	 TRUE/FALSE/DON'T KNOW
b) Users of credit unions are known as members TRUE/FALSE/DON'T KNOW
C) Users of a credit union can stand for election to the board of directors
TRUE/FALSEIDON'T KNOW
4.	 Which of these reasons comes closest to explaining why you joined?
Because you thought it would be helpful to you personally	 1 U
Because you thought it would be helpful to other people 	 20
Because you thought having a credit union would bring people together 	 3D
Because somebody asked you to do so	 40
Other (please state) 	 	 50
5. Have you ever attended the following events organised by x credit union? (please
circle as appropriate)
a). Annual general Meeting 	 YES NO Don't KnowlCan't Remember
b). Social events YES	 NO Don't Know/Can't Remember
c). Other meetings YES NO Don't Know/Can't Remember






Communitylpeople orientated 	 3
Poor	 40
Amateurish	 5
Other (please state) 	 	 s 0
334
7. Does being in the credit union give you a greater sense of beltsnging to your
community / fellow workers?
Yes, definitely	 LT.
Yes, maybe	 20
Don't Know/ Not Sure
	 30
No, not really	 40
No, definitely not	 so
8. Would you remain in the credit union if your contributions were NOT deducted from




Don't know / Not sure	 30
No, not really	 4U
No, definitely not	 50
9. What additional services would you like to see x credit union offer? (tick one or more
boxes)
Different opening hours (state which times) 1 0
More collection points 22
Internet banking 30
Cash point machines 4U
Credit Cards
Cheque books s
Money management advice 70
Other services (please state) 	  0
10. How satisfied are you with the service you receive from x credit union?
Very satisfied ir;
Fairly satisfied 20
Neither satisfied or dissatisfied 30
Rather dissatisfied 40
Very dissatisfied 50






12.What dividend do people earn on their savings with the x credit union/ 	
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13. Has being in the credit union easier or more difficult to save money?
Much easier	 10
_A little easier	 20






14. Before joining the credit union where did you get credit from?
Mainly borrowed the money from a friend or relative 	 10
Mainly borrowed the money from a bank or building society	 2 0
Mainly borrowed from a moneylender or pawnbroker 	 30
Usually brought goods on credit from a shop 	 40
Mainly saved up before buying things or gone without 	 5 0
Other (please state)	 s u
Never borrowed from the credit union 	 70
15.Would you use credit more or less if you were NOT a member of x credit union?
Much more	 1 0
A bit more	 20
About the same	 3U
Less	 4 n
A lot less	 SO
16. Has being in the credit union made it easier or more difficult for you to manage your
money?
Much easier	 1 :
A little easier	 20
Neither easier or harder	 30
More difficult 	 ( fl
A lot harder	 50
17. Do you have an account with any banks or building societies?
YES (Please state which one(s)) 	  10
NO	 20
18. Have you heard of the phrase the demutualisation of building societies'?
Yes	 10
No	 20
Don't know/Can't remember 	 30
18a. If YES can you name any building societies that have demutuallsed?
19. , Have you ever received any shares or cash following the demutualisation of a
building society?





W.	 In general what is your attitude towards demutualisatIon?
Strongly approve	 10










21a. If YES can you name any nationalised industries that have been privatised?




23. In general what is your attitude towards privatisation?
Strongly approve	 10





24.How do you see your political allegiance?
Conservative	 in
Labour	 20
Liberal Democrat 	 30
Other (please state) 	 	 40
25. Please state your gender (circle as appropriate) 	 MAN/WOMAN
26. Please state your year of birth 	
27. Please confirm your current or most recent occupation 	
Thank you for participating in this research and if you have any additional comments please
state them below-
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
Karl Dayson, Institute of Social Research, University of Salford, M5 4WT.Tel: 0161 295 4778.
Appendix E: Cyber-ethnography
The following nine pages contain examples of the websites and bulletin board
information used during the research:
I. In its original format the Carpetbagger.com bulletin boards were purely lists of
messages. Surfers searched through the titles and clicked on a topic of interest.
2. Once clicked on the message appeared in a memo form. From here the surfer
has the opportunity to respond and thus continue the 'thread'.
3. Following the arrival of themoneybag.com , the carpetbagger.com website was
upgraded, making it possible to read all correspondence on a thread.
4. The bulletin board forum lists on themoneybag.com  shows increasing interest
general financial information. Note the activity on the 'UK Internet Shares and
MO topics' forum was only a third below interest in 'Building Society topical
issues'. Also the 'Portman Members — Action Group' is the first example of
restricted access bulletin boards, which I was unable to access.
5. From its inception themoneybag.net bulletin board used software that was later
adopted by Carpetbagger.com . Apart from the ability to read all relevant
messages on one sheet, contributors could also use emoticons and send emails
directly to other participants. Additionally the contributors date of registration
and the number of posts made, updated once a day, were listed. Through this a
meritocratic hierarchy could emerge based on the length of participation and the
number of posts.
6. Carpetbaggers demonstrated the computer literacy by engaging in spoof
websites, such as this `Porkman' home page.
7. These sites were an effective and humorous way to communicate with the
public. Note that the site is registered in the USA and therefore beyond UK libel
jurisprudence.
8. In comparison with capertbagger.com SOBS used their website to project their
message to the media and the bulletin board was only of marginal utility.
9. SOBS bulletin board clearly showed the technology divide between themselves
and the carpetbaggers.
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Caspetbaggers Tales TOC	 hapyiwww.c.arpecbaggencomicbtales I
With-profits - more like with ripoffs Dilbert 14 Aug 1999 171.215.57.96
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs Carpet Realist 14 Aug 1999 195.92.197.38
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs Ozzie 15 Aug 1999-203.56.239.111
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs Ord 14 Aug 1999 195.99.56.187
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs The Ferryman 14,41.1g 1999
195.99.53.99
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs Hawkeye 14 Aug 1999
194.168.238.194
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs The Ferryman 15 Aug 1999
195.99.49.32
Re: With-profits - more like with ripoffs Hay Week 15 Aug
1999 194.168.69.234
Scottish Widows Regular Savings Plan MM 14 Aug 1999 194.168.252.150
Article 295 14 Aug 1999 194.168.252.150
RE: Scottish Widdows Regular Savings Plan Realistic 14 Aug 1999 195.44.7.28
Wonderful news Ord 14 Aug 1999 195.171.251.111
Scottish Widows Regular Savings Plan MM 13 Aug 1999 212250.37.46
Re: Scottish Widows Regular Savings Plan Wobbegong 13 Aug 1999
195.166.139.132
scottish widows—regular savings plan Doctorbagger 12 Aug 1999 212.1.136.135
Re: scottish widows—regular savings clan Ord 13 Aug 1999 195.171.249.48
Re: Ord What do you mean not full wo as this was the recommended product
from Chartwell ? Mr C 13 Aug 1999 195.44.201.129
Re: Ord - should one therefore go for full wp all the time and not
unitised ?. Mr C 13 Aug 1999 195.44.18.91
Full with profits where possible & affordable Ord 13 Aug 1999
62.172.58.141
Re: Ord What do You mean not full wp as this was the recommen... Ord
13 Aug 1999 212.140.97.35
Re: Ord What do you mean not full wp as this was the recommen... 
The Phantom Bag 13 Aug 1999 130.238.33.100
Re: Ord What do you mean not full wp as this was the recommen... 
Norfolk'nChance 13 Aug 1999 195.44.200.52
Get a good Financial Adviser if you are buy WP policies GeorgeS
19 Aug 1999 198.240.212.30
Scottish W - Date release? Moose 12 Aug 1999 194.168.18.89
Chartwell carpet carole 11 Aug 1999 195.92.194.76
Re: Chartwell Dilbert 12 Aug 1999 193.133.190.50
B&B CENSURED FOR 'MISLEADING' ADS Peter 11 Aug 1999 212.140.84.120
Scotish Widows "Shareholders" The Maximiser 10 Aug 1999 194.83.240.32
Re: Scotish Widows "Shareholders" Perplex 10 Aug 1999 193.122.240.33
Re: Scotish Widows "Shareholders" The Maximiser 13 Aug 1999
194.83.240.23
Re: Scotish Widows "Shareholders" Ord 13 Aug 1999 62172.92.84
Re: Scotish Widows "Shareholders" Hawkeye 10 Aug 1999 194.168.56.177
Re: Scotish Widows "Shareholders" Perplex 12 Aug 1999
193.122.240.33
Re: Scotish Widows "Shareholders" The Phantom Bag 12 Aug
1999 130.238.33.100
18 of
	 9/23/99 9:56 AM
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Re: To Oanbcrt Notracon
	 bop/www.carpetbagger.comicbtales4a/ _disc98/000001a0.ium
Mutuality vs Conversion
[ FAQ f Contents I Post I Reply I Next I Previous I
	 Index I Home I Disclaimer j
Be: To Danbert Nobacon
From: Harry Hall




We are trying to maintain the moral high ground with regard to to the porkmen and fellow fat cats
who don't believe in dissenting views being heard. Therfore the banning/censorship of an individual
who views were slightly at variance with those of Pilot / Dilbert was therefore most hypocritical and
damaging (rudely's posts were mild and totally inoffensive) An importnat principle was at stake and
thankfully this right to free expression of inoffensive views prevailed.
I didn't try to pull rank with you. You questioned my contribution to this site so I had to mention this
in response. But this is an understandable mistake given that I have changed my handle. I woudn't
use the term "half-wit" to describe my actions against dilbert. I was rightly offended by his
actions/posts. This post by a dyslexic says it all:
http ://www.carcetbaqqer.com/cbtales8/ disc98/00000130.htm























rb 	 1I5 Nesjim
I	 One chino dear :o me
...wd4...........-r.-7-f s
r7.2..:0ft ! 212L5121. ' ; refer.., n cel :-i_la igacz
l exc 'ev7esr ":7,01c : ^ext ;iciest -:.:cig
Topic: One thing's dear to me









2 costed 03-C6-2000 21:34 1J3	 E..
-	 •	 -	 -	 -
Is that some of the members here are unpleasant, vindictive, ungrateful,
lazy, paranoid, greedy and offensive_
Are these typical of baggers in general?
As a newcomer to bagging I am not sure L want to stay around with this
sort of person..
Probably the same sort of scum that made threatening calls to Bob Goodall.
4 osred 03-C6-7.000 21:51 j2	 21.0
Cheerio.
Sorry, but you reailv asked 'or :her.
2; posted 03-06-2C00 21:52 LZ.5.1
- -
Dead right - and ten times that lumber are charitable, intelligent, attruistc,
witty, helpful and talented.
If you do dedde to l eave us aster such a short evaluation period - don't
send a card.
Mel - probably the same sort of scum that was repeatedly threatened by
Sob Goodall's partner.
[This message has been edited by Mel (edited 03-06-2000).j
zostea 33-36-:COC 2:3:::0 ..;21 V 2+
Mel - Soot on with the comment in your first sentence.
Carcetbagger - ?lease correct me if I am mistaken, but are you referring to
some of the oasts that were made 'ate 'ast higntlearly this morning
concerning ?flat from The Moneyeag? If you are :hen I agree with vou
entirely. They were some of the most unpleasant attacks on 3 fellow oagger
that : have seen in the iast LS months. Com paring someone 'Cu oareiv
know with Hitler is riot runny even when accompanied with 3 smilie 'ace.
I'm not surprised that the comments in question seem to nave been
removed pretty quickly. :n addition, some of the comments elsewnere




Building	 ociety topical issues	 sa 353 13-04-2000 16:17 Smiler, Pilot
Building Society futures / tips	 j86 446 ; 03-04-2000 16:34 Smiler, Pilot
Portman (& Skipton/Chelsea)	 45 193 103704-2000 15:04 • Ord, Pilot
Issues
Stockmarket based investments
UK Internet Shares & IPO topics !44 264 I 02-04-2000 20:46	 Smiler, Sykes




All Other Shares (UK St Foreign)
	 17 59 I 29-03-2000 23:41 Sykes
Mutual Insurers and other mutuals
Life Co. (St Others) topical 	 30 131 02-04-2000 23:08 Pilot
issues








Independent Financial Advisor	 48
O&As
Web Site feedback, ideas &	 57 255 03-04-2000 10:06 Webmaster, Smiler
news
Mutual Building Societies (carpetbagging
Portman Members - Action	
-60
Group 
268 103-04-2000 14:39 Ord
The Money Bag The Money Bag Discussionsgrofile recnster nr.fPr=nc-s f2ci I searcil 
Click Here To View Toclav's Active Topics (all oublic forums)
= Registered Members: 7a6
All orries are 35T
Contact is The Money Bag Home Page
oft
	 1(100 1:09 PM
3.42
"%El U136Fnenci: Email his Pace ':C1 Someone' 
This topic ;s 2 pages ;ong: 1 2
./
next -iewest:oolc next oldest-odic
Happy Bagger
Member






finalise bids for Chelsea f3uildung Sue -1hc %,Ione% Bag Discussions
The Money Bag
a Topic Closed
intp:..xn v.w.themunes nag. -um,	 ,ruin I it i '.IL
711 e MOnev Bag Discussions
l-C* Building Society tooical ssues 
I Fe, Totaluse aids for Chelsea Building Soc I Page 21
Post No Topic -- -Thread Closed'. 
=ale I recister I preferences fag / aear_cn 







)0 posted 1.5-04-zaoci 00:20 L.42
- .
.	 .	 .	 _
I've:just come in' from the pub. orilj4ha-. cf. .:1-...?-v.ii 4i.reifiirip'-'
-
,,,_. ,,,,	 .,_	 ..,.	 _	 ..	 ..
!hailucirrating...rm- sure. r11 wake up. tomorro—w.—ati`i:Fwan
	la2Perteci
E".'"t • .. . ' - 
:Must, buy this beer again !' •" .'-- - . • ' - ...' ..	 , -	 ....: ..	 -- - . ..,,,,..:-.41,_.:,-•••:-E- - :,•42.-,-.1 ........,14--;-'.,,,. r.--..t...:77.-:' •
.--	 -*-::-: ..: 	 ,- - -7: ...--,----,- .: - --%,-4-,445-'-f.,•-,., .,f-.. ,-,T=-M*0.41--iii-f:.=-.1'26-17,--
,	 7.t...-:::- • -• `'.:•::-.:J: -•.' :::'. -:—.A.' *-.--'.---.P-t.:rf-!!:-27,77-7..44%,-*::-17?&Z.•
iDirtr Bagger, hict The. original" and best! (Iklotthe,!rnevg.rtrember  posting'
underthe "D.B..' handle. I thought impersonátioniViity.
 hapPeried-are.'f.t."_::..:7.:'..-
.	 _ .
.S.-",•-":4--...i. "-,-1-.7..:r. ..,:--- ,..-:_•,' •	 ::..:...:. - : '._ . _
l	 •	 - .,:' •-;--,.:',:	 • ,• ...---,'!. ' 	 •-•:*.z.c::1
carpetbagger.com!
.0 0. 65 @
•
-	 -







I usually accessed using .../new/tales.htm route, but now all the links from











. •7-7 '' •
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BTW, Richard, I hope you took the proceeds in cash! Dat.com
 shares not
doing too well at the moment!
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Poikman Building Society regretfully announces that in view of an increase in
speculative account opening we have been forced to take the following action:
No savings accounts will be opened for 3ew customers
We apologise for any inconvenience this may cause.
Mutuality doesnt matter
Porkman. established for over 150 years as a nuditional buildin g society, is a top 5 UK
building society servin g the high needs of our directors. 1.5 million members and
employing 1.400 staff.
We are committed to continue as a traditional building society so that we can offer our
directors very hi gh remuneration packages without any pressures.
Pothm. an believes :hat remaining Indeber.dent is in the best interest of our directors as
remaining
 mutual allows them to have :rood salary pacicages without the need for any
interference from our members. we are committed to dismissing any resolutions that
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This campaign has been established to help champion the case for a mutual sector of
financial institutions offering mortgage lending and investment saving options 'within
the UK financial marketplace. Building societies date back to 1775. Small groups of
people joined together to provide mutual financial support allowing members to
become housed. That tradition is now in jeopardy.
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SAVE 
OCR BUTT  DING So= FIESsobs sob s	 sobs sobs
The Save Our Building Societies Campaign (LX)
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Dick, my lad, your effusions make my points for me. but here are
some responses anyway. (1) It was 'stupid socialist Conservatives
who introduced the 40% tax. (2) If you're not rich. why do you
keep on bragging that you are (private school. private medicine.
etc. etc.)? (3) You know nothing about me or my income or the
taxes I pay. so don't embarrass yourself by sayin g such sad things
as 'I pay into the system while you take out'. Oh dear. it really
is sad to think that building societies are at :he mercy of people
like you, Ordure. and Hong Kong?
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